Nicaragua
Who is Going to Say Uncle? The Terms of the Conflict Become Clearer
Envío team
On February 6, in his State of the Union Address, President Reagan initiated his administration’s recent series of verbal attacks on Nicaragua. This unprecedented rhetoric led him to declare publicly that his objective is to “remove the present structure of the Sandinista government.” However, while Reagan is attempting to impose a domestic consensus concerning his policy of war in Central America, Nicaragua, in a highly eventful month, is continuing its search for peace. Simultaneously, Nicaragua is:
- maintaining the military offensive against the contras;
- orienting the entire economy towards defense;
- initiating dialogue to rebuild national unity;
- initiating an offensive to revitalize the Contadora peace process;
- extending its alignment with Latin America.
In the face of Nicaragua’s various initiatives this month, certain sectors of the country’s domestic opposition openly united with the armed counterrevolution, jointly calling for national dialogue.
Reagan steps up the rhetoric“We cannot play innocents abroad in a world that is not innocent. Nor can we be passive when freedom is under siege. Without resources, diplomacy cannot succeed; our security assistance programs help friendly governments defend themselves and give them confidence to work for peace. Congress should understand that, dollar for dollar, security assistance contributes as much to global security as our own defense budget.
“We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.
“The Sandinista dictatorship of Nicaragua, with full Cuban Soviet-bloc support, not only persecutes its people and the Church, and denies a free press, but arms and provides bases for communist terrorists attacking neighboring states. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense and totally consistent with the OAS and UN charters. It is essential that the Congress continue all facets of our assistance to Central America. I want to work with you to support the democratic forces whose struggle is tied to our own security.”
- Excerpt from Ronald Reagan’s State of the Unions Address on February 6, 1985.
To this unusual reference to a specific country in a speech of such importance, Reagan added a deluge of insults against the Nicaraguan government, while heaping praise on the counterrevolutionaries. Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, Vice President George Bush, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, UN Ambassador Vernon Walters, US Special Envoy for Central America Harry Shlaudeman, and other administration spokespeople all made important statements regarding Nicaragua over the past month. In order to avoid the presentation of an excessively long list, we will only make mention of the most significant statements by Reagan and Shultz.
On February 16, in his weekly radio broadcast, Reagan said that the counterrevolutionaries were “brothers” of the US citizens dedicated to the struggle for freedom. He compared the contras’ activities to those of Simón Bolívar and likened the administration’s covert aid to Lafayette’s support for the thirteen colonies during the war for independence from Britain.
On February 19, while testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Shultz said that the people of Nicaragua have fallen “behind the iron curtain” and that the US has a “moral duty” to help contras to keep Nicaragua’s Soviet-dominated government from becoming permanent.
On February 21, Reagan declared at a press conference that the US had an “obligation” to aid the contras and that in doing so he hoped to “remove it [the Sandinista government] in the sense of its present structure, in which it is a communist totalitarian state and it is not a government chosen by the people.” The actual “overthrow” of the present Nicaraguan government, he said, would not be necessary if it would only “turn around” and “say uncle,” inviting the counterrevolutionary forces into the government.
On February 22, speaking in San Francisco, Shultz indicated that he was indifferent to precisely “how” the “present structure of the Nicaraguan government” was removed. He mentioned that this might result from unilateral initiatives on the part of the FSLN, from agreements with other countries, or from “the collapse of the Sandinista regime.” Shultz alluded threateningly to the possibility of direct intervention, which might take place if the Sandinistas were not pressured into changing and if Congress failed to certify the additional $14 million in aid to the contras. He said that if the aid were denied, Nicaragua would fall into “the endless darkness of Communist tyranny.” “If we do not take the appropriate steps now,” he added, “then we may find later that we can no longer avoid acting, that the stakes will be higher and the costs greater.”
On March 1, in his speech to the 12th annual Conservative Political Action Conference, Reagan claimed that the contras are “the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French Resistance,” adding that “the struggle here is not right versus left but right versus wrong.”
The last month was thus full of aggressive and provocative statements. Never before has the rhetoric been so intense, and never has the United States appeared so openly committed to the internationally discredited armed counterrevolutionaries.
In search of domestic consensusGiven that, for the time being, Reagan has opted for a low-intensity war of attrition, one might wonder what would move the administration to use rhetoric so seemingly disproportionate to its actual “military needs” in Nicaragua. Why heighten the level of controversy over $14 million when the war of attrition can continue, as it has for months, with support from numerous other sources? Why has there been such a proliferation of threats? The abundance of statements has produced, in turn, a fair number of hypotheses.
The international cost is high for such aggressive and excessive judgments. Reagan’s acceptance of this cost would seem to indicate that he is determined to resolve the domestic conflicts surrounding Central American Policy.
Following Reagan’s electoral campaign and victory, the administration once again hoped to secure the bipartisan support for its Central American policy that the Kissinger Commission had failed to produce. The first phase of this search for domestic consensus was completed last month. Reagan sought to bring the rest of the administration line in a way that would close off the options for the talks in Manzanillo and the legal proceedings in The Hague. The maneuvers were directed at high-level officials who had previously argued for combining such diplomatic channels with support for military pressure, in an attempt to portray the military solution as the only plausible one.
Following the first phase of forging unity within the executive branch, Reagan sought unity with the legislature and also appealed to public opinion. This second phase will last until the vote in Congress on renewed “covert aid.” According to Richard Lugar, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nicaragua has divided the two branches like no other issue since Vietnam.
In essence, Reagan has made Nicaragua into a sort of supreme test case for his foreign policy and has used it to evaluate the unity and loyalty of the Congress and Senate. Yet in Nicaragua, far from the infighting produced by an “imperial presidency” or a “strong executive,” regardless of the final vote on the $14 million, the aggression will continue. Moreover, it will be buttressed by the US military maneuvers in Honduras and the growing militarization of Costa Rica, financed through other channels, and complemented by economic pressure.
Since February, however, Nicaragua has launched a full-scale diplomatic offensive, one component of which is a call for diplomatic and political solidarity aimed at pressuring Congress into refusing further aid for the counterrevolutionaries. The lack of consensus in the US government favors peace in Nicaragua. The international campaign to pressure Congress is gaining force. Miguel D’Escoto, Nicaragua’s Foreign Minister, recently stated that, while present signs of aggression are strong, one cannot ignore indications that the strength of truth and objective reality is continually gaining ground in the US and that, even within the Republican majority, there are increasing numbers who pragmatically feel that some type of modus vivendi with Nicaragua should be reached.
Aggressive rhetoric and attempts to influence Congress have proven partially counterproductive. They have increased divisions and worn down the legislature. This will probably lead to a delay in the Congressional vote on the $14 million. Reagan needs time to develop a coherent political offensive that will unite the leaders of the Nicaraguan political opposition, bestow prestige upon them, and justify the continuation of aid. Furthermore, in case Congress rejects the “covert” aid, Reagan will need to prepare a new package of anti-Nicaraguan measures. In addition to renewed aid to the contras by way of the maneuvers in Honduras, such measures might include new forms of aid through “humanitarian” channels, increases in economic pressure, and efforts to legitimize the armed counterrevolution in legal terms.
Nicaragua continues the search for peaceThis month’s military information includes:
- In 82 confrontations during February, counterrevolutionary forces suffered 245 casualties (166 dead).
- On February 7, Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega reported to the Cabinet on additional recruitment for regular military service to be carried out throughout the first half of this year, and on recruitment for reserve military service (men from 25 to 30 years of age), which will take place during the second half of the year. These measures are part of the large-scale military offensive designed to inflict long-term damage on the contras in 1985.
The US-Honduran Big Pine III military maneuvers are continuing. In the exercises christened “Scorpion,” which began February 11 and will proceed until April 13, more trained US troops are concentrated at a single locale than ever before in this type of maneuver. Some 4,500 US troops are operating 12 kilometers from Nicaragua’s northeast border, just outside the department of Chinandega. The maneuvers are producing a growing and unified opposition extending from public opinion to all the political parties, including sectors of the Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN) currently in power, and even to a group within the Honduran army.
The war remains the country’s main problem. As he has done on many occasions, President Ortega reiterated this week that Nicaragua is a truly nonaligned country, which has no part in any Eastern or Western military pact. Therefore, he concluded, the responsibility for the country’s defense rests solely on the shoulders of the Nicaraguan population itself. At the present time, strengthening military defenses and continuing to win on the battlefield are key elements in Nicaragua’s broader policy goal of striving for peace with dignity at the negotiating table.
Reorienting the entire economy toward defenseThe new package of economic measures described in general terms in the latest editions of envío were finally made public this month. Awaited for several weeks now, the first stages have begun to be implemented. Some economic analysts have stated that, while the new package is totally consistent with Nicaragua’s economic reality and the emergency situation caused by the war, its initial implementation has been somewhat delayed and has come without any apparent preparation to confront the domestic political costs that such a severe package will certainly engender. It should be noted that, although the recent presentation of the economic policy has been wide sweeping, the actual application will be a gradual process taking place over the course of the year.
On February 8, the FSLN’s National Directorate solemnly announced and explained the significant changes in economic policy taking place in these difficult times of war. For the first time, the entire economy will be directed toward the war effort. Unlike other economic plans, this one was preceded by almost a year of discussion between the government and broad sectors of the organized working class, both urban and rural. The Nicaraguan economy has been inherited from underdevelopment and the Somoza dictatorship, battered by the war and the international economic crisis, and led for five years by a young and inexperienced government. This economy should no longer be viewed as that of a country whose development has been impeded by a war; instead, it must be interpreted as a defense economy geared toward war. The change in perspective is fundamental, and the policy shifts are strategic.
In 1985, one-fifth of the Nicaraguan labor force is involved in defense-related tasks; 40% of the national budget is devoted to defense needs; and 35% of the GNP will be absorbed by military activities.
The new economic policy begun this month is designed to guarantee the country’s defense, raise productivity, and protect the real wages of productive workers. Only by guaranteeing defense, winning the war, and securing peace will Nicaragua be able to develop economically—a goal temporarily suspended because of the scarcity of available resources. Raising productivity will allow for greater social equality, creating a broader base from which to distribute. Finally, the sectors privileged by the new economic policy will be productive wage earners and efficient enterprises, both private and state owned. Those lower-class sectors involved in “informal” commerce (the self-employed) especially in Managua, may well suffer from the new policies. These policies are geared toward encouraging these sectors to move into or return to urban or rural productive activities, in which there are many employment opportunities and seasonal labor shortages.
On February 5 and 6, the National Assembly went through 18 hours of grueling debate over the Salary Regulation Law, which was finally passed. The new law increased the urban minimum wage to 2,500 córdobas (47% higher than in January), and a recent readjustment raised it to 3,000 córdobas as of March 1 (a 76.5% increase over the minimum wage set in January). Continual cost-of-living increases are planned so that wages may serve as the basis for any future anti-inflationary measures. (As of March 1, the minimum wage for rural workers rose to 2,800 córdobas. This is very close to the stated goal of parity between rural and urban wages.) The government has insisted that, in these crisis-ridden times, the new wage increases do not represent an attempt to resolve, either immediately or equitably, the problem of workers’ decreased and decreasing purchasing power. The new wage scales simply represent an endeavor to reduce the gap between wages and basic needs.
In the National Assembly, opposition to the FSLN was strong. The opposition began by criticizing the executive branch for suggesting that rapid procedures be used to pass the bill. Later, a discussion concerning the contents of the bill resulted in personal insults and evidenced the new legislative body’s lack of experience. The post-election balance of power has produced new political alliances and demanded creative argumentation on the part of all parties, beginning with the FSLN.
Changes in the general wage-price relation are a basic part of the new law, which eliminates the majority of state subsidies. From a situation of low, subsidized prices and low, frozen salaries, we have moved to one of real prices (based on production costs) and salaries that are somewhat higher.
On February 18, there was an increase of 100% or more in official prices for 22 products, including some basic goods such as milk, sugar, and rice. As soon as increases for diesel fuel are calculated, the price of public transportation will rise. In an attempt to prevent these price hikes from sparking increased speculation, production centers have begun to organize and reorganize their commissaries, where rural and urban workers will be able to purchase the 22 products mentioned above at speculation-free prices. It has been virtually impossible for the state to exercise adequate control over speculation in other commercial channels. The new move will leave the informal commercial sector outside the official network of lower price distribution. The present freeze on all new social service projects (lighting, housing, etc.) in Managua’s poor neighborhoods, where the bulk of the informal sector lives, is likely to generate discontent. The sector’s just demands, to which the new economic adjustments will be unable to respond, will be a great political challenge for the FSLN. Moreover, both the right and the left, always eager to capitalize on public discontent arising from crisis situations, will make the most of this opportunity.
In other countries, the announcement of similar measures has recently resulted in riots, confrontations with the police, arrests, injuries, and even deaths. However, Nicaraguans have taken the blow with a relative amount of patience, without repression and without public disorder.
This month, the government also announced a five-tier scale for the devaluation of the córdoba with respect to the US dollar. The previous rate of 10 córdobas to the dollar will be maintained for foreign debt payments, but a 50-to-1 rate will be used for trips abroad, donations, etc. Rates of 20, 28, and 40 to 1 will also be used for particular types of transactions. In addition, the government will set up money exchange booths in order to establish a free market for córdobas, whose dollar price will fluctuate according to supply and demand.
The government has also implemented a new fiscal policy, which will introduce three new taxes: (1) a capital gains tax; (2) a sales tax; and (3) a presumed earnings tax. The latter has provoked some grumbling among professionals and merchants accustomed to cheating on their tax returns. It is actually a new means of taxation, and not just an additional tax. Presumed earnings taxes are used in many countries in which the government, for some reason, has difficulty collecting from the liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.). If the state has any doubts about a professional’s tax statement, it can “presume” a given earning level and tax accordingly. This presumption can be appealed by the professional, who must then agree to be audited by the state. In Nicaragua, however, it is not expected that many professionals will resort to such appeals. The government hopes to receive some 2.5 billion córdobas annually with these taxes; this amount is equal to the Ministry of Health’s entire budget.
Owing to the character of some of the measures in the recent economic package, sectors of both the right and ultra-left have compared the government’s new economic policies to those frequently imposed on the countries of Latin America by the International Monetary Fund. Because it is such an important issue, and in order to facilitate a better overall understanding of the economic shifts that will be so crucial in the upcoming months, we have provided a comparative annex of Sandinista and IMF policies at the end of this article.
The announcement of the new economic policy was followed by many efforts to explain the reasons behind the shift in course: speeches by leading figures in the revolution, neighborhood meetings, broadcast and published segments of interviews with several economic analysts, educational cartoons in the newspapers, etc. The entire population, but especially the poorer sectors, has felt the sharp increases in the prices of basic goods and the cost of living in general. A large sector of the lower classes—those involved in informal commerce—will be affected particularly hard in that the new policies clearly privilege the productive sector and tend to impose greater controls through taxes. The country’s total resource pool has diminished, and the little bit that remains will go increasingly to defense. The government is telling the Nicaraguan people that, over the short- to medium-term, at least, it really has nothing more to offer them than the opportunity to participate in a long-term project that will bring happiness to their children and future generations and will require enormous sacrifice and much generosity. With this realistic approach, the revolutionary government hopes to forge a coherent and reliable national unity capable of attaining peace.
Efforts to engage in dialogue and rebuild national unityWithin the framework of economic policies based on the search for increasing national productivity, the government made significant overtures this month toward dialogue aimed at rebuilding national unity. During this period of shifts in basic economic strategy, the government appealed to all the groups involved in the nation’s productive activity.
On February 16, the President and his entire Cabinet listened to four and a half hours of worries, complaints, proposals, and opinions from over 400 private producers. Leaders of the Nicaraguan High Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), Sandinista and opposition trade union leaders, and a wide sampling of small, medium, and large producers of diverse political tendencies all attended the important conference. The conference was the first of its magnitude to be broadcast live on television and radio. Some private producers lodged strong criticism of the government’s economic policy over the last five years. Both the criticism and replies were formulated in a mature and reserved manner. Likewise, almost all those producers who spoke expressed a patriotic desire to raise the country’s production levels and end the war.
The government was open and flexible in response to producers’ statements, but it was also very firm in its basic message, which was aimed at the large-scale producers in the opposition: The revolution has removed their absolute economic and political control over the country, and they will have to learn to live with that fact; the revolution, however, did not take away their means of production and does provide them with the opportunity to work and profit.
COSEP, which has energetically refused to accept this reality, expressed its opposition by conditioning future dialogue and negotiations with the government on five demands: (1) the return of various confiscated properties; (2) wage negotiations that would include the employer, the employee, and all the major trade union confederations; (3) the repeal of all retroactive laws affecting private property; (4) freedom of the press; and (5) dialogue including the armed counterrevolutionaries. Except in the case of the last point, the government expressed a willingness to search for reasonable solutions to these demands.
During the debate, there appeared to be little political cohesion among the large-scale private producers. Representatives of each area of production appeared more interested in their own particular problems than in a united front for opposition and common demands. Their present unity appears to be based on both patriotism and class interests. From these characteristics we can deduce two fundamental trends: (1) the producers’ desire to remain in Nicaragua and continue producing; and (2) their desire to produce as members of the private sector, with sufficient privileges, and to receive well-founded assurance that they will be able to continue as such forever. Basic questions about the future of the mixed economy were present throughout the conference, which in large part placated some of the fears of the large entrepreneurs.
The National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG), which currently represents some 50,000 small- and medium-sized producers throughout the country, came across as a dynamic organization, with much incisive commentary. UNAG’s increasing consolidation enables it to serve as the most qualified mediator between the government and private producers.
It is difficult to briefly summarize the complex ideological debate that took place on February 16. Politically, the conference was an important event, the first of its kind in almost six years of revolution. The degree of success in future meetings with particular productive sectors will determine the ultimate significance of this initiative toward dialogue and peace. Some such encounters have already begun.
Initial hopefulness dwindled when the President on the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Committee (CDN), Eduardo Rivas Gasteazoro, released a document belittling the dialogue. The document also criticizes international talks, such as the Manzanillo and Contadora initiatives. It even condemns the conversations begun in December between the Catholic Church hierarchy and the government. In lieu of these initiatives, the CDN proposes a new national dialogue to be convened and coordinated by the Nicaraguan Bishops’ Conference.
The document’s extreme positions prevented it from being taken very seriously. However, the proposal for such a national dialogue has since gained strength as a key part of the strategy of opposition to the revolution. (We will return to this point at the end of the article.)
New efforts to revitalize ContadoraSince the very day of President Ortega’s inauguration on January 10, Nicaragua has been carrying out a broad and creative series of diplomatic peace efforts. In the eyes of Nicaragua’s Foreign Minister, these are the most significant efforts made since the beginning of the revolution. Father D’Escoto has also stated that, in its clamor for the right to self-determination for all countries, no matter how small, and for respect for international law by all countries, no matter how big, Nicaragua speaks not only for the survival of its own revolution but also for the future of all liberation movements in small countries of the Third World.
Given the crisis that besets Contadora, this month’s peace efforts were crucial. It is an oversimplification to read the new Nicaraguan proposals strictly in relation to the vote on the $14 million in Congress. They must be understood in the broader framework of the development of the Contadora process.
On February 14 and 15, there was to be an important meeting of Contadora and the five Central American representatives in Panama. This meeting was to produce the final results of the still-debated revised accords of September 7. Nicaragua had approved these agreements, whereas Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica had proposed, at the behest of the United States, that changes be made in their content.
The meeting never took place. Since it appeared that the Contadora countries would stand firm in their decision not to accept major modifications, such as those proposed by the three Central American countries, neither these countries nor the United States wanted the meeting to take place. Thus, Costa Rica , supported by Honduras, refused to attend the meeting, claiming that it had been indisposed by the diplomatic conflict caused by the arrest of Urbina Lara, the young army deserter who had received diplomatic protection from the Costa Rican Embassy in Managua. Even though Costa Rica received no international support for this position, and although there are no grounds for such bilateral conflicts to interfere in multilateral negotiations like those of Contadora, the pretext was successfully used to paralyze Contadora. This set a dangerous precedent.
In various statements by national leaders since December, Nicaragua had firmly insisted that Urbina would not be delivered either to Costa Rica or to any other country without first serving the sentence handed down by the court that was trying him as an army deserter. Nonetheless, given the success of Costa Rica’s pretext, which all lamented but none—not even Contadora—could remedy, Nicaragua yielded. With this move, Costa Rica’s pretext was eliminated, as was the frequently heard contention that Nicaragua was blocking Contadora with its “stubbornness.” It is not enough, however, simply for the Contadora process to continue; it must continue along the lines of its basic peace proposal.
The crux of the matter is that Contadora’s most basic principles are unacceptable to the United States, which would have to make concessions in three security areas: arms, bases and maneuvers, and foreign military advisers.
The September 7 accords propose:
- On arms: “To halt the arms buildup and begin immediate negotiations regarding the control and reduction of the current arms inventory and the number of soldiers in arms.”
- On maneuvers: “To prohibit international military maneuvers in the respective [Central American] territories.”
- On military advisers: “To schedule the gradual withdrawal and eventual elimination of foreign military advisers and other foreign elements, including the immediate withdrawal of all those advisers presently located in areas of military operations and training.”
On these three points, as well as on many others, the changes proposed by Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica are fundamental:
- On arms: They request negotiations not over the “control and reduction of the current arms inventory and the number of soldiers in arms,” but rather over “the establishment of maximum limits” on weapons and armed soldiers, which each country would unilaterally decide for itself. For example, this would allow for the militarization of Costa Rica, a process that is already underway, and for the continuation of the militarization of the other Central American countries according to their own criteria. The results would clearly be very unfavorable for Nicaragua.
- On maneuvers: They would eliminate the basic prohibition, and the Honduran maneuvers could continue as they have until now, though reinforced with the Contadora stamp of approval.
- On military advisers: They would eliminate the “immediate withdrawal” of the advisers located in combat or training areas. This change would permit US advisers to continue operating in the war in El Salvador, for example. American advisers would also remain on the military bases in Honduras and continue their participation in the “covert” war on Nicaragua.
(It is worth noting that US military laws only “register” advisers or other military operatives as such once they have remained on a foreign base for 180 consecutive days. If 179 days go by and the adviser leaves the country and returns, he will not appear as being officially registered. This technicality was used in Vietnam to reduce official figures for US soldiers and military officers. It is being used once again in El Salvador, where only 55 US advisers “officially” operate. The rest rotate, each making sure that he does not overstay the stipulated 180 days. The same device is also being used in Costa Rica, where there are officially no US advisers, although US advisers are operating and training Costa Rican pilots and paratroopers.)
These are the basic Contadora points, which are essential to the achievement of genuine peace in Central America. Nicaragua hoped to call attention to these points in its new unilateral peace proposals:
- On arms: Nicaragua has declared “an indefinite moratorium on the acquisition of new arms systems, such as the fighter planes necessary for the country’s present antiaircraft system.”
In addition, Nicaragua has invited “US Congressional leaders to form a delegation and visit our country, if they can conveniently do so, to evaluate the defensive nature of our country’s armed forces and weapons.”
-On advisers: Nicaragua “will suspend the cooperation of 100 Cuban military advisers. The first 50 of these instructors will begin returning to Cuba in May 1985.”
In 1983, Nicaragua prepared its own peace proposal, expressing for the first time its willingness to establish an arms moratorium as soon as foreign military advisers left the other Central American countries and foreign military bases and maneuvers were banned. All this was accepted within the framework of multilateral negotiations, in which the rest of the countries in the area and the United States would promise the same. The novelty of the steps taken this month is that Nicaragua made the commitments unilaterally.
In various statements made in Managua and Montevideo, Daniel Ortega offered a framework in which to understand these proposals more completely, and he elaborated on them further. He explained that Nicaragua has no combat planes and genuinely needs interceptor planes to confront the counterrevolutionary infiltration. The unilateral moratorium would freeze the attempts to procure these planes or any other arms, even though they may be of a purely defensive nature. The President clarified that arms shipments have not been an expense for the country, since they have been donated. He also responded to US claims that 100 Cuban advisers would represent barely 1% of the total. He stated that the number of Cuban military instructors is less than 800 and that the total number of Cubans, including these instructors, as well as doctors, technical workers, construction workers, etc., is less than 1,500. This is the first time that Nicaragua has presented such figures. President Ortega indicated that US intelligence services know perfectly well that these figures are correct and that, in any event, they have all the means necessary to verify them.
The invitation for a Congressional delegation to verify the defensive nature of Nicaragua’s weapons was first made when five US prelates visited Nicaragua from February 24-27. The Congressional delegation would have unlimited freedom to go wherever it wanted. The Nicaraguan government is thus providing a show of confidence in the solidarity of all those US forces working for peace and a negotiated solution to the Central American conflict. US bishops have long been supportive of such positions. In both public and private statements, the recent delegation also supported these positions.
On March 5, Cuba ratified Nicaragua’s decision concerning the May withdrawal of the 100 military advisers, regardless of the results this measure may ultimately produce in the US Congress. Cuba also reiterated its support for Contadora and clearly proclaimed its right to continue providing any kind of aid—including security and military aid—whenever Nicaragua requests it.
“We cannot take any additional measures. Now is the time to return to the talks. The measures have required a tremendous effort on Nicaragua’s part, and there is nothing left to ask of us,” said President Ortega upon returning from Montevideo and evaluating the positive international reaction to Nicaragua’s initiatives. The US disparaged and derided Nicaragua’s proposals, thereby displaying its lack of a convincing and coherent response to Nicaragua’s flexibility.
Extending alignment with Latin AmericaVice-President Sergio Ramírez carried out a European diplomatic tour from February 5-18, visiting Great Britain, Ireland, France, and Spain. His intentions were to secure support for the Contadora negotiations and to evaluate more closely the willingness of certain US allies in Western Europe to call Reagan’s Central American policy into question. Such possibilities do exist, and Nicaragua hopes to take advantage of them.
While aiming at several parts of the world, Nicaragua concentrated the major thrust of its peace proposals on the countries of Latin America. Latin America’s critical economic situation, exacerbated by an overwhelming and unpayable foreign debt, the crises of the Southern Cone military dictatorships, continuing echoes of the US role in the Falklands crisis, and the mere existence of an initiative like Contadora have all contributed to a renewed consciousness of Latin American unity. None of this existed at the time of the Cuban revolution, and the US easily succeeded in isolating Cuba from the rest of Latin America. Now, with a new balance of power, Latin American nationalism can play an important role in broadening the political views of even reformist governments. These developments have allowed Nicaragua to seek its nonalignment within a Latin American framework. In his discussions with private producers on February 16, Daniel Ortega stated, “We are not part of any military pact; we do not belong to the Warsaw Pact or to NATO. The defense of Nicaragua rests squarely on our own shoulders. We seek our security in the moral support of Latin America.”
This basic aspect of the Nicaraguan revolution—its “Bolívarism” and clear Latin American alignment—constituted one of the most important parts of Bayardo Arce’s speech at the closing of the first Congress on Anti-Imperialist Thought. The Congress marked the closing of the ceremonies in commemoration of the 51st anniversary of Sandino’s assassination. Arce’s speech also reformulated the definition of the Sandinista revolution, describing it as the convergence of three ideological currents: Third World nationalism, post-Medellín Latin American Catholicism, and nondoctrinaire, anti-dogmatic Marxism. He also reaffirmed the three-pronged character of the revolution—the mixed economy, political pluralism, and nonalignment—and raised participatory democracy to the status of a fourth characteristic of the Sandinista movement.
Banking on its good relations with Alfonsín’s Argentina, Sanguinetti’s Uruguay, and in all probability, with Neve’s Brazil, Nicaragua hopes to reinforce, support, and protect the Contadora proposal’s Latin American content. Nicaragua hopes to unite as many countries as possible around the basic principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Within Central America, Nicaragua has taken noteworthy initiatives concerning trade and tariff relations with Guatemala. Since the outset of the conflict between the present US administration and the Nicaraguan government, Guatemala has shown more independence with regard to the United States than any of the latter’s other Central American allies.
Nicaragua chose the city of Montevideo, now relieved of a long and tragic military dictatorship, as the site to express once again its search for Latin American alignment and its proposals for national dignity. In an atmosphere of hopefulness and solidarity, President Ortega presented his proposals to a large and highly receptive crowd of Uruguayans. Amidst all the Latin American solidarity and anti-imperialist slogans, it would have been difficult for George Shultz to refuse to engage in discussions with Daniel Ortega. Sanguinetti himself invited Shultz to participate in the discussions, which lasted for almost an hour.
Afterwards, Daniel Ortega affirmed that he had said nothing new to the US Secretary of State. “We outlined proposals that were already well know,” he stated, pointing out the fact that the meeting took place as the only new element. Moreover, he spoke of reticence on the part of the US regarding the resumption of the Manzanillo bilateral talks.
Security questions are at the heart of the Contadora proposals, and Nicaragua’s new security proposals have been received very well by the four Contadora nations. Just as when Nicaragua first announced that it would sign the September 7 Contadora Treaty, the US has been unable to provide a rapid response.
The US probably needs time to coordinate its reaction with the war. This reaction may well materialize in the form of new political and economic pressures to be implemented by different sectors of the domestic opposition and leaders of the armed counterrevolution. Although Nicaragua’s peace proposals cannot stop the war by themselves, they do clearly illustrate the US government’s desire to continue the war. Arce’s speech, referred to above, stated that we are now witnessing a clash between the Reagan administration’s revived Monroe Doctrine and the Bolívarism reborn in Sandinista foreign policy.
Nicaragua’s government is endeavoring to achieve peace by combining a new military offensive; the reconstruction of national unity based on increased production; more sustained diplomatic efforts; and Latin American nationalism. The US administration may have to “say uncle” and accept the irreversibility of the Sandinista revolution.
Opposition and counterrevolution unite in call for national dialogueThe analysis of this month’s many events would be incomplete without mention of the national dialogue proposal put forth by the nonparliamentary domestic opposition and the armed counterrevolution, in clear compliance with the Reagan administration’s future plans.
We have already mentioned the CDN document that expressed disregard for any dialogue initiative other than a “national dialogue” convened by the Nicaraguan Bishops’ Conference. Issued while Contadora was at a standstill, the document acquired certain legitimacy. Meanwhile, the archbishops belonging to the Secretariat of Central American Bishops (SEDAC) were meeting in Tegucigalpa, Honduras to study the refugee question. At the meeting, the SEDAC secretary, Salvadoran Auxiliary Archbishop Rosa Chávez commented, “We believe that the Contadora proposals must not fail, but if they did, the Church could possibly mediate in the Central American crisis by way of the Latin American Bishops’ Conference (CELAM).”
This statement encouraged the CDN in its proposals. Luis Rivas Leiva, from the tiny Social Democratic Party (PSD), made several statements to La Prensa, claiming that Rosa Chávez’s statement had made the dialogue necessary. At one point, Rivas Leiva spoke of a double dialogue that could resolve the Nicaraguan crisis: dialogue between the Sandinista government and the US, and between the Sandinista government and the Nicaraguan political parties. Rivas Leiva called for a national dialogue coordinated by the Bishop’s Conference, with “international guarantees” and a maximum duration of 30 days.
In various statements to La Prensa, Independent Liberal Party (PLI) leader Virgilio Godoy offered general support for the above-mentioned style of national dialogue, although he made no specific reference to the Bishops’ Conference. The Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN) made similar remarks. All three political parties agree that Nicaragua’s problems are basically political and must therefore be resolved through political talks. Thus, they reject the validity of the economic dialogue initiated between the government and producers.
Debates in the National Assembly have revealed that the PLI is presently the parliamentary party most strongly opposed to the FSLN. The PLI is attempting to lead the opposition tendencies in their demands for greater power sharing. It has backed two of the three leftist parties, the Socialists and the Communists (each has only two National Assembly representatives) and is also striving for alliances with the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC), which has six representatives. However, the extreme ideological heterogeneity of the different parties would seem to make any lasting alliance impossible. With respect to both the national dialogue and other opposition positions, Virgilio Godoy clearly appears to be the link between the parliamentary and nonparliamentary opposition groups.
The illegal opposition presented its proposal for national dialogue in San José, Costa Rica, on March 2. The signatories of this proposal are Adolfo Calero (FDN), Steadman Fagoth (MISURA), Alfonso Robelo (ARDE), Arturo Cruz (The CDN’s ex-presidential candidate), Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, Jr. (former coeditor of La Prensa), and several other well-known counterrevolutionary leaders. They presented their demands in the form of an ultimatum directed at the Nicaraguan government. Neither Edén Pastora nor Brooklyn Rivera’s MISURASATA signed the ultimatum.
The document appraised the Nicaraguan political spectrum as follows: “There are two political tendencies in Nicaragua: the totalitarian tendency, which presently accepts the FSLN as its vanguard, and the democratic tendency, which is divided into both armed and civilian organizations.” According to this document, these are the two tendencies that must engage in dialogue. The counterrevolutionary proposal assigns the Bishops’ Conference the responsibility of convening, legalizing, and coordinating the dialogue, determining the number of delegates from each of the two “tendencies,” requesting the participation of other Central American governments to guarantee the respect of any eventual agreements, and establishing a definitive agenda. The signatories urge the Bishops’ Conference to include various items in the agenda, including the dissolution of the National Assembly, a plebiscite for new presidential elections, and a new electoral law.
The contras’ document adheres to the CDN proposal, adding that the talks “must begin no later than March 20, 1985, this date being nonnegotiable. If the national dialogue has not begun nor made evident and substantial strides by April 20, the Nicaraguan resistance will suspend it, thus ending the possibilities for peaceful agreements with regard to the national crisis.”
At the time the counterrevolutionary document was made public, contra radio stations in Honduras were publicizing the fact that Arturo Cruz had visited an FDN camp in that country on February 2, at the invitation of Enrique Bermúdez, a former National Guard Colonel, and Adolfo Calero, the FDN’s top leader. The two leaders informed the FDN troops that this “distinguished visitor” was coming as a sign of the “unity agreements” proposed and arranged by the US government. During his speech, Cruz praised both the Reagan administration’s policies toward Nicaragua and the “heroism” of the counterrevolutionaries. He expressed “affection and respect” for the troops, asking for God’s continued help to keep them strong in battle. Cruz’s presence among the contra troops and his signature on the San José document clearly make him the liaison between the armed counterrevolution and the CDN.
The formation of a type of “broad opposition front” comprising all the non-Sandinista political parties and their respective labor unions is the National Assembly appears to be a concrete possibility in the future. Although ostensibly civic and legal in nature, such an “opposition front” would nonetheless be linked with the positions of the CDN and La Prensa. The most extreme sectors of the latter two groups have already taken steps to unite themselves with the armed counterrevolution. While sustaining the contras through both overt and covert means, the Reagan administration is attempting to provide the grounds on which to make the contras a legitimate and acceptable alternative to the Sandinista government. A unified opposition, regardless of its real breadth or cohesion, would favor US designs, which, in the medium term, could entail severing relations with the Nicaraguan government and recognizing a “government in exile.”
Thus, the FSLN is faced with a new challenge, a key element of which appears to be the call for national dialogue. The present situation also presents a challenge for the civic opposition and the Catholic Church hierarchy within Nicaragua. Washington is pressuring all sides of the conflict in a desperate attempt to reduce the possibility of political solutions and polarize the contending sectors, leaving war as the only option. The response to such a challenge—which, for Nicaragua, can only mean a peaceful alternative—will require more energy, skill, and patience than ever before.
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a monthly magazine of analysis on Central America