El Salvador
Election Results: The Cost of Government Intransigence
This account was written on the eve of the March 12 municipal and legislative elections, but the results were already quite clear. Those results in turn harbinger interesting new scenarios, with continuing progressive leadership in the capital and the chance finally to achieve a balance among the branches of state.
Ismael Moreno, SJ
At the beginning of this year, the governing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) was sure that it would defeat the FMLN by a landslide all around the country in the March 12 municipal and legislative elections. ARENA leaders were not the only ones convinced of this victory. The general population was expecting it too.
Even some FMLN leaders saw their defeat as a given. Society has been disappointed by the leftist party, whose actions have barely distinguished it from ARENA. Discredited by its incapacity to resolve local problems, much less national ones, the FMLN expected to be punished at the polls. This was the main reason that ARENA thought it would have the whole pie in its hands. The only tough battle would be to win the mayor’s office in the municipality of San Salvador, which has been run for the last four years not just by the FMLN, which would be easy to defeat, but by a man who is anything but an easy opponent: Héctor Silva, who has won indisputable sympathy in all sectors of society.
Campaigning for SilvaIn politics, however, nothing but politics itself has the last word. In the two months leading up to the elections, the scenario was radically changed by factors having nothing to do with the FMLN’s electoral campaign. The central government made grave mistakes in several conflicts that have recently broken out in the country, especially in the health care sector. President Francisco Flores’ singular clumsiness in responding to social demands also worked in the FMLN’s favor, as did ARENA’s campaign in San Salvador. Luis Cardenal, ARENA’s mayoral candidate, launched an all-out attack on everything Silva has done, in a municipality where he has accomplished more than the three preceding ARENA mayors put together. ARENA and Cardenal were Silva’s most effective campaigners, and helped guarantee his reelection.
Silva distances himself from the FMLNSilva hired a public opinion firm in November 1999 to take the capital’s pulse on his candidacy. Although the survey was never made public, some of the results leaked out, including the fact that 90% of those polled believed Silva would be reelected. Nearly 45% of the capital’s residents registered a positive opinion of his work, thus giving him the highest approval rating among politicians. At the opposite end of the poll, Facundo Guardado and Shafik Handal, the top leaders of the two main tendencies within the FMLN, appeared to be the least popular politicians among the electorate, with 43% and 42% negative ratings, respectively.
The results of this survey made Silva’s campaign strategy clear. He would have to focus on himself and his administration’s achievements in the capital, staying clear of any symbol that that would link him to the FMLN campaign, and avoiding any public appearance with the leftist party’s top leaders. Paradoxically, although Silva ran as the candidate of a coalition dominated by the FMLN, his campaign had to downplay the FMLN and its leaders.
Government discredited by health care conflictThe conflict in the health care system also influenced the election results. A chronicle of government intransigence, the conflict has grown increasingly sharp since November 15, 1999, when the government decided to take solid steps towards privatizing the social security system and fired dozens of workers in the sector. The unions representing doctors and other health care workers protested by striking to pressure the government to reinstate those who had been fired and stop the program to privatize health care services.
No one knows for sure what pressures are being put on President Flores from other quarters to make him so inflexible in negotiations with the two health care workers’ unions. There are signs of pressure from former President Alfredo Cristiani’s powerful economic group, which has interests in seeing health care privatized. envío spoke with strikers from both unions, who believe that the prolongation of the conflict has harmed not only the poor sectors of society, who are not receiving care because of the strike, but also the very economic sectors behind the privatization. "We don’t understand why the President doesn’t get his head on straight and negotiate with us," one doctor told us. "Either these economic groups are putting enormous pressure on him, or he’s clumsy and politically incapable of dealing with the problem." What is clear is that the conflict has become one more strike against Paco Flores, already widely discredited after just nine months in office.
To regain something of his lost credibility, the President’s advisers recommended that he use the media to speak directly to the population. He decided to give a weekly Sunday broadcast. On February 27, Flores promised that "while I am President of the country, health care services will be free." In this way, he attempted both to respond to the general rejection of the privatization of health care, and to wrest legitimacy from the health care workers’ struggle. Under any other circumstances, such a resounding affirmation would have been decisive, but Flores’ words are already so devalued that they had no influence over the course of the conflict. His failure to fulfill his commitments and a certain lack of seriousness in his actions have meant that few people now trust or credit his government. In fact, a recent survey by the Central American University gave Flores a lower approval rating than any of the three other ARENA Presidents who preceded him. Flores has beaten all records of unpopularity.
Origins of the health care conflictThere is a long history behind the conflict in the health care sector. Salvadoran doctors in the Social Security system were obliged to form a union after the government refused to negotiate with them on demands related to salary increases and improvements in the public health care system. They formed the Union of Doctors in the Social Security Institute (SIMETRISS) and began their struggle to win raises and the right to participate in the definition of government health care policies. In January 1998, the doctors stepped up their pressure on the government until they succeeded in signing agreements in May, which the government immediately began to ignore.
SIMETRISS decided to wait and negotiate with the new Flores government. When he took office in June 1999, he declared in his inaugural address that he would honor the agreements signed by the previous government with the doctors’ union. Encouraged by this commitment, SIMETRISS felt confident that it could significantly improve the medical care provided by Social Security.
The union soon found, however, that his words were just that. The Social Security Institute continued to block or complicate any attempts to improve service. The hospitals were so overcrowded that, to give but one example, instead of delivering what should have been a maximum of 12,000 births a year, they were delivering 19,000 as best they could. Yet when SIMETRISS proposed to ease the burden on the existing hospitals by opening two new ones that had been finished for nearly a year but had not yet been put into operation by the government, the institute refused. Its absurd position fed suspicions that the government is bent on privatizing the system.
Privatization underwayThrough a completely credible source, doctors in the union discovered that at the time they were demanding that the two new hospitals be opened, the government was already well into talks with two private insurance companies to run them. It is no accident that the two companies count Cristiani of Banco Cuscatlán, Baldochi of the Banco Agrícola Comercial and the Poma family among their shareholders. When SIMETRISS learned this on November 15, it and the Union of Social Security Institute Workers (STISS), the other main union in the sector, began to paralyze services to denounce the privatization plans and the government’s violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The government wasted no time in responding. While busily negotiating the privatization, it fired 221 workers at the end of November, held back year-end bonuses for many others and docked the striking workers three months’ pay. The President further aggravated the conflict when he announced that the privatization of the two new Social Security Institute hospitals would go ahead as part of a pilot project that would lead to the privatization of all the country’s health care services. An uproar ensued, since this decision falls to the legislature and cannot be made unilaterally by the executive branch. Furthermore, such a drastic change in the system is unconstitutional, since it would violate the constitutional guarantee of free health care.
Repression, insults, and a health emergencyOn January 27, the Labor Court decided against the workers’ demand that those fired be reinstated. The STISS appealed the decision to a higher court, which overturned it on February 11 and declared that the Social Security Institute had failed to respect clauses in the collective bargaining agreement in effect. It also ordered the institute to rectify its actions within ten days of notification. Rather than accept this verdict as a step towards resolving the conflict, the government and the Social Security authorities appealed to the Supreme Court to reverse it.
In February, the government decided to use repression, while the union called an indefinite national strike. The government ordered that striking workers be violently evicted from several health care units in the Social Security system. After announcing on February 14 that it was cutting off all negotiations, the government put a parallel medical care program into effect using military installations and resources. The Ministry of the Interior called a press conference to announce an Emergency Health Care Service Plan for the Salvadoran Population. It also threatened to cancel the legal status of SIMETRISS and STISS and the Medical Association, and described the union leaders as "bums and crooks."
A week before the elections, the government violently repressed doctors and health care workers in the streets. The tear gas used by riot police even affected patients in one hospital.
Decisive influence on the electionsThe government’s stubbornly misguided position in this conflict radically transformed an electoral panorama that had previously seemed straightforward, with few if any doubts about an ARENA landslide.
People interpreted the inflexibility of the President and his Cabinet as a sign of ARENA’s incapacity to govern. The medical union said as much on February 16, in response to the decision to cut off talks: if the President and his Cabinet are unable to sit down to negotiate in order to resolve a public conflict, the union argued, they should resign so that Salvadoran society can elect a more serious, capable government.
The March 12 election results were widely expected to reflect this interpretation and this rejection. Although the predicted results cannot be described as either a calamity for ARENA or a resounding triumph for the FMLN, it was clear that Silva would win by an ample margin in the capital and that ARENA would lose a significant number of votes. (See box at the end of this article for election results that came in just as this issue of envío was going to press.)
Despite the government’s many mistakes, it was not expected that the FMLN would win significantly more votes. The leftist party, which the country’s President accuses of being antidemocratic, has called for halting the government’s privatization program, cutting taxes and tightening anti-corruption laws, but has been unable to present a real alternative to the government’s clumsiness.
Votes ARENA lost because of Flores’ poor administration appear more likely to go to either the National Conciliation Party, a rightwing alternative, or the Democratic Center Union, a haven for middle-class urban residents disappointed by the FMLN. Many will abstain, the only other choice for those who have become increasingly discouraged by politics in general, political parties and especially politicians.
Surveys rain downIn the weeks leading up to the elections, surveys rained down on Salvadorans. They were carried out by the leading media, private groups hired by the two main parties, the firm Silva hired and some of the Salvadoran universities. All showed the governing party losing ground and Silva well ahead of his ARENA challenger, Luis Cardenal. The difference between the two amounted to as much as 23% in a survey done by the Technological University, while the smallest gap was 9%, reflected in the CID-Gallup poll.
Amidst this storm of surveys, the one most anxiously awaited by Salvadoran society, and especially by politicians in all parties, was the one by the Central American University’s Public Opinion Institute (UCA-IUDOP). This survey has already established itself as the most trustworthy poll in Salvadoran elections, and on several occasions political leaders spoke of a need to wait for its results, since they felt it would best reflect the trends among the diverse sectors of society.
The results of the survey, carried out on February 12-20, were released on February 24. Nearly 60% of those polled expressed little or no interest in the municipal and legislative elections, while only 22.6% said they were very interested in the elections. These troubling results suggested that many would abstain. Most of the population shared neither the enthusiasm nor the passion and energy that the media, the state and the political party elite who participate in the electoral process invest in it.
Lack of credibility and enthusiasmThe UCA survey found that 63.6% of Salvadorans do not feel that the political parties benefit them, and 59.2% do not feel that they represent their interests. Over half the Salvadoran population not only rejects political parties, but views the elections as a waste of time. Although several elections have now taken place since the peace accords were signed, little if anything has improved in El Salvador and some things have worsened. Such is the opinion of 69.5% of those surveyed.
The Salvadorans polled gave the President only 4.84% backing, and the National Assembly only 4.74%. The lack of credibility of the political system and the state’s institutional system helps explain the high abstention rate.
Over half of those interviewed said they do not sympathize with any of the nine parties participating in the elections. Barely four in ten expressed an interest in one of the parties. Among that minority with an interest, 21.8% favor ARENA and 21.6% the FMLN, in a virtual dead heat between the two leading parties.
Héctor Silva: Nightmare and threatSilva’s second term as the capital’s mayor, assuming he will indeed be reelected for the coalition of the FMLN and the Social Christian Union, means the continuation of programs for urban development, the environment and high-risk youth, and the launching of important new projects proposed by his team. All this is being implemented with remarkable administrative transparency and participation by diverse sectors of society through open town hall meetings and occasional plebiscites where decisions are made on issues of general interest.
This scenario bodes for increasing confrontations with social and political sectors linked to big business and the governing party. ARENA does not aspire to win the capital in order to improve the lives of its residents. It is only concerned about this large gap in its power and all the future ramifications of the opposition maintaining control of the capital and reaping the fruits of success there.
Ever since Silva launched his candidacy in the March 1997 elections, he has been a nightmare for the hard right, those who believe they own the country but have been kept out of this showcase that they would like the capital to be. With these elections, Silva has become more than a nightmare; he is now a real threat to ARENA’s intention to hold onto the central government.
Héctor Silva has emerged as a potentially successful candidate for President a couple of years down the road. With Silva’s second administration in the capital, San Salvador may well renew its reputation as a springboard to the presidency. Silva promised he would work to form a broad coalition of parties to govern the city—something that could work in his favor in a future presidential bid since El Salvador is far from a two-party system. Eight parties participated in these this year’s elections.
ARENA is more aware of Silva’s potential than the FMLN itself. In the current scenario, the FMLN will grow stronger if it can let the municipal council develop and keep making autonomous decisions, and can allow Silva to consolidate his leadership and make progress in the search for consensus and cooperation among the various leading tendencies within the FMLN.
Prospects in the AssemblyIn the National Assembly, with polls showing a virtual tie between ARENA and FMLN representatives, neither of these two leading parties will be able to control the legislature. They will have to negotiate with the smaller parties to pass any legislation, giving the latter major brokering power.
What is most valuable about this scenario is that a balance will be achieved between the branches of state. For the first time, the executive branch will be obliged to take the legislature into account, and the legislature will be able to exercise some control over the decisions of a Cabinet that has thus far stood out for its arbitrariness, intransigence and mediocrity in responding to the nation’s demands.
In the new National Assembly, all parties will count, not only the two leading ones, and in fact the vote of the smaller parties could make or break key legislation. The FMLN should be able to win the votes of the Democratic Center Union, and may also find support from the Christian Democrats, who after a long winter under the control of the hard right, are now being led by people in line with the party’s best historical traditions. ARENA will have to curry favor with the National Conciliation Party to win the votes it needs in its fight to achieve a difficult legislative majority.
Chaos or a Nicaraguan-style pact?ARENA would be the big loser in such a scenario, since it would have failed in its efforts to win control of the two branches of state. This would help break the long-standing impunity of an executive branch accustomed to unilateral decisions imposed by top party leaders, which has prevented the legislators from debating and deciding on issues that fall under their responsibility. An enormous risk in this scenario is that work in the legislature will bog down in the polarization between the two dominant political forces, which may well become entangled in sterile fights.
Another possibility is an ongoing confrontation between the executive branch and opposition representatives. This could lead to a dangerous lack of governability, in which the only winners would be the sectors that could consolidate their secret deals under the cover of this political and social chaos. More than a few politicians and state officials have been encouraging such chaos.
One particularly dangerous resolution to this possible scenario of polarization, which is luckily not very likely, would be an agreement between the two leading parties to ensure the country’s "governance" in exchange for splitting up the state spoils. In a "Nicaraguan-style" pact, the two main parties would agree to approve laws that would favor their interests at the expense of national interests.
Social violence will increaseOn the social scene, agitation is likely. It seems inevitable that demands and pressure on an unbending executive will increase. If the President and his Cabinet remain intransigent, social violence will rise, Flores’ administration will be further discredited and ARENA will lose credibility and possibly step up its repressive tactics, encouraged by the party’s hardliners. Without significant changes in the government’s current policies, the post-electoral situation will be defined by increasing confrontation and polarization between the government and the social sectors.
If the political elite and top officials in state institutions do not act responsibly and commit themselves to a consensual search for solutions to social problems, the forecast is a stormy one.
Incomplete Vote Returns Bear Out Predictions
With 92% of the vote counted in San Salvador, Héctor Silva won with 56% to Luis Cardenal’s 39%. The FMLN also claimed victory in 8 of the country’s 14 departmental capitals, but it was too early for meaningful quantitative results from the 262 mayoral races in the municipalities nationwide.
In the legislative elections it appeared that the FMLN defeated ARENA for the first time to become the largest single bloc in the National Assembly, although the right as a whole will maintain a narrow majority. Three years ago, ARENA won 28 seats to 27 for the leftists in the 84-member assembly. This year, with 88% of the vote counted, calculations gave the FMLN 31 seats to ARENA’s 29. The rightwing National Conciliation Party will most likely have 14 seats, the Christian Democratic Party 5, the center-left Democratic Center Union 3, and the National Action Party 2. Fewer than 50% of the 3 million eligible voters turned out to cast ballots, election officials said.
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