Nicaragua
The Labor Code: Workers’ Rights vs. Economic Recovery?
Envío team
Unemployment in Nicaragua has reached the highest levels ever registered. Estimates vary according to the source, but the government, business sector and workers agree that the situation is critical. Un- and underemployment is acknowledged to be approximately 58%.
It seems paradoxical that during Nicaragua's worst economic crisis in history the labor unions want to improve labor laws and working conditions. They are fighting for the passage of a new labor code that not only recognizes all the de facto changes to the benefit of workers over the past 12 years but also advances workers' rights even further.
This stance raises important questions. Is it possible to pass a progressive labor code under neoliberal economic policies? By promoting a labor code that benefits the workers, are we putting social justice over investment, thus sacrificing economic recovery for all to social justice for some?
The discussion of a new labor code in the National Assembly has unleashed a broad debate throughout the country, among workers, women, the government and business. The unions and government are at opposite ends of the spectrum. For the unions, the most important issue is social justice—how to guarantee, insofar as possible in a country in crisis, job security and mechanisms that help workers fight for their rights in the work place. For the government, the most important issue is attracting investment, and this, according to the labor minister, requires a labor code that permits hiring "flexibility"—the opposite of what the unions seek.
The Sandinista government and the labor code The current labor code, passed in the mid-1940s, is largely obsolete. Technological, economic and political changes have rendered it unresponsive to the reality of today's society. The majority of the reforms to this code were passed during the Sandinista government, but it was never totally rewritten as is being done now.
Many have asked why the FSLN—a party that has proclaimed itself in defense of the workers since its beginnings—never passed a new labor code while in government. There are many answers. Dr. Jorge Samper, legal adviser to the Sandinista National Assembly bench, emphasizes three key ones: first, labor relations changed de facto, and collective bargaining agreements conceded rights far beyond those guaranteed by the labor code; second, amendments to the law attenuated the necessity of making a total change; and third, the war relegated a number of issues that should have been addressed.
Sandinista legislative representative Dora María Téllez adds other reasons—economic and productivity concerns, "the same reasons that make the discussion so complex now. Both concerns clashed with reality; we had one labor code but a different labor practice in effect. Reality went far beyond the actual code. And we didn't recognize or accommodate rapidly to this change."
Labor leaders from both the pro-Sandinista union umbrella, the National Workers' Front (FNT), and the traditionally US-linked Confederation of Trade Union Unity (CUS) blame the failure to rewrite the code on the contradictions generated by the state as a business interest. CUS president Jose Espinoza says, "The Sandinista Front confused class—and party—interests with its interests as a government. It said that the workers and peasants were in power, and asked them why they would want a new labor code that worked against them since they were in power The FSLN could have created a labor code that would have served as a model for all of Latin America. That would have been a legacy "
In addition, although the government's Ministry of Labor (MITRAB) and the opposition's Popular Social Christian and Conservative parties all drafted bills, there was never a lot of pressure to pass a new labor code. Toward the end of the Sandinista government, however, the Sandinista Workers' Confederation (CST) began working on its own bill, and a year after the electoral defeat, the Sandinista legislative bloc together with the CST—and now the FNT—forced the current debate.
In the final analysis, the real changes in labor relations that occurred under the former government in spite of the law made possible the prospect of passing a new and more progressive labor code today. At the same time, political polarization impeded the unions from fighting for a new code from a unified class position until recently. For example, during the Sandinista government's lame duck period, the Sandinista-controlled National Assembly repealed the labor code's controversial article 116. That article permitted an employer to abrogate—without cause—any work contract with only 30 days' notice (and 30 days' pay). Yet, in the first days of the new post-election legislature, many of the same pro-UNO union representatives who are now fighting against such contract policies voted with the majority UNO bloc to reinstate the repealed article.
The government-labor debate The bill written in May by the Assembly Commission on Labor Affairs modernizes the existing code in many ways. It includes, for example, the concept of women's equal right to job access and on-the-job treatment, as well as the principle of equal pay for equal work. It also eliminates specific outdated sections on work in bakeries—once a much more significant faction of the work force—and updates sections on work in the mines, at sea and in agriculture.
But most important, it takes into account democratic changes and the transformations in employer-employee relations over the past 12 years. Union leaders, whose perspective is largely reflected in this commission's bill, want a progressive labor code that guarantees job stability in a national context of severe unemployment.
As could be expected, the neoliberal UNO government has strongly criticized the bill. It alleges that, in order to attract investment and thus bring about the country's "economic takeoff," the new labor code must guarantee work force "mobility."
The four most controversial issues are the termination of contracts, severance pay, various issues related to strikes and the resolution of minor conflicts. The following explanation of each point begins with the changes made to the current labor code in the labor commission's bill and the unions' viewpoint, and is followed by the government's criticism.
Termination of contracts and severance pay The bill. In the opinion of FNT leader and Assembly representative Damaso Vargas, article 116 of the current labor code, described above, responds "to private enterprise's conception that if I own the tools of the work place, I also own the worker." CUS president Espinoza says, "[Firing without cause] is precisely what we don't want, because it simply allows employers to selectively discriminate against all those who protest."
The commission eliminated the possibility of dismissal without just cause, basing its arguments on the recommendations of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and other countries' labor codes, such as Venezuela's and Costa Rica's. A fired worker has the right to appeal after which an employer will be required to rehire the employee if it is determined that he or she was unjustly dismissed. The employer's only alternative to rehiring the worker is an indemnification twice that established for justifiable dismissals or for voluntary resignations.
Under the current code, when a worker is dismissed (or resigns), the employer is obliged to pay only outstanding vacation days and the accumulated portion of "thirteenth month" bonuses*, plus one month's wages, no matter how many years the employee has worked for the company. Collective bargaining agreements negotiated in many companies have now made it common practice to link severance pay to years of service, at least up to a point. Today few employers give only the minimum required by the code. The labor commission took the best of those collective bargaining agreements and established an unlimited severance pay of one month's wages per year worked.
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*Nicaraguan workers all receive by law an extra month's pay as a Christmas bonus, known as the "thirteenth month."
In addition, Nicaraguan law establishes another category of workers for those in jobs known as "positions of trust." It refers to employees in substantial and frequent contact with a company director or state minister, and who, for this reason, can be dismissed by any new incoming director or minister without recourse. The commission's bill establishes an additional indemnification for these employees of up to six additional months' wages.
The government. From Labor Minister Francisco Rosales' perspective, Nicaragua will not be able to enter the Central American common market because it is not competitive. The country, he argues, needs to modernize its existing enterprises and take steps toward industrial conversion and reorganization, which could mean personnel reductions currently prohibited by the commission's bill. Rosales also alleges that investors will not come to Nicaragua unless contract obligations are flexible and allow for labor "mobility." One of the biggest problems, he argues, "is that if you hire someone it's as if you're contracting him for life. In this country you can divorce your husband or wife unilaterally... so it's ridiculous that I can divorce my wife but I can't divorce my employee."
Rosales describes the fundamental problem as a contradiction within the workers' movement, which "wants jobs and at the same time immobility. They don't think it's better to have a job for six months than to have nothing. Today, in order to be able to generate employment, Nicaragua needs an agile job policy with flexible hiring. Given Nicaragua's current context, to speak of immobility, of absolute stability, is totally ridiculous and out of place." He alleges that because of the restrictions established in the bill, simply "no one is going to hire."
In Rosales' opinion, the unions should cede in these first two points for their own good: they should allow for the "unilateral" dismissal of a worker without cause, and eliminate indemnification for years of service. His proposal is to retain article 116, modifying it only to increase the 30-day severance pay currently required to 60 days, with no other indemnification.
The labor minister also argues for reinstating the current code's guarantee for workers dismissed from positions of trust—up to six months' pay as indemnification. The fact is that the new bill already includes that, but on top of the severance pay for years of service. Rosales told envío, as well as local news media, that the bill guarantees one year's pay for employees in positions of trust who have worked between six months and one year in that job—but that is not true.
Another problem, says Rosales, is that neither the code nor the new bill facilitates hiring for fixed time periods. Both allow for closed contracts, but only once. Upon a contract's renewal, it automatically becomes an open contract, which allows an employee the right to all the benefits guaranteed by the labor code and/or the company's collective bargaining agreements. What advantage does a chain of fixed-term contracts give an employer? It is simply a way to avoid giving workers their just benefits and rights.
Contrary to Rosales' implications, the bill does not make it impossible to fire an employee. It allows for a 30-day probation period; it permits dismissals with just cause, including failure to fulfill one's job obligations as one of a list of such possible causes; and it even allows for dismissal without cause, but with an indemnification double that required for years of service. Workers thus interpret Rosales' use of the term "mobility" as granting an employer the right to fire employees with little cost simply because he or she does not like them—or because they organize, protest poor treatment or demand their rights.
It is true, however, that the bill does not leave an employer much maneuvering room to reorganize an enterprise. Layoffs are only considered just cause when a business or industry is going to shut down entirely. The bill thus makes a large-scale reorganizational layoff very expensive. On the other hand, Rosales is referring to existing enterprises; but state enterprises—the only ones in which this is really an issue—have already had two years in which to reorganize with article 116 in effect. Those that were going to conduct massive layoffs have already done so. In any case, foreign investors are far more interested in establishing new enterprises than buying existing ones.
Some details of the bill definitely leave room for debate, such as the specific amount of pay for years of service and the list of causes that merit it. For example, as the bill is currently written, even a worker who intentionally destroys company machinery would receive full severance pay. While the bill does not distinguish between kinds of dismissals with respect to indemnification, Damaso Vargas calls this a negotiable point.
The bottom line for the workers is the right not to be dismissed unjustly, particularly in a country where unemployment is rampant and finding another job nearly impossible. It is also essential that they be paid a fair indemnification upon dismissal, given not only the excessive unemployment but also wages that barely allow for a family's subsistence.
Rosales' comparison between a work contract and a marriage contract is also deceptive. In a marriage, both parties are equal before the law. This is not true in an employer-employee relationship. The objective of a labor code is precisely to help correct the inherent imbalance between the two parties and authorize greater protections to the underdog.
THE VIEWS OF BIG BUSINESS An analysis of the labor commission bill by COSEP legal adviser Dr. Gonzalo Cuadra reveals very few criticisms. Basically, he opposes the presence of striking workers in their work place, the expansion of union privileges to more than five members of a union's governing board, and the lack of an arbitration process after a strike has been declared, which he proposes be obligatory. Dr. Cuadra also proposes lowering severance pay per years worked from one month to 15 days per year, up to a maximum of five months’ salary.
In an interview, Orestes Ramiro Rojas, COSEP’s Executive Secretary, noted several additional objections. Rojas is in basic agreement with the government’s position on dismissals. “The existing code is fine,” he says. He would accept greater indemnification for years of service, but only if the count begins with the passage of the new code; this way, he argues, employers could begin to develop a reserve for these additional future costs. With respect to strikes, he accepts workers’ right to declare them without getting MITRAB approval, but would like a MITRAB observer to verify that the decision was really made by major-it)' vote without pressure in n free election. He believes that the only state workers who should be believes that the only state workers who should be prohibited from striking (other than the armed forces and police) are those who provide direct attention to the public, such as hospital workers.
The right to strike The bill. The existing labor code requires an extensive bureaucratic process before striking, ending with the labor minister's approval of a strike declaration. The commission's bill also establishes a series of prior requirements, though much simplified ones, prior to declaring a strike, the most important of which is the use of the established labor-management conciliation process to resolve the conflict. The key difference, however, is that, if the workers have exhausted this process, they have the right to unilaterally declare a strike, if the majority so decides, without the labor minister's seal of approval. This concept is much more in line with ILO conventions. The bill only gives the minister of labor the possibility of declaring the strike illegal if the workers have not fulfilled the requirements. Though the bill explicitly exempts both the army and police from the right to strike, and, in fact, from the labor code in general, it allows strikes in the public service sector, as long as these do not cause irremediable damage to the population or to institutions.
Perhaps the most controversial change with respect to strikes is that the bill allows workers to remain "in their job or work place once the strike has been declared." While the government and business sector argue that the goal of this clause is to legalize "the Sandinistas' notorious work place takeovers," Espinoza claims that the GUS "undertook strikes under Somoza, and from that time forward, workers have remained in the work place. You have to make sure that the enterprise isn't going to break the strike with scabs."
The government. The government objects to every one of these changes. Before declaring a strike, says Rosales, the process should be as follows: the union invites the employer to negotiate; if the employer refuses, the union then turns to the Ministry of Labor (MITRAB), which calls the employer to negotiate; if he or she still refuses, the union can strike, and MITRAB will declare it legal. The idea, says Rosales, is "to avoid that there necessarily be a conflict before negotiating."
But this obviously means that a strike can be declared illegal if an employer simply appears at the negotiating table but does not necessarily negotiate anything. This process ignores the fact that workers normally declare strikes precisely because negotiations do not reach a commonly acceptable solution. Strikes are a union's best weapon for pressuring an employer to negotiate in good faith.
Rosales said he would accept the bill's pre-strike procedure if another 30-day negotiation period were added to it. After that, in Rosales' vision, the union could request a declaration of legality from MITRAB to strike. But, contrary to the ILO's principles, this would still leave the labor ministry with the right to declare a strike, not the workers.
Rosales also criticizes authorizing the right to strike to public sector employees, and alleges that the bill even concedes this right to the army and police. But article 3 of the bill is unequivocal; it "excludes members of the state's armed forces." Rosales claims that another chapter of the bill referring to state workers conspires to establish special laws that will allow the armed forces to strike. Members of the commission and legal experts alike, however, firmly deny this accusation.
And finally, the labor minister opposes giving workers the right to remain in their work place once a strike has been declared. He argues that this would put the employer "at the mercy" of the workers and "often leads to the deterioration of the enterprise and acts of embezzlement." The important issue for the workers is to prevent an employer from replacing them with scabs.
Resolution of minor conflicts The bill stipulates that minor legal issues involving workers be resolved by the labor courts rather than MITRAB, as has been done to date. Although the aim of this change is to resolve a constitutional issue of jurisdiction, it has generated opposition even among some labor leaders who are not National Assembly representatives. Their problem is a pragmatic one: there are very few judges to hear the thousands of cases that arise every year. It could thus take months or even years to resolve a case in the labor courts, while MITRAB has a summary process that, according to Rosales, takes two weeks at most.
Rosales, a Sorbonne-educated lawyer who has taught labor law at the Central American University in Managua, views the proposed change as "a political problem." Ignoring its constitutional implications, the labor minister accuses those promoting it of "having the primary goal of generating social chaos," given the number of cases and the lack of judges. The solution currently being sought in the National Assembly is to establish a transition period of sufficient length to allow for an increase in the number of judges.
Other major labor concerns The unions emphasize and defend several additional changes to the current code that have not engendered serious public objections from either the government or the Higher Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). Nonetheless, they merit mention here for their importance to the unions. (COSEP as an organization has not presented an official position on the bill, but the opinions of two representatives of this bigbusiness umbrella organization are presented in the box on page 30.)
Union privileges The existing labor code establishes special union privileges for the five top positions on a union's governing board. They include the right not to be transferred to another department and exemption from dismissal without cause. The new bill expands coverage to all members of the board and also extends it temporarily to anyone organizing a new union. Though COSEP has criticized the expansion of protection, Rosales did not mention it as a concern.
Collective bargaining agreements According to Damaso Vargas, the existing labor code establishes a number of limitations on negotiating collective bargaining agreements. The most important one leaves an employer the loophole of refusing to negotiate, contrary to ILO tenets. The commission's bill makes negotiation obligatory and reduces MITRAB's role from approving or rejecting the agreement to guaranteeing that it "does not limit the minimum guarantees established" by the labor code. Says Espinoza, "The state, or in this case the labor ministry, has no reason to interfere [in the negotiating process] as it has been doing to date, saying this is okay, this isn't."
Freedom to organize According to Vargas, current labor code regulations on the formation of unions restrict the right to organize. They give MITRAB the faculty to accept or reject a certain union, he explains, adding that "the procedure is so complicated that fulfilling it alone restricts union freedom. And the Ministry interferes so much in the process that a year can go by without it conferring the corresponding certificate." The commission's bill, therefore, eliminates this extensive and unnecessary process and allows much greater flexibility in the formation of unions. No prior authorization or any other intervention by state authorities is required, and legal status is procured by simply registering the new group's statutes and certificate of formation in the appropriate MITRAB office.
The rights of women workers Women's organizations from all over the country have made an important effort to incorporate women workers' needs and demands into the new labor code. Women representatives from the Sandinista and UNO legislative blocs submitted a joint proposal to the labor commission, based on seminars with women from all sectors. According to Leticia Herrera, secretary of the Assembly's commission on women, they based their arguments on Nicaragua's Constitution, ILO conventions and other international pacts signed by Nicaragua such as the Universal Human Rights Convention. The vast majority of their proposals, however, were not incorporated into the labor commission's bill.
Even so, the bill does include some important new protections for women, such as the previously mentioned right to equal access to and treatment at work, as well as the concept of equal pay for equal work. The commission also agreed—reluctantly—to explicitly prohibit sexual harassment by either employers or other workers, but refused to include its corresponding punishment. In addition, the bill extends greater rights to pregnant and nursing women. (See box on page 34 for some of the women's proposals.)
Enter the justice commission The bill passed to the Justice Commission for review at the end of May. Contrary to the expectations of some labor leaders, this second commission made very few changes—far fewer than the government would like to see. But the areas it modified most are the same three that are most controversial to the government: contract termination, severance pay and strikes. The UNO members on the commission effected all these changes over the objections of the Sandinista minority.
Termination of contracts and severance payWithout reincorporating article 116, the commission reinstated unilateral dismissal without cause, and omitted severance indemnification for workers fired for extreme cause, such as seriously threatening "the life or physical integrity of one's workmates."
The commission maintained the right to indemnification for years of service but cut the amount in half, to two weeks' wages per year worked up to a maximum of 15 months' pay. It eliminated the additional indemnification of up to six months' wages for workers in positions of trust.
StrikesThe commission left intact the workers' right to unilaterally decide to strike after fulfilling established requirements, adding only the clarification that a "majority vote" means the absolute majority of all workers in that work place. (The bill had left some doubt as to whether the term referred to workers or only union members.)
The commission eliminated all public employees' right to strike, which will probably be declared unconstitutional if passed into law. It also eliminated workers' right to remain in the work place while on strike. In addition, it established an arbitration process that would be obligatory after 60 days of strike. (The labor commission's bill did not establish any procedure for resolving a conflict once a strike was declared. Union leaders do not object to the arbitration process inserted by the justice commission, but oppose that it be obligatory.)
The potentially most dangerous change made by this commission is a clause permitting access to an enterprise during a strike by "those who will be in charge of guaranteeing the vigilance and care necessary for the enterprise...not to suffer damage." Some analysts see this as a deceptive way to open the possibility of replacing striking workers with scabs.
The next step Both commissions must now hammer out their differences and issue a joint bill. The areas of disagreement are few but very controversial. So far, they appear to have agreed to allow dismissals without cause, but with a table of indemnifications—higher than the old code but lower than the labor commission's bill—depending on the reason for dismissal. They also seem to have agreed to accept public sector workers' right to strike. But the debate continues.
When the compromise bill is ready, it goes directly to the plenary, where various groups—including the Assembly's Commission on Women and representatives of the Permanent Workers' Congress (CPT), an umbrella group of non-Sandinista unions including the CUS—will lobby hard for additional changes. Labor Minister Rosales will doubtless do the same. Both Rosales and some CPT leaders claim to have the votes necessary to get their respective positions approved. It is more likely that neither does.
Both Sandinista and CPT union leaders believe that differences within the FSLN will divide that party's vote. But while conflicts between Sandinista union representatives and those with business interests have been apparent in past National Assembly debates, this has virtually never resulted in a divided Sandinista bench vote. Both Jorge Samper and Dora María Téllez deny such disparities with respect to the labor code. While differences of opinion surely exist, the Sandinistas who sit on the Justice Commission did, in fact, present a clearly united position in defense of the labor commission's bill.
In spite of the current movement—albeit slow—toward a compromise, there are those who doubt that a new code will be approved this legislative session, not only due to other conflicts within the National Assembly but also to fundamental differences over the labor code itself. Labor leader and Assembly representative Zacarias Hernandez told Barricada that if the new labor code is not going to fulfill its duty to the working class, "it's better if it's not passed this year." Others say this is exactly what the government and business sector want—that the current code remain in effect.
Between social justice and economic takeoff? Both the government and COSEP have campaigned hard against the new bill, arguing that the workers are doing themselves more harm than good by promoting a code that restricts labor force mobility and confers greater rights on workers. A code like that, they claim, chases away investors, while a more "flexible" code would attract them, thus leading to an economic takeoff that would improve everyone's lives.
But, is it true that the economy will take off if labor laws allow greater worker mobility? Such mobility does, in fact, serve the interest of some investors, particularly in the assembly-for-reexport industry known as maquila plants. These viciously competitive companies seek the country that provides them the best benefits key benefits, one of which is rock-bottom labor costs. Since their installations are designed for an easy hop to another country when conditions look better there, they also shun encumbrances of any kind. Obviously, a labor code that both authorizes costly indemnifications and restricts the conditions under which contracts can be terminated works against their interests.
But also because of this very nature, investments in maquila industries offer very little to the country in which they establish themselves. While they do bring jobs, they will not be the motor force of economic takeoff.
The kind of investment that truly benefits a country is precisely that which is most interconnected to the national economy and prefers a well-trained and stable labor force. One only has to look at Japan, which emphasizes worker stability and immobility, to see the advantages. In Japan, employers even promote worker participation in enterprise administration so employees will feel more invested in their work. They consider the workers' accumulated experience over time an advantage: Japanese workers average more than 10 years in the same work place.
In any case, is it worth sacrificing today for the hope of economic takeoff tomorrow? Throughout Latin America, unemployment and poverty levels are higher than ever. The unemployed and the poor have been awaiting the infamous "economic takeoff' ever since the first structural adjustment programs began. The evidence is now quite ample that their increased poverty is not a temporary stage in the economic recovery process but a permanent structural change. This becomes guaranteed when such sacrifice is codified into law rather than made by workers as their own tactical decision.
And the last question: is it possible to pass a new progressive labor code under a neoliberal government? In almost all other countries of Latin America, it is doubtful that this could be done. Since it depends largely on the strength of the unionized labor force, one only has to examine unemployment statistics to see how neoliberal policies have weakened unions. But Nicaragua has a history that—perhaps—makes it possible. The current strength of the unions comes more from their past than from their present. It remains to be seen what the correlation of forces will be when the labor code bill finally reaches the National Assembly plenary, and again when it reaches the President's desk.
Women Workers and the Labor Code
The following is a selection of issues dealing with women workers in the labor code debate. After noting some of the changes benefitting women included in the labor commission’s bill (none of which have been disputed so far), we have extracted a number of specific themes from a quite long list of additional proposals submitted by representatives of the National Assembly's Commission on Women, Youth, Children and the Family to the labor commission (and rejected by it). Although there is not space here to include all their demands, it is worth mentioning that the women’s commission submitted many proposals on topics as diverse as collective bargaining agreements and the Atlantic Coast. While these proposals did not specifically address women as such, they came out of meetings throughout the country with women from all sectors affected by the labor code.
Changes in the Commission on Labor Affairs Bill
General Issues
* The provision in the old labor code prohibiting women from working overtime was eliminated.
* The provision in the old labor code prohibiting women from working in the mines or in tasks considered superior to their strength or endangering the physical or moral conditions of their sex was eliminated.
* Equal rights of men and women in access to work and in treatment was guaranteed.
* Equal pay for equal work with-out discrimination by religion, race, sex, political views or for any other reason was guaranteed.
* Sexual harassment by either employers or other workers was prohibited.
Pregnant Women
* Employing pregnant women in work that endangers their condition was prohibited, as in the existing code, but the employer's obligation to transfer them to another post with-out any salary loss was added.
* Putting women who have reached the sixth month of pregnancy on night shifts was prohibited.
* An hour total of rest time per day for nursing was established as a right of nursing mothers.
* The 3-month period of pre-and post-natal paid leave was maintained, and made obligatory.
The Family
* The possibility of adopting reduced work shifts for women workers with family obligations was added.
* A 3-day leave for a death in the family and 5-day leave for a marriage was permitted.
Key Women’s Commission Proposals Rejected by the Labor Commission
Sexual Harassment
* Include dismissal as a punishment for proven sexual harassment by a worker.
* Temporarily prohibit the dismissal of a women who makes an accusation of sexual harassment or abuse.
* Establish a disciplinary committee to hear cases of sexual harassment or abuse.
Pregnant Women
* Prohibit the participation of women on night shifts from the start of their pregnancy through 6 months or nursing.
* Prohibit fixed-term hiring contracts for pregnant women.
* Increase the period of pre-and post-natal paid leave to 5-1/2 months.
* Oblige the employer to provide facilities for nursing mothers for up to 1 year.
The Family
* Withhold (for his wife and children) 50% of the salary of a man who separates from his wife.
* Oblige employers with more than 12 women workers to establish a child care center.
* Oblige the state to establish child care centers to help allow mothers to work.
Various proposals to establish greater rights for domestic and farm workers, to improve reproductive health care, to create women’s secretariats in the union structures, and to establish specific worker training plans, among others, were rejected, although the latter was accepted in general terms.
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