Alert in the Face of New Pressure

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"We're going to fight with all we've got against Nicaragua's Marxist Leninist government." This comment was made by Vice President George Bush in Honduras on his way back from attending the presidential inauguration in Brazil. On that occasion, Bush refused to meet with Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega.

Although the Reagan administration is willing "to fight with all it's got," so far it has only brought out part of its arsenal of options for "replacing" the Sandinista government. This month, the administration began to apply various forms of pressure, including the adoption of a proposal for national dialogue set forth as an ultimatum by the armed counterrevolutionaries under the political leadership of Arturo Cruz.

The timing with which these pressures are emerging is critical to understanding the significance of the administration's new moves in its war of attrition against Nicaragua.

Proposal for a national dialogue

On March 2, leaders of the armed counterrevolution and opposition figures living outside Nicaragua, including Arturo Cruz and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Jr., signed an ultimatum in San Jose, Costa Rica, urging the Sandinista government to engage in a national dialogue with them before April 20. Conspicuously absent from the list of signatories were the names of Edén Pastora, Brooklyn Rivera, and Alfredo César. The dialogue was to be preceded by a cease fire and mediated by the Nicaraguan Catholic bishops.

Since that date, and particularly since April 4, when President Reagan publicly adopted the proposal as part of his Peace Plan for Nicaragua, the national dialogue has become the principal tool with which to pressure the Sandinistas. The ultimatum initially contained a definitive March 20 deadline by which the Nicaraguan government had to engage in negotiations with the contras. This deadline was later set for April 20. The ultimatum specifies that "it is up to the Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference to establish the final agenda." However, it urges the bishops to include in the agenda such points as "the immediate dissolution of all repressive FSLN organizations such as the neighborhood Civil Defense Committees (CDS), the dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly, the implementation of a new provisional electoral law, the holding of new elections for a Constituent Assembly, the calling of a plebiscite to decide whether to hold new elections," etc. These and other aspects of the ultimatum are actually a proposal to eliminate the institutionalization of the revolution.

On March 7, Arturo Cruz, the San Jose document's principal signatory, was to travel to Nicaragua to deliver the text to the President of the Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference, Pablo Vega. The Nicaraguan government denied Cruz entry into the country, charging that the US administration and the CIA were intending to launch an international campaign if Cruz were arrested once inside the country, given the latter's publicly known ties with the armed counterrevolution. If he were not arrested, a US devised plan to assassinate Cruz and hold the Sandinistas responsible was to be put into effect, according to the Nicaraguan government. The political reasons for denying Cruz entry into Nicaragua were explained by President Ortega on March 10: Cruz's alliance with the armed counterrevolutionaries in cosigning the ultimatum, as well as his February visit to contra troops in Honduras, where he spoke before the anti Sandinista soldiers, have "liquidated him politically." Ortega asserted that these activities will prevent Cruz from freely entering Nicaragua as he had done before in his role as an opposition leader operating through civic channels.

On March 12, in San Jose, Costa Rica, nine Nicaraguan organizations formed what they call the Nicaraguan Opposition Coordinating Committee (CON). These groups, with no individual signatories, called on the Nicaraguan government to engage in a national dialogue to organize new elections "after the overthrow of the Marxist Leninist dictatorship" as their "only demand." The nine organizations are the Nicaraguan Social Democratic Movement in Exile, the Nicaraguan Social Christian Party, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, the Independent Liberal Party, the Nicaraguan Conservative Party in Exile, the Nicaraguan Democratic Workers' Solidarity, the Union of Nicaraguan Workers and Peasants, the Committee of Nicaraguan Democratic Workers, and Nicaraguan Private Enterprise in Exile. On March 9, just prior to this organization's founding, Nicaragua's Interior Ministry warned leaders of the Democratic Coordinating Committee (CDN) parties, the High Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), and La Prensa that it would be illegal to form ties with the armed counterrevolution. They were also warned of the consequences that their contacts with the counterrevolutionaries would entail. Despite the fact that some of these leaders have made general statements in favor of a national dialogue, none have publicly acknowledged any ties with the recently created CON, which has been largely ignored within the country, by both Sandinista sectors and the civilian opposition.

On March 22, the Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference published a statement making known that it would accept the role of mediator in a national dialogue, as proposed by the counterrevolutionary ultimatum The bishops' central point read as follows: "Convinced that violence will never resolve the roots of any problem, we are willing to mediate in a domestic dialogue, provided the following remain clear: (1) Given our duty as representatives of the Church, we cannot impose dialogue; (2) The dialogue should be accepted by both parties; and (2) our decision should not be interpreted as a political position in favor of any party or ideology."

On April 4, President Reagan presented what he called a Peace Plan for Nicaragua, centering his proposal on the call for a national dialogue between the Sandinistas and the contras and linking this plan with the Congressional debate concerning his request for $14 million worth of aid for the contras. The same day, the President received Cruz, Calero, and Robelo—three of the main signatories of the contra ultimatum—whom he asked to extend the deadline for commencing negotiations from April 20 to June 1. The three contra leaders publicly accepted the change in dates. According to President Reagan's plan, if, under a mutual cease fire, the Sandinistas engage in talks with the "members of the democratic resistance," the $14 million would be allocated as humanitarian aid (medicines, food, clothing, "and other survival oriented support") for the counterrevolutionaries. If, after 60 days, no agreement were reached, the money would be used for military assistance. In addition, the plan calls for new elections to be held in Nicaragua "under international supervision." Reagan pointed to presidents Duarte of El Salvador and Betancur of Colombia as "models" for the Sandinistas, as these two leaders were able to negotiate with their enemies.

Also that day, President Betancur declared in Washington that Reagan's plan was "a constructive proposal ... it gives time to think and time to react," adding that he would propose including Reagan's initiative on the agenda of the Contadora peace talks.

Nicaragua's Foreign Affairs Minister D'Escoto rejected the plan on April 5, stating: "It makes no sense to negotiate with mercenaries... They don't decide anything. This is Reagan's war; he can put an end to it."

US strategy and the timing of Reagan's proposal

Following President Reagan's explicit affirmation that the real objective of the war on Nicaragua is to "remove the present structure of the Sandinista government," it would be naïve to think that the Peace Plan is intended to achieve peace and that it is not simply another means of pressure aimed at removing the Sandinistas from power.

An element in the administration's tactics is the formation and implementation of possible alternatives, should Congress vote down the $14 million. The Peace Plan is one such alternative. Another is the administration's move to transfer its case with Nicaragua from the Contadora framework to the Organization of American States (OAS). The US is requesting that institution to apply joint economic, diplomatic, and military sanctions against Nicaragua. At the economic level, this would entail the implementation of a naval, financial, and commercial blockade. In the military sphere, it would include a series of actions within the framework of the Inter American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty.

These alternative means of pressure merely constitute different forms of the same war of attrition against Nicaragua. Though this type of war is presently the administration's preferred option, the alternative of military intervention remains a possibility.

Diplomatic alternatives: Using the OAS

Throughout his first term in office, President Reagan was determined to replace Contadora with the OAS. The incessant argument of Nicaragua's "unfulfilled promises" to the latter institution was a recurring theme used to justify the administration's intention to move the debate to the OAS. Now, in Reagan's second term, this plan appears to have acquired more strength, given the real limitations of Contadora, which has had to deal with the US government's efforts to block its initiatives.

On March 27, the administration decisively began to pursue its objectives in the OAS. The US representative to the OAS, William Middendorf, read a speech entitled "The Stolen Revolution," repeating the complaint regarding Nicaragua's "unfulfilled promises." Though Middendorf did not present any concrete motion to sanction Nicaragua for the presumed "robbery," he did set forth the following position: "The United States is not willing to permit the OAS to neglect its responsibilities by not intervening if Contadora fails." The response from the member states was an almost unanimous gesture of support for the Contadora initiative. The only countries supportive of the US were Honduras, El Salvador, and Grenada.

Economic alternatives:
The case of the IDB

With growing insistence, representatives of the US administration are speaking of the need to exert more economic pressure on Nicaragua in order to support the war of attrition. This month, the news media revealed details of one such incident in the financial sphere. Some observers have interpreted this case as the beginning of a potentially greater "economic war." The incident involved the direct application of pressure by US Secretary of State George Shultz on the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) in order to block the passage of a $58.4 million loan to Nicaragua. The credit was officially requested by Nicaragua in 1982 and approved after requirements were fulfilled. (The money was intended for agricultural and agroexport projects, benefiting some 4,500 peasants farmers and medium size producers working on private plots of land or in cooperatives.)

On January 30; Shultz wrote to IDB President Antonio Mena urging that the Bank not approve the loan on the grounds that the funds would reduce the financial pressure on Nicaragua and help consolidate a Marxist regime by financing acts of aggression against neighboring countries and fellow IDB members. Shultz threatened to withdraw the US contribution to the Bank (35% of its total funds) if it did grant the loan.

The pressure applied by Shultz is unprecedented in the Bank's history, particularly given the absence of economic criteria to substantiate the US government's claim. Nicaragua, through the president of its Central Bank, Joaquín Cuadra, took the case to the IDB's 26th annual assembly at the end of March in Vienna. Participating in the conference were 2,500 delegates from the 25 Latin American countries and 15 European and Asian nations composing the Bank's membership.

Nicaragua's denunciation constituted the essence of the debate at the assembly. With the exception of the US, the participating countries were unanimous in defending the multilateral and apolitical character of the Bank's decisions; they clearly excluded the use of political criteria as a means to determine the admissibility of loan requests. Though these principles were reaffirmed in the assembly's conclusions, there were no explicit references to Nicaragua's case in the final document.

Nicaragua's Minister of Finance, William Hüpper, has pointed out that the incident with the IDB demonstrates the US administration's underlying objective: to impose both a financial and commercial blockade on Nicaragua, thereby isolating it from the US market.

Before the revolution, 50% of Nicaragua's exports and 40% of its imports went to and came from the us. These amounts have diminished since 1979, as can be seen below:

Nicaraguan Trade with the US

1983 (1st semester) 1984 1st semester)
Exports 17% 7.9%
Imports 18% 15.6%

Owing to the diversification of its markets, Nicaragua would be able to withstand a total US trade blockade. Nicaragua currently exports meat, seafood, and bananas to the US because of the latter's more favorable prices. If the US imposed a commercial blockade, Nicaragua would lose the better prices for these items but would not lack other markets. With respect to imports, Nicaragua acquires machinery, technical equipment, and certain spare parts from the US. In the event of a blockade, these items would become more expensive, although Nicaragua could obtain them from other markets that sell US goods. In any case, as a result of its industrial weakness, Nicaragua has purchased only very limited amounts of industrial machinery. Therefore, a commercial blockade would not have tragic consequences on Nicaragua's imports, either.

According to its laws, in order for the US to decree a trade blockade, it must first declare a "state of emergency" in its relations with Nicaragua; in other words, the US government must define Nicaragua as its "enemy." This is only possible if the US officially breaks relations with Nicaragua and/or recognizes a government in exile. In the short run, none of these options appear to be feasible. President Reagan publicly stated as much this month, demonstrating the limits of his commitment to the contras, despite the seemingly unlimited verbal support he affords them. Reagan has not limited his commitment because of ethical considerations. Instead, he apparently believes that the present level of US involvement in the contra war and the credibility he intends to bestow on his "freedom fighters" will be sufficient to pressure Nicaragua to "cry uncle." With a less problematic approach, the administration expects to secure support in Congress and from US public opinion for its anti Nicaraguan policies.

Military pressures mount with new maneuvers

Since February, the joint US Honduran military maneuvers known as Big Pine III have beer under way in Honduran territory. This month, for the first time in the history of Central American military maneuvers, the US included a series of tanks in the exercises.

A total of 125 tanks belonging to the Honduran and US armed forces are presently in operation. Some of the tanks are Soviet made and resemble those owned by Nicaragua. Among the tanks taking part in the maneuvers is the M 1, the most advanced in the US arsenal. This tank, which is capable of firing nuclear projectiles and was built for deployment in the NATO countries, has not yet been tested in combat. The tanks are currently being mobilized only a few kilometers from the Nicaraguan border in maneuvers simulating an invasion of Honduras by Nicaraguan forces.

This month also brought news of plans for yet greater military pressure on Nicaragua. New and unexpected maneuvers called Universal Trek 85 will take place between April 12 and 27 and will include the participation of 6,500 US troops from several US military bases. These troops will join the 3,000 US soldiers currently involved in the Big Pine III exercises and another 1,500 permanently stationed in Honduras. The new maneuvers will basically consist of an amphibious landing at Puerto Castilla, on the northern coast of Honduras, by paratroopers in the 101st Airborne division. The assault will be supported by 36 war ships, including a cruiser with teleguided missiles and attack helicopters.

This exercise, which constitutes the largest landing maneuver ever recorded in the military history of Central America, was directly requested by President Reagan as part of his recent strategy to step up all forms of pressure on Nicaragua. Even the Honduran government was not aware of plans for this maneuver until March 7.

On March 27, Nicaragua's Foreign Affairs Minister sent a note to George Shultz denouncing the maneuvers as "part of the US administration's effort to effectively block Contadora."

The debate over the $14 million

The Debate in Congress over the release of $14 million in aid for the contras—a key element in the current US strategy—has continued in the midst of the aforementioned diplomatic, economic, and military pressures on Nicaragua. Reagan has delayed the vote in Congress in order to gain time to prepare an adequate alternative in the face of a possible failure to secure the funds from both Houses. Reagan's attempt to link his Peace Plan with the debate over the $14 million, while trying to achieve bipartisan support for his request, clearly demonstrates the real intent behind the "peace" initiative: to win votes in Congress. The administration used the same strategy in order to gain enough bipartisan support to tip the balance in favor of the MX missiles, and it is possible that this tactic's effectiveness is now spent. In any event, the vote on the $14 million is set for April 23 in the Senate and will be preceded by a campaign on the part of the administration to push the Peace Plan.

During this month, diverse political, religious, and humanitarian sectors in the US and throughout the world have sent urgent appeals to the US Congress asking it not to approve the aid to the contras. One of the basic factors motivating broad sectors to lobby for cutoff of contra funds is the increasing frequency of atrocities committed by the "freedom fighters" against Nicaragua's civilian population. The details of these atrocities are receiving ever greater publicity in the US. This month, for example, the prestigious human rights group Americas Watch published a lengthy report documenting "violations of war laws by the counterrevolutionary and Sandinista forces." The document concludes that, while there has been a drastic decline in such violations by the Sandinista army since 1982—referring specifically to the abuses during the relocation of Miskito Indians from the Río Coco—the same cannot be said of the counterrevolutionary groups, which have stepped up violations during this time. Americas Watch points to the FDN and MISURA, the groups receiving the most US backing, as those that have committed the most atrocities against Nicaraguan civilians. Moreover, statements during this month by Salvadoran Colonel Roberto Santiváñez reveal the direct connection between two former Somocista guardsmen (currently leaders of the FDN) and Roberto D'Aubuisson's death squads in the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Romero.

Reagan has not succeeded in his attempts to legitimize the contras. The contras' image is largely negative in the eyes of broad political sectors within the US and around the world, even among those unsympathetic to the Nicaraguan government. The recent effort to link Arturo Cruz with the armed counterrevolutionaries is part of the administration's strategy to transform these groups into a legitimate and presentable alternative. Though Cruz is viewed by most sectors within Nicaragua as a "political fiction" created in Washington, the prestige surrounding his figure is essential for the contras' legitimacy. President Reagan's Peace Plan, which incorporates the ultimatum put forth by the FDN and MISURA groups, is intended not only to pressure Nicaragua further but also to portray the contras as a palatable alternative to the current Nicaraguan government.

The counterrevolution lacks political legitimacy and is incapable of achieving its military objectives. In early March, upon leaving his post as Chief of the Southern Command, General Paul Gorman stated before the Senate Armed Forces Committee that "the anti Sandinista forces are incapable of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government in the near future, whether the United States helps them or not."

In preparation for the upcoming Congressional vote on further funding and support for President Reagan's Nicaraguan policies, the US administration, while continuing other forms of pressure, shifted its focus from the military sphere to a political and ideological level. It thereby sidestepped any discussion of the contras' military capabilities or of the atrocities committed. Since the blow to their image caused by revelations of the CIA manual, the administration has been searching for a way to restore credibility to its backing of the contras. This search led to Reagan's Peace Plan, which incorporated a proposal for national dialogue between the Sandinistas and the contras. The image of counterrevolutionaries willing to implement a cease fire and proceed with negotiations mediated by the Catholic Church would certainly appear to be an improvement. Even when the Sandinistas refuse to negotiate with them, the contras' "peace gestures" will merit them the support and funding necessary to continue their war of attrition.

On the threshold of a major military offensive

Nicaragua has announced preparations for a major military offensive intended to deal the contras a significant strategic blow in the near future. Plans for this offensive, which is to be launched at midyear, are well underway. From March 1 to April 1, Sandinista and contra forces fought 55 battles. The Defense Ministry announced 331 contra casualties, 310 of them deaths. In addition to maintaining the offensive in certain regions, preparations for the midyear offensive include the continued implementation of the military draft. A new registration drive was held in March for young men born between January 1, 1967, and January 1, 1968. New recruits for the second semester of 1985 will be selected among these youths. A considerable number of special forces battalions are expected to be ready by the time the offensive begins.

This month, the Interior Ministry discovered part of a network involved in smuggling draft dodgers out of the country for exorbitant prices. Furthermore, Interior Minister Tomás Borge openly criticized the "inadequate and clumsy procedures" sometimes used in recruitment, adding that they have deeply offended the sensitivities of Nicaraguan mothers.

The relocation of thousands of civilians from their isolated homes in the war zones is a measure that the government is having to take as a result of contra attacks and in preparation for the Sandinistas' strategic offensive. The relocation project began in early February with the task of expanding existing resettlement communities, built in 1982, particularly around Jalapa. Over the next two years, the government expects to resettle some 50,000 families (approximately 300,000 individuals, of 60% are children) on fertile lands in regions I and VI, where they will be afforded better protection from contra raids. Though the government had intended to relocate many isolated peasant families in better protected communities—where health care, educational services, and agricultural assistance could be more easily provided—at a much more gradual pace, the war has sharply precipitated the move.

In addition to protecting peasants from marauding bands of contras, the resettlement communities will prevent civilians from being caught in the crossfire during the Sandinistas' strategic offensive. The relocation has sparked concern among national and international sectors in view of both the human suffering created by moving entire families from their ancestral homes and the enormous challenge that such an undertaking represents for Nicaragua’s struggling economy in the midst of a war of attrition. Nonetheless, international aid for the project is beginning to arrive and is being distributed to the various communities.

In the context of Nicaragua's upcoming strategic offensive, the counterrevolutionary proposal for a national dialogue is interpreted by many observers as the contras' recognition of their military weakness—a preemptive move in the face of almost certain defeat. Never having attained any important military objectives, the contras are banking on their demand for dialogue to restore them the share of power that they failed to achieve militarily.

Politics and economy: Entering a new phase

The coffee harvest ended in mid-March. It had begun shortly after the November elections and was carried out in the face of enormous infrastructure-related difficulties and a critical military situation. Despite the odds, the results were relatively successful. Of the stated goal of 1,250,000 quintals, 1,074,000 were collected. 250,000 quintals (worth a total of $25 million) were lost in the regions hardest hit by the war. Participating in the harvest were 10,000 traditional harvesters and 13,144 volunteer pickers, 8,000 of whom were state employees (teachers, office staff, etc.) and 770 of whom were foreigners from various countries. The contras damaged or completely destroyed 43 coffee farms, causing a total of 23 million córdobas in damages. Thirty-nine coffee pickers were killed during this time, mostly at the hands of the contras.

In March, the government began to apply new economic measures aimed at responding to the crisis brought on by the war. While talks continued between the government and various sectors of private enterprise, the former urged the population to strive for efficiency, savings, and a rational usage of the country's natural resources. The government also criticized the state enterprises for their financial disorder, deficient production, and low level of worker participation in administrative tasks. Certain cases of administrative corruption in state institutions have been widely publicized. A large number of state employees are presently being tried, and if found guilty, it is expected that they will be given exemplary punishment. The best known case of corruption involves a series of thefts in the Health Ministry, in which several officials and other employees have been implicated.

Economic experts believe that the price and salary increases have reestablished a certain degree of equilibrium between supply and demand. The government is currently carrying out a study on the cost of basic necessities. Significant hikes in the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel are imminent. Moreover, the costs of the resettlement proj¬ect combined with those of the entire war effort will probably produce a considerable rise in inflation.

In addition to facing multiple economic readjustments, Nicaragua is entering a new political phase with the institutionalization of new structures and the reorganization of others, such as labor unions, grassroots organizations, and political parties, including the FSLN.

Following seven 10 to 12 hour days of grueling debate in the National Assembly, the legislature passed the statute that will regulate the Assembly's procedural mechanisms and overall functioning. This statute also defines the legislative attributions of both the executive and legislative branches.

Despite vigorous objections on the part of the opposition parties, the new statute has given the executive branch a hefty share of power. The FSLN claims that a strong executive branch is necessary at a time when the nation is under attack.

The party that has kept up the most systematic opposition to the FSLN has been the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), under the leadership of Virgilio Godoy. In the face of tenacious opposition during debates, the FSLN representatives have not been able to overcome a general mediocrity in their political arguments. They have almost always won out because of the overwhelming Sandinista majority in the Assembly. This has made parties such as the Liberals, Communists, and Socialists frequently refer to the FSLN's "steamroller" technique as the only one the FSLN can use to make its proposals prosper.

Following the statute's approval, a special commission was formed to draw up the first draft of the Constitution. This commission, composed of members from all seven parties represented in the Assembly, must present the draft no later than February 21, 1986.

The government and Nicaraguan Catholic bishops resumed negotiations this month, mutually agreeing not to disclose the contents of the latest session. On March 26, the third round of talks between the government and MISURASATA leader Brooklyn Rivera was held in Bogota, Colombia. Prior to the meeting, Rivera described the Nicaraguan revolution as "a hope for the indigenous poor of Nicaragua and all Latin America," referring to the Sandinistas' "willingness to admit their errors." The indigenous leader reaffirmed his plan to attend the Bogota talks, adding that he hoped the Nicaraguan government "would assume a position much more like ours." However, the negotiations did not conclude with the desired results. Luis Carrión, heading the Nicaraguan government delegation, affirmed: "So far, we have found little flexibility in MISURASATA's positions, a fact which has made it impossible to reach concrete agreements, however minimal they might be.... We are exhausting all possibilities." The next round of talks is set for April 20 and 21.

In the midst of institutionalizing its political structures while implementing economic readjustments, the Nicaraguan government has embarked upon a series of domestic peace initiatives that are moving forward at a gradual pace. Within the framework of this delicate transition, the contras' proposal for a national dialogue appears to be a destabilizing tool for unifying the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition with the armed counterrevolution in a broad opposition front, while thwarting domestic negotiations and peace initiatives already underway. In this sense, the Reagan administration's Peace Plan is an additional means with which to speed up and sharpen polarization among domestic social sectors. Though very carefully worded, the bishops' offer to mediate in a national dialogue ties them directly to the Peace Plan proposals, creating an even more delicate situation.

Diplomatic peace initiatives

Last month, Nicaragua launched a series of unilateral peace initiatives concerning its military situation. The government agreed to withdraw 100 Cuban military advisors, freeze the purchase of additional arms, and invite a bipartisan commission of US Congressional representatives to investigate the defensive nature of Nicaragua's military.

These initiatives received broad international support and served to reinforce the Contadora process. However, no positive reaction was forthcoming from the US regarding the renewal of talks with the Nicaraguan government in Manzanillo.

This month, Nicaragua continued its peace overtures, with President Ortega traveling to Brazil for the presidential inauguration of Tancredo Neves. During the ceremonies, US Vice President Bush turned down an initiative to engage in talks with President Ortega. Bush maintained that "we have no common points to discuss." Ortega responded: "It is precisely because of the lack of common ground between the two countries that we should meet."

The US administration has clearly stated its determination not to renew bilateral talks with Nicaragua. The unwillingness to resume conversations is particularly evident in the light of Reagan's proposed Peace Plan. The Manzanillo talks would represent a serious obstacle to the new pressures the administration intends to exert on Nicaragua. By calling on the Sandinistas to negotiate with the counterrevolutionaries, the US is diverting attention from its own refusal to resume talks and seek peaceful solutions directly with Nicaragua.

Nonetheless, Contadora was rekindled in Brazil. On March 6, prior to the meeting of presidents and foreign affairs ministers in Brasilia, representatives from the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica convened to discuss a document regarding the verification and control of armaments. On March 15, the document was analyzed by three Contadora members, four Central American foreign ministers, and Guatemala's vice minister of foreign affairs. The synthesis of these encounters led to the revival of Contadora. Shortly afterward, the Contadora members began consultations with the Central American governments. The result was an agreement by the full Contadora group to meet on April 11 and 12 in Panama.

Following a five month stalemate, Contadora's revitalization is occurring at a delicate time. The terms of Reagan's Peace Plan clearly divert attention from the military and security issues at the heart of both Contadora's overall peace proposal and Nicara¬gua's most recent initiatives. Contadora has discussed subjects related to national dia¬logue and the process of domestic reconciliation in Nicaragua, but only a general agree¬ment to encourage the promotion of democracy has been reached. Nicaragua maintains that to decide the course of other countries' internal affairs would be to insult those nations sovereignty. Moreover, by insisting on a national dialogue between the contras and Sandinistas, the Peace Plan would become an instrument to "effectively block" the Contadora process.

While in Brazil, President Ortega spoke of the Nicaraguan revolution's alignment with the rest of Latin America. "Latin America is engaged in a struggle to persuade the United States. This struggle does not seek to confront the US but rather to bring it to reason. The US has never understood Latin America. We are faced with an unchanging foreign policy."

The Nicaraguan delegation also explored future commercial relations with Brazilian companies, particularly petroleum producing firms and gasohol industries. Ortega mentioned the possibility of building an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua. Once the key motivation behind the first US invasions of Nicaragua in the 19th century, the canal project under the Sandinista government would serve not only the rest of Latin America but also the European community and socialist countries. It would constitute a concrete sign of the multiplicity of interests that have characterized the Nicaraguan revolution.

In the face of Reagan's Peace Plan and a proposal in favor of a national dialogue as the US solution to its conflict with Nicaragua, Latin America is becoming conscious of the need for economic and political independence in order to survive. The emergence of this new consciousness—precipitated by the common problem of foreign debt—has helped to unify the Contadora group and keep it alive. Many sectors within the US are realizing that this nation's crisis with Nicaragua and the rest of Central America is only a reflection of a greater danger for the US: the whole southern Continent. As Argentina's President Alfonsín vividly expressed in Washington, DC: "[The Central American question] is the first challenge in breaking the vicious circle that is bleeding our continent."

The continental crisis is virtually a time bomb. Traditional US policy, based on the principle of political interference, is becoming ever less realistic and effective in confronting the crisis. Rather than resolving deep rooted problems, it adds wood to the fire and heightens political complications. The most recent and palpable proof of this is the present Honduran crisis arising from that country's attempts to institutionalize its political structures. The Honduran elections next December will be a decisive factor in shaping the context of events in Central America and the rest of the continent.

When asked in Brazil whether Nicaragua could withstand further US pressure, President Ortega replied: "It's better to ask: Will Latin America tolerate it? Nicaragua's battle is Latin America's, too." The so called Peace Plan, which will put the Contadora initiative to the test, represents an important touchstone for the evaluation of Latin America's capacity to stand up to the US

(Translator's note: The wording of English speakers' quotes in this article may be slightly inaccurate because they have been retranslated from Spanish language sources.)

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