The Embargo: A Time for Solidarity

Envío team

On April 4 President Reagan announced his Peace Plan for Nicaragua. An integral part of the plan was the "immediate release of $14 million" in aid to the US-backed counterrevolutionaries The controversial debate over the aid culminated in several votes in both houses of Congress on April 23 and 24. Lobbying efforts regarding the votes not only expended enormous political and diplomatic energy in the US, Nicaragua, the Contadora countries and elsewhere, but also revealed the limits of support for Nicaragua's government at this time.

After the final House vote, which effectively paralyzed the Peace Plan and prohibited resumption of military aid to the contras, the Reagan administration retrenched and resorted to a comprehensive economic embargo in its war against Nicaragua. It hopes that this will force the Sandinistas to say "uncle" and consent to a dialogue with the counterrevolutionaries.

Nicaragua unequivocally rejected dialogue with the contras, but reiterated its openness to bilateral talks with the US President. Ortega's controversial trip to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other socialist bloc countries sought to strengthen economic ties that were increasingly important given the growing probability of economic sanctions. This trip was one of many with similar objectives. In January and February Vice President Sergio Ramírez visited Spain, France, Great Britain and Ireland. In March President 0rtega visited Uruguay and Brazil. In May, Ramírez will travel to Austria. The new trade embargo will necessitate even greater efforts by Nicaragua to strengthen and further diversify its economic relations with all areas of the world.

Debate over the Reagan Plan

The peace plan announced by President Reagan stirred up an international controversy that went beyond the content of the plan and called into question Reagan's entire policy toward Nicaragua. Understandably, the debate was most intense and captured the greatest interest in Latin America.

The plan had three main points:
1. It gave the Nicaraguan government an ultimatum in which it had 60 days (until June 1) to accept dialogue with the contras.
2. It tied continued US military aid to the contras to the ultimatum.
3. It endorsed the positions taken in San José, Costa Rica, on May 2 by a loose coalition of contra groups and individuals. Among other demands, that declaration called for new elections in Nicaragua.

The debate in Latin America

Criticisms of Reagan's plan revolved around the hypocrisy of a peace plan designed to further the war effort. Support for Contadora and for resumption of the Manzanillo talks were also common Latin American reactions. The reactions of the Contadora countries are particularly important.

Reagan announced the plan during Colombian President Betancur's visit to Washington. The first reactions by the Colombian President on April 4 were favorable. On April 6, Daniel Ortega, Fidel Castro and Colombian Foreign Minister Ramírez Ocampo met in Havana. According to the official communiqué by the Nicaraguan government, President Ortega made it "absolutely clear" to Ramírez that Nicaragua would not accept the ultimatum. After that meeting, Colombia's position became increasingly less positive toward the plan. Upon his return to Bogota, Ramírez said, "It is very clear that an independent, free and sovereign country like Nicaragua does not accept ultimatums." A few days later, in an extensive report to the Colombian people on his trip, Betancur said that, the Department of State had not given him the complete text of the Reagan Plan in Washington and thus he was not aware of all its aspects. Betancur particularly questioned the military aid, saying, "It is not a peace proposal but rather a preparation for war." Betancur made his growing opposition even clearer in a personal letter to President Reagan on April 17, in which he stressed the fundamental Latin American principles of "self determination, non-intervention, and peaceful resolution of controversies."

Mexico's initial reaction was somewhat ambiguous. Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepúlveda's first comment was, "Nicaragua ought to study President Reagan's recent proposals more carefully to find what might be in their interest." After Mexican President De la Madrid was visited by US Special Envoy Harry Shlaudeman and later phoned by President Reagan, the Mexican government issued a statement that summed up De la Madrid's response to Reagan. "Internal national reconciliation processes and the corresponding dialogue among groups within each Central American country are not appropriate matters for the Contadora Group. One of Contadora's basic principles is non-intervention of any kind in the internal affairs of any of the Central American countries."

Because of health reasons, Venezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi was in the US at the same time as Ecuador's President Fébres Carriers. The two issued a joint statement supporting the plan's call for dialogue with the contras. Lusinchi compared the highly acclaimed efforts to continue dialogue in El Salvador with dialogue that could occur in Nicaragua.

Panama, as usual, maintained the lowest profile of the four Contadora Countries. Panamanian Armed Forces Chief, General Noriega, made a brief visit to Nicaragua on April 13. He conferred with President Daniel Ortega and Comandante Humberto Ortega, head of Nicaragua's armed forces. Panama's Assistant Foreign Minister Cabrera said several times that Reagan's Plan would not be on the agenda of the Contadora meeting.

Venezuela did not repeat its initial support for the plan, nor did it question the position of the other Contadora countries.

For ten days after the plan was announced, the Reagan administration insisted that it had the backing of Latin America. Most Latin American countries, however, ignored, questioned or rejected the plan. Only President Duarte and the government of the Dominican Republic explicitly supported it a few days before the vote in Congress. A clear indication of the Plan's lack of support was evident at the Contadora meeting.

The Contadora meeting

One of the most alarming aspects of Reagan's plan was its potential to block the Contadora process at a time when Contadora was emerging from a long period of stagnation and was preparing for a difficult and critical meeting.

Reagan's plan attempts to change the very essence of Contadora. It removes Central American security as the mainstay, replacing it with the theme of reconciliation within one Central American country, and it insists on internal bilateral dialogue within that country. This is the very thing that Nicaragua has tried to avoid in Contadora with Mexico’s consistent backing.

Contadora kept to its original agenda at its April 11 12 meeting. While it did not condemn the Reagan Plan, neither did it include it on the agenda. A copy of the plan was distributed along with many other documents, "without additional consideration," according to the official statement.

Why was this Contadora meeting so important? The Contadora meeting last September produced a peace proposal that only Nicaragua agreed to sign. After Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica proposed major modifications in the security section, there was little room for progress. But without progress, Contadora had no chance to survive. With all its limitations, Contadora offers a Latin American diplomatic peace alternative to the Reagan administration's war. After two years and three months of work, Contadora was well aware of the difficulty of its task.

The Panama meeting bore no significant results, but some secondary agreements did keep Contadora alive. These agreements were political advances regarding verification and control on security issues. Agreement on content will be increasingly difficult while US policy in the region remains unchanged.

In addition, all Central American countries agreed to the creation of a Permanent Verification and Control Commission to be made up of one person from each Central American country plus four other members from outside the region. Two of these have already been announced: Canada and Spain. Two of the Commission's tasks were also agreed upon: to draw up its guidelines and procedural rules; and to appoint an international group of qualified inspectors whose task will be to verify arms supplies, military troop strength and foreign advisers.

No agreement was reached on basic issues such as military inventories, acquisition of new supplies and foreign bases, nor was there agreement on the distinction between military and civilian advisers.

Honduras is the only country with a permanent foreign military infrastructure and large numbers of foreign troops in its territory. Nicaragua is the only country willing to agree to the immediate withdrawal of all foreign military advisers. In fact, on May 2, Nicaragua sent home 100 Cuban military advisers, a move that had been announced on February 27 as a concrete gesture of support for Contadora, The ambassadors of the Contadora countries were present at the farewell ceremony for the Cubans.Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, which have US, Argentine and Israeli advisers for their armies, have not agreed.

Even though agreement on the main point, security, was not reached, there was consensus over verification procedures, but there was no agreement on what would be verified. These achievements, plus the agreement to meet again in mid May, were enough to create certain optimism among the participants.

International opinion

Outside Latin America, the Reagan Plan was also a major topic of debate. Three country's reactions have particular importance to Nicaragua: Spain, the European country most tightly linked with Contadora; the Socialist International countries, a necessary barometer for analyzing Nicaragua's foreign support; and the Vatican, usually noncommittal on US policies.

In Spain, President Felipe González pointed out, in two different statements, contradictions in the Plan. 1) Reagan asks Nicaragua to dialogue with the contras but refuses to resume the US Nicaraguan Manzanillo talks; 2) Reagan speaks of peace but proposes to continue aiding those waging war. Gonzalez also referred to the FDN’s Somocista characteristics, saying that justifies the Nicaraguan government's refusal to dialogue with them.* González indicated that he had expressed his "profound disagreement" with Reagan's Plan during a phone conversation with the US President.
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*A report issued by the US Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus during the debate on contra aid cited FDN publications verifying that 46 of the 48 high ranking FDN military leaders, plus task force leaders and regional commanders, had been members of Somoza's National Guard.

The Socialist International published a statement signed by Willy Brandt and Social Democratic leaders from 26 countries. The statement expressed support for Contadora, urged US congressional rejection of Reagan's Plan and repeated Colombian President Betancur's words, "It is not a peace proposal but a preparation for war."

The Vatican reaction was prompted by one of the many blunders Reagan has made in his anti Sandinista campaign. In the propaganda escalation that accompanied his plan, Reagan said on April 16 that he had received a letter from the pope supporting it. The Vatican representative contradicted the President's statement and gave the following clarification: On April 4, shortly before making his plan public, Reagan informed the pope that his National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, had spoken to Cardinal Cassaroli about the plan. On April 13, the pope received a delegation of US politicians led by Senate Republican leader Robert Dole, who delivered another personal message from Reagan. The pope made a public address to this delegation the next day, without mentioning Central America. The Vatican communiqué ended, "There are no other messages." Reagan repeated his allegation of Vatican support on April 17, saying he made his statement because the pope "has supported all our activities in Central America." The Papal Nuncio then repeated that at no time had the Vatican approved military aid to any group.

Reagan’s defeat in Congress

The political debate over the $14 million in contra aid became more and more a struggle between the legislative and executive branches of the US government and between the two parties. It was an opportunity for Nicaragua to gauge its support in Washington.

Reagan waged an all out rhetorical, diplomatic and political campaign in both the US and abroad in an effort to win congressional approval. He called his defeat a "deep disappointment," blaming the defeat, predicted in the days before the vote, on a "lack of time to effectively convince everyone."

Reagan's proposal won by seven votes in the Republican controlled Senate. A decisive factor in this victory was the last minute letter Reagan sent to the senators in which he pledged that the aid would only be used for humanitarian purposes (a key issue in the debate) and that he would reopen the Manzanillo talks.

In the Democratically controlled House, the idea of humanitarian aid had gained some acceptance. In the first House vote, the Democratic proposal to send humanitarian aid through international agencies won 219 206. A proposal by Republican Representative Michel to channel the $14 million in humanitarian aid through AID was narrowly defeated 215-213. The final vote on the entire package was defeated 303 123, however, effectively killing aid to the contras, at least temporarily. Under last year's legislation, release of the $14 million was contingent on approval by both houses.

The defeat put the ball back in the administration's court and it is expected that the matter will be reintroduced soon, either as part of the annual Supplemental Spending Bill or attached as a rider to the FY86 Foreign Aid Bill. Reagan has already announced that he will request $28 million in aid to the contras for FY 86.

One factor that influenced the outcome of the vote was the visit to Nicaragua by approximately 20 senators and representatives, both Democrats and Republicans, in five different delegations during Congress’ Easter Recess. The last was headed by Democratic Senators Thomas Harkin and John Kerry, both Vietnam veterans. President Ortega made a commitment to them that if the US aggression were stopped and the Manzanillo talks resumed, Nicaragua would pardon a significant number of prisoners,* lift press censorship, send home foreign military advisers, etc.
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*On April 30, the National Assembly approved the presidential pardon of 108 prisoners, among whom were 50 former Somocista National Guardsmen.

None of the arriving congressional delegations was a response to the Nicaraguan government's February invitation to the US Congress to send down an official bipartisan delegation to ascertain the defensive nature of Nicaragua's military installations. Nevertheless, all the congressional visitors were interested in the military situation. Some went so far as to demand access not only to troop and arms inspection but also to the Nicaraguan army's strategic military plans. Obviously these demands were not met.

Those opposed to Reagan's plans for Nicaragua were also busy during April. There were endless diplomatic moves at all levels, letters, messages, delegations, long conversations inside Nicaragua and out. These efforts were aimed at pointing out the contradictions in Reagan’s Peace Plan and in opening some space in the US for a presentation of Nicaragua that was less colored by Reagan's high pitched rhetoric.

In the final days before the vote, 25 Nicaraguan women, all of them mothers of children killed in the fighting or presently defending the country, held a 64 hour fast and prayer vigil. Their petition was that the aid to the contras be defeated. When the final. House vote was announced, the announcer on the state radio station commented, "The mothers’ prayers have been answered." A very moving moment for the mothers was the visit to their church by President Ortega, who arrived with his own mother, Foreign Minister Miguel D’Escoto and Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal. The mothers' fast, supported by a constant stream of visitors, illustrates the life and death nature of Reagan’s policies in the eyes of the Nicaraguan people.

In Nicaragua, the celebration of the contra aid bill’s defeat was somewhat subdued by the realization that:

- A debate over the limits of aggression is itself an illegal and immoral interference and a violation of international law;
- The contras continue to receive US assistance through channels, thus the toll in Nicaraguan lives and property will continue;
- The nature of the congressional debate and the reactions by some congresspeople to the economic blockade that followed and to Nicaragua's request for solidarity from the socialist countries demonstrate how little respect there is for the Nicaraguan people and their sovereignty, even by "friends" in Congress.

Dialogue with the counterrevolutionaries?

The Reagan Plan was intended to pressure the Nicaraguan government to dialogue with the contras.* The newest economic sanctions have the same goal: to wear Nicaragua down, force a "surrender" to the idea of dialogue and thus move toward a "change" in the Nicaraguan government—goals Reagan made clear in March. The economic embargo, according to Shlaudeman, represents "changes in tactics but not in basic policy." Since 1981 the basic policy has been to destroy the revolution.
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*The June 1984 envío examines in detail the efforts to force Nicaragua to accept such a dialogue and points out the errors in the argument of "symmetry" in the situations of E1 Salvador and Nicaragua.

Since 1981 Nicaragua’s basic policy has been to defend the revolution. It has used varying amounts of firmness and flexibility depending on the circumstances. One point that has not varied either in content or in tone has been the position toward dialogue with the FDN contras. This position has remained unchanged since December 1983 when COSEP and the Coordinadora first made dialogue with the contras a condition for their participation in the elections.

The Nicaraguan government rejects dialogue with the FDN because of their Somocista base and because they are powerless to make decisions independently of their US backers. The government interprets this proposed dialogue, in which power sharing and the principles of the revolution would be topics for discussion, as the beginning of "saying uncle”—the beginning of a US victory in overthrowing the revolution. The San José ultimatum, backed by Reagan, even called for the dissolution of all laws and institutions created during the last five years, "to start with a clean slate."

These pressures on the Nicaraguan government brought clear and unequivocal response. In his April 1 letter to the Presidents of the Contadora countries, President Ortega pointed out, "Our government does not want our well-founded rejection of the ultimatum to be seen as a blanket rejection of all dialogue." Along with world leaders who stressed the need for reopening the Manzanillo talks, (Craxi, González, the Socialist International, De la Madrid, etc.), Nicaragua wants this forum that the US rejects. Nicaragua's position regarding the Manzanillo talks is consistent with its position that dialogue with the contras is pointless: "One doesn't dialogue with the dog, but with its owner."

There are those who argue that a concession by Nicaragua might later facilitate US-Nicaraguan dialogue. But based on the pattern of US actions in the past, there’s a strong suspicion that the Reagan administration has no desire for a peaceful solution. The belief is that the administration’s bottom-line intention is to overthrow the Nicaraguan government and that debate over the Manzanillo talks is merely a diversionary tactic. Dialogue with the contras is seen as a trap, behind which lies more and more destructive aggression.

In a statement after the vote in Congress, Nicaragua called the results "a first step that could lead the US government to regain its lost credibility as a serious and responsible member of the international community." It said another step would be to stop "pressuring Nicaragua to negotiate with the CIA's mercenaries." The statement emphasized Nicaragua's "firm and irreversible position that it will never accept any type of dialogue with the mercenary forces led by the US government, regardless of the context in which this suggestion is presented."

The economic sanctions, supported by many congressional members of both parties, indicate that there is little likelihood that pressure to negotiate with the contras will be lifted.

A military response

The present military situation does not compel Nicaragua to bow to US demands. Early this year the Nicaraguan army launched a military offensive in several areas, particularly the mountains of Matagalpa and Jinotega (Region VI). Since the offensive began, the contras have incurred substantial casualties, some of their strategic concentrations (regional commands or task forces) have been broken up, and hundreds of contras have fled to Honduras or formed small groups trying to evade the army within Nicaragua.

Nicaraguan Defense Ministry information indicates the offensive has been successful. Between March 20 and April 30, there were 49 battles in which the contras suffered 1,293 casualties, including 348 dead. There were also 128 civilians kidnapped, wounded or assassinated in ambushes or contra attacks on villages.

This offensive resulted in some unusually heavy fighting.* Between March 20 and April 15, battles in various areas of Region VI succeeded in breaking up the contras’ "Jorge Salazar" Regional Command. The contras lost 97 in those actions. The completion of efforts to break up two other command groups was also achieved. (A regional command has approximately 2,000 troops). On April 22 and 23, battles 10 km north of Wamblan (Jinotega) combined the use of infantry and artillery and caused 1,000 casualties, including 200 dead.
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*Nicaraguan Defense Ministry statements never list the corresponding number of government casualties but there have been no indications of comparably heavy losses by government troops.

These military successes are driving the contras back toward Honduras, even those who had penetrated farthest into Nicaragua. The FDN has been weakened and is on the defensive. In light of this, a dialogue would certainly appear to be an unwarranted concession.

In contrast to Nicaragua's refusal to dialogue with the FDN, talks with Brooklyn Rivera of the armed Miskitu group, Misurasata, have been underway formally since December. The ethnic make-up of the participants of the war on the Atlantic Coast does not alone explain the different attitude toward Rivera. The Nicaraguan government is in dialogue with Rivera, but will not dialogue with Misura and Stedman Fagoth, who has been aligned with the Somocistas and what is now the FDN since he left Nicaragua. He has repeatedly made clear his desire to destroy the revolution. Rivera broke with Fagoth over basic differences in purpose. Rivera says he is not out to destroy the revolution but rather to make sure that his people’s agenda is incorporated into the revolution. The feeling that this hadn’t been done sufficiently led his group to take up arms. The Nicaraguan government has initiated a process on the Atlantic Coast that will lead to framing an Autonomy Statute for the region, which has contributed in a positive way to the talks with Rivera.

On April 20-22, Rivera and Luis Carrión of the Nicaraguan government held a new round of talks in Mexico. The first round in Bogota ended without concrete results. This meeting, which didn’t achieve a cease-fire, did arrive at three basic agreements:

"The Nicaraguan government agrees to facilitate the reestablishment of medical and food supplies through its institutions and to facilitate assistance to those communities by humanitarian organizations in coordination with the government. It will also aid in the resumption of fishing, hunting, farming and marketing in the indigenous and Creole communities that have been affected by the conflict. Misurasata agrees to instruct its followers to support this agreement and insure that it can be carried out.
"The government and Misurasata agree to avoid armed offensive actions between the Nicaraguan armed forces and the Misurasata forces in an effort to aid the implementation of the previous agreement.

"The Nicaraguan government agrees immediately to extend the amnesty decreed in December 1983 to include all Miskitu, Sumu, Rama and Creole Nicaraguans who are still in prison for their participation in, or ties to, Misurasata or Misura."

While efforts to carry out the first measure were underway, the National Assembly approved the amnesty decree on April 29. It is estimated that since December 1983 two thousand Miskitus, including whole families, have accepted the amnesty offered at that time and extended now. Of those, some 300 had belonged to Fagoth's group, Misura.

The dialogue with Rivera, which was not without difficulties, and the amnesty program demonstrate Nicaragua's desire for peace and dialogue. Amnesty has been offered to Miskitus and peasants who have joined the FDN ranks, and, as of January 1985, the offer of amnesty has even been extended to FDN leaders who want to lay down their arms.

A political answer

If the military situation does not impel Nicaragua toward negotiations with the contras, neither does the political situation. The "civic arm" of the counterrevolution (the extra-parliamentary group that refused to participate in the elections, COSEP, La Prensa, etc.) has called for dialogue with the "armed rebels" since late 1983. Although this demand is common to all these individuals and groups, disunity among them prevails because of differences that have existed for years.*
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*Even sharper divisions exist between the armed contra groups (Robelo, Calero, etc.) and those who have stayed in the country. One of the latter, Ramiro Gurdián, president of UPANIC (a member of COSEP) said to The New York Times on March 31 that Reagan's assessment that Nicaragua is "a virtual communist dictatorship" is "somewhat premature, since the game isn't over yet." He added, "There's Sandinista rhetoric, there's Reagan rhetoric and there's reality. And they are three very different things."

La Prensa recognized this in its April 29 editorial, which stated, "We feel that the need for unity among the opposition is even more urgent than the call for national dialogue. First we need to agree among ourselves, then we’ll talk to the adversary."

The opposition lacks viable leadership. Arturo Cruz is a Washington political creation but does not represent opposition parties or businessmen, or even the sector of the public that has become critical of the revolution. The opposition has nothing to offer except Washington's plan or the unrealistic dream of turning back the clock.

The weakness of the contras’ civilian leaders was underscored when Reagan had to take up their cause. "Reagan backs our proposal; he considers it workable, reasonable.... This proposal has the force that Reagan gives it," said Adolfo Calero enthusiastically on April 4 after a meeting with Reagan. However, the later economic sanctions seemed to catch the contra leaders by surprise. In Costa Rica, Alfonso Robelo said he agreed with the sanctions but admitted they "were hasty," and that perhaps the measures were not the best thing. He was visibly irritated that "our plan" had not been thoroughly examined.

All this underscores the fact that real peace can only come from a change in attitude by the US government that would lead to a real and meaningful dialogue with Nicaragua. "The problem is between Nicaragua and its neighbors and between the Nicaraguan government and its own people. It's not a problem with the US," according to Robert McFarlane. A change of attitude seems unlikely.

The bishops’ role

The Catholic hierarchy is playing a key role in the effort to strengthen and unite the "civilian arm" of the counterrevolution. This role became clear in April 1984 when the bishops issued a pastoral letter saying that dialogue with the contras was necessary to achieve peace. Since then the hierarchy has not deviated from this point of view. The opposition and the armed contras have also not ceased to seek legitimacy from the hierarchy's demand for dialogue. The bishops' nomination as mediators in such a dialogue and their acceptance underlines this legitimizing role.

In the Church-State meeting last March 4,* the topic of possible mediation by the bishops was not on the agenda but a communiqué accepting the role of mediation was made public March 22. Since then, the bishops have made frequent public statements pointing out the benefits of this suggested dialogue. Similar positions are expressed frequently in the pages of La Prensa . The Reagan Plan, which loudly demands press and religious freedom, ignores the reality that exists in Nicaragua.
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*On April 24, before leaving on his trip, President Ortega met with the entire Bishops’ Conference, whose members had invited him to brief them on the national situation. The President said this meeting was part of the ongoing Church-State talks that had begun on December 24. Subsequent sessions took place between commissions appointed by the government and the hierarchy. The latter's representatives at the meetings were Bishop Vega, president of the Bishops’ Conference; Bishop Bosco Vivas, auxiliary bishop of Managua; and Bishop Santi of Matagalpa.

When Reagan was announcing his plan on Holy Thursday, Holy Week celebrations were underway all over Nicaragua, without interference. Radio Católica, along with three other private radio stations, had live national coverage of all the liturgical celebrations officiated by then Archbishop Obando in Managua.

At the Holy Thursday service, Archbishop Obando said, "It’s hard for the Nicaraguan people to support a system that deprives people of their rights and liberties."

The day before, Adolfo Calero of the FDN said in Washington that Archbishop Obando had made the same request to him that Reagan had: to extend the deadline for the ultimatum from April 20 to June 1. Calero said he would grant Obando's request.

During the Mass on Holy Thursday evening, the papal nuncio chose the theme of dialogue and reconciliation for his homily. He outlined the role the Church "could and should" play and insisted that "no peace initiative should be discarded." The Good Friday Way of the Cross procession in Managua, which was attended by 50,000 persons, was also broadcast.

On April 23, Pope John Paul II announced the naming of 28 new cardinals. Nicaragua's Obando y Bravo was among them. A special 14-hour program on Radio Católica, was devoted to paying homage to the new Cardinal. The program was filled with personal and institutional messages of congratulations, some of which had strong anti-government political overtones. The morning the announcement was made, President Ortega went to the Curia to offer his congratulations. This visit was not reported on Radio Católica.

The elevation of Obando caught Nicaragua by surprise. Pastoral, political or even historic considerations would favor the archbishops of San Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, or Costa Rica. Central America could use a less controversial cardinal and one with a clearer historical vision. Many observers feel that the papal action is an endorsement of Obando's attitude of confrontation toward the revolution and fosters more political and religious polarization. "I do not object to being identified with the people who have taken up arms," said Obando in one of his first interviews as cardinal, granted to Spanish television.

On May 1 a May Day Mass for opposition union members was celebrated in a church in Managua's Oriental Market. The Mass was broadcast live and celebrated by the new cardinal. No reference was made to the newly announced trade embargo, but Obando did ask "that God enlighten our government leaders to understand that only a national dialogue will avoid so much violence by which our young people are dying in a fratricidal and useless war."

The economic embargo and ultimatum announced by Reagan on May I were sent in writing to the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry along with the usual "conditions" (demilitarization, cessation of military relations with the USSR and Cuba, etc.). The note said:

"The US repeats its conviction that a political dialogue between the Nicaraguan government and all sectors of the opposition, in the terms proposed by the unified Nicaraguan opposition on March 1, 1985, is the first essential step in the process of national reconciliation inside Nicaragua. This is indispensable for a more global agreement on the regional conflict. The US calls on the Nicaraguan government to initiate an immediate cease-fire and to accept the offer for dialogue under the auspices of the Catholic Church. The US also repeats today the offer made by President Reagan on April 4 to support this proposal.”

And, the ultimatum:
"The US is prepared at any time to reexamine its decision on the sanctions announced today, dependent upon the concrete steps taken by the Nicaraguan government to respond to these concerns. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that if this is not done, prospects are diminished for a peaceful solution in Central America”.

Given the contras' present military weakness and negative international image, the backing of the hierarchy is the only support the demand for dialogue has. This backing comes principally from the new cardinal.

The Nicaraguan bishops have never supported the Sandinistas. Their historical opposition is perhaps stronger now than ever. Never before has the silence of the bishops been so clearly incompatible with the pastoral preferential option for the poor of the Latin American Church. And never before has the bishops' position been so clearly in agreement with US administration policies.*
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*The position of the Catholic hierarchy is complex. Examples of the contradictory signals include the dialogue with the government, publicly requested in December 1984 by two bishops and encouraged by the nuncio, the presence of Bishop Vega at the inauguration of President Daniel Ortega, and the smooth Church-State relations in several dioceses.

Economic sanctions:
Another arm of the war

During the weeks of heated congressional debate over the $14 million, there was speculation in the US press that the Reagan administration would soon implement economic sanctions regardless of the outcome of the vote. The purpose would be to isolate Nicaragua, further cripple its economy and increase political pressure. Reagan's defeat in Congress, coupled with the contras’ military weakness and the lack of unity among their civilian allies, helped concretize the decision to apply economic sanctions.

Nicaragua has long recognized the possibility of an economic blockade and the serious effects it would have on the economy, already reeling from three years of war.

The position of the Catholic hierarchy is complex. Examples of the contradictory signals include the dialogue with the government, publicly requested in December 1984 by two bishops and encouraged by the Nuncio, the presence of Bishop Vega at the inauguration of President Daniel Ortega, and the smooth church-state relations in several dioceses.

On April 24, President Ortega left on a trip to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other socialist countries. Upon his departure, Ortega went over the serious economic problems affecting the country even before the embargo. He mentioned the US blocking of the $58 million loan solicited from the IDB, problems in acquiring petroleum,* difficulties in meeting payments on bilateral loans and on the foreign debt service, and the enormous cost of the war. Anticipating even more serious problems, and in light of the new leadership in the Soviet Union, Nicaragua sought to strengthen already existing economic ties and look for additional help at this time. "We are seeking aid that promotes the well-being of the Nicaraguan people," Ortega said.
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*Nicaragua's oil needs cost $175 million/year, 40% of the foreign exchange from its exports. The debt with Mexico and Venezuela, Nicaragua's primary suppliers of oil until 1983, is nearly $1 billion. Today, Iran and the USSR have replaced Venezuela.

On April 23, immediately after the defeat in Congress, Reagan asked Shultz and McFarlane to study all options that could be used against Nicaragua. President Ortega's visit to the Soviet Union, although planned for some time, gave Reagan a convenient excuse to impose economic sanctions.

The decision was announced in Bonn by White House spokesperson Larry Speakes on May 1. This was the eve of the economic summit of the world's seven most industrialized nations. The measures, frequently called a "blockade" in Nicaragua, stipulate:

- Total commercial embargo on goods between Nicaragua and the US (an exception is material destined for the "organized democratic resistance")*
- Prohibition of access to US ports or airports by Nicaraguan planes and ships.
- Intention to abrogate the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation enacted between the US and Nicaragua in 1956. (US legal experts have raised serious questions about the President's authority to unilaterally break the treaty, which includes a 1-year notification clause.)
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*The wording erroneously characterizes such aid as an export to Nicaragua, rather than to its primary destination, Honduras.

At the same time as the embargo was announced, other measures under consideration were mentioned. These include demanding immediate payment in full on Nicaragua's debt with private US banks (approximately $250 million), thus freezing all Nicaraguan assets in the US; freezing bank accounts of Nicaraguan citizens in the US; and taking measures to make it more difficult for US citizens to travel to Nicaragua.

The economic sanctions did not come as a surprise. What was surprising, and absurd, was the legal basis on which the sanctions were justified. Reagan declared a "national emergency" in the US "to confront the extraordinary and unusual threat to US foreign policy and national security caused by Nicaragua's actions."

The sanctions went into effect seven days from the announcement. The administration’s justification stated that relations between Nicaragua and the Soviet Union and its allies are "incompatible with normal trade relations" and charged that Nicaragua is a threat to its neighbors, etc. The measures were called a warning to Nicaragua "to moderate its activities of exporting subversion and terrorism" and to democratize its internal policies. The most cynical attitude expressed in the US press was that these measures should convince Nicaragua "not to isolate itself" and to "respect the Contadora initiative."

Effects of the blockade

Since 1979, Nicaragua has been committed to nonalignment, which necessitates a diversification of economic dependency. For more than a century, Nicaragua had been totally aligned with and dependent upon the US, but with the revolution it began to look for new diplomatic, political and economic relations and was successful. The latest official figures for the first half of 1984 illustrate the position of Nicaragua at the time of the embargo.

Projections for Nicaraguan trade with the US in 1985 called for $58 million in exports and $134 in imports. Nicaragua's successful efforts to diversify its trade relationships have softened the blow, and will assist it in finding markets to replace the US. Unfortunately, further diversification will take some time. The initial period will be the most difficult and will require creativity and efficient organization.

Nicaragua’s main exports to the US are bananas ($23.5 million in 1984), beef ($9.7 million in 1984), fish and shellfish, coffee and sugar.

In 1983, when Standard Fruit broke its contract for the transportation and marketing of Nicaraguan's bananas in the US unilaterally and without warning, Nicaragua was successful in quickly resolving this problem. It has continued to sell the same quantity at competitive prices in the US. Banana production is concentrated on large private plantations in western Nicaragua. But the marketing is done by the state. Belgium has already agreed to buy the Nicaraguan product.

Approximately 65% of cattle production is in private hands. In 1984, state slaughterhouses offered better prices to cattle ranchers for their beef in an effort to increase export production and avoid price speculation by unauthorized slaughterhouses. One incentive was to pay a certain percentage of the price in dollars. Because the embargo will exacerbate the shortage of dollars, this incentive may have to be reduced or replaced. If the government is unable to obtain dollars, it will have to replace dollar incentives with production inputs such as feed grain and fertilizer. Canada and Europe are the most likely new markets for Nicaraguan beef, as well as for its fish and shellfish.

In 1983 the US cut its sugar quota for Nicaragua by 90%, so new markets had to be found at that time. Algeria is now the primary market.

Imports present a much more serious problem than do exports. Especially problematic are agrochemical products and spare parts for industrial machinery. Although US imports don’t include any essential strategic products, results will soon begin to be widely felt. The machinery in Nicaragua's few factories is old and US made. Any spare part needed for repair, maintenance, etc. can paralyze production of Nicaraguan's basic goods.

Although the greater transnationalization of US industry that has occurred since the Cuban trade embargo could mitigate the effects on Nicaragua, a few examples will help to illustrate the more serious effects of the embargo:*

The privately-owned Penwalt factory is the only producer in Central America of caustic soda, a prime ingredient for manufacturing soap. The factory's machinery is entirely of US origin. A stoppage in this factory, which also makes numerous products used by other businesses, would affect 75% of all Nicaraguan industry and many others throughout Central America and Panama.

The five cooking oil producers, both state and private, also use US machinery. In addition, soy beans and basic oil are imported and are used to produce both cooking and industrial oil.

Many of the electric power installations also use US technology. At the time of the embargo, $18 million had been earmarked for new material and equipment for this sector. It is possible to buy this material in other countries but it will mean a significant delay. It would take three years to replace all the US technology in the power plants. Anticipated problems will affect industry, agriculture, private homes, etc.

Managua's oil refinery, a subsidiary of ESSO, processes crude oil and produces 75% of Nicaragua's fuel needs. It is 100% dependent on US technology; its equipment, spare parts and chemicals are all imported from the United States.

The budding pharmaceutical industry will be seriously affected. A few weeks ago, the state-owned Solka factory closed for renovation. The plan was to increase production capacity through the acquisition and installation of new US equipment. The two other drug companies also use US equipment. The embargo will have immediate effects on the production of such simple medicines as antiparasitics, analgesics, oral saline solution, antibiotics, etc., all of which are used to treat common illnesses, especially of Nicaragua’s children. Nicaraguan hospitals will be very hard hit as their equipment is almost all of US manufacture.

Fifteen small industries (shoes, military boots, plumbing pipes, etc.) depend on the products of the Policasa plastic company (70% private capital). This plant depends on the US for 80% of its raw material.

Since the embargo was announced, state and private producers and economic analysts have been assessing the effects on various sectors and industries. This latest US action will hurt the private sector the most, and even more than the military aggression has to date. In Nicaragua's mixed economy, 60% of total production is controlled by small, medium and large private producers. During the last five years, state agroindustrial and agroexport operations (the sectors most seriously hurt by the embargo) have made the biggest changes in technology, while the private sector has remained almost totally dependent on US technology. As an example, the state has acquired Polish crop dusters while the private sector still uses US planes.

In a May 7 editorial reflecting COSEP’s position, La Prensa acknowledged that the private sector will be the hardest hit:

"Breaking the commitment to nonalignment, turning over Nicaragua's international policies to the interests and conveniences of the Russian-Cuban-communist bloc and, the final straw, President Ortega's trip to Russia after Reagan's defeat by Congress have, as we predicted, gotten us into an extremely serious economic war, which would not have happened if we had a proud but prudent government, revolutionary but democratic.

"We condemn the attitude of the Sandinista government as irresponsible and reckless, as it was called by the vice president of the Social Christian Party. But we consider Reagan's response unjust because the measures of an economic blockade fall equally on the entire population. Defense of democracy cannot be carried out by indiscriminate measures that would discredit the very cause they try to defend.

"The great majority of Nicaraguans inside the country resist the revolution’s deviations and the government’s totalitarian tendencies, but that majority is the one that will be punished by the blockade. And there is the risk that the results of other economic blockades in recent world history will be repeated. The victims get sacrificed, while the victimizers’ power is consolidated."

The editorial also demonstrates the degree of freedom of expression that exists in Nicaragua.

In the short term, the Nicaraguan economy will suffer a difficult period of readjustment. The embargo will also affect decisions concerning long-term development strategies, especially regarding industrial conversion to other technologies.

The embargo will test the creativity and imagination of workers (spare parts "innovators," for example, have been encouraged for some time). It will also demand an increase in the capacity of the people and the government for organization, flexibility, austerity and efficiency. The success of the revolution has always depended on these qualities. Now they are critical.

Vice President Sergio Ramírez said recently, "The advantage Nicaragua has in confronting this problem is that in our history we've never had it easy." At a recent celebration marking the first paved street in one of Nicaragua's small villages, an old man summed up the frustration of thousands of Nicaraguans: "If it weren't for the aggression... the damned aggression that is taking our children, our bread and our pills!"

Initial international reactions:
A blockade against Reagan

The international reaction to the embargo was quick and negative, leaving Reagan isolated by his sanctions. Within 48 hours, the Non-aligned Movement, the European Economic Community, Latin American and European governments, the socialist countries, China, Australia, Algeria and India had all expressed their disagreement.

Latin American reaction to the embargo will certainly be decisive. First reactions included condemnations from governments, parties, unions and grassroots organizations. The first reaction from the Contadora countries came from the Colombian foreign minister, who said the embargo would jeopardize peace efforts. There were official statements of condemnation from Mexico, Cuba, Peru, Uruguay, and Bolivia. The Venezuelan government said that both the embargo and Ortega's trip to the Soviet Union were detrimental to peace efforts. All Central American nations agreed that the move would have serious adverse effects on the Central American Common Market. Guatemala was the only Central American country during these initial days to refuse to join in the embargo. Honduras welcomed it and El Salvador's President Duarte said he would support it. Costa Rica's initial declarations were ambiguous.

The Canadian reaction distanced that government from the US position arid reaffirmed trade—including increased trade—with Nicaragua.

The US President confidently included the embargo on the agenda of the economic summit in Bonn. Although there were no immediate public condemnations, there were statements from Great Britain, France and West Germany that made their lack of support clear. Western Europe emphasized that Reagan had not consulted with them, nor would they go along with the measures. Progressive West German groups said it was unfortunate that forty years after the end of the Second World War, Reagan had declared another war from German soil. Outside the "big seven," official expressions of criticism came from Spain, Norway, Holland and the European Common Market.

The distancing of Western European countries from US policies toward Nicaragua and Central America has been growing during the last two years, although the extent of the breach has not always been publicly evident. In the case of the IDB loan, for example, there is evidence of growing irritation on the part of European members over US actions. The blocking of the loan provoked the most strongly worded communiqué ever sent by the Dutch government to the US. According to reliable sources, the highly critical statement, which was not made public, was sent directly to Secretary of State Shultz. Sources also say disagreement was expressed privately by Switzerland, Spain and France over US policies in the IDB.

Many of these critical opinions were expressed privately because US European allies do not want to weaken the US negotiating position at Geneva in this critical moment in search for a decrease in world tensions. There is, however, growing concern over the ideological obsessiveness that has characterized Reagan's Central American policy, leaving no room for pragmatic realism. There is also concern that European differences from US policy in Central America could affect NATO. One analyst of US policy remarked, "Not only does the US not understand Latin America, but, because of its own historical lack of a socialist tradition, it also has not learned to distinguish reformists from subversives or one kind of socialist from another."

Sweden's response highlights US-European differences. As an open expression of solidarity, Sweden cancelled the debt owed it by several third world countries, including Nicaragua and Tanzania. In addition, it created a $70 million fund to replace any future losses incurred by private banks due to debt default by third world countries. Sweden is the first capitalist country to take such a step.

On April 30, Nicaragua presented its final brief in its suit against the US at the International Court at The Hague. The 258-page brief details the human and material damage caused in Nicaragua in the years of "dirty war" by the US. Nicaragua is asking the Court to find the US guilty and to order it to stop its aggression. Nicaragua is also asking compensation for damages, which were estimated at $370,200,000 at the time the brief was presented. The US has already indicated it will not accept International Court jurisdiction in this matter.

Nicaragua’s answer:
A search for concrete collaboration

Since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union in March, Nicaragua has been the subject of frequent high-level Soviet statements.

In condemning the Reagan Plan, the Soviet government said, "The USSR actively supports the search for a just political solution in the region. The USSR categorically rejects the policies of aggression and interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs as well as the policies of state terrorism practiced against that country...."

On April 23, after the vote in the US Congress, Gorbachev stated that solidarity with Nicaragua is a "matter of principle with the forces of progress and democracy."

As he was leaving on his trip, President Ortega said, "We are going primarily to make economic overtures to try and recover what the US denies Nicaragua. We know the US is blocking a $58 million IDB loan for Nicaraguan agriculture. We know the economic situation is difficult and we have to look for help, especially when there are countries like the USSR, which have been collaborating economically with Nicaragua."

Ortega's first stop was Moscow. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto and Minister of Foreign Assistance Henry Ruiz. Upon signing an agreement for economic, commercial, technical and scientific cooperation, the Soviet government said it would "continue giving fraternal assistance to Nicaragua to help it overcome urgent problems of economic development as well as political and diplomatic support in its struggle to preserve its sovereignty." Both countries also spoke in support of the Contadora Group.

Besides the USSR, Ortega visited Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany. In all of these countries, economic agreements have been signed that will help Nicaragua get through this difficult period as well as give it much needed assistance in long-term development.*
__________________
*At the close of our edition, several West European countries, including Spain, France and Italy, were added to President Ortega's trip. There were indications of substantial European support for Nicaragua. Most significant was Italy's $25 million agreement to develop a second geothermal electric plant at the Momotombo volcano.

While President Ortega was looking for economic assistance, Vice President Ramírez officially announced the embargo. His announcement came on May 4, anniversary of Sandino's 1927 refusal to submit to an ultimatum by the US invasion forces and their Liberal and Conservative allies. Ramírez' message was directed not only to the Nicaraguan people but also to Latin America.

"Six years ago, Nicaragua initiated a revolutionary process that has been an example for poor peoples all over the world who have valiantly joined the struggle for the democratic transformation of Latin America. It is not because we are a threat to US national security interests, not because of an East-West conflict in the Central American region, that the US government has rejected our revolution so intransigently and called for our destruction and elimination. It is because the Nicaraguan people, with their meager weapons, overthrew the Somoza dictatorship, which had been supported by the US with the same intransigence that it now wants to destroy us. The example of this victory opened the possibility of independence, justice and change, rejected by the imperial presidency of the Reagan administration as contrary to its interests of Latin American domination....

"We’re aware that we are an example. We’re not the strongest link on this continent, but precisely because we’re carrying out a national revolution in a weak and small country on the same continent, we’re a vital link and we therefore have to increase our efforts and never give up. If we did, it would be the end of a possible history of Latin American independence, which is now being put to the test at the cost of so much bloodshed here in Nicaragua.

"We ask all of Latin America not to leave Nicaragua atone. This is what the US wants so it can attack us with impunity.... Now as never before, this is a test period and a challenge for the continent that we inherited together from heroes such as Bolivar, O'Higgins, Artigas, Morazán, Martí, Zapata, Sandino and Torrijos, who all wanted a Latin America that would not allow its dignity and strength to be snatched away.”

Nicaragua depends right now on the socialist countries, the European countries, the Latin American countries and, above all, its own people to move toward peace in this difficult moment. This period of Reagan’s ultimatums makes very relevant the secret National Security Council document leaked to The Washington Post last October. The briefing paper clearly laid out the administration’s political efforts to discredit the Nicaraguan elections and block the Contadara process. What is at stake now is obvious: the Nicaraguan people’s political determination, expressed clearly in their elections and Latin America’s political determination to resolve a Latin American conflict independently. Reagan wants to override both. At present, the international community’s opposition is making his objective more difficult to obtain. Nicaragua can only count on the firmness and persistence of that international community to counteract the obsession of the imperial American President.

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