Nicaragua
A National Project: Necessary but Unattainable?
Paul Oquist and Rodolfo Delgado
The political and economic crisis Nicaragua is living through gives urgency to the search for a clearly democratic and economically just national project with broad social consensus.
In addition to being necessary, however, such a project is a true challenge for Nicaraguan civil society, taking into account the tragic consequences of the political pacts engaged in throughout the nation's history. The following analysis is based on answers to the basic question, "What does civil society think about a national project in Nicaragua?"
The statistics presented in this work come from a national public opinion survey carried out in June 1991 as part of the research for a project titled, "Towards a Viable National Project in Nicaragua." The sample consisted of 1,200 people at least 16 years of age, and was taken in the western half of the country.
Of those surveyed, 90.9% felt that the search for a national project in Nicaragua is necessary. Support for such a project is based on the need to consolidate peace, achieve political stability and overcome the economic crisis.
An even greater majority (96.3%) agrees on the need for national reconciliation, while 91.3% feel that all the country's political parties, the government, and union, social and other organizations should come to agreements to achieve political stability and resolve the economic crisis. In addition, 90% feel that all sectors must collaborate, putting economic and political interests to one side to reconstruct the nation.
These figures, all representing at least 90% of those surveyed, demonstrate an indisputable consensus about the need for a national project. Interviews done at the leadership and opinion-maker levels underscore two key factors explaining this consensus.
Generalized fatigue. The population is worn down from the war, chronic confrontational positions and an atmosphere of crisis that has gone on 15 years (20 if the 1972 earthquake and the years of trauma following it are included). All surveys carried out in Nicaragua since 1990 have consistently demonstrated that a majority of the population has a negative opinion of confrontational organizations and political figures.
The thorough-going economic crisis. This crisis affects virtually all Nicaraguans, and its importance in the consensus about the need for a national project is growing. Controversies and insecurities related to property, social and labor instability—which in extreme cases generates anarchic tendencies and social explosions—and credit restrictions to producers are all factors that promote this consensus. The pendulum has swung from the extreme of offering credit to all and forgiving all debts, to the opposite extreme of excluding many producers from credit and restricting the possibilities of investment projects.
We thus find ourselves with a government that preaches a facilitator role for the state, but which in practice often ends up blocking production and trade. This is due in part to the incoherence and ill-timing of its economic policies, particularly those oriented towards small producers; in part to its weakness in dealing with bottlenecks—for example in the ports and maritime transport, which ties up exports; and in part to normal problems of bureaucracy, inefficiency, favoritism and corruption.
It is important to point out a subjective element in the national economic vision at the grassroots level. In the Nicaragua of the 1970s and 80s, a significant proportion of the population began to conceptualize a socialist economy or at least a mixed economy with socialist tendencies as the solution to the country's economic and social problems. Their vision mixed Marxist, Christian and Sandinista values, and the 20% to 30% of the population who share it make up the FSLN's key base of support.
In the 1980s, and particularly during the 1989-90 electoral campaign, another significant group of people—more difficult to quantify, but certainly as large as the Sandinista base—operated from a very different vision. They felt that voting the Sandinistas out of power, achieving peace and normalizing relations with the United States—which would reinitiate massive foreign aid—would considerably improve the economy, at both the household and national levels.
In mid-1992, growing numbers from both groups have lost the hope of social or economic betterment. These people without hope are becoming an ever-greater factor in national politics. This political phenomenon is already quite generalized in the Latin America of the 90s and translates into a loss of faith in ideologies, political parties and political and governmental leaders.
Two interrelated conclusions thus arise from this consensus about the need for a national project. The first is that, if such a project does emerge in Nicaragua, the key motivation will be economic. In Chile, Christian Democrats and Socialists forged a national project based on their common goal of defeating the Pinochet dictatorship once and for all; in El Salvador, the ARENA government and the FMLN reached a national accord to end a prolonged and stalemated war that was taking a high toll on everyone. In Nicaragua, a national project would be based on the common interest of getting out of the economic crisis that is affecting the interests of virtually the entire nation.
The second conclusion is that if Nicaraguan politicians and parties are unable to hammer out a national accord and the population sees their behavior as blocking a solution to the economic crisis, the political and party system as a whole would enter into crisis. The already present anarchic tendencies would increase as a consequence, and the final blow could be the definitive disintegration of what is already one of the most precarious productive systems in Latin America.
In other words, there are interrelated economic and political needs for a national project. There can be no economic recovery without political stability and no political stability without economic recovery. The last two years of economic and political practice demonstrate this vicious circle, as well as the difficulty of escaping it without a national project.
Who could make it happen?A significant majority of the population surveyed (82.5%) believes that a national understanding is possible. The difference between the 90.9% who view such a project as necessary and the 82.5% who feel it is possible reflects a very pessimistic 8.4% of those surveyed. Theirs is not a foolish position when one considers the formidable obstacles that must be overcome to achieve a national project. Even among those polled who think a national project is possible, the percentages shrink when they are asked which leaders and organizations they believe could effect a national understanding.
In terms of political leaders, 57.7% of those surveyed think that President Violeta Chamorro could bring about a national understanding. In contrast to this absolute majority, opinions are more evenly divided with respect to both former President Daniel Ortega and current Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo. In the case of Ortega, 42.1% consider that he could achieve a national understanding, while 43.1% disagree; for Lacayo, 41.1% believe he could and 40.8% do not.
From there, the majority swings against the other national political figures: National Assembly president Alfredo César (50.5% no); Vice President Virgilio Godoy (55.8% no) and Managua mayor Arnoldo Alemán (55.5% no).
Opinions are again evenly divided on whether the country's two umbrella union organizations—the Sandinista-identified National Workers' Front (FNT) and the pro-government Permanent Congress of Workers (CPT)—could reach a national understanding, whereas 54.1% feel that the big business umbrella COSEP would be incapable. On the other hand, 51.3% feel that UNAG, the producers' organization bringing together small, medium and large producers, could contribute to such an understanding. In sum, President Chamorro and UNAG are seen as the two key actors that could contribute positively to hammering out a national project. Clearly, not every politically relevant actor must be included, but the absence of key groups or people will weaken any accord.
IEN has found greater political polarization at top levels of all organizations than at the base, although there is significant polarization at both levels. A majority at the grassroots, however, is either less politicized or not polarized.
The predominant vision of a national project does not involve overcoming or abandoning ideological positions and political identifications, but rather negotiations based on common interests. One illustration of this is the success of UNAG and the National Peasant Coordinator in bringing together Sandinista cooperatives and small producers with former contras, in an alliance based on their common interests as peasants. This example should not be overstated, however, since negotiating such an alliance requires great skill and the resulting balance is very delicate, as evidenced by current tensions within UNAG.
Another example is the formation of scores of "revuelto" commandos, composed of both recompas and recontras, to pressure the government to comply with the accords it has signed to date and to raise other demands—again, based on common interests between the two groups. In some extreme cases, the way these demands have been raised has been anarchic and socially explosive. The revuelto phenomenon took many of the country's political leaders by surprise since they had never considered this sort of political coordination to be viable. This demonstrates that the base has much more capacity for coordination than the leadership does. It also indicates the relative lack of understanding of some political leaders who continue to be surprised by what goes on at the grassroots level.
What might it look like?The objective reality is that at the time of this survey, no national project existed. Nor was there a mechanism to produce it despite the broad national consensus favoring it and agreeing on some points of content.
Logically, the content of a national project should emerge from a national negotiation process oriented towards developing such a project. Nonetheless, IEN has uncovered certain converging and diverging elements based on the public opinion polls it has carried out over the last two years. Broad consensus has been found regarding key economic themes, while views are polarized around political topics. This indicates the advisability of centering the negotiations on economic issues and designing strategies to overcome or avoid political differences in order to advance the overall process. A series of themes around which 90% agreement already exists could play a key role in this sense.
Economic issuesA 68.6% majority feels that the free market is a good solution to Nicaragua's economic problems, while 20.2% disagree. Yet other answers indicate there is not a resounding endorsement for radical free market solutions, as 68.3% feel that a mixed economy is the best way to develop the country, while 19.4% disagree. The cooperative option as the best way for the population to develop is accepted by 62.7%, while 11.1% think otherwise.
A full 84.1% think that the state should control the basic elements of the national economy, while only 7.8% take the opposite position. Regarding forms of state intervention, 93.3% feel that the agrarian reform is the way to resolve the problems in the countryside.
Political issuesA 57.7% majority (equally represented by UNO and FSLN voters) agree that the Constitution is the guarantee for stability in the country, while 21.1% do not agree, and 21.2% either do not know or did not respond. Similarly, 51.2% (again, equal among UNO and FSLN voters) feel that the Constitution responds to the country's needs, 30.5% disagree and 18.3% do not know or did not respond. Just over 50% feel that the Sandinista army and General Humberto Ortega's continued presence as head of the army has contributed to stability in the country, while 38.6% disagree and 11% either do not know or did not respond.
Asked if the country's political parties are concerned about resolving the country's problems, 45.6% said yes, 43.3% said no and 11.1% did not know or did not respond.
The following political elements, which enjoy virtual consensus, along with the economic topics already discussed, are substantive and significant starting points for the negotiation of a national project:
- There must be reconciliation (96.3%);
- Nicaragua must defend its sovereignty (95%);
- The agrarian reform should resolve the problems of ongoing demand for land and contribute to the country's process of development (93.3%);
- All the country's political parties, the government, and unions and other organizations must come to an agreement in order to achieve political stability in the country as a necessary first step to overcoming the economic crisis (91.3%);
- To have authentic democracy, the population should be consulted about important decisions and participate in the search for solutions to the country's problems (91.2%);
- The search for a national project is necessary (90.9%);
- The rule of law must exist for authentic democracy to take hold (89.6%).
What are key actors saying?For the government, the political parties and social groups, the structuring of a national project is a national need, since it is felt that the current political crisis and tensions conspire against the possibilities of economic recovery and development.
In addition, the parties and social groups interviewed agree that Nicaragua's political culture, despite having little history of resolving problems through dialogue, is capable of generating and accepting a national project.
It is important to note that the prevalence of polarized positions is greater among political parties than among the population in general, which indicates that the space exists for parties to make a more positive contribution to the peace and reconciliation processes through a national project.
The following are the key actors' opinions—some overlapping, some quite polarized—on the most important elements of a national project:
Contributions of the revolution
The government: The electoral results show that society rejected many elements of the Sandinista administration. Some changes made during the Sandinista government, however, have been accepted as part of Nicaraguan political culture, for instance the promulgation of the Constitution, under the auspices of which the 1990 elections were held and the change of government effected. Other generally accepted elements include access to land for thousands of peasants. If there is acceptance of these aspects, it is important to incorporate them as themes of a national dialogue.
Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) : Nicaragua has been making efforts at modernization throughout its history. The Zelaya administration at the turn of the century contributed to the separation of church and state and the subsequent secularization of the state, while the Somoza regime did its part by creating the Central Bank and broadening the social security system. The Sandinista government made clear contributions to the country's development in key aspects that should be considered as starting points for future advances. These include the democratization of agricultural lands, which gives Nicaragua an advantage over other Central American countries; the greater role achieved for women; and grassroots leadership in social, union and political arenas, which is obliging parties to act within the framework of democratic criteria.
The FSLN and its affiliated unions and organizations: Sandinistas list the agrarian reform as one of the revolution's great achievements, since it relates to the key aspect of this agricultural country's economic problem. They also list improved distribution of income and social benefits, the representative democracy that has been institutionalized, as well as the key issues of participatory democracy, greater participation of women and the defense of sovereignty and national independence.
Independent Liberal Party (PLI) : The PLI gave more weight to errors made by the Sandinista government, although it does recognize evident gains, including the emancipation of women, the opening up of educational opportunities to all social classes, expanded health care and the more active role of workers in society and industries.
Social Democratic Party (PSD), COSEP, the Chambers of Industry and Commerce: The Sandinista administration represents a lost decade for the country in both economic and social terms, a decade that tore the Nicaraguan family apart and left the country in misery .
National democratic modelThe government: Favors respect for the rule of law so as to consolidate democracy and argues against the preeminence of the Parliament. The objective should rather be to strengthen the equilibrium between the branches of the state.
The FSLN and affiliated organizations: The objective should be to strengthen institutionality, achieve an adequate balance among state branches and strengthen participatory democracy.
PLI: Modernize the political system's structures, achieve a balance among state branches and strengthen democratic foundations in order to avoid violent transformations.
CTN: Reaffirms rotation in power, political pluralism, municipal autonomy and political freedoms.
COSEP: It is necessary to reform the political system to diminish the power concentrated in the presidency and achieve a balance of powers, while consolidating the preeminence of civil society.
PSD: Limits should be put on presidential periods and more requirements established for candidates. Favors a stronger National Assembly and feels that the Supreme Electoral Council and Supreme Court should be independent, without party representation.
PPSC: It is important to consolidate political pluralism, rotation in office and municipal autonomy, and to explore whether it is in Nicaragua's interests to implement a parliamentarian or semi-parliamentarian regime.
Constitutional reformsThe government: The current National Assembly should not be granted power to interpret the Constitution. If an accord about constitutional reforms were to be reached during a national dialogue, a constituent assembly should be called.
The FSLN and its allies: Constitutional reforms are not indispensable to achieving a national project. Agreement on reforms in the national dialogue should use the Constitution itself as a starting point.
PLI: The Constitution must be reformed to achieve a balance among the state branches.
PPSC: Constitutional reforms must be effected to reduce executive power and steps must be taken towards a parliamentarian regime. Public and private spheres of economic action must be separated in order to avoid illicit amassing of wealth.
Role of the state and the armed forcesIn general, the government, political parties and unions all agree that the state should establish the country's strategic framework, promote development and intervene when civil society requires it.
The government and the FSLN: In the current situation of polarization in a still incipient democracy, the role of the armed forces goes beyond safeguarding national sovereignty and public order, to safeguarding the democratic system, stability and the very legitimacy of state power.
COSEP and its allies and other political parties: The army should continue to make periodic cuts until it disappears, making way for the "forces of domestic public order" (police, etc.).
CTN: Any military reduction must be simultaneous throughout Central America.
PPSC: The role of the armed forces should be defined following a national discussion about what are understood as threats to national sovereignty and the vigilance of national borders.
Economic and social framework The interviewees generally agree that the definition of an economic development strategy is one of the central points to be contemplated in a national project.
The government: The most essential element is the stabilization plan and structural adjustment program, which can serve as a starting point for a national project.
PLI, COSEP and its allies: They propose a social market economic model.
PPSC: Favors a social market economy model, the production and equitable distribution of more wealth, concern about food security and taking full advantage of worldwide technological developments. Avoid reconcentrating property in the hands of a few. Property conflicts should be studied one by one. Workers' participation democratizes the economy, and thus privatization should be opened up to assure access by the population.
FSLN and its allies: A new economic model should be designed as part of the national project, taking into consideration the imperfect nature of the market, particularly in international economic relations. Promote economic growth with justice and equity, stimulate cooperatives and small and medium agricultural and industrial production as a priority, and develop social programs. Due to the country's underdevelopment and exceptional conditions, the country will have to continue exporting raw materials at least in the short run, linked with economic activities that permit technology transfer, growth and equity.
PSD: Try to reconstruct original production, which is agricultural, and achieve the greatest raw materials transformation; promote nontraditional agricultural exports.
PLI: Implement a social market economy, as a response to pure capitalism and economic stabilization. Solution is to promote the primary sector, which could be industrialized.
CTN: Since the productive structure is mainly agricultural, efforts must be concentrated there, although a study of economic strategy in the country should also be carried out as soon as possible. A social market economy cannot be implemented because, despite its valid points, others have serious social effects. Opposes privatization, and argues for a self-management economic model.
CUS: Neither the model concentrating wealth in the hands of a few nor a state-run model are viable. Pushes for a cooperative model with a dual social and productive function. Property and privatization are problems that should be resolved in accordance with the second phase of the Concertación forum.
UNAG: The country's key productive forms—cooperatives and small and medium production—should be given priority. On the property question, the Concertación accords should be complied with, and the agrarian reform broadened.
COSEP and its allies: The social market economic model is valid as is opening the country to the international economy. Without security around property issues, there will be no stability, no rule of law and no foreign investment. Privatization of state enterprises should be quick, but return of confiscated enterprises should be first.
National convergence holds that the development strategy should not be neoliberal and IMF-inspired, but rather contemplate a mixed economy, promotion of cooperatives and strengthening of small and medium business with a new employment and wage policy, all backed by a modern and efficient state. Any economic development project should also be a social development project.
In a similar vein, the College of Biologists and Ecologists visualizes a development strategy that incorporates the preservation of natural resources and the environment. Its goal is a model of sustainable economic development, linked to quality of life standards for the population, to achieve the country's economic and biological survival through rational natural resource use. In sum, there is broad consensus around many points dealing with economic themes, among them putting a priority on agriculture.
No other country in Latin America with a market economy has an agrarian reform with such broad legitimacy as an effective mechanism of economic and social development. Few countries in Latin America have such consensus around the privatization process. The discussion in Nicaragua is not about whether to privatize, but about who will receive the enterprises and in what proportion.
What's blocking the process?In spite of the consensus about the potential viability of a national project and about some of its possible content as well, many of the obstacles blocking the beginning of a negotiation process are formidable. Following is a summary of eight of the key obstacles, according to the political analysis done by IEN in mid-1992.
IMF and World Bank Policies. The conditioning of international credit and the adoption of economic and social policies to meet specific goals determined by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank restrict the space for national decision-making about basic public policies. That restriction is felt in almost all Latin American countries, but there could be more space for relatively autonomous decision-making than is actually being used in these countries.
The IMF's ultimate goal is to make sure the countries can repay their foreign debts; the imposing of policies and monitoring of results is thus much greater in those countries that can generate significant financial flows—which is absolutely not the case in Nicaragua. In addition, the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank are supporting decentralization and micro-enterprise programs in Nicaragua, both of which are likely to be part of the content of a national project. In fact, international banks are demonstrating increasing flexibility in considering development needs and the importance of credit, technical assistance and marketing for small productive units, including agricultural ones.
Thus, even when the imposition of policies and goals limits the space for a national project, a more finely honed national policy would have room to make decisions and would be in a better position to negotiate policies based on national consensus with the international lending agencies. Herein lies part of the importance of achieving overall and sectoral medium-term strategies, as can be seen in the following point.
No Medium-Term Proposals. The government lacks articulated proposals, even partial ones, around medium-run social and economic development. Nor have the political parties, unions or other organizations been able to offer such proposals. The information necessary to elaborate them does not exist. Decision-making and resource allocation are based on short-term structural adjustment measures. This irrationally compromises the medium and distant future. Twice in ten years, highly ideological decisions by the former and current governments have weakened the Nicaraguan state's capacity for information, decision-making and economic and social planning.
In 1980, the Sandinista government transferred the Economic Studies section of the Central Bank to the Ministry of Planning (MIPLAN), with disastrous results for economic decision-making, which was cut off from its analytical capacity. The Secretariat of Planning and Budget (SPP) subsequently replaced MIPLAN, under Mexican advice. In Mexico, however, that same entity is very powerful—the last three Presidents have come from it. It is a direct dependent of the presidency, to assure coherence between policies and economic planning; it also serves as the economic Cabinet's technical secretariat.
In 1990, the current government abolished the SPP and divided up its affiliated organizations, to the detriment of the state's planning capacity and coherence. In this very ideological decision, it would seem that the state confused not having a planned economy with not having an economic planning apparatus.
Meanwhile, the ARENA government in El Salvador makes its short-, medium- and long-term public investment plans compatible with social and economic policies through a powerful planning apparatus directly linked to the President.
Even if the Nicaraguan government's decisions were correct, they erred by eliminating one structure before its replacement was consolidated. With the exception of the fiscal and monetary policies implemented by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, the current economic Cabinet has no technical secretariat capable of offering analytical support to make sectoral policies coherent.
Those in charge of the current administrative reforms hold to the ideologically tinted myth that, by eliminating the SPP, they were dismantling a planned economy and replacing it with a market economy. This also meant dismantling the administrative apparatus designed to manage a planned economy. Some international technical advisers share this myth. They preach administrative transformation as if Nicaragua's transition were similar to the dismantling of the socialist economies in Eastern Europe. The ideological error consists of confusing intentions with results, and rhetoric with reality. The fact is that Nicaragua never stopped having a market economy, even in 1981-84, when there was a serious effort to construct a highly planned mixed economy, which caved in to the realities of a market economy. The best example of this was the state grain agency's failed effort to monopolize basic grain marketing and the Ministry of Internal Commerce's attempt to control the market for its goods through administrative and police measures.
In 1985, these economic policies were abandoned and by 1990, not even vestiges remained. Thus, what the new government's administrative reforms dismantled was the planning apparatus of a market economy. As in the 1980s, the country will again pay the price with some years of inefficiency while the lost capacity is reconstructed.
Another argument favoring a national project, then, is that it would grant greater long-term stability to public administration and could create the conditions necessary for civil service and an administrative career. This would make it possible to correct part of the cause of the policy incoherence and administrative weaknesses of the state apparatus. It would also address the exclusion, for political reasons, of a number of the already limited pool of specialized high-level personnel at the national level, an exclusion that has cost the country dearly.
The failure of the government and political and social actors to articulate strategic concrete proposals blocks the beginning of substantial political and economic debates that should precede and serve as a framework for negotiating a national project.
Obsession to liquidate Sandinismo Putting forth the liquidation of Sandinismo as the key objective implies putting economic recovery, stabilizing the government and consolidating democracy on the back burner. In fact, it leads to actions that weaken democracy, destabilize the government and make economic recovery more difficult. An example of this is the conditioning of US aid to measures that isolate and marginalize Sandinismo.
If the primordial goal is to consolidate democracy, stabilize the government or reactivate the economy, the US government and that part of the right wing whose third base coach is the US Embassy will have to search for some mechanism of coexistence with Sandinismo in order to reach these objectives.
One of the current government's basic positions has been that any effort to liquidate Sandinismo will only throw Nicaragua into chaos, that the country is ungovernable without FSLN participation in the institutionalization of democracy.
Obviously, this implies that said institutionalization must give Sandinismo and the Sandinistas the pluralist space they merit as part of the national whole. US and national political sectors have pressured the government due to this position. This blocks the negotiation of a national project that would broaden the political arena and deepen the government's policy of basing national stability on coexistence with Sandinismo.
COSEP as a political partyIf COSEP were to act as an organization based on production and commerce, it would be at the forefront of efforts to create the conditions necessary for political stability that would in turn permit economic recovery. But for too long COSEP has acted as a political party and not an economic organization. In fact, in the UNO Congress that elected the presidential candidate for the 1990 elections, COSEP put forward its own candidate and was resentful when it was not successful.
COSEP did not sign the Concertación accords, thus weakening that process. COSEP is correct in asserting that the property problem is central, but any solution must come from a social and economic negotiation in which the Concertación is a first important step in the definitive deepening of a national project.
The World Bank has presented novel recommendations to the government, based on the recognition that Nicaragua's property transformations constitute a deed of great value that should be preserved. It proposes that those who have agrarian reform titles granted by either the Sandinista or the current government should be recognized as legitimate landowners. As a counterpart, it proposes offering separate treatment to indemnify those former owners who were unjustly confiscated.
Fragmentation of the UNOThe UNO electoral coalition that brought together 14 different parties and won the 1990 elections is currently divided into at least five blocs. The leaders of these different groups include Antonio Lacayo, Alfredo César, Miriam Argüello, Virgilio Godoy and Arnoldo Alemán. All signs indicate that it would be impossible to reconstruct the UNO coalition. At the same time, to the despair of some concrete unification movements, the Conservatives, Liberals and Social Christians remain internally divided, while the other parties are very small.
The extreme fragmentation of these traditional parties, along with the lack of cohesion, even within the existing political groups, makes political negotiations within and among the groups very difficult, not to mention the negotiation of a national project.
FSLN's crisis of adaptation The Sandinista Front is not only the largest, best-organized and most coherent party in Nicaragua, it is the only large, organized and coherent party. There has been much speculation about the possible crumbling of the FSLN's internal cohesion due to the different positions within the FSLN. These differences do certainly exist, but more than two years after the change in government, the FSLN is still a unified, single party.
Nonetheless, national and international political changes have provoked a programmatic, organizational and even identity crisis within the FSLN. It must adapt, as left parties throughout the world are doing, to an accumulation of unprecedented political changes.
The FSLN is one of the political organizations that have undergone the most transformations in the world today. From a clandestine and selective political-military guerrilla group, it became the party in power, heading up the government, armed forces and mass organizations. Within a framework of political pluralism, the FSLN lost the 1990 elections and thus began to transform itself into a civilian opposition party, which implies renouncing vanguardist philosophies and considerable programmatic and organizational restructuring.
Historically, the FSLN has demonstrated tremendous capacity for adaptation and self-transformation, but the process has not been automatic, nor short-term, nor lacking in complexities. For example, the FSLN's first Congress was absorbed by a debate about how the National Directorate would be elected. The authority and power of the Directorate was weakened within the party compared to the 1980s. But at that time, the FSLN did not advance in adapting its programs to the new conditions; this lack of definition about basic policies makes many decisions and actions controversial.
Another issue is the normalization of relations between the FSLN and the government. Such normalization is essential to the country's political stability, the possibility of a national project in Nicaragua, the consolidation of democracy and the holding of the 1996 elections in a normal atmosphere. The hope is that the FSLN-US confrontation in the 1990 elections will not be played out again, but as long as normalization is not accepted as official party policy, each specific move toward normalization becomes conflictive.
A similar situation can be seen in relations between the FSLN and the government and even in relation to the national project. Thus, programmatic adaptations are required to permit the FSLN a clear and central role in negotiating a national project.
Anarchic tendencies The anarchic tendencies in the country constitute one of the motivations for a national project. The obstacles previously described contribute in diverse degrees and in different ways to such tendencies. In turn, the accumulation of other obstacles, along with the depth of the economic crisis, help create conditions favorable to anarchic tendencies.
These tendencies are expressed in the government's loss of control of towns and other areas of national territory, in which small commandos take temporary political-military charge.
Governmental channels and political mechanisms cease functioning for whole sectors of the population; faith is lost in the national institutions' efficiency, to say nothing of their potential and their very future. To the degree that violence and delinquency become a key road to survival, these expressions block the negotiation of a national project and limit the scope of its potential effective applicability.
These anarchic expressions could lead to a civil war or social explosion. Much has been said about this potential, but with the current levels of both urban and rural delinquency, the social explosion is, de facto, with us. Delinquency in the rural areas has grown to such a degree that it has become an economic factor influencing the farmer's decision to plant and the rancher's decision to invest.
To the degree that these expressions deepen, the government's real political power will increasingly shrink, as will that of other political and union organizations that could author and execute the national project.
Governmental incoherence There is tremendous governmental incoherence in monetary issues, reflected in its control of hyperinflation at the cost of an excessive emphasis on a balanced budget and zero inflation in the midst of a serious economic recession. The country has no production or investment strategy, and has been unable to establish what should be hubs of accumulation or a medium-term strategy.
The US government policy, shared by the Nicaraguan right wing, of liquidating Sandinismo; COSEP's practice of acting as a political party rather than a business organization; the fracturing of UNO and the FSLN's internal crisis all reduce the political coherence of a government trapped by these political phenomena. Its problems of governability include Nicaragua's lack of a pluralist political culture, the weakness of the state's administrative apparatus, the feudalist tendencies rampant in different ministries and the anarchic tendencies taking root in the country. In the absence of a pluralist political culture, the opposition tends to seek ways to topple the government, while the government's bent is to try and wipe out everything done by its predecessor, exclude the opposition and govern based on cronyism, favoritism and nepotism.
In 1990 pluralist elections were held because that was the FSLN's political choice. It mobilized around this objective and made an agreement with the UNO to hold elections with many observers present. The normal impulse of Nicaragua's political culture would have been for both sides to try and win the elections at any cost, which in fact happened in the areas still under contra control. This means that the government, the FSLN and other political forces committed to building pluralist institutions and processes were acting in an adverse and difficult environment.
It is necessary to build a pluralist political culture and this requires a complex process of changing behaviors, ideological positions, attitudes and even values. The country's anarchic tendencies further complicate the situation, making it very easy to promote conflicts and create chaos, but very difficult to govern.
In the current conditions, the government's political incoherence along with its administrative weaknesses make the problems of governability even more acute. They even affect the government's capacity to convoke and coordinate a negotiation for a national project.
Some reflections It is evident that, to be successful, a national project must be in the national interest. It is very easy to block or sabotage the national understanding required if any of the key national players, or the US government, decides to do so. The best defense against this would be massive support for a national project that goes beyond class and party interests. Support for a national project is aimed at overcoming the economic crisis, which could turn the desire for it into an uncontrollable and even explosive social and political demand. Once again, the great facility for negative power that has characterized Nicaraguan politicians in the past emerges. It is hoped that, in this case, it could turn into a positive accord for the future. The existence of broad political and social consensus within civil society has been identified that makes the definition of a viable national project feasible. A national project implies a long-term development strategy to frame the government's priorities and existing social conflicts, and which assumes political stability based on national consensus around the most basic development themes.
This project will not be free of crisis, due partly to the different political and ideological positions held by the various groups, and partly to some sectors' outright rejection of these efforts. This could create another significant division in the political spectrum, between those who support a national project and those looking for outside solutions. This, in turn, could redefine who the moderate and constructive forces in the country really are, effectively isolating the extremists.
The most powerful outside influences divide Nicaraguans while the predominant tendencies of domestic policy tend to be less polarizing. Civil society's aspirations for political stability and economic recovery are moving past the contradictions of political sectors stuck in the inertia of past divisions. But if these divisions are not overcome, they will create a crisis in this incipient democratic system.
As we pointed out at the beginning, the past tends to divide Nicaraguans, while the future unites us. It remains to be seen if we really want to save the country and build an economically viable nation based on solidarity, democracy and social justice.
That is the true historical challenge ahead. Nothing justifies continuing inertia in the midst of a vicious cycle of permanent crisis.
*By Paul Oquist Kelly and Rodolfo Delgado Romero of the Institute of Nicaraguan Studies (IEN), which conducted the surveys on which the article is based.
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