Guatemala
After El Salvador, is Guatemala Next?
Envío team
After only a year in power, Guatemala's second civilian government, inherited from the weakened Vinicio Cerezo presidency, has become so debilitated itself that it seems as if President Jorge Serrano Elias were at the end of his own term. The highly acclaimed "democratic transition" permitted by the army since 1986 has been paralyzed, and the country's conflict continues without resolution.
In 1991, President Serrano promoted three major initiatives to strengthen his government and earn it national and international legitimacy. He called for a "social pact" between the unions and the business interests represented by the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF), reinitiated talks with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) under new conditions and opened a national debate to "break down the wall of impunity." These initiatives have both influenced and constrained the already organized popular movement, while spontaneous popular organization has increased significantly.
Lame government, lame alliancesThe unexpected electoral victory of Serrano, neo-Pentecostal leader of the Helim church, is a result of a backlash vote against the Christian Democratic government of the previous five years, which dashed people's expectations that a state of law would finally be established. As in other Latin American countries, it was a vote against traditional policies that have repeatedly proven incapable of changing anything. In Guatemala, those changes include putting an end to human rights violations and alleviating the majority's poverty. The election of Serrano, alternative candidate of the Solidarity Action Movement (MAS) and the last to enter the race, is a shift toward the conservative and moralizing tradition of his party, which has been closely linked to the military and the far Right. But his victory was also marked by 50% voter abstention in the first round and 70% in the second, which gave him the presidency with 28% of the votes. The MAS controls only 8% of Congress and 3% of municipal governments. Throughout the year, Serrano tried to disguise this weakness—as well as the fact that the MAS had no party infrastructure, qualified cadres or even a government program—by periodically undertaking authoritarian initiatives and promoting such bold measures as direct talks with the URNG.
The one strength Serrano had was the legitimacy conferred by an electoral process that, while not participatory, was, for the second time, formally "clean." To a large extent, he needed the alliances he made with the Christian Democrats and other political and economic sectors because he came to power by a political stroke of luck, given that General Efraín Ríos Montt was not allowed to run since he had ruled in the 1980s thanks to a military coup. The Christian Democrats supported Serrano in the second electoral round in return for being given the directorate of the National Congress. No single political party has a majority in the legislature, which should allow it to become a truly deliberative body that could play an important role in the current political debate—although internal disputes have so far prevented it from taking on that role. The powerful economic groups of the modernizing right wing, as well as sympathizers of Ríos Montt and Alvaro Arzú's National Advancement Party (PAN), did not finance Serrano's campaign but later formed part of his Cabinet, whose priority is to promote the neoliberal economic project.
The economy and the social pact bombSerrano inherited a crumbling state apparatus and established a weak government—the expression of a weakened and frail civil society. He also inherited a structural adjustment plan with negative results since its implementation in 1987, an economy in recession and the old Right's staunch opposition to tax reform. (Guatemala has the lowest taxes in all of Latin America.)
After a year in office, Serrano, just like the "modernizing" Right that governs in the rest of Central America, is able to present impressive results with respect to Guatemala's principal macroeconomic indicators. The exchange rate has stabilized, financial reserves have increased, the stabilization period has lasted longer than in previous cases (1986 and 1988) and inflation dropped from 60% at the end of 1990 to 12% in December of 1991.
But the social costs have been very high. According to official estimates, two-thirds of the population is either unemployed or without steady work or, at least, has an income far below minimum consumer needs. Over 90% of the population works in the informal sector, laboring an average of 15 hours per day—almost twice as long as formal-sector workers—while earning barely two-thirds of the cost of meeting a family's minimum monthly needs.
At the same time, the country's economy descended into open depression in 1991 after a 3% growth in 1990. Preliminary indicators for the first half of the year show a drastic drop in private consumption, a determining factor in price stabilization.
Imports also contracted severely during the first six months. Between January and March alone, they dropped over 40%, and from April to June, another 18%. For an economy as open as Guatemala's, these are very disturbing indicators. In addition, an increase in interest rates on credit caused a contraction in production. The only dynamic economic sectors were construction and nontraditional exports (maquila and certain agricultural crops).
The construction industry's success is closely related to the laundering of drug trafficking money. According to the US Drug Enforcement Agency, some $300 million is entering the country annually through the drug trade. The maquila industries' growth is a result of Korean, US and Guatemalan capital investment in response to the new maquila laws. Although this sector has grown rapidly over the last three years (some 400 such industries provide jobs for 100,000 Guatemalans), its impact on urban employment and the balance of payments is still insignificant.
There is reason to believe that investments in maquila industries and the export of nontraditional crops have not created jobs and additional income for the population as much as it has monetarized traditional peasant and artisan production, throwing it further into crisis. Case studies carried out by the Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences (AVANCSO) indicate that, in real terms, peasants are earning less from these new crops than they got from their traditional subsistence farming. But they have been forced by soil depletion, the massive importation of basic grains (through PL-480 food aid from the US government) and credit restrictions to abandon their old practices and participate in the new market economy, despite very unfavorable terms from intermediaries and input suppliers.
Government measures have been primarily based on a disciplined program of monetary contraction and the issuing of $500 million in public debt bonds at 30% interest to promote the "return of capital." Public services such as health and education are functioning at their lowest possible level, and public works have been paralyzed to reduce the fiscal deficit and control public spending.
It is doubtful that Serrano and the neoliberal Right will be able to maintain even this level of economic "success" unless they can reactivate production and begin to go after the traditional oligarchy. Guatemala's problem is not merely the promotion of a neoliberal project; worse yet is that the right wing cannot even agree on such a "modernizing" project and rejects those appearing too reformist.
As long as the primary beneficiaries continue to be the financial and agroexport sectors of the oligarchy, it is hardly feasible to achieve the "social pact" proposed by the government. Over 80% of the population lives in almost total poverty, and the hope of improving living conditions under the current system diminishes daily. When the government called for the negotiation of a social pact, Union and Popular Action Unity (UASP), a grouping of independent unions, immediately demanded that human rights and other social and economic matters be discussed as a condition for their participation. Finally, only the business sectors of CACIF, government representatives, the social democratic unions and the General Federation of Workers participated in the meetings, and even the latter two later withdrew in solidarity with state employees when they mobilized to demand salary increases.
The social pact failed because the leftwing unions refused to give the new government a blank check unless it agreed to resolve Guatemalan society's most vital problem—the human rights situation. It also failed because the popular movement as a whole has no alternative to the business sector's neoliberal thrust.
URNG-Serrano negotiate, military negatesThe lack of agreement on human rights has also stalled the negotiations—more appropriately called dialogue sessions—between the government and the URNG. The two delegations had previously reached agreement on aspects related to democratization, one of the ten common agenda items, among which socioeconomic issues and the rights and identity of Guatemala's indigenous peoples are also included. It is a truly historic event that the military is now participating directly in the talks. In addition, Serrano showed greater courage than Cerezo by eliminating the precondition that the guerrillas lay down their arms before his government would negotiate. But the boldest political decision Serrano made in 1991 was to fire Defense Minister Bolaños and military Chief of Staff Matta, in order to move the negotiation process forward.
Nevertheless, everything seems to indicate that the government's strategy was not to reach a negotiated solution but to wear down the guerrillas both at the negotiating table and on the battlefield, thus ending the war without giving anything significant in return. Sources close to the negotiations pointed out that the government delegation played a passive role, limiting itself to giving partial responses to URNG initiatives. After seven months and five rounds of talks, the President emphasized that he would make no concessions to the guerrillas "outside the country's current legal framework."
It is not by coincidence that each negotiating round was accompanied by a wave of selective assassinations and an increase in violence in the country, in what appears to have been a conscious effort to provoke the guerrillas into withdrawing from the talks. Serrano's intention in initiating the dialogue with the URNG might have been to increase his national and international space for legitimacy by demonstrating that he has more power than he really has, but he has embarked on a journey that has only one end: a negotiated solution.
The search for "total peace," initiated in April, moved almost parallel to the negotiations between the Cristiani government and the FMLN; both processes even coincided several times in Mexico. For both the URNG and the FMLN, land reform, democratization and respect for human rights turn on the demilitarization of society.
It is probable that the break in negotiations with the URNG in October responded to the Guatemalan military's concern after the United Nations gave the Salvadorans a deadline for reaching an accord. Many also believe that the military is waiting for a split in the URNG or for one of its three organizations to adopt more radical positions, thus allowing it to push again for a military solution to the conflict.
In any case, the peace accords in El Salvador will undoubtedly affect the Guatemalan negotiations. US Secretary of State James Baker and other international figures have already stated that "it's Guatemala's turn." Although Serrano has so far rejected the mediation of other countries, arguing that the negotiation is an internal Guatemalan affair, the UN, now only an official observer, may end up playing a more important role in the search for a negotiated peace.
Many factors indicate that the search for peace in Guatemala will continue to get bloodier and more complex. First, the military conflict is not deadlocked as it was in El Salvador. The URNG continues to broaden its zones of influence and battle, and the conflict could go on for several years. In 1991 the guerrillas' military activity came closer to the capital than it ever had in the past 30 years, affecting Antigua, only 24 miles from the capital, and military operations were on the increase in the first days of 1992.
Second, while it is believed that the URNG would attain less than the FMLN did through negotiations, it is unlikely that the URNG will accept the government proposal to sign a ceasefire in return only for the promise that the guerrillas' lives will be respected and that they may incorporate into the country's political life. As a revolutionary vanguard, the URNG's goal, as laid out in meetings in Oslo in March 1990 with various political sectors of the country, is to secure constitutional reforms that consolidate democracy and bring an end to militarism. It is not realistic, then, to think that Latin America's oldest guerrilla force will accept conditions that do not allow for a real transformation of society, after having survived all the government's counterinsurgency plans in a 30-year war that has cost over 100,000 lives.
Third, there is nothing in Guatemala similar to El Salvador's Democratic Convergence or its unions, which would make the URNG's insertion into civil society less difficult. Fourth, and most important, the military—appealing to "anti-gringo" nationalism—does not appear willing to be even the least bit flexible; it believes that it can resist pressure and international isolation and, alone, defeat the guerrilla forces. As guerrilla Commander Gaspar Ilóm (Rodrigo Asturias) said, Guatemala "has developed, in 30 years of dirty war, the most comprehensive and complete oppressive structure in Latin America." More people in Guatemala died violently in the last decade than in El Salvador and Nicaragua combined, in spite of more intense wars in both those countries.
The terror goes onIn 1991, international attention and pressure have prevented more large massacres, but the violation of human rights has continued, with more systematic and selective crimes or intimidation. An average of one to two people have been killed daily, according to the last report of the Guatemalan Archbishop's Office on Human Rights. A total of 575 people were murdered during the year, the majority of them peasants, workers and leaders or members of popular organizations, the church, political parties or unions.
Just days after the first URNG-government dialogue in Mexico, some 30 union and popular leaders were forced to flee into exile. In July and August, a wave of assassinations, searches and intimidations obliged even more to leave the country. Not even national and international journalists escaped this official policy of terror.
No one has been punished for these crimes and the wall of impunity remains intact. The only concrete result of the Attorney General's declaration that "the installation of a state of law in Guatemala means putting an end to impunity" was the opening of a public debate in which it is almost unanimously recognized that a state of law cannot exist until the judicial system is reformed. According to the Archbishop's office, there are no political prisoners or people accused of crimes against state security, and even official cases of torture are few. There is a simple and brutal explanation: people the state considers enemies are openly assassinated or quietly "disappeared." In 1991, 144 people disappeared, and in the past three decades, about 40,000.
Nevertheless, the struggle against impunity has galvanized the popular movement. Organized popular sectors, unions and humanitarian groups have taken on Serrano's promise to "knock down the wall of impunity." The 1989 murder of Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack, believed to have been committed by an intelligence agent in Vinicio Cerezo's Presidential High Command, is the first political crime the government has recognized since the military rule of civil society began in Guatemala almost 40 years ago. International pressure and solidarity, together with the Mack family's thirst for justice, have been key to the progress in clarifying the case, and could be a first signal to the army that the end of its impunity is nearing, or at least that the possibility of being punished exists.
But headway in this area has not been consistent. Institutionalized repression is still the underpinning of governability for the oligarchy and demonstrates the military's hegemony over all mechanisms of power in society. Even President Serrano has admitted that fierce resistance within the armed forces prevents progress, but he and his Cabinet members are lending themselves to the latest repressive strategy. They have publicly called popular and union leaders "political arms" of the guerrillas, thus marking them as potential death squad victims. One example is indigenous leader Amílcar Méndez, who received death threats after Serrano accused him on television of working for the guerrillas and is forced to leave the country.
The judicial system does not have the ability to make changes in this area. Its institutional weakness, technical limitations and, above all, lack of political will to apply the law correctly make a state of law in Guatemala nonviable. AID recently canceled a project related to the administration of justice in the country, concluding that "the system is not reformable."
The popular movement: Less fear, more autonomyWithin this repressive political context, the unorganized popular sectors and the peasantry are demonstrating increased willingness to fight back. They have resisted the army and security forces in land takeovers, salary struggles and opposition to forced recruitment. After the December 1990 massacre, the indigenous population of Santiago Atitlán actually expelled the army. Before this rebellion, one person was murdered there per week; in 1991, with the military gone, not a single person was killed in the entire year. The army has tried to enter the town three times, and three times the people have forced them out. "What happened in Santiago will happen to them here" is a slogan that has begun to be heard in other towns.
This year has also brought greater national legitimacy and unity to the Communities of Populations in Resistance (CPR) in Quiché and Huehuetenango, which set themselves up in the mountains to resist army repression. The popular movement has also found that the growing community opposition to corrupt elected mayors is providing greater and more legitimate openings to combat them politically.
Neighborhood protests for rights such as potable water have been organized spontaneously, without the participation of the unions or traditional leaders. Such traditional leaders, particularly from political parties, have almost completely lost their ability to influence these popular sectors, let alone to direct their struggles.
The popular movement's principal problem is that the struggle for legitimate demands always runs up against repression. Any direct contact or even perception of contact between the URNG and the popular sectors connotes a death sentence. And it is always the people who are the victims of military actions intended to counteract the URNG's increased military confrontations. The army has implemented stricter control over the population in popular neighborhoods and the countryside and, in some cases, has reinforced the civil self-defense patrols.
Alongside its military activity, the URNG will have to concentrate on the negotiations and on more effectively using the new space available to it in the media to better inform the people about its project and actively involve other sectors of civil society in the search for a negotiated solution.
The popular sectors, especially the rural indigenous majority, know nothing or almost nothing about the negotiation process, but they could be involved in it, promoting peace and their own future as a people. How can the problem of the indigenous be discussed without their participation? Is it not crucial and determinant, in this year celebrating 500 years of resistance, that the Guatemalan indigenous peoples present their own contribution to the reaching of an accord that will minimally mean the end of a reign of exploitation and terror that dominates their daily lives? If it is true that the URNG does not have the military force of the FMLN, it becomes even more imperative that all sectors of Guatemalan society participate in its negotiations with the government. This is especially true for the poor majority, the real victims of this war, who represent the only guarantee of an authentic democratic transition that comes from the people and not the empty rhetoric of traditional political parties or the current government.
A still uncertain futureReports from the reinitiated government-URNG negotiations in January are encouraging and open the possibility that an international team, similar to ONUSAL in El Salvador, could supervise the human rights situation in Guatemala. This would be a decisive step, and could mean the beginning of the end of impunity. Nevertheless, Serrano still appears to be repeating the military's positions and statements. It remains to be seen if international pressure will be enough to advance the negotiation process in a positive direction. The US Congress, the German Parliament, Japan and the European Community have all urged the Guatemalan government to end impunity and human rights violations, making it a condition for economic aid. The human rights commissions of the Organization of American States and the United Nations, along with other organizations that defend human rights, will almost surely reiterate their criticism of the Guatemalan government this year.
The terms of the international debate on human rights will harden positions within the military and the extreme sectors of the political parties and private business, who will confront the criticism with the banner of nationalism. The army, which associates demilitarization and the subjection to civilian rule with a loss of "national sovereignty," perceives a "national security threat." The civilian leadership must impose pragmatic and more open ideas to prevent these sectors from hardening their positions and isolating the country. The issue of impunity, taken up from different perspectives, can contribute to strengthening a civil and democratic project.
The abyss between the far Right, military included, and the rest of society will make it difficult for Serrano to continue to govern effectively. He will have to make full use of his skills and international contacts to survive. In the economic sphere, this traditional Right will oppose him on the issue of tax reform, and if Serrano cannot force them to yield, he will have to accept an economic setback this year.
This year will be decisive for Guatemala's future, and it is questionable whether Serrano has the leadership skills necessary to keep the country from falling into international isolation and remaining at the caboose of the neoliberal economic train crossing Central America. A democratic future depends on respect for human rights and a negotiated peace that allows for the transformation of society.
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