El Salvador
Land and Military to Center Stage
Envío team
If the Chapultepec accords did not imply profound transformations in El Salvador's traditional power structure, there would be no obstacles to their implementation. The first steps taken in applying the accords reveal a right wing still unconvinced of the need for change, but pressured to make real transformations. Land has become a flash point of conflict in the implementation of the peace accords and could threaten democratic stabilization in the country. Already existing conflicts were put on hold only after the visit to El Salvador by key UN verification official Marrack Goulding.
Although the agrarian issue was not dealt with in as much depth or detail in the Chapultepec accords as was the ending of the armed conflict, the minimum agreements were quite specific. (Refer to box at the end of this article.)
The agrarian problemAt the end of February, the large private producer organization ANEP, the Association of Industrialists, and the Chamber of Commerce began a campaign around the land issue under the banner of law and order. They even conditioned their participation in the Concertación Forum—required by the accords—on the solution of the agrarian problem and the stabilization of the situation.
The campaign, which the government joined through its National Land Financing Institute, centered on the supposedly massive wave of land takeovers throughout the countryside. After the formation of the special COPAZ commission, mandated to deal with agrarian issues, this campaign and conflict were briefly put on hold. But private business quickly took the offensive again, by calling on the government to enforce law and order through the use of evictions and, in a clear usurpation of the specific functions assigned to the COPAZ special commission, by setting up offices in San Miguel and San Salvador so that the "legitimate" owners could denounce the occupation of their properties.
According to a census carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture, nearly 12,000 acres, a total of 57 properties, have been affected by takeovers. But ANEP intended to take a census of all "illegally occupied" lands, among which it includes lands in the conflict zones, thus refusing to recognize what had been agreed to in the Chapultepec accords.
ANEP was hoping to mobilize and manipulate those who would presumably be interested in recovering their lands. But to its surprise, the majority of the claimants who came to their offices were small landowners who have property titles for lands in the conflict zones and were hoping to sell, rather than recover them.
In any case, some land takeovers have occurred in the first months of this year. Some are due exclusively to a real need for land, while others are a response to ANEP's challenge. The evictions that have subsequently taken place are a result of pressures, from ANEP as well as some landowners, on justices of the peace in the zones.
It is within this context that US Jesuit Stephen Kelly was expelled. Kelly had been working for almost a year in Jiquilisco in the department of Usulután. The justice of the peace there ordered the "El Campeche" Cooperative evicted from land that had been taken over in August 1991. National Police, paramilitary forces and the former landowners came to the cooperative, destroying the small huts where the cooperative members lived. Father Kelly was detained and later taken to court after refusing to leave a hut that was to be destroyed. His release was quickly ordered; nonetheless, he was sent to the National Police headquarters in San Salvador and then deported to Guatemala, on express orders, according to authorities, of President Cristiani.
THE PEACE ACCORDS AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTIONThe state should ensure the transfer of rural agricultural lands over the constitutional limit of 612 acres (arts. 105 and 267). It should also ensure the transfer to agrarian reform beneficiaries of those lands that are state property and do no constitute forest reserves (art. 104). It is agreed that preference will be given to ex-combatants on both sides. At the same time, the state will procure the acquisition and subsequent transfer of lands voluntarily sold by their owners (a function of the Land Bank recently created by the government). The first part is not, in principle, a product of the negotiations; it simply represents the state’s obligation to comply with what is constitionally stipulated. It also represent both sides’ commitment to attend to landless peasants and ex-combatants, as well as to search for mechanisms of payment and credit assistance.
Land in Zones of Conflict
According to the peace accords, “The current state of land tenure will be respected, within the zones of conflict, until a satisfactory and definitive legal solution is reached. Thus the current tenants will not be evicted.” Once compliance with the accords was underway, the FMLN handed over its land inventory. The government should procure a legal solution between the legitimate owner and the current tenant through the buying and selling of land. The COPAZ special commission was created as part of this, although COPAZ itself will be the organization verifying these two points.
Occupied Lands
According to the July 3, 1991 agreement between the government and the peasant organizations carrying out land occupations, the government committed itself to resolving the problem of land tenure in favor of the peasant organizations. Occupations after July 3 will be considered illegal. Although the government reserves the right to apply the law in these cases, the FMLN exhorts it to find solutions through dialogue and the mechanisms proposed by the peace accords.
The right Wing Interprets the Accords
“Whatever the letter of the ‘peace accords, ‘they must, above all, limit themselves to the laws of the nation.
The essential goal of the peace process is to return to a state of legal security in accord with the law, not distribute property or concede political space. While, due to outside pressure, it was agreed to hand over to FMLN ‘combatants’ some lands belonging to the government, this was done with the understanding that demobilized members of the army would enjoy the same right, but in no case was it accepted that we would return to the thefts carried out under the Junta and the Duarte administration.
“What is taking place is a monstrosity which only a sick mind would try to justify. The reasons are clear and irrefutable:
“First, no negotiating group, regardless of the powers given it by the government, can go beyond the Constitution. Second, the adjudication of government properties should take place in conformance with a legal process. Third, if the objective is to assure a living for MLN members, undermine public security and weaken the basic institutions of the state, one of the country’s principal pillars of prosperity is being destroyed.” (From a Diario del Hoy editorial, March 4, 1992).
Demilitarization? The second hub of conflicts revolves around the concentration of military forces. The first phase of this process—the concentration of both the government's armed forces and FMLN troops—took place without incident. But the beginning of the second phase has been plagued with delays and problems. A number of factors have complicated the process: the mysterious overflights of military and civilian planes into FMLN zones, the pseudo-dissolution of the security forces, the agrarian problem and other logistical concerns.
On the last day of February, the FMLN denounced a series of A-37 and F-5 flights over Perquín in Morazán and Las Flores in Chalatenango, as well as civilian flights over Guazapa and Usulután. All of these areas are zones of concentration for the FMLN forces. Even though the ONUSAL forces were not the first to denounce the flights—even though they have military observers on the ground in the guerrilla camps—they did verify that the planes had not taken off from the Salvadoran base at Ilopango. Quite after the fact, the Salvadoran government protested the overflights to the Honduran government. It also declared that the Cartographic Institute had contracted Bolivian civilian airplanes for the elaboration of national maps. It is well known that there was ongoing coordination between the Cartographic Institute and the Armed Forces High Command throughout the war.
For its part, Honduras denied that its airplanes had made the incursions, but announced the deployment of troops towards border areas—particularly those still in litigation between El Salvador and Honduras in the International Court of Justice. Honduras' pretext for this deployment was that there had been skirmishes between the FMLN and the Salvadoran army, a charge denied both by ONUSAL and area residents. Its latest variation in pronouncements on the subject was that the FMLN was taking over and subsequently distributing lands in the disputed zones.
The peace accords set the dissolution of the security forces (the National Guard and the Treasury Police) for March 2. That day, the government announced the transformation of the National Guard into the Border Guard, and the Treasury Police into the Military Police, following their incorporation into the army and virtual "dissolution" as public security forces. Clearly, the peace accords contemplate the right of the armed forces and the government to reorganize their forces according to the Constitution. What the accords do not suggest is that these military corps remain intact, undergoing a change in name only and much less that they remain in their old military installations. To do so would be equivalent to not complying with the agreement to concentrate the armed forces in the stipulated areas. The authentic dissolution of the security forces is an imperative within the demilitarization process.
In recent weeks, assassinations have been carried out in the style of the death squads operating during the war years. The most significant of these was the murder of Nazario de Jesús Gracias, a former union member at the state grain distribution enterprise, which closed in August 1991.
Why the delays? These events, along with the agrarian issue and a number of logistical problems, caused delays in the concentration of FMLN forces. The FMLN argued that it could not concentrate its forces in the 15 stipulated areas while they were under surveillance.
While the possibility of bombing raids over the guerilla encampments was unlikely, the situation became very tense. It was also impossible for the process to advance until the concentration of forces became simultaneous, the Treasury Police and National Guard were dissolved and minimum security measures were made available to demobilized FMLN combatants and the civilian population in the zones. Finally, it is not feasible to concentrate hundreds of guerrillas—in some cases, a thousand—without offering at least minimal nutritional and sanitary conditions.
Until mid-March, the peace process seemed dangerously stalled. However, Marrack Goulding's visit eased tensions, and some issues were clarified. First, it was agreed to put the land problem temporarily on hold so that the process as a whole could move forward. The FMLN and the government agreed to abandon the occupation-eviction dynamic and work together until March 28 on a reinterpretation of the agrarian problem.
Second, it was reaffirmed in Goulding's presence that neither the Treasury Police nor the National Guard are to have any public security tasks or jurisdiction over the civilian population. The parties recognized the armed forces' right to reorganize, but also that this would not imply the transformation of the former security forces into military corps. It was also established that they must concentrate into the areas stipulated by the accords and withdraw from their present command posts in order to incorporate into the army.
After the signing of the accords on January 6, and in the wake of the new UN Secretary General's inauguration, the peace process in El Salvador was abandoned internationally. ONUSAL even began its work isolated from the UN. With Goulding's visit, the UN seized the initiative once again, designating him as the key UN official responsible for overseeing and mediating the peace process. Thus a void has been filled—one on which the Salvadoran right wing was about to capitalize. In general, however, the process has not reached a crisis point.
The long process of first selecting, and then weeding out, the list of candidates for new institutions such as the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Public Security Academy has also tested the peace process. Though other delays are clearly part of the ultra Right's strategy to thwart it, progress is being made. Different versions of proposals for the National Reconstruction Plan show a positive evolution. The plan includes a restructuring of investments, gives a role to nongovernmental organizations in project implementation and grants the FMLN representation on the National Reconstruction Commission.
The ultra RightTowards the end of February, rumors were flying about the possibility of a coup attempt. Prominent leaders of business associations and members of the armed forces held meetings on military premises, including the headquarters of the Atlacatl Battalion.
The most radical sectors of the right wing are trying to force a renegotiation of the accords more to their liking. Though the accords as a whole do not allow for such an adjustment, the far Right hopes to take advantage of and exaggerate existing conflicts in order to destabilize the entire peace process. COPAZ's own delays in meeting established timelines play into this strategy. So does the campaign around the land issue.
Another element is the right wing's public security demands, given the inability of the National Police to confront the growing crime problem. The far Right bemoans its loss of control over the security forces and makes clear its intention to recover them sooner or later. At the same time, the increase in crime gives them a pretext for making political assassinations appear as nothing more than common crime. The death squads can thus continue operating in a somewhat veiled fashion. They are not attacking high profile political figures or popular leaders, but are concentrating on ordinary citizens—who have once again begun to express themselves—in an attempt to stifle popular participation in the political process.
By its passivity, the government is participating in the ultra-right strategy. It has taken no measures against the owners of the ADOC shoe factory, which closed its doors without following any legal proceedings. Nor has it put a brake on ANEP's politicking around the land issue. Before Goulding's visit, the government also tended to denounce only FMLN violations of the accords.
A bloc is clearly forming in opposition to the accords and their implementation. It includes large landowners, ANEP and the armed forces, all longstanding opponents of any profound changes in the country's socioeconomic system. Along with these sectors is the "hardline" ARENA faction, which, since Roberto D' Aubuisson's death, is fighting to regain control of the party. This bloc, which sees that its very power is at stake, will continue to try to destroy the implementation process and renegotiate the accords in its favor.
One case among manyONUSAL and the international verification team constitute a retaining wall against the ultra Right. It would thus not be surprising to see campaigns like those in the past against ONUSAL and international solidarity efforts. The case of Rodolfo Matarollo is a good example.
A well-known human rights specialist from Argentina, Matarollo had worked closely with the Central American University's Human Rights Institute on the case of the slain Jesuits. He later signed on as an adviser and specialist in ONUSAL's human rights divisions. During a human rights seminar for the National Assembly, he was prevented from speaking. Assembly representatives claimed he was in the country illegally and told him to leave. Opposition party representatives protested and abandoned the Assembly chambers; the seminar was suspended. To date the government has not given a clear explanation of Matarollo's legal status. The Foreign Ministry has kept silent, saying only that it is discussing the matter directly with ONUSAL.
Those favoring change have two key tools: the guerrilla forces, currently being transformed into an important political bloc, and popular protest. The guerrilla forces, though concentrated in their camps under ONUSAL supervision, function as a deterrent to the distortion of or noncompliance with the accords. Given the highly tense situation generated by ANEP's land campaign, the refusal to dissolve the National Guard and Treasury Police and the killing of people who favor the peace process, FMLN Comandante Joaquín Villalobos warned that the FMLM's conversion to a political force could be delayed if both sides do not simultaneously comply with the accords, and if security cannot be assured for former FMLN combatants, as well as of all Salvadoran citizens.
The second greatest force defending the accords is popular mobilization. But the popular movement is faced with two challenges. First, it has to broaden itself significantly, precisely because the ultra Right is focusing on confrontation rather than on dialogue and negotiation. Second, it could exert effective political pressure on those opposing the accords by activating and incorporating the broad segments of the population that have been outside the country's political life during the last decade.
One possibility would be to incorporate the interests of small landholders in the zones of conflict into the Left's political platform. The majority of landholdings in these zones are very small minifundios. Some landowners clearly want to return, while others hope to sell their land. The dispute is thus between the former owners and the civilians who have repopulated these zones in recent years.
Acquired rights? In a meeting between former landholders from the area and the repopulated community of Nueva Trinidad, "Maria," an FMLN leader in Chalatenango, expressed the problem this way: "On the one hand, your request to return to your homes and your land is just. But it is also just that the current tenants stay put until the situation is resolved." Fairly resolving problems such as this one is precisely the task facing the special COPAZ commission set up to address land issues. In Maria's words, "We still carry a huge burden, but we're not struggling uphill anymore; we've stopped the war, and moved on to the plan."
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