Nicaragua
The Elections Reagan Would Like to Forget: An Analysis of the November 4 Election Results
Envío team
The “MIG crisis,” which began only two days after Nicaragua’s November 4 elections, banished the electoral results from the focus of worldwide public opinion like a cyclone dumping mountains of mud on an urban landscape. In the words of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) delegation that had come to observe Nicaragua’s elections, “They were literally buried under an avalanche of alarmist news reports, based on secret intelligence information deliberately leaked to the US television networks by Reagan administration officials, which portrayed a massive, Soviet-supplied offensive arms build-up in Nicaragua, allegedly aimed at giving the Sandinistas the capacity to invade neighboring countries.”
The fallacy of these reports became apparent after a few days, but the damage had already been done. According to the LASA delegation, the uproar over the initial leaks helped the Reagan administration to attain one of its objectives: “to distract attention from the Nicaraguan elections, with their heavy turnout, absence of irregularities, and competitiveness (a 33% opposition vote).... The outcome of the Nicaraguan elections was virtually ignored in the United States and Western Europe.” (Latin American Studies Association, The Electora1 Process in Nicaragua: Domestic and International Influences. November 19, 1984, page 31.)
Opportunity for a new electoral analysisOn the basis of its successful propaganda stunt, the Reagan administration began to spread the word that Nicaragua’s elections had been “a sham.” The unleashing of the MIG crisis before the Supreme Electoral Council had finished the tallying process helped to obscure any information on the final election results. The nebulous obscurity encircling Nicaragua’s election process has provided cover for the verbal onslaught with which Reagan is determined to fight to the end in an attempt to obtain renewed Congressional financing for the contras. He has constantly repeated that the Sandinista government lacks the legitimacy of a representative democracy. Moreover, he and other administration officials have been able to state their policy objective of “removing the present structure of the Sandinista government” without being systematically refuted by the public opinion of those who might have retained a vivid memory of Nicaragua’s election results.
In the November and December 1984 issues of envío, we analyzed Nicaragua’s electoral results at a national level and provided a description of the days leading up to the elections, election day itself, and the days that followed. The Supreme Electoral Council has just finished its final review of the results and has made them available to the general public. Therefore, we can now provide our readers with a more detailed examination of Nicaragua’s 1984 electoral results.
Some sectors of world opinion have already taken stands against Nicaragua’s revolution and consider it irredeemable. The White House has been first and foremost among them. An illustration of the Reagan administration’s analysis of Nicaragua is the response of Robert R. Reilly, Special Assistant to President Reagan for Public Liaison, to LASA’s Executive Director, who had sent Reagan a copy of the association’s Nicaraguan election report: “The FSLN, a Marxist-Leninist party since its inception, sees as the only utility of elections the provision of a patina of legitimacy to its regime.” As proof of this categorical assertion, Reilly mentions a secret speech made by Bayardo Arce to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party. In this speech, according to Reilly, Arce “stated that the election was an inconvenience imposed by the United States and would be used only to legitimize FSLN power after which such silly bourgeois window dressing should be dropped.” (LASA sent envío a copy of Reilly’s letter with its report on the elections.)
It would seem that Arce did make such a statement, for the Managua newspaper La Prensa printed the text of the speech without censorship. However, Reilly does not consider the possibility that one member of the FSLN’s National Directorate was expressing a political position that his party was to defeat. It is certainly true, as Reilly affirmed, that several Sandinista leaders had made statements to the effect that “elections would not put political power at stake in Nicaragua.” Nevertheless, although Reilly makes no reference to this point, FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega declared during the electoral campaign that power would be given to whichever party won the elections and that the 1983 Political Parties Law defines political parties as “groups of citizens” whose objective is “to vie for political power.”
Some opinions from observersNo analysis of the election results will convince those who profoundly believe that the Sandinistas do not take elections or democracy seriously. Be that as it may, the observation experiences of quite a few delegations from different countries and institutions led to diverse conclusions that nonetheless coincided in acknowledging the legitimacy of Nicaragua’s elections. According to a joint delegation sent by the International Human Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin America, “If the elections do not solve all Nicaragua’s problems, and elections rarely do, the electoral process served a number of purposes. The process created a political opening. Party organizations are developing. Nicaraguans have received a taste of an open political system and it will be increasingly difficult to justify a return to the previous situation. Nicaraguans also have seen an efficient and honest electoral system at work and this should build confidence for future elections.” (International Human Rights Law Group and Washington Office on Latin America, A Political Opening in Nicaragua: Report on the Nicaraguan Elections of November 4, 1984. December 1984, pages 49-50.)
The Irish delegation, composed of parliamentarians from several parties, came to the following conclusions.
“We believe that the election in Nicaragua was a free and fair one, in particular we note the following:
- The electoral process was carried out with total integrity. Despite the general conditions in the country, voting took place with all the necessary precautions and safeguards for a valid result.
- As observers of the elections and on the basis of the wide range of political and social representatives we interviewed, we have no doubt regarding the validity of the election results.
- The seven parties participating in the elections represent a broad spectrum of political ideologies and are an indication of the pluralism of political life in that country.
- Nicaragua, despite considerable efforts to diversify its trading partners and financial sources and improve the living standards of its people through its economic programs, is facing critical destabilization springing from opposition to the present administration by the United States.” (Irish Inter-Parliamentary Delegation, The Elections in Nicaragua, November 1984. November 21, 1984, page 3.)
The Church figures and members of human rights organizations who comprised the Canadian delegation expressed these views on Nicaragua’s elections:
- The electoral law of Nicaragua is excellent.
- The elections were well-administered under exceptionally difficult conditions.
- Opposition parties, representing political options very distinct from the FSLN, freely expressed their criticisms of the government.
- People participated democratically in the electoral process, with one third voting for parties other than the FSLN
- The non-participation of a coalition of three parties is regrettable and the US role in their abstention highly questionable.
- Fair recourse was available for dealing with complaints.
- The vast majority of Nicaraguans supported the FSLN during the war against the Somoza dictatorship, supported the FSLN during five years of reconstruction, social change and continuing war, and elected and FSLN-led government on November 4. (Canadian Church and Human Rights Delegation, Nicaragua 1984: Democracy, Elections and War. December 1984, page 38.)
The delegation sent by the Churches of Holland summarized its observations as follows:
“We do think that the November 4 elections were a step in the direction of pluralist democracy. Following free elections in which the people had a real opportunity to express their political choice, the FSLN cannot return to superficial mechanisms in order to legitimize its power. In the first place, the population has declared itself in favor of free elections as such; and secondly, it gave majority support to the FSLN. The electoral process constituted a form of parliamentary and political education.” (Group of Representatives from the Churches of Holland, statements in VIAL, issue 206, December 7, 1984.)
A US foundation from the state of Virginia provided the following analysis of the elections’ significance:
“But, more importantly, this was the first time that a multi-party election has been held in a country undergoing a profound social revolution. One party cannot represent the interests of all classes and sectors, a fact which is demonstrated by the twenty-nine percent of Nicaraguans who voted for parties to the right of the FSLN. Nor does historical experience show that the self-criticism of a revolutionary party in power is sufficient, no matter how well-intentioned it might be. In this sense, the Sandinistas have embarked upon an experiment more daring and of potentially greater significance than anything they have done so far.” (Tidewater Nicaragua Project Foundation, Nicaragua Votes. Virginia, 1984, page 3.)
Even the least enthusiastic statements, like those of the European Parliament’s official delegation, reveal a measure of good sense that is completely lacking in the declarations coming from the Reagan government:
“The fact that the opposition parties won 32% of the valid votes means: (1) that the Sandinistas have benefited from their identification with a victorious revolution; and (2) that Nicaragua is not presently a totalitarian state, although the capacities and courage of the elected and non-elected opposition will be vital in determining whether democracy will thrive in Nicaragua or whether this country will gradually slip in the direction of a one-party regime.” (Official European Parliament Observers Delegation to the Nicaraguan Presidential and Legislative Elections on November 4, 1984, Rapport au bureau élargi du Parlement Européen, page 5.)
Finally, several of the delegations expressed their conviction that the nonparticipation of the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Committee (CDN) had been decided from the beginning and that the CDN parties had been instructed not to participate by the Reagan administration, which described this coalition of parties as Nicaragua’s “strongest opposition group.” (See the documents presented by LASA (pages 20 and 30); the Irish Inter-Parliamentary Delegation (page 7); the International Human Rights Law Group and Washington Office on Latin America (pages 36-37, 47-49, and 51-52); and the Canadian Church and Human Rights Delegation (pages 25-28).)
Analysis of the electionsThe following analyses are based on the results of the presidential election. The differences between the National Assembly and presidential results are generally too small to be significant.
The departmentsThe elections results on the departmental level reveal notable differences in the population’s electoral behavior. Participation was highest in the departments of Estelí (86% of registered voters) and Managua (81.9%). In the departments of Madriz—which borders on Estelí—Chinandega, and León, participation reached 79%. Rivas, Granada, Carazo, and Masaya were also above the national average of 75.4%.
It is interesting to note that 74.8% of the registered population took part in the elections in the Río San Juan, the Special Zone III, which borders on Costa Rica and has been an active war theater. In Nueva Segovia, participation surpassed 70%. With 54.6%, the northern department of Jinotega, severely battered by the war, was the only one to fall below 60%. Participation rates of less than 65% were registered in Boaco, Chontales, and Central Zelaya. Finally, Matagalpa and the two Atlantic Coast special regions (Northern and Southern Zelaya) had participation figures between 65% and 69%.
This departmental data indicate that in the war zones (Jinotega, Central Zelaya, and part of Matagalpa) and areas with a very traditionalistic peasant population and extensive cattle farming (Boaco and Chontales), fewer people wanted or were able to vote. Regions V (Matagalpa and Jinotega) and VI (Nueva Segovia, Madriz, and Estelí) contained 21.4% of the total population registered to vote. Despite frequent fighting in these departments, some of the heaviest voting took place in Estelí, Madriz, Chinandega, and Río San Juan.
The highest percentages of null votes were cast in Southern Zelaya (11.8% of all votes cast) and Madriz (10.1%). León (4.1%) and Chinandega (4.5%) registered the lowest null rates.
The FSLN won the outright majority of votes (with respect to the total number of registered voters) in six departments: Estelí (59.9%), Chinandega (56.5%), Río San Juan (56.1%), León (54.4%), Managua (52.1%), and Rivas (50.7%). These six departments contained 54.3% of the country’s registered voters. However, lower figures for the FSLN in the other departments reduced the national average to 47.4% of all registered voters.
The FSLN won an outright majority of the votes cast in 17 of the 18 departments or zones. The only exception was Boaco, where the FSLN tally was 49%. However, the FSLN obtained over 50% of the valid votes in every department and zone.
Basing the analysis on the total number of votes cast, we find that the FSLN achieved its best performances in Río San Juan (75%), Chinandega (71.1%), Estelí (69.7%), León (68.2%), Northern Zelaya (66.8%), Nueva Segovia (65.1%), and Carazo (64.1%). Its weakest showings were in Boaco (49%), Granada (51%), Masaya (53.8%), Matagalpa (56.1%), and Southern Zelaya (56.9%). The departments with the highest numbers of agricultural workers and strongly politicized rural populations gave the FSLN its most solid majorities. (The Rural Workers’ Association developed its first roots in Carazo as a result of work carried out by members of the Delegates of the Word movement.) The FSLN won similar majorities in the corresponding departmental capitals: Estelí (70.2%); Jinotepe, Carazo (71.4%); León (69.6%); and Chinandega (69.%). On the contrary, the strong support for the FSLN in Northern Zelaya was not due to the votes received in the capital town of Puerto Cabezas (54.4%) but rather to the municipalities located in the mining region: Siuna (73.5%), Rosita (72.5%), and Bonanza (82.8%). The weakest support for the FSLN came from Southern Zelaya, as well as from the areas dominated by a traditionalistic rural population characterized by its strong links with Conservative landowners, large-scale coffee growers, and agricultural commerce.
The runner-up Democratic Conservative Party (PCD), with 13.2% of the votes cast at a national level, received its greatest support in Boaco (15.3% of the registered voters and 24.2% of the votes cast), Masaya (17.6% and 23.1%), Granada (16.1% and 20.7%), Chontales (11.2% and 18.6%), Central Zelaya (10.6% and 17.6%), and Matagalpa (10.9% and 16.6%). Its weakest showings were in Chinandega (3.8% and 4.8%), Nueva Segovia (4.6% and 6.4%), Estelí (5.4% and 6.3%), León (6% and 7.5%), Río San Juan (6.7% and 9%), and Rivas (7.3% and 9.3%).
The Independent Liberal Party (PLI) finished third, with 9% of the votes cast at the national level. Its best performances came generally from the departments where the FSLN was strongest: Rivas (10.7% of the registered voters and 13.7% of the votes cast), León (10.9% and 13.6%), Southern Zelaya (9.6% and 14.1%), Estelí (9.7% and 11.3%), Nueva Segovia (7.9% and 11%), and Chinandega (8.2% and 10.3%). The PLI’s poorest results came from Central Zelaya (3% and 5.1%), Northern Zelaya (3.1% and 4.5%), Chontales (3.7% and 6.1%), Carazo (4.1% and 5.2%), Boaco (4.7% and 7.5%), and Managua (5.8% and 7.1%). These results demonstrate two tendencies: (1) the PLI’s capacity to win votes in areas strongly dominated by the FSLN; and (2) the historical contrast between zones of Liberal and Conservative influence.
The Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) came in fourth, with 5.2% of the total votes cast. This party, which originated from a split with the Social Christians, attained its best results in the departments of: Granada (5.8% of the registered voters and 7.4% of the votes cast), Managua (5.1% and 6.3%), Chinandega (4.7% and 5.9%), and Boaco (4.5% and 7.1%). It won a higher percentage of votes in historically Conservative and urban areas. In the municipality of Boaco, it received 8.7% and 13%; in Granada, 7.1% and 9%; in Puerto Cabezas, 5.6% and 7.7%; and in Managua, 5.5% and 6.7%. The PPSC won 8% of the votes cast in 2 of the 11 polling districts situated in the city of Managua. Its weakest performances came mostly from those departments farthest from the capital, where its recent organizational efforts have scarcely made inroads: Río San Juan (0.8% and 1%), Estelí (2.4% and 2.7%), Madriz (2.6% and 3.3%), Chontales (2.6% and 4.3%), León (2.7% and 3.4%), and Rivas (2.8% and 3.6%).
Together, the three small leftist parties totaled 3.6% of the total votes cast. The Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN), which finished fifth, had 1.7% of the registered voters and 2.2% of the votes cast in Madriz, where the rural population is considerably impoverished and semi-proletarian. The Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) obtained 1.4% and 1.8% in the department of Granada, while the Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP-ML) won 1.3% and 2.1% in Central Zelaya, the heart of Nicaragua’s “agricultural frontier.” The results attained by these three parties in the rest of the country are so insignificant that there is no need to mention them, although it is interesting to note that none of them won even 1.5% of the votes cast in the department of Managua.
The municipalitiesNicaragua has 139 municipalities. A look at the municipal results reveals even more clearly the variations in the Nicaraguans’ electoral behavior.
Two extremes in participation were (1) Somotillo, in the department of Chinandega close to the Honduran border, where 99.1% of those registered cast their votes at the polls, and (2) Bocana de Paiwás, a war-torn municipality in Central Zelaya, where 86.2% of the registered voters were unable or chose not to vote.
In ten other Nicaraguan municipalities, voter participation surpassed 89% of the registration figures: in the department of Estelí, Estelí (89.2%) and Pueblo Nuevo (89.5%); in Madriz, Las Sabanas (91.8%) and San Lucas (93.8%); in León, Achuapa (95.5%); in Managua, Ticuantepe (90.8%); in Northern Zelaya, Bonanza (89.6%); in Chinandega, San Pedro del Norte (92.1%), San Francisco del Norte (89.8%), and Cinco Pinos (89.7%).
In 23 other municipalities, abstention varied between 40% and 73% of the registered voters: in Madriz, San Juan del Ro Coco (40.3%); in Masaya, San Juan de Oriente (40.9%); in Rivas, Moyogalpa (40.8%); in Boaco, Camoapa (52.6%); in Chontales, San Pedro de Lóvago (45.2%), Villa Sandino (46.6%), Santo Tomas (51.5%), Santo Domingo (53.7%), and Comalapa (59.8%); in Central Zelaya, Paiwas (40.9%), Rama (45%), and Muelle de los Bueyes (54.3%); in Matagalpa, Muy Muy (41.2%), Matiguás (42.7%), and Río Blanco (61%); in Jinotega, Yalí (42.8%), Wiwilí (45.3%), El Cuá (50.7%), San Rafael del Norte (51.5%), Pantasma (56.1%), and San José Bocay (72.9%); in Northern Zelaya, Siuna and Waslala (45.4%); in Southern Zelaya, La Cruz del Río Grande (56.1%).
In 55 municipalities, voter participation was equal to or greater than the national average of 75.4%. In 49 municipalities, participation varied between 60.2% and 75.3%. Of the country’s 139 municipalities, 66 equaled or surpassed the figure of 75.4% participation at the polls, while 73 did not.
We again find a great deal of diversity on the municipal level when we examine the number of null votes. The two extremes are far apart. San Francisco del Norte (Chinandega), where participation reached 88.8%, was the municipality with the lowest number of null votes (0.9% of the ballots cast). In contrast, Ciudad Antigua (Nueva Segovia), with a 70.5% participation rate, had a null figure of 33.5%
In 11 municipalities (including 4 in León, 3 in Chinandega, 2 in Rivas, 1 in Southern Zelaya, and 1 in Río San Juan), null votes represented 3.5% or less of all ballots cast. In 18 municipalities (5 in León, 3 in Chinandega, 3 in Carazo, 3 in Río San Juan, 2 in Chontales, 1 in Managua, and 1 in Masaya), null votes amounted to 4.5% or less. In 39 municipalities, the null rate was between 4.6% and the national average of 6.1%: 6 in Chinandega, 5 in Managua, 5 in Rivas, 4 in Carazo, 3 in Masaya, 3 in Central Zelaya, 3 in Jinotega, 2 in Madriz, 2 in Granada, 2 in Northern Zelaya, 1 in Estelí, 1 in Boaco, 1 in Chontales, and 1 Chontales, and 1 in Matagalpa. In 43 municipalities, null votes varied between 6.2% and 8.9%: 7 in Matagalpa, 5 in Nueva Segovia, 5 in Masaya, 3 in Estelí, 3 in Rivas, 3 in Boaco, 3 in Central Zelaya, 3 in Northern Zelaya, 2 in Jinotega, 2 in Granada, 2 in Chontales, 1 in Madriz, 1 in León, 1 in Managua, 1 in Carazo, and 1 in Río San Juan. Finally, in 26 municipalities, null votes totaled between 9% and 18.5% of the ballots cast: 6 in Madriz, 5 in Nueva Segovia, 3 in Chontales, 3 in Jinotega, 3 in Matagalpa, 2 in Boaco, 2 in Southern Zelaya, 1 in Estelí, and 1 in León.
In 18 municipalities, there was a relationship between a small percentage of voters (less than 70%) and a large percentage of null votes (more than 9%): San Juan de Río Coco and Telpaneca in Madriz; Quilalí, San Fernando, and Mozonte in Nueva Segovia; San Nicolás in León; Boaco and Camoapa in Boaco; Comalapa, San Pedro de Lóvago, and Villa Sandino in Chontales; Terrabona, San Dionisio, and Río Blanco in Matagalpa; San Rafael del Norte and Pantasma in Jinotega; Bluefields and Corn Island in Southern Zelaya. This relationship did not exist in 34 other municipalities, where participation amounted to less than 70% and null votes represent less than 9%. Therefore, one can assume that there was a high degree of political rejection of the elections in the first 18 municipalities, whereas such a hypothesis would not seem valid in the remaining 34.
The FSLN received at least two-thirds of the votes cast in 51 of Nicaragua’s 139 municipalities: 9 in Chinandega, 6 in Nueva Segovia, 6 in León, 4 in Estelí, 4 in Madriz, 4 in Northern Zelaya, 3 in Carazo, 3 in Rivas, 3 in Río San Juan, 2 in Chontales, 2 in Central Zelaya, 2 in Jinotega, 1 in Managua, 1 in Boaco, and 1 in Southern Zelaya.
The FSLN won between 50% and 66.5% of the votes cast in 64 municipalities: 7 in Masaya, 7 in Rivas, 7 in Matagalpa, 5 in León, 5 in Managua, 4 in Chinandega, 4 in Carazo, 3 in Madriz, 3 in Nueva Segovia, 3 in Granada, 3 in Boaco, 3 in Chontales, 3 in Central Zelaya, 2 in Jinotega, 2 in Río San Juan, 1 in Estelí, 1 in Northern Zelaya, and 1 in Southern Zelaya.
In 24 municipalities, the FSLN tallied less than 50% of the votes cast: 4 in Matagalpa, 3 in Nueva Segovia, 3 in Chontales, 3 in Jinotega, 2 in Madriz, 2 in Masaya, 2 in Boaco, 1 in Managua, 1 in Carazo, 1 in Granada, 1 in Central Zelaya, and 1 in Southern Zelaya. Only in one municipality (Teustepe, in the department of Boaco) did the FSLN fail to receive more votes than any of the other parties. However, not only in Teustepe, but also in Yalagüina (Madriz), Mozonte (Nueva Segovia), San Rafael del Sur (Managua), Tisma and La Concepción (Masaya), San Pedro de Lóvago (Chontales), and San Rafael del Norte (Jinotega), the FSLN obtained less votes than the sum of those won by all the other parties together. The FSLN received a national average of 62.9% of the votes cast.
The PCD finished first in Teustepe, with 41.8% of the votes cast. Moreover, it won over 30% of the votes in six other municipalities; La Concepción (35.4%) and Catarina (30.8%) in Masaya; San Rafael del Sur (32.7%), Villa Carlos Fonseca (32.3%), and Ticuantepe (30.8%), in Managua; and Dolores (30.3%), in Carazo. The PCD received between 25% and 30% of the votes cast in nine municipalities: Tipitapa and San Francisco Libre (Managua), Nindirí (Masaya), La Paz (Carazo), San José de los Remates (Boaco), Comalapa and Villa Sandino (Chontales), Ciudad Darío and Terrabona (Matagalpa). The Conservatives won between 20% and 25% of the votes cast in 17 municipalities, including the important towns of Granada, Diriamba, and Puerto Cabezas. The worst results for the PCD (less than 5% of the votes cast) were distributed over 12 municipalities: 5 in Chinandega, 2 in Rivas, 1 in Central Zelaya, 1 in Jinotega, 1 in Northern Zelaya, 1 in Southern Zelaya, and 1 in Río San Juan. The Conservatives’ national average was 13.2% of the total votes cast.
The PLI attained its highest total in La Concordia, Jinotega: 24.1%. In 5 other municipalities, the PLI received at least 20% of the votes: Mozonte (Nueva Segovia), Quezalguaque (León), San Jorge and Moyogalpa (Rivas), and Río Blanco (Matagalpa). In 12 municipalities, the PLI won between 15% and 20% of the votes: 3 in León, 2 in Madriz, 1 in Estelí, 1 in Nueva Segovia, 1 in Chinandega, 1 in Rivas, 1 in Jinotega, 1 in Southern Zelaya, and 1 in Río San Juan. The worst PLI results came from 26 municipalities in which its tallies failed to reach 4% of the votes cast: 4 in Chinandega, 4 in Jinotega, 3 in Northern Zelaya, 2 in Managua, 2 in Carazo, 2 in Chontales, 2 in Central Zelaya, 2 in Río San Juan, 1 in Nueva Segovia, 1 in León, 1 in Masaya, 1 in Rivas, and 1 in Southern Zelaya. The PLI’s national average was 9% of the votes cast.
The PPSC, which came in fourth nationally, managed to win the third position in 20 Nicaraguan municipalities. It won its best results in Corinto, Chinandega, where it came in second with 14.2% of the votes cast. In five municipalities, the PPSC moved up by pushing the Conservatives into fourth place: Ocotal (5.4%) and Ciudad Antigua (6.2%) in Nueva Segovia; León (4.5%); Chinandega (6.4%) and Chichigalpa (8.1%) in Chinandega. In the following 15 municipalities, the PPSC displaced the PLI by moving into third place: Cusmapa in Madriz; Mateare in Managua; Jinotepe, Diriamba, Dolores, and El Rosario in Carazo; Boaco, San Pedro de Lóvago, and Santo Domingo in Chontales; Nueva Guinea, in Central Zelaya; Terrabona, in Matagalpa; Siuna, Rosita, Bonanza, and Puerto Cabezas in Northern Zelaya. The PPSC did better than its 5.2% national average in 23 of Nicaragua’s municipalities.
The PCN obtained its best results in Santa María, Nueva Segovia, with 3.5%. The PSN’s highest mark was in Granada: 2.2%. The MAP-ML achieved its highest tally in Nueva Guinea, Central Zelaya: 2.4%.
The citiesNicaragua has the highest percentage of urban residents in Central America: 53.8% according to 1980 figures. (In Costa Rica and El Salvador, which follow Nicaragua in this category, the 1980 figures were 45.7% and 44.1% respectively.) Moreover, the percentage of Nicaragua’s population living in the capital in 1980 was also considerably higher than that of its Central American neighbors: Managua (28.1%), San José (22.4%), Tegucigalpa (13.4%), Guatemala (11.7%), and San Salvador (9.2%)
The information at our disposal for the study of Nicaragua’s urban voting patterns is the data on the 26 municipalities that are either departmental capitals or have more than 10,000 citizens registered to vote. (In the municipalities, no distinction has been drawn between rural and urban areas.)
In 14 of these 26 municipalities, participation was below the national average: Wiwilí (54.7%), Jinotega (60.2%), Matagalpa (66.6%), Boaco (67.2%), Bluefields (69.2%), Nagarote (70%), Nueva Guinea (70.6%), Ciudad Dario (71.6%), Juigalpa (72.5%), San Rafael del Sur (72.5%), El Viejo (72.6%), Puerto Cabezas (72.7%), Diriamba (73.9%), and Chichigalpa (75.3%). In the other 12 municipalities, participation was above the national average of 75.4%: Masaya (75.5%), San Carlos (78.9%), Tipitapa (79%), Granada (79%), Jinotepe (80.3%), Ocotal (81.3%), Chinandega (81.7%), León (82.3%), Managua (82.6%), Rivas (82.8%), Somoto (86.9%), and Estelí (88.2%).
In 13 of the most urban municipalities, the percentage of null votes was higher than the national average of 6.1%: Bluefields (12.3%), Boaco (10.5%), Jinotega (8.7%), Matagalpa (8.5%), Puerto Cabezas (8.5%), Ocotal (8.1%), Somoto (7.3%), Granada (6.9%), Ciudad Dario (6.9%), San Rafael del Sur (6.7%, Masaya (6.3%), Nueva Guinea (6.3%), and Estelí (6.3%). In the other 13 municipalities, the percentage of null votes was lower than or equal to the national average: Juigalpa (6.1%), Wiwilí (5.9%), Chichigalpa (5.4%), Jinotepe (5.2%), Managua (5.1%), Diriamba (5.1%), Rivas (4.7%), Tipitapa (4.6%), El Viejo (4.6%), Chinandega (4.4%), Nagarote (4.3%), León (4.2%), and San Carlos (4.1%).
In the 13 following urban municipalities, the FSLN surpassed its national average of 62.9% of the votes cast: San Carlos (81.4%), Wiwilí (78.7%), Jinotepe (71.9%), Estelí (70.2%), El Viejo (69.7%), León (69.6%), Chinandega (69%), Somoto (67.5%), Chichigalpa (66.4%), Managua (65.1%), Ocotal (64.8%), Rivas (64.7%), and Juigalpa (63.7%). Only in 3 of the other 13 urban municipalities did the FSLN not win the outright. majority of votes cast: San Rafael del Sur (46.6%), Granada (46.9%), and Ciudad Dario (48.4%).
The PCD obtained its best urban results in San Rafael del Sur (32.7%), Ciudad Dario (29.2%), Nagarote (21.5%), Tipitapa (20.4%), Granada (16.3%), Masaya (15.5%), Puerto Cabezas (15.5%), and Diriamba (15%). These were the only urban areas (8 out of 26) where the PCD succeeded in surpassing its national average. Keeping in mind Nicaragua’s political and historical tradition, one should not be surprised to discover that the Conservatives’ sturdiest electoral support came from rural areas.
The PLI bettered its national average of 9% in 12 of the 26 urban municipalities: Ocotal (15.8%), Rivas (15.6%), Bluefields (15.1%), León (14.6%), Diriamba (14%), Estelí (12.2%), Granada (12.2%), Chinandega (12%), Nagarote (12%), Matagalpa (11.2%), Chichigalpa (10.5%), El Viejo (10.4%), and Masaya (9.1%).
The PPSC also improved on its national average of 5.2% in 12 of the country’s 26 urban municipalities: Boaco (13.1%), Granada (9%), Chichigalpa (8.1%), Puerto Cabezas (7.7%), Nueva Guinea (7.1%), Managua (6.7%), Masaya (6.7%), Chinandega (6.4%), Diriamba (6.2%), Jinotepe (5.8%), Jinotega (5.8%), and Ocotal (5.4%).
The great losers in the urban areas were clearly the three leftist parties. Only in two urban municipalities did they manage to receive over 2% of the vote; the PCN won 2.6% in El Viejo, and the PSN totaled 2.2% in Masaya.
The city of ManaguaFor electoral purposes, the municipality of Managua was divided into 11 zones. Two of these zones are more rural than urban: Zone 2 covers the area near the beginning of the Old Highway to León; and Zone 11 comprises an extensive stretch of land between the Pan-American Highway heading south and the Masaya Highway. Part of Zone 8, which includes the locality of Esquipulas, is also considered rural.
Zones 4 (including the Bolonia neighborhood), 6 (Los Robles, Planes de Altamira, Villa Panamá, etc.), and 11 (Altos de Santo Domingo and Santo Domingo Las Sierritas, for example) are areas where a sizable proportion of Managua’s wealthy families reside. Zone 1 corresponds to Ciudad Sandino, a large working-class district that, because of flooding and the 1972 earthquake in downtown Managua, has grown up over the last 15 years on alluvial lands far from the center of the city. Zone 1 also includes the wealthy Eduardo Contreras neighborhood, near the Asososca Lake. Zone 3 encompasses the populous Monseñor Lezcano district, whose residents are mostly working-class families and small businesspeople. However, it also contains Las Palmas, an affluent neighborhood. Zone 6, mentioned earlier, is composed primarily of the Camilo Ortega, Sierra Maestra, and San Judas districts, whose residents are among the poorest of Managua.
Part of Zone 8 covers the middle-class districts of Bosques de Altamira, Colonia Centroamérica, and Reparto Schick. Nevertheless, it also comprises some of the working-class eastern districts, which distinguished themselves during the insurrection: Riguero, Máximo Jeréz, México. Zones 7 and 9 contain the middle-class neighborhoods of Ciudad Jardín and Bello Horizonte, respectively.
Zones 9 and 10 contain Managua’s heaviest population concentrations, situated on both sides of the North highway, which leads to the airport, and on both sides of the major arteries connecting the Masaya and North highways. Many high-ranking public officials live in Las Colinas (Zone 8), Pancasán (Zone 8), Villa Panamá (Zone 6), and Los Robles (Zone 6). The map illustrates these indications.
All 11 zones of Managua surpassed the 75.4% national average for voter participation. The lowest rates were in Zones 2 (78.3%) and 11 (78.8%). The highest figures were to be found in Zone 5 (86.3%), a sparsely populated area surrounding the former downtown sector, and in Zone 1, Ciudad Sandino and Eduardo Contreras (86.2%). Participation in the remaining zones varied between 81% and 83.8%. Only Zone 7 (Ciudad Jardín, Larreynaga, Tenderí, Jorge Dimitrov, etc.) equaled the national average of null votes (6.1% of those cast). Zone 1 had the lowest percentage of null votes: 3.3%.
The FSLN obtained its best results in underpopulated Zone 5 (72.1%); Zone 6: San Judas, Sierra Maestra, Camilo Ortega, Los Robles, Planes de Altamira (70.4%); Zone 4: Bolonia, Colonia Divino Pastor, María Mazarello, etc. (68%); Zone 1: Ciudad Sandino and Eduardo Contreras (66.7%); and Zone 10, the most populous zone in Managua: Ducualí, El Dorado, La Nicarao, Las Américas, Rubenia, La 14 de Septiembre, Villa Venezuela, Villa Revolución, Villa Libertad, Colonia La URSS, Colonia Georgino Andrade, Omar Torrijos, and Primero de Mayo (66.6%). The worst results for the FSLN came from Zone 11, the rural localities of Silvia Ferrufino and San Isidro de la Cruz Verde and the residential districts of Altos de Santo Domingo and Santo Domingo Las Sierritas (52.6%); Zone 2, the semi-rural area of the Old Highway to León (55.5%); and Zone 7, Ciudad Jardín, Larreynaga, Tenderí, and Jorge Dimitrov (61.7%).
The Conservatives’ strongest showings were in Zones 11 (26.8%), 2 (24.5%), and 1 (16.7%). Its worst results came from Zones 6 (9.1%), 10 (10.4%), and 4 (10.7%).
The PLI did best in Zones 9 (8.9%), 7 (8.6%), and 10 (8.3%). Its lowest tallies were reported in Zones 5 (4.8%), 1 (5.3%), and 6 (6.1%).
The PPSC scored highest in Zones 3 (8.2%), 9 (8%), and 7 (7.1%). Its lowest counts came from Zones 1 (4.9%), 5 (4.9%), and 2 (5.1%).
None of the three leftist parties won 2% in any of Managua’s zones. The Communists had their best results in Zones 6 and 10, with 1.6%. The Socialists ran up their highest counts in Zones 9 and 10, with 1.4%. The MAP-ML’s highest results were reported in Zones 1 (0.9%) and 11 (0.8%). Ironically, the archbishopric is located in Zone 11.
In two of the three zones where the PCD obtained its best results, the FSLN had its poorest showings (Zones 11 and 2). In the zone where the PLI received its second-best results and the PPSC its third best, the FSLN tallied its third-worst count (Zone 7). The third-best results for both the FSLN and PCD came from Zone 1. The third best for the PLI and fourth best for the FSLN coincided in Zone 10. The PLI and PPSC made their strongest and second-strongest showings, respectively, in Zone 9, where neither the FSLN nor PCD did particularly well. Finally, the PPSC obtained its best results for Managua in Zone 3, where none of the other three front-running parties attained its top performance.
The countrysideIn very general terms, it is possible to divide Nicaragua’s rural population into three categories: (1) those peasants who have grown progressively poor and, in a certain sense, have become proletarians by taking on salaried agricultural work on a seasonal or permanent basis; (2) peasants who produce on their own plot of land or who belong to a cooperative and who sell their produce to buyers in the cities, especially Managua (many times producers and sellers are members of the same nuclear family); and (3) the more traditional peasant population, composed predominantly of plantation workers and families that produce mostly for their own consumption; these peasants, who live relatively far from urban centers, are to be found from the mountain spurs to the agricultural frontier that penetrates into the Atlantic Coast region. The first group, the proletarianized peasants, reside mostly in the municipalities of León and Chinandega, along a stretch of the Pan-American Highway that runs close to the Pacific Coast; in several municipalities of the department of Managua; in Estelí and the Western Segovias; in parts of Rivas; and in certain municipalities of Matagalpa’s Sébaco Valley. The second group, the produce-selling peasants, live for the most part in the municipalities that comprise Masaya, Granada, and Carazo. The third group, traditional peasants, is located in the Eastern Segovias, Matagalpa, Jinotega, Boaco, Chontales, and the agricultural frontier of Zelaya.
Electoral participation also varied greatly in Nicaragua’s rural areas. For the purpose of this analysis, we are including 110 municipalities in the rural classification. (8 of these, because of their mixed nature, were also included in the 26 urban municipalities.) Of these 110, 31 belong to the first category of proletarianized peasants; 21 to the produce-selling second category; and 58 to the third category, the traditional peasants.
In these rural municipalities (excluding Special Regions I and II of the Atlantic Coast and Special Region III, which is the department of Río San Juan), voter participation was equal to or greater than the national average of 75.4% in 53 cases, falling below the national average in the remaining 57 municipalities. Differences from one category to another were substantial. 22 of the 31 municipalities (71%) in the first category equaled or surpassed the national average for participation, with 9 of the 31 (29%) remaining under this average. In 14 of the 21 municipalities (66.7%) in the second category, voter participation reached or surpassed the average, and in 7 (33.3%) it fell below the average. However, in only 17 of the 58 municipalities (29.3%) in the third category did the participation equal or better the national average. In the other 41 municipalities (70.7%), participation did not attain the average. The municipalities of this third category also had the highest percentage of null votes.
The FSLN exceeded its national average of 62.9% in 22 of the 31 municipalities (71%) of the first category. It did the same in only 7 of the 21 municipalities (33.3%) of the second category. In the third category, 24 of the 58 municipalities (41.4%) gave the FSLN a higher percentage of the vote than the national average. These results reflect several things: the success of programs such as PRONORTE for the peasants of the western Segovias; the emphasis placed on the well-being of cooperatives and armed protection in the border regions; the government’s strong concern for state farms; and the terrible effects of the war and of the interruption of trade on the extensive, thinly populated rural areas. This rural electoral data also reveals the continued existence of Nicaragua’s traditional alliance between the bourgeoisie and certain peasant populations, as well as the results of deteriorating transportation conditions between the countryside and the capital’s marketplaces.
The PCD only equaled or surpassed its national average of 13.2% in 8 of the 31 municipalities (25.8%) in the first category. In contrast, the Conservatives exceeded their average in 19 of the 21 municipalities (90.5%) in the second category. It also improved on its average in 28 of the 58 municipalities (48.3) in the third category.
The PLI matched or bettered its national average of 9% in 16 of the 31 municipalities (51.6%) in the first category. It only outdid the average in 3 of the 21 municipalities (14.3%) in the second category. In the third category, it improved on the average in 20 of the 58 municipalities (34.5%).
The PPSC only surpassed its national average of 5.2% in five rural municipalities: one in the first category and four in the third.
The border zonesTwenty-three Nicaraguan municipalities, excluding Puerto Cabezas, are located near border areas. Of these, 16 are in the north and west of the country, near Honduras, and the other 7 are in the South on the border with Costa Rica.
The five municipalities in the north of Chinandega provided a strong example of voter participation: Somotillo (99.1%), San Pedro del Norte (92.1%), San Francisco del Norte (88.8%), Cinco Pinos (88.7%), and Santo Tomás del Norte (79%). In all these municipalities, null votes amounted to less than 4% of the total, well below the national average of 6.1%. In San Francisco del Norte, null votes represented only 0.9% of all votes cast. In all five of these municipalities, the FSLN won over 80% of all votes cast: San Francisco del Norte (96%), Somotillo (89.4%), San Pedro del Norte (88.8%), Cinco Pinos (85.8%), Santo Tomas del Norte (82.5%).
In El Viejo and Puerto Morazán, on the banks of the Gulf of Fonseca, participation figures were 72.7% and 73.4% respectively, and null votes totaled 4.6% and 3.3%. 69.7% and 72.3% respectively voted for the FSLN, and the PLI was runner up in both cases, with 10.4% and 13.7% of the votes.
The figures varied greatly in Nueva Segovia. In Dipilto, Macuelizo, and Santa María, participation remained above 80%. In Murra, San Fernando, and Mozonte, however, participation was only 64.4%, 61.8%, and 61%, respectively. 86.7% of those registered turned out to vote in Jalapa. In Mozonte (37%) and Dipilto (48.3%), the FSLN received tallies that were among its poorest in the country. In Macuelizo (61.9%), the FSLN came close to its national average. In Santa María, San Fernando, Jalapa, and Murra, it bettered this average handily. Only in Mozonte (13.5%) did the PCD exceed its national average of 13.2%, whereas the PLI surpassed its average of 9% in Mozonte (23.4%), Dipilto (13.4%), Jalapa (11.2%), and Macuelizo (10.6%).
In San José Bocay (27.1%) and Wiwilí (54.7%), voter participation was very low, but null votes did not surpass the national average of 6.1%. In both municipalities, the FSLN won a high percentage of the vote: 72.9% and 78.7%.
In the southern municipalities of Cárdenas and San Juan del Sur, 87% of the registered voters participated in the elections. In San Juan del Sur, null votes totaled only 2.9%, whereas they amounted to 8.1% in Cárdenas. The FSLN won 71.5% of the votes in San Juan del Sur and 90.8% in Cárdenas, where a large military contingent is stationed. In San Juan del Sur, the PLI topped its national average of 9%, reaching 13.3%. The Conservatives fell well below their average in both San Juan del Sur (4.3%) and Cárdenas (1.5%).
The remaining five municipalities are all located in Special Zone III, which corresponds almost exactly to the department of Río San Juan. (The Río San Juan municipality of El Almendro was incorporated into Region V.) Participation in these five municipalities was very irregular: 64% in Morrito, 71% in San Miguelito, 74.8% in El Castillo, 78.9% in the departmental capital of San Carlos, and 82.9% in San Juan del Norte, a military post. Null votes remained at 4.4% or below, except in San Miguelito (7.2%). Voting for the FSLN was uneven: San Juan del Norte (98.6%), El Castillo (83%), San Carlos (81.4%), San Miguelito (63.1%), Morrito (50%). The PCD received 20.2% in Morrito, and the PLI won 17.8%. The PCD also exceeded its national average in San Miguelito (17.1%).
The resettlements:
A result of the warIt is interesting to analyze the electoral results from areas where the population has been resettled, always as a result of the war and sometimes against its will. The best known of these cases is that of the Miskitos who were moved from Waspán and several small localities along the banks of the Río Coco, which forms a segment of Nicaragua’s border with Honduras. These Miskitos were taken to resettlements in Tasba Pri, now a part of the Puerto Cabezas municipality. Another Miskito resettlement is located in Wasminona, in the municipality of Rosita. Other resettlements include one situated in Río San Juan and a well-known one in Jalapa (Nueva Segovia), the municipality on the tip of the “beak” that juts into Honduras. (See the article titled “Jalapa: A Symbol for All Nicaragua” in the February 1984 issue of envío.)
In Tasba Pri, 88.2% of the 3,202 registered voters took part in the elections. Null votes totaled 5.1%, as compared to the national average of 6.1%. The FSLN won 2,018 votes, or 64.1%, slightly more than its national average. The PCD received 21.8%, considerably more than its average. The PPSC finished third, with 4.3%, a lower score than its average of 5.2%. The PLI obtained 2.5% of the votes cast. All three leftist parties together tallied 2.2% of the votes. Therefore, two and a half years after resettlement, Tasba Pri gave the FSLN a solid victory. However, the diversity of the results demonstrates that the FSLN victory in Tasba Pri was not a massive response caused by fear, as would have been the case in what Reagan has described as Nicaragua’s gulags. This diversity can be seen even more clearly in the following table, which breaks down the Tasba Pri results by polling centers.
Another Miskito resettlement, Wasminona, is located in the municipality of Rosita. It had 541 registered voters, of which 461 (85.2%) cast ballots. The PCD came in first, with 178 votes (38.6%), followed by the FSLN with 153 votes (33.2%). The PPSC received 36 votes (7.8%), and the PLI 17 (3.7%). The MAP-ML had 16 votes (3.5%), the PCN 8 (1.7%), and the PSN 6 (1.3%). There were 47 null votes (6%).
In Jalapa, 86.2% of the registered voters participated in the elections, and the null votes (7.2%) exceeded the national average of 6.1%. The votes panned out in the following manner: FSLN 71%, PLI 11.2%, PCD 5.1%, PPSC 1.9%, MAP-ML 1.3%, PCN 1.2%, PSN 1.1%.
Río San Juan has four resettlements in the municipality of San Carlos (Santa Isabel, La Esperanza, Azucena, and Los Chiles); three in San Miguelito (Valencia, San Cristóbal, and San Antonio); and one in Morrito (El Oyate). The electoral results in these resettlements are shown in the table below.
This data indicate that it is very different to analyze the short-term and long-term results of resettlements. Although the displaced populations may feel resentment toward the government immediately after being moved, this is not necessarily the case once they have had time to evaluate the circumstances leading to their resettlement and compare their situation with that existing in the war zones that they had to leave.
Voting results in the region of the Atlantic Coast
Participation in Special Zone I (Northern Zelaya) fell short of the national average of 75.4%. In the municipality of Puerto Cabezas, 30.8% of the registered voters failed to take part in the elections. Null votes in Puerto Cabezas (8.5%) were higher than the national average of 6.1%. In Puerto Cabezas, the FSLN’s tally of 54.4% was almost 10% lower than its national average (62.9%). In contrast, the PCD won significantly more than its national average of 13.2%, with a score of 21.3%. In third place, the PLI (7.7%) remained below its national average of 9%. The mining municipalities had very irregular participation. It was high in Bonanza (89.6%) and Rosita (82.6%) but dropped below the national average in Siuna (60%) and Siuna-Waslala (54.6%), two municipalities where counterrevolutionary aggression has been particularly fierce. Null votes amounted to 4.8% in Bonanza, 5.5% in Siuna-Waslala, 7.1% in Siuna, and 7.8% in Rosita. The FSLN won at least 70% of the votes in all four of these mining municipalities, with 82.8% in Bonanza. In all four municipalities, both the PCD and PLI had results inferior to their national averages. It is important to remember that the nationalization of Nicaragua’s mines, the establishment of retirement pensions, and the implementation of health programs were among the first measures undertaken by the National Reconstruction Government.
In Special Zone II (Southern Zelaya), participation was well below the national average, with 69.2% in Bluefields, 67.7% in Corn Island, and 43.9% in La Cruz del Río Grande. Null votes totaled 12.3% in Bluefields and 9.8% in Corn Island, but only 2.2% in La Cruz del Río Grande. The FSLN won hands down in La Cruz del Río Grande (92.5%) but received only 56.4% of the votes cast in Bluefields and 46.2% in Corn Island. The PLI surpassed its average in Bluefields, with 15.1%, and the PCD improved on its average in Corn Island, winning 19% of the vote. Thus, the Atlantic Coast’s multiethnic vote (that of Mestizos, Creoles, Miskitos, Ramas, Sumus, and Caribes) would seem to be symptomatic of the troubles these populations are suffering.
We have seen some of the Miskito vote in the settlements of Wasminona, where the FSLN did not finish first, and that of Tasba Pri, where the FSLN did win. In Tasba Ponie (Southern Zelaya), not one of the 509 registered voters cast a ballot. In Sandy Bay (Southern Zelaya),* 115 of the 465 registered voters did not participate in the elections, and the remaining 350 who did take part all cast null ballots. In Kakabila (Southern Zelaya), 30 of the 86 registered voters (35%) did not go to the polls. The 56 votes cast were distributed in the following way: PLI 16 (28.5%), FSLN 11 (19.6%), PSN 5 (8.9%), PCN 4 (7.1%), MAP-ML 4 (7.1%), PPSC 4 (7.1%), and PCD 3 (5.3%). In Raitipura (Southern Zelaya), 142 of the 329 registered voters (43.2%) did not vote. Those who did take part divided up their votes as follows: FSLN 122 (65.2%), PCD 20 (10.7%), and PLI 14 (7.5%). Finally, in Karawala (Southern Zelaya), 355 of the 425 registered voters (83%) took part in the elections, and null votes only represented 2.5% of the ballots cast. The FSLN received 247 votes (69.6%), the PCD 59 (21.8%), the PLI 14 (4.3%), and the PPSC 12 (3.4%).
The Miskito votes that we have analyzed correspond to almost 6,000 citizens. In 1981, the Miskito population living in Jinotega and the Atlantic Coast region was estimated at almost 67,000 (see CIDCA’s Demografía Costeña, 1982, page 49). Of these, between 10,000 and 15,000 are presently in Honduras and Costa Rica, and several hundred are in Managua. Therefore, the above electoral data offer only a beginning for the analysis of the Miskito vote in the 1984 elections.
A few particular casesIn the municipality of Pantasma (Jinotega), members of the FSLN and Sandinista Army committed some very serious crimes against the civilian population in early 1984. Although they were tried and given sentences ranging up to 30 years (the maximum in Nicaragua), the population of Pantasma demonstrated at election time that it had not forgotten the recent past. Just over 56% of the registered voters did not take part in the elections. Part of this high abstention rate can be explained by the fact that Pantasma is located in a dangerous war zone. However, the FSLN won only 45.2% of the votes cast. (See the January 1984 issue of envío for a general overview of the Pantasma area.)
In a very different setting—the Archipelago of Solentiname in Lake Nicaragua, where Father Ernesto Cardenal carried out his famous lay-monastic experiment—the electoral results differed enormously from those of Pantasma. Of the 457 (86.7%) registered voters, 396 went to the polls and only 12 (3.5%) cast null votes. The FSLN received 353 votes (89%), the PCD 18 (4.5%), the PLI 8 (2%), the PCN 4 (1%), and the MAP-ML 1 (0.3%). The National Guard devastated Solentiname in October 1977, following an attack on San Carlos by Sandinistas who had set off from Solentiname. Solentiname was rebuilt after the 1979 victory, and its handicraft industry has been strengthened with the addition of a furniture factory that possesses some of the best machinery in Nicaragua.
The municipalities of Tola and San Juan del Sur, in the department of Rivas, were the scene of Father Gaspar García Laviana’s pastoral activities. In December 1978, García Laviana was killed in combat. The electoral participation figures for these two municipalities were 86.3% and 86.7%, respectively, while null votes totaled 5.4% and 5.1% of those cast. The FSLN obtained 66.5% and 71.5% of the votes. In both municipalities, the PLI finished second, surpassing its national average of 9% with 13% of the votes.
The municipality of Masatepe, in the department of Masaya, was the birthplace of the Association of Rural Workers (ATC). The Center for Education and Agrarian Promotion (CEPA) worked there for years training Delegates of the Word who later became involved in labor union and political work. Electoral participation in Masatepe included 78.8% of the municipality’s registered voters. Null votes totaled 4.7%. The FSLN obtained 64% of the votes, a percentage that, in the area of Masaya, Carazo, and Granada, was only bettered in La Conquista (64.6%) and Jinotepe (71.9%), both in the department of Carazo.
In the region of Las Segovias, where Sandino’s army fought most of its battles against the US invaders, and especially in the city of Estelí, the site of three insurrections in 1978 and 1979, the majorities won by the FSLN frequently exceeded 70%.
Monimbó, an indigenous district in the city of Masaya, was the scene of a spontaneous insurrection in early 1978 in response to the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. However, its electoral results portray neither a Sandinista stronghold nor the stereotype of disillusion that is said to result from a “betrayed revolution.” 6,325 citizens were registered to vote in Monimbó’s 14 polling centers. 4,725 (74.7%) did vote. Null votes totaled 294 (6.2%). The FSLN received 2,815 votes (59.6%). 717 people (15.2%) voted for the PCD. The other parties divided up the remaining votes as follows: PLI 411 (8.7%), PPSC 343 (7.3%), PSN 102 (2.1%), PCN 62 (1.3%), and MAP-ML 34 (0.7%).
ConclusionsAny analysis of electoral figures is tedious. However, it is a way of measuring a population’s reaction to the manner in which it has been governed during the period of time preceding the election. We believe that it was important to provide a meticulous and detailed study of Nicaragua’s elections in order to help free them from the straitjacket of ideological epithets within which the Reagan administration has attempted to imprison them. The following are the conclusions that we have managed to extract from this endeavor to approach concrete realities rather than images draped in propaganda.
1. Only those who accept the premise that the political programs of the non-participating parties (the CDN) largely resemble the programs of the PCD and PLI, which did participate, can grant validity to an electoral analysis of this kind, despite the non-participation of the CDN. On the other hand, those who claim that the CDN constitutes Nicaragua’s most powerful opposition force will certainly describe this analysis as both tedious and useless, contending that Nicaragua’s voters were deprived of the chance to vote for a real alternative to the FSLN. In order to justify this contention, one would have to prove that more than the 29% of Nicaraguan electors who voted for parties openly less revolutionary than the FSLN would have voted for the CDN or, at least, for the CDN and the other alternatives to the FSLN. Such a supposition implies that a sizable proportion of Nicaraguan citizens are in favor of turning back the country’s revolution. A demonstration of such political will might have included massive abstention or voiding of ballots, unless, of course, the population genuinely feared that it would be repressed for expressing its discontent by those means. In the latter case, only a tiny proportion of dissidents would have had the courage to face the consequences of their acts. It is difficult to imagine that the 24.6% of registered voters (381,455 people) who did not vote and 4.6% (71,209 people) who cast null ballots, some of whom may have intentionally voided their votes) would have dared to brave a true threat of repression only to make a gesture of political disapproval. Moreover, the foreign observers detected no evidence of coercion to vote or fright concerning possible reprisals against those who did not vote.
2. The election results cannot be used in the evaluation of how much democracy was present during the entire electoral process. Clearly, this democracy was not perfect, and it cou1d not possibly have been so in Nicaragua, whose political traditions had favored the development of authoritarianism during the greater part of the country’s political independence. Much the same can be said of many other Latin American nations. Nevertheless, the foreign electoral observers had very little criticism of the way the electoral process unfolded in all its technical facets. Furthermore, the majority of the observers expressed the opinion that the population took the election campaign very seriously. According to these observers, except for certain instances of press censorship, the antidemocratic incidents that did take place were neither significant nor frequent enough to decisively restrict the different contenders’ political opportunities. As regards the FSLN, on one hand, it held an advantage because it had been in power for five years and because it was closely identified with the revolution and the latter’s institutions. On the other hand, the FSLN was disadvantaged by the fact that it had to hold wartime elections and bear responsibility for a seriously deteriorated economy, as well as for the implementation of obligatory military service.
3. The electoral results reveal considerable variation in the behavior of Nicaragua’s electorate. For example, the low rate of participation at the polls in Jinotega, Chontales, Central Zelaya, and Boaco cannot be attributed exclusively to the war; many municipalities in Chontales and Boaco have been only scarcely affected by counterrevolutionary aggression. The percentages of null votes also varied significantly from one area to another. It was clear in many cases that the FSLN’s weakest areas were the Conservatives’ strongest. The different sectors of Nicaragua’s rural population also behaved very differently, as did the multiethnic population of the Atlantic Coast. Support for the FSLN was more consistent in the urban centers, which account for the bulk of the country’s population. This was not a surprise, considering that the insurrections leading to the FSLN’s 1979 victory were of an urban nature. However, even the urban electoral results do show important variations in the amount of support for the FSLN.
4. The variations in the behavior of Nicaragua’s voters do not reveal inconsistencies so great as to reflect on the credibility of the results. In three war zones (Regions I and II and Special Zone III), electoral participation was high, and the FSLN significantly exceeded its national average of 62.9% of the votes cast. In two regions (V and VII), participation was weak, and the FSLN scored considerably below its national average. The first three zones comprise a large proportion of proletarianized peasants, have benefited from successful agricultural programs implemented by the revolutionary government, or are relatively accessible and therefore more likely to be well defended by the army. On the contrary, the regions inhabited by the traditional or commercial peasantry have not witnessed a high level of success in the revolution’s agricultural programs, have seen their commercial activities seriously decline as a result of the war, or have large stretches of terrain so inaccessible that the army cannot effectively defend them on a permanent basis. Furthermore, in Region I certain municipalities did not follow the general pattern of heavy participation and/or strong support for the FSLN: Macuelizo, Mozonte, Ciudad Antigua, Dipilto, San Fernando, and Quilalí. In some of these municipalities, there was a strong tradition of recruiting for Somoza’s National Guard. In others, there have been cases of abuse on the part of the Sandinista army.
5. Nicaragua’s high degree of civic education, which began with the National Literacy Crusade, seems to have contributed considerably to the quality of the electoral process. Today, almost six years after the 1979 Sandinista victory, every town in Nicaragua has gained at least a minimum of political and organizational experience. Many foreigners have visited regions such as Estelí or Jalapa and have seen impressive numbers of armed civilians. One of their most frequent comments is that the people would have turned their weapons against the FSLN long ago if the Sandinistas did not really represent the aspirations of Nicaragua’s majority. The electoral results appear to confirm their impression.
6. Elections are not the citizens’ only opportunity to involve themselves in politics. The elections have reinforced the government’s legitimacy but do not constitute the only source of this legitimacy. The population felt the legitimacy of its government when it was called upon to carry out the literacy crusade and when tens of thousands took part in health and vaccination campaigns. Legitimacy can also be seen in the fact that Nicaragua’s population does not fear its military or police forces. After almost six years of existence, the Sandinista Police has not had one violent encounter with mass demonstrations; this is clearly a record for Latin America. Nicaragua’s workers are able to discuss economic austerity programs and work efficiency with political leaders and technical experts. The people see that their leaders frequent the same tourist centers and popular gatherings as they do. In the propagandistic accusations of totalitarianism hurled against Nicaragua’s government there are large doses of disregard and ignorance concerning the dignity that Nicaraguans have acquired through the revolution.
7. In the light of a serious analysis of Nicaragua’s electoral results, Reagan’s demand for new “democratic” elections in Nicaragua reveals his government’s lack of respect for the political will of Nicaragua’s people. A senior PS diplomatic official in Central America told members of the LASA delegation: “The United States is not obliged to apply the same standard of judgment to a country whose government is avowedly hostile to the US as for a country like El Salvador where it is not. These people [the Sandinistas] could bring about a situation in Central America which could pose threat to US security. That allows us to change our yardstick.” Hence, the fundamental reason why the Reagan administration cannot consider Nicaragua’s elections as valid arises from its own distorted conception of what represents a threat to US national security. Obviously, such a criterion has nothing to do with a sober analysis of a nation’s elections.
In the final paragraph of its document, the LASA delegation comes to the following conclusion: “We submit, however, that the future of freedom and democracy in Nicaragua rests primarily in the hands of the United States. As it has been almost continuously since 1909, the United States remains the principal maker of Nicaragua’s political options.” (Latin American Studies Association, The Electora1 Process in Nicaragua: Domestic and International Influences. November 19, 1984, page 32-34.)
In the history of almost any people there are periods (some very lengthy) during which colonial or neocolonial foreign powers have a determining effect on the nation’s political life. However, during other historical periods, the people themselves succeed in defending their right to self-determination and in shaping their own destiny, while nevertheless taking into consideration their geopolitical situation and the international balance of power.
Nicaragua’s 1984 elections, although buried internationally under the cyclone of Reagan’s propaganda, have remained vividly present in the political consciousness of Nicaragua and the rest of Latin America. It would seem that these elections were a very concrete expression of the Nicaraguan people’s capacity to create its future.
According to the agreements reached by Nicaragua’s political parties at the October 1984 summit meetings, municipal elections will take place either in 1985 or in 1986. They will provide a new opportunity to measure the people’s will to continue determining their own tomorrow.
|
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
a monthly magazine of analysis on Central America