Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s Resettlement Project
“Tasba Pri”, which in the Miskito language means “Free Land” or “Promised Land”, is the name of the settlements to which the government has moved ten thousand Miskito Indians.
Envío team
“Tasba Pri”. In Miskitu this means “the promised land”; it is the name of the resettlement area to which the Sandinista government has moved 10,000 Miskitu people. It may hold the promise of a new and better future for many there, not only the Miskitu but also the Sandinistas who are trying to resolve the serious problems of the Atlantic Coast. However, at the moment it is not flowing with milk and honey.
This action by the Nicaraguan government has generated so much controversy that we would like to focus again on the Atlantic Coast. Exaggerated or totally fabricated stories have mingled with the real, often poignant, circumstances which affect the poor, marginated and easily manipulated people who lived along the banks of the Río Coco. There has been international concern for the human rights of these people.
This article will present the following information:
I- Background
A- People
B- History
C- Church
D- Insurrection
II- After the Victory
A- Problems
B- Achievements
C- Increasing Tensions
D- Steadman Fagoth and MISURASATA
III- Recent Events
A- “Red Christmas”
B- The Decision
C- The Move
IV- The Resettlement Areas
V- Those Who Left
VI- The Rest of Northern Zelaya
VII- Reflections
I. BACKGROUNDSince the history of the Atlantic Coast is so different from that of the rest of Nicaragua, and since the ethnic makeup, religion, and culture are also so distinct, it is necessary to examine these factors in order to understand what is happening at the present time.
A. PEOPLEThe ethnic diversity of Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast gives it a special charm and richness, but also forms the roots of many of the present problems. There are approximately 280,000 people on the Atlantic Coast, just 10% of the national population, although the region encompasses 56.2% of the total area of the country. Population figures for the Coast are often contradictory and controversial. There has never been a serious census in the area, and estimates were always very rough and often manipulated by special interest groups. A national census was in progress but this week it was announced that it will be postponed until next year due to all of the serious problems in the country at the present. The figures used here are provided by CIDCA (Investigation and Documentation Center of the Atlantic Coast), the research arm of INNICA, the Nicaraguan Institute for the Development of the Atlantic Coast. CIDCA recently did an extensive population study of the Coast area which gives the following breakdown: 172,000 Mestizo (63% of coastal population); 67,662 Miskitu (24%); 27,279 Creoles (10%); 6741 Sumu (2.5%); 1304 Garifuna (.47%); and 668 Rama (.24%). The total indigenous and Creole population is about 4% of the national total.
The Miskitu are the majority in the northern part of Zelaya. They are believed to be descendants of the Chibchas of Colombia, as are the Sumu. The Miskitu is a mixture of the Sumu and Creole peoples. The Sumu live mostly in the mountainous areas of the north. The small numbers of Rama are concentrated in southern Zelaya.
The Creole population, the result of various immigration waves, but principally of the importation of large numbers of slaves from Jamaica, lives mostly in the Bluefields area. The numbers of “españoles” or Spanish-speaking Nicaraguans has increased significantly in recent years on the Atlantic coast; many of them live in the “agricultural frontier” between the Pacific and Atlantic areas. The agricultural frontier refers to the easternmost migration of agricultural settlements from the Pacific side.
There are also small numbers of Chinese as well as the descendants of the English, Germans and Americans who came to the area at various times.
The Miskitu and Sumu peoples each have their own language, which for some is their only language. The Creoles speak English or Caribbean English. Many Costeños are bi-or tri-lingual.
Because of the extensive intermarriage among all of these groups, it is impossible to visually distinguish one group from another. Often what determines a person’s ethnic identification is the culture in which one has grown up, or the culture into which one has married, and more especially the mother tongue of a person, rather than the racial phenotype.
B. HistoryThe Atlantic Coast’s history has been quite different from that of the Pacific, where the Spanish conquistadors virtually eliminated the indigenous population by the 19th century. Few of the British who came to the Atlantic Coast had a desire to settle; instead they formed trade relations with the Indians. Later they established large plantations and brought in thousands of slaves from Jamaica to work them.
The Miskitu were allies of the British in their forays against the Spanish. In 1687 the British established a “Miskitu King”, which gave the Miskitu a semblance of self-rule, although always under the control of the British. This situation lasted for almost two centuries.
Later, the Atlantic coast was a British protectorate, but in 1860 the British withdrew this status, and the Atlantic became a “reserve” under Nicaragua with the right of self-government. In practice, the natives of the Coast only changed one colonial ruler for another.
In 1893 Zelaya became president of Nicaragua and opened the doors to foreign investment, especially in the mining and timber areas and the banana plantations on the Atlantic Coast. This began the domination of foreign companies and the enclave capitalism that lasted until the Insurrection. In 1894 Zelaya issued the declaration of “Reincorporation of the Mosquitia”, which to the people on the Coast was really just another conquest.
The presence of foreign companies reached a peak in the 1950’s and then gradually decreased, due to such factors as increased taxes on their earnings and over-exploitation of the timber reserves. By the time of the Insurrection, there were very few companies left on the Coast.
The Somoza dynasty ignored the Atlantic Coast except in the exploitation of its natural resources. But one effect that was strongly felt and had lasting results was a successful propaganda campaign that pictured communism as exemplified by Cuba as the greatest enemy of the Nicaraguan people. The people were convinced that a Cuban invasion for the purpose of imposing atheistic communism was imminent. This campaign’s climax was the launching of the Bay of Pigs invasion from Puerto Cabezas in 1961.
C. The ChurchIn the North, where 80% of the Miskitu are Moravian, political problems have extended into the churches. The Moravian Church, which began in Czechoslovakia in 1457, came to Nicaragua in 1849. As of five or six years ago, it became a native church with Creole and Miskitu clergy and hierarchy. It has been active in social work and development projects, and its ministers were often leaders in the indigenous organizations. As political and military problems increased in northern Zelaya the church was more and more affected.
The Catholic Church in the north is staffed by U.S. missionaries, many of whom reflect the fear of communism which was so prevalent and which was deeply ingrained in them in the U.S. during their formation.
The whole state of Zelaya is one Catholic diocese which is in the process of being divided into two. Recent declarations by the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference have strained the already fragile relations between the Church and the Government. (See attached document)
Under Somoza, the priests enjoyed special position and privileges. In many of the small villages the church functioned as the political apparatus and as the government, because no one else made any attempt to fill that role. While the leverage of the priests often served a very good purpose, many clergy came to expect deferential treatment. The Church itself has said it no longer wants special privileges but, in practice, it is often hard to adjust to a new position in which the church has to work with the government in a secular state.
D. The InsurrectionThe Insurrection against the Somoza regime barely touched the Atlantic Coast. Few Costeños participated in the struggle and there was no fighting on the Atlantic Coast. One exception to this was the mining area, where there was considerable support for the Sandinistas and where many campesinos were massacred by the Guardia. The rest of the Coast seldom saw the Guardia and thus had little of the intense hatred for them that exists on the Pacific.
II. AFTER THE VICTORYVictory for the Sandinistas came almost without a shot being fired on the Coast. The triumphant Sandinistas arrived on the Coast and found to their dismay that the Costeños considered them just one more conqueror; Sandino was less a hero to them than George Washington.
A. ProblemsThe economy on the Coast was in shambles. The last of the foreign companies had pulled out, leaving factories and machinery in disrepair, no spare parts, and few technical or administrative people who could help in the reconstruction period.
Transportation problems were and are incredible. Almost everything has to be brought from Managua by plane (which is sporadic and inadequate) or by boat (which is also unreliable and insufficient). The transportation difficulties are intimately connected to the food shortages, since all milk products, meat and vegetables have to be brought from the Pacific. This has the effect of increasing the cost of living in an area which was already economically devastated.
Communications is next to non-existent. Telephones and television are found only in Bluefields. There are no local newspapers and the Managua papers, if they arrive, are several days late. There is one radio station in La Tronquera near Puerto Cabezas, which was recently taken over by the government, and one station in Bluefields. During this last year, with increasing problems on the Coast, the government has had no way of disseminating information, clarifying misinformation, or countering rumors. In contrast, the counterrevolutionary radio from Honduras is received all along the Coast and there is no effective way to combat this propaganda.
Health problems are monumental. Tuberculosis, silicosis (in the mining areas), malaria, parasites, and malnutrition are prevalent. Bringing health care to the outlying villages is a huge task since there are no roads to many of the villages.
The land on the Atlantic Coast is not conducive to extensive agriculture. Much of the soil is acidic, poorly drained, and there is an extremely high annual rainfall and frequent flooding. This limits the crops that can be grown.
The Sandinistas tried to bring government to an area that to a large extent had only the churches as a government. This entailed the initiation of a bureaucracy which also brought difficulties. Many matters can only be resolved in Managua, a time-consuming and cost-prohibitive task for poor people. Many plans originate in offices in Managua with people who have no knowledge of the impossibility of implementation on the Coast.
All of this activity and effort in trying to bring the revolution to the Atlantic Coast to a people who were not prepared for significant change has had the unfortunate result of causing fear and distrust among the people. That, combined with the ultra-conservative position of many of the religious leaders, feeds their historic lack of identification with the rest of Nicaragua; it makes them recall the years of U.S. domination of the area as a good thing; it reaps the harvest of years of Somoza and U.S. propaganda which painted Cuban-style communism as the greatest of all possible evils.
B. AchievementsOn the Atlantic Coast, the tendency is often to concentrate on the difficulties, and little attention is paid to the achievements, which, given two short years and tremendously limited resources, are considerable.
In contrast to the past years of indifference and neglect, the Sandinista Government, shortly after the victory, began the Literacy Campaign, which has received international recognition. On the Atlantic Coast, the campaign was conducted in Spanish, English, Sumu and Miskitu. This opened new doors to people in even the most remote areas.
Health care, which still is not adequate, has brought limited but free medical attention to most of the people. Health campaigns are being carried out against dengue, malaria and other diseases. A new hospital is being built in Bluefields and should be completed within a year.
The highway linking the two coasts is under construction, a major undertaking considering the terrain, number of bridges required, length of rainy season, difficulties in getting supplies. The only part still to be completed is two bridges which should be finished within a few months.
Drinking water and electricity are coming to areas that have never had them before.
ENABAS (Government Distributors of Basic Foodstuffs) and the People’s Stores are bringing basic foodstuffs to the most remote areas at the lowest possible cost, while guaranteeing against speculation and hoarding. Their efforts have practically eliminated the exploitative practices of some local merchants.
C. Increasing TensionsIn the euphoria of victory, the Frente proclaimed the solutions that the Revolution would bring to the Atlantic Coast. People on both coasts failed to realize – possibly even the Frente failed to realize – the amount of time and resources that would be required to achieve these promises.
The difficulties faced on the Coast did not begin with the arrival of the Sandinistas. They are the product of 300 years of internal and external colonialism. This legacy of oppression is so deeply a part of the people on the Coast that they could not be easily convinced that these new “españoles” would treat them any differently than previous rulers.
Another important consideration was the differences in revolutionary consciousness. The anti-imperialism which was a foundation of Sandinismo was totally absent on the Coast. On the contrary, many regarded the U.S. as a benefactor and the days of the U.S. presence as “the good old days”. Another factor was the lack of cross-cultural awareness on both sides of Nicaragua. The superiority felt by the people from the Pacific was matched by the distrust and suspicion of the Costeños toward the “españoles”. The economic devastation on the Atlantic Coast was also a large contributor to the difficulties.
The people on the Coast had been used to seeing very few Guardia. After the victory, the presence of many Somocistas just across the river in Honduras necessitated the stationing of large numbers of young Sandinista soldiers. They arrived on the Coast with no cross-cultural education and little cultural sensitivity. Many had never been to the Atlantic before. Almost none of them spoke either Miskitu or English. All of this, plus their youth and inexperience, led to misunderstandings, incidents, resentments.
The Sandinistas come out of a Nicaragua in which ethnic minorities and indigenous rights were never an issue. They tend to operate from a class analysis, and they view the people of the Atlantic Coast as among the most exploited, most marginalized and most alienated. They therefore see them as the group to benefit most from the goals of the Revolution. Their desire to bring the benefits of the Revolution to the Atlantic Coast and create one Nicaraguan family can cause the Frente’s policies to have many of the characteristic of an integrationist approach to ethnic problems.
Comandante William Ramírez stated in December 1981: “One of the principal means to combat racial discrimination, therefore, is economic development. If every Nicaraguan has access to a decent living standard, the material basis for racism will be destroyed”. While Nicaragua’s minorities agree that poverty and underdevelopment have to be eliminated in order to eliminate racism, they believe that there are ethnic and cultural differences which cause conflicts that transcend economic differences and which must be recognized.
The working paper which the Nicaraguan delegation presented at the U.N. Conference on Racism and Racial Discrimination in December 1981 presents another perspective:
“…within the class organization there is discrimination against indigenous inhabitants, whether they are peasants or not. Such discrimination occurs when, mechanically, with no regard for their traditions, their customs, their language, their mentality, their aspirations, their ways of interpreting life, etc., the authorities have tried to make the Indians participate in society like any other exploited person. They impose on them an abstract and alien cultural code to justify their exploitation instead of starting from their own system of symbols. These organizations have thus nullified the potential of the indigenous inhabitants because they operate on the discriminatory assumption that the only revolutionary path is based on Western culture and that the object of the revolution is to reduce all people to a mass and to suppress ethnic groups and nationalities, instead of enriching the exploited class with all the creativity of the different cultures and with all the points of view of the ethnic groups”.
This perspective is supported within some sectors of the Government, and there is a serious and constructive debate currently in progress within the higher levels of government in regard to this issue.
D. Steadman Fagoth and MISURASATAOperating from the integrationist perspective, the Frente began to have serious cultural clashes with the Costeños. One of the most costly outcomes of this perspective was the whole handling of MISURASATA and Steadman Fagoth Mueller.
During the time of Somoza, an indigenous organization had been formed called ALPROMISU (Alliance for the Promotion of Miskitu, Sumu and Rama). Wycliff Diego, at that time a Moravian pastor at Waspan, was upset at the treatment of the Indians, especially in forms of commerce. He and other Miskitu leaders decided to start an Indian store to provide a marketing outlet for the Indians as well as to sell them goods at reasonable prices. It was also to be a pension or rooming house so that Indians from the outlying areas would have a place to stay when they came in to town. This plan evolved into the ALPROMISU organization which continued up until the time of the Insurrection. It concerned itself with Indian problems but was never a serious political threat for Somoza.
After the victory, the Frente wanted to dismantle ALPROMISU, saying that it was not an organization which would fully collaborate with plans to finally integrate the Atlantic Coast with the rest of the country. The people protested and insisted on retaining their organization. The government relented but insisted that the name be changed to MISURASATA (Miskitu, Sumu, Rama and Sandinistas together). They encouraged the emerging leadership of Steadman Fagoth, an ambitious young Miskitu from the Río Coco who had attended the university in Managua. The organization operated freely for over a year.
It grew rapidly in size and influence among the people but there were always certain tensions between it and the Frente. The Sandinistas, again from the class analysis perspective, viewed ethnic distinctions as being possibly separatist in orientation. The MISURASATA people were skeptical of the Revolution and began to move their members toward direct conflict with government authority.
In 1980, the General Tenets of MISURASATA expressed some of their strong concerns about the assimilationist ideals that had been practiced on the Coast. “The rural school, through its methods, its programs and its language, is outside of our cultural reality and not only looks to change our children into a type of mestizo without definition or personality, but also equally pursues our assimilation into the national and capitalist culture”. The Council of State, the same year, authorized by law bilingual education (English-Spanish and Miskitu-Spanish) in Creole and Miskitu communities. The importance of language to ethnic minorities cannot be overestimated. The right of peoples to education in their native language has been affirmed by the United Nations and is a basic demand of indigenous groups throughout the world.
During this time, both MISURASATA and Fagoth had gained prominence. Fagoth was the MISURASATA representative on the Council of State. He was an extremely charismatic person who soon exerted an extraordinary amount of influence over the Miskitu people. Although his actual accomplishments were not significant, he convinced the people that he would resolve all of their problems for them.
When MISURASATA drew up it’s Plan ’81, it decided to use its increased leverage to press for extensive demands including regional political autonomy over extensive land rights that it was claiming (38% of the national territory). The government recognized the concern of the indigenous people over land, especially over the exploitation of natural resources and the proceeds from that exploitation on lands which are clearly part of the communal indigenous lands. This was a problem which required extensive studies in order to resolve. The MISURASATA Plan ’81 did not consider the interests of the Mestizo and Creole populations on the Coast. It also demanded 5 seats on the Council of State and 1 representative on the Junta. The demands could not possibly be met by the government, who was feeling more and more that Steadman and MISURASATA were betraying the confidence the government had given them.
The increased aggressiveness of MISURASATA and the government’s response have to be seen in light of the U.S. political situation. Reagan was taking office, and the republican platform had expressed the intention to reverse the Sandinista revolution. Stronger and stronger accusations were coming from Washington regarding supposed Nicaraguan help to the Salvadoran guerrillas. The Somocista camps were openly operating in Honduras with no objections either by that government or by the U.S.
The degree of polarization between the government and MISURASATA made it likely that MISURASATA would call for international support and the Sandinistas would be forced to appear to be opposed to indigenous rights. The government had to act before the demands of MISURASATA could be manipulated by those bent on destabilizing the government. On February 18, just before MISURASATA was to give the government the results of a land survey as part of a plan to resolve the land rights issue, Fagoth and the rest of the MISURASATA leadership were arrested. The people were incensed.
The other leaders were released within a short time. After they were freed, Comandante Luis Carrión called on the Miskitu leaders to promote a campaign to join the aspirations of the Atlantic and Pacific communities in such a way that “we all feel, above all, Nicaraguan and not Miskitu or “
‘españoles’”.
Steadman was charged with fostering counterrevolutionary and separatist plans. As far as the people were concerned, he was still their leader and they protested his arrest. Finally, on May 7, the Government released him on the condition that he go abroad to study. Within a few days of his release, however, he crossed over into Honduras, where he has been actively collaborating with the Somocistas already there. He continues to influence the people, mostly through the clandestine radio station operated by the counterrevolutionaries in Honduras. He has traveled extensively to the U.S. and other countries looking for support for the counterrevolution. In December, he received minor injuries when the Honduran Army plane in which he was traveling crashed. Also on board was Major Leonel Luque, the supposed “godfather” of the counterrevolutionary forces within the Honduran military.
During the time of Fagoth’s imprisonment, many young Miskitu (estimates are 3000) crossed into Honduras out of fear, ideological differences and/or general confusion. Their living conditions and the influence of Fagoth made them easily manipulated by the large numbers of Somocista ex-National Guard who are training there with the openly stated objective of overthrowing the Sandinista government.
While the MISURASATA leadership were in jail, about 2000 Miskitu gathered in Waspam in a continuous peaceful demonstration in support of them. After three weeks, the government forced the people to disperse. For many, that was the action which cemented their opposition to the Government.
Another incident which has become a symbol to the people of government mistreatment was the attempt by Sandinista soldiers to arrest a MISURASATA leader in Prinzapolka, during which a scuffle ensued which left four Sandinista soldiers and four Miskitu people dead; two Miskitu men are still in jail as a result. These incidents continue to be used against the government and often obscure the accomplishments that have been made.
III. RECENT EVENTSWhile military activity by counterrevolutionary groups had increased in recent months, neither the extent of those activities nor the seriousness of the situation was known. This was due, in part, to restrictions on news and travel which were in effect at that time.
Even though raids and emigrations to Honduras had been taking place periodically since July, there had also been a concerted effort by church and government leaders to improve relations and rebuild confidence. A brutal raid at San Carlos in December, in which 35 Sandinistas were tortured and killed, threw everything into chaos. The people were frightened; many fled in hopes of finding a better situation in Honduras.
A. “Red Christmas”On February 3, the Government released details and confessions of the “Red Christmas” plot. The plot had as its goal the control of the northern section of Zelaya by the counterrevolutionary groups, the setting up of a provisional government and the asking for help from sympathetic foreign governments, chief among which was the United States.
The involvement of many members of the Moravian church in the plans resulted in a general mistrust on the part of many Sandinistas toward all Moravians and all Miskitu. Some members of the Moravian clergy are not permitted to work on the Atlantic Coast, at least for the present, and CASIM, their social action organization, had to suspend its operations.
Both the testimony of those involved in the counterrevolutionary plans and corroborating accounts in the U.S. press indicate U.S. support and encouragement of these plans. The press recently disclosed that $19 million had been approved by the Reagan administration and earmarked for destabilization of the Sandinista government. The San Francisco Examiner quoted a U.S. official as saying that in his opinion a military blockade by the U.S. against Nicaragua could not be justified “unless it was connected to some uprising in Nicaragua, … unless parts of Nicaragua were taken by anti-Sandinista guerrillas”.
Of those charged in the “red Christmas” plot, 110 have been found guilty and sentenced to from three to thirty years in prison. These prisoners are being held in Managua because there are no permanent prisons on the Coast so that these prisoners can be incarcerated near their homes to enable their families to visit hem.
B. The DecisionDuring the first part of February, the Government also disclosed that the difficult decision had been made and implemented to move the people from the villages that dot the banks of the Río Coco to an area further inland. The major factors that affected the decision were the following:
1) The increased attacks by counterrevolutionary bands against villages along the Río Coco had to be stopped; the social base for these groups and the source of their supplies had to be cut off.
2) The counterrevolutionary supporters in Nicaragua had to be identified and apprehended and the government wanted to avoid using military action to accomplish this. These “contras” represent a small minority of the people. Most of the people in the remote villages are not politicized at all. They trust neither the contras nor the Sandinistas but their very presence in the area made them either collaborators or victims of the counterrevolutionary.
3) The villagers had to be protected. This was an impossibility in the existing situation with small, scattered villages extending all along the Río Coco, often within 100 meters of the Honduran side.
4) The idea of moving at least part of the Río Coco villages had been considered for some time due to the impossibility of providing services to the area.
5) The difficult decision to move the people away from the Río Coco to resettlement areas in the interior of the area was made, but it would never have been made at this time, considering the tremendous commitment of human and material resources required and the inevitable suffering of many people, if the situation had left the Government any viable alternatives.
A recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal stated that the reason for the move of the Miskitu was so that they would not be in the area to see the Russian MIG’s which supposedly are coming, the alleged reason for the expansion of the airstrip in Puerto Cabezas. Of all possible reasons for the move of these people, that would seem to be the least plausible. None of the Miskitu living in the remote villages along the river would ever be able to see the MIG’s, even if they existed. In addition, there has been no evacuation of Puerto Cabezas where the landing strip is located – and there is no attempt to conceal it. It is located right off the highway to the resettlement area and the plane that we took to Managua took off from the new strip. There are many people with complaints in Puerto Cabezas – possibly more than existed on the river before the move – and no one is moving them.
C. The MoveOnce the decision was made to effect the transfer, much effort went into the actual move. Many volunteers from the Juventud Sandinista (Sandinista Youth), the Militia, and the Frente went to the border to help in the move. For many the move was a long, arduous trip on foot lasting from four to ten days. However, we spoke with many people who had made the move by plane, by helicopter or by vehicle. Old people, pregnant women and small children were moved in this way. All of the people with whom we spoke praised the young volunteers who helped: their concern, their willingness to carry children or possessions, their understanding. These comments came even from those who were otherwise very angry about the move.
Their anger is understandable. They had to leave their homes, their land, their belongings, however few, their clothing and animals. This was extremely painful for them. For most, there was some advance notice but the exact time was not given for security reasons. But all those who preferred to flee or cross the river to Honduras had the opportunity to do so. Many of the villages were burned and the animals destroyed to prevent their being used as a base of operations and source of food by the counterrevolutionary bands. This also caused great sorrow to the people, as well as much resentment.
IV. THE RESETTLEMENT AREAThere are four settlements in operation at the present and one which will be occupied soon. They lie on the road between Puerto Cabezas and Rosita, between the Wawa and Kukulaya Rivers. We visited all the settlements and arrived without any advance notice.
Truslaya is the area closest to Puerto Cabezas, about two hours away. It is the largest with 5200 people and is very provisional since all of the people will soon be moved to the new camp, Columbus, or to Sahasa. The biggest difficulty in Truslaya is its size. It is too big to manage well and the knowledge that they are soon to leave prevents the people from developing community there.
Sumubila is the next camp, about 45 minutes further down the road. It had a much better atmosphere, and there seemed to be good rapport between the 2100 people and the soldiers and volunteers helping. Young people from two of the villages now in Sumubila, Asan and San Carlos, had formed folk-dancing groups, complete with makeshift costumes. We accompanied the folk group back to Truslaya to put on a performance for the people there which was very well received. When the dancers finished doing their traditional Miskitu dances, accompanied by a Miskitu musical group, they invited all of the soldiers and volunteers to dance with them and everyone seemed to have a good time and enjoy themselves.
We spent the night in Sumubila and attended an award ceremony where both Miskitu people and Sandinistas were given awards for efforts made in getting the settlement organized.
Sahasa is the smallest village, with only 516 people, and perhaps that is why it has by far the best atmosphere. It is also surrounded by cornfields which were bought by the government and now belong to the settlement. This adds to the good feeling, as well as to the diet. There is a beautiful little river on the edge of the settlement, where the people bathe, wash their clothes and get water. Efforts are made to teach them the importance of boiling the water, but this has met with limited success. In Sahasa, we went to the ceremony where housing lots were given to the families.
They will now begin to clear the lots and construct bamboo and thatch houses similar to the ones that they left. All were very enthused about that prospect as life in the tents is quite difficult. The plans of the government are to construct prefabricated houses later, but for the majority of the people the bamboo and thatch huts will be a welcome change from the “champas” or tents.
The settlement furthest from Puerto Cabezas and closest to Rosita (about 20 minutes) is Wasminona, which has 1,690 persons. This is the area which we had visited in early February, and in three weeks we noticed a great improvement. Most importantly, the rains have stopped, which has eliminated the ankle-deep mud and has also significantly improved the health situation of the people. Many people have constructed separate small family huts, and others have made thatched roofs to put over the plastic and make the tents much cooler. Because of problems with the land near Wasminona, many of these families will also be going to Sahasa, and 93 have already received their lots.
All of the settlements have clinics, at least one doctor, several nurses, and a pharmacy. Vaccination and immunization programs have been completed against polio, measles, DPT, tetanus and malaria. All have at least a temporary school with Miskitu teachers. Sahasa even has a children’s park with bamboo teeter-totters and play equipment. Moravian and Catholic church services are held in all the areas by resident deacons and lay pastors.
We visited Rosita, where we spent the night. That is where the headquarters for all of the planning of the resettlement operation is located. We had the opportunity to talk with people from INNICA who explained the plans that went into the area, the soil studies, environmental studies, etc. More than 365 million córdobas will be spent on the development of this project during the next few years. The first 300 prefabricated houses are ready to be shipped to the area.
The following morning, we rode in the back of a truck with several health engineers who were supervising the construction of wells and water-purification systems.
In all of the settlements we were free to visit with the people, unaccompanied. We visited with them in their tents, by the cooking fires, at the river where they were washing, and on the roads. We heard their fears, their misgivings, their heartbreak, their hopes. Many are sad, many are very bitter at being in the resettlement areas. All they want to do is return to the Río Coco. They have no political sophistication and little if any understanding of the international politics that has effected the decision to move them. Some had been in villages which have been attacked and were relieved to be safe. Others were in villages that had not yet been touched by the violence of the counterrevolutionary bands and thus do not understand the necessity of the move.
There are many shortages in the area. Dishes, cooking utensils, clothing, tools, rubber are among the most urgent. Most people say they the food, while monotonous, is sufficient. Meat is given once a week but this can be supplemented by hunting for small wild animals, such as armadillo, that abound in the area, or by fishing in the river. Milk is provided, but not as often as would be ideal. Very few complained about work and no one said that they were forced to work.
Latrines seen to be adequate although in some of the areas new ones are being constructed in better locations. Because of the military emergency that exists on the Coasts, people must have permission to leave the area, although there are no fences. Permission seems to be given without too much difficulty to go out and hunt or fish or visit family in other settlements.
One of the benefits that the resettlement project has brought to the surrounding area is health care. On one of our many rides in the back of a truck, we gave a ride to a woman and her son who live in the village of Nazareth. She had been to Truslaya to the clinic for an appointment. She told us that before the project there was no local medical attention and she had to go all the way to Rosita or to Puerto Cabezas for care.
The presence in the settlements of so many young, enthusiastic Sandinista volunteers, while having many positive effects, also has some drawbacks. Their very Sandinismo with lots of slogan shouting, tends to be counterproductive among people who arrived with, at best, built-in indifference and, at worst, hatred for the revolutionary process. It would seem that the avoidance of all overt politicizing for the present, giving the people time for the wounds to heal, would be beneficial. Much more effective are the positive works that are being provided, such as plots of land, help with houses, education and health care for their children.
One decision unexpectedly turned out to be a huge public relations plus for the government. The government decided to send 20,000 baby chicks to the projects. When the directors of the areas heard that they were getting 20,000 chickens, they assumed they were dead and began making preparations for storing part and cooking the rest. They cancelled the butchering of the beef for the normal Sunday meat-meal and all had mouths watering for a chicken dinner. When the baby chicks arrived, the solution was to give them to the families, so each family received several. Within 24 hours, almost all the families had somehow constructed little pens for them and had even marked them with some kind of identifying mark (since all baby chicks tend to look pretty much alike). When we were visiting with the people, even those most bitter and angry, when we would say “And the chickens?”, would break into smiles and tell us how much they had grown in one day and how happy they were to have something of their own to raise.
V. THOSE WHO LEFTThe UNHCR (U.N. High Commission on Refugees) gives the number of Miskitu in its camps in Honduras as 4,500. Other estimates indicate that as many as 12,000 have crossed over. World Relief, a United States group which is the service branch of the National Evangelical Association form Wheaton, Illinois, is the administrator of the Honduran camp. The staff is made up of World Relief staff and Peace Corps volunteers. The camp is located at Mocorón on the Mocorón River. According to people who have recently visited the camp, food seems to be a serious problem there. People talked openly of the counterrevolutionary camp at Rus, and there were insinuations by people in Puerto Lempira that supplies and food were being diverted to that camp by Honduran military. There was a very amiable relationship between the workers in the camp and Major Leonel Luque, the supposed “patron” of the counterrevolutionary forces. The refugees talked of fear as the main reason why they had left Nicaragua, and most mentioned the killing of animals and burning of villages. There was talk of a “massacre” at Leimus just before Christmas, but the reports of this were all second-hand. There was supposedly a survivor of this incident in the area but he was being guarded by the Honduran military.
a. Human Rights.On our trip we tried to ascertain whether or not there had been serious human rights violations on the Atlantic Coast, as has been charged in the international press. We talked with village people, military and government authorities, and church people in this effort. Reports in the U.S. media tell of people forced to dig their own graves and being buried alive; 200 supposedly died on the marches. U.S. Embassy officials in Managua have told people that anyone who did not want to leave the village was shot. Nothing that we heard would substantiate any of those charges. We specifically asked about people being shot or killed on the marches and could find no evidence of this.
Large numbers of people were reported by the U.S. media to have been killed at Leimus. There are rumors circulating on the Coast of an incident there. We were unable to find any first hand accounts of the incident. Some sources did say that some people were killed there, but the circumstances were very unclear. Some people who were originally reported to have been killed were located in the settlements. Local military authorities told us that they were very concerned about the reports and were investigating them, and that if an incident occurred, anyone who participated would be punished. The military spokesperson in the area with whom we spoke said, “Any unjustified killing, even if done out of fear or rage or revenge is totally against the principles of the Sandinista Army and will not be tolerated”.
VI. THE REST OF NORTHERN ZELAYAWe noticed a definite difference in the atmosphere in Puerto Cabezas from that of last August. Although there are many more troops in the northern Zelaya area, there are fewer uniformed, armed soldiers on the streets. There was also construction going on, including the installation of pipes for drinking water. This is not to imply that there are no problems there. There is anger and resentment among the people and much distrust on both sides. However, we did not feel tremendous tensions, nor did we feel we were in a war zone.
We went from Puerto Cabezas to Waspam by jeep; since we got lost, we ended up in Bilwaskarma, which has been evacuated. The town was the site of a Moravian hospital which had been donated to the government after the victory, as well as the Moravian seminary and church headquarters. The hospital is now an army post and the rest of the town has been evacuated. Contrary to rumors, nothing in Bilwaskarma nor between there and Waspam had been burned, and many animals were in evidence. Also, the Moravian church and seminary had not been harmed. This was also verified by Moravian bishop John Wilson in Puerto Cabezas.
In a conversation with “old” Bishop Wilson (there is also a “young” Bishop Wilson), he said that from a military standpoint the Frente was justified in moving the people. Fagoth and his people on the other side were a detrimental element to the stability of the country. By removing the people from the Río Coco, they will lessen the chance of contact between those groups. “If the plans that the government has are implemented, the people will be much more benefited than they were on the Río Coco, where flooding frequently destroyed their cash crops and food shortages were always a problem.” The Bishop had visited all of the resettlement areas and said that, while he certainly understood the sadness and pain of the people, the important thing was to concentrate on the future and build for themselves and for their children.
Waspam has been the economic and bureaucratic seat for the Río Coco. With the evacuation of all of the other river villages, the town has suffered a tremendous economic blow. An estimated 60% of the town has left and gone to Puerto Cabezas or has accepted a government “homesteading” kind of offer in Tasbaraya near La Tronquera. There is much fear, apprehension and uncertainty over the future in Waspam. Rumors abound that Waspam will also be evacuated, but government officials assured us that, on the contrary, their plans are to develop Waspam and encourage people to stay there.
VII. REFLECTIONSThe only certainty about the Atlantic Coast situation is that it is an extremely complex one with no easy solutions. The ethnic differences, compounded by well-intentioned but erroneous actions by the Sandinistas, have created chasms that will be very difficult to bridge, even under the best of circumstances.
The international situation and the determination of the U.S. to destroy the Sandinista government, certainly eliminates the possibility of operating under optimal conditions. Steadman Fagoth recently made a trip to the U.S. where he disseminated false information about the Coast situation. He was personally attended to by the staff of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Alexander Haig, the same week, made several false accusations about the actions of the Sandinistas on the Coast and used photos of Sandinistas supposedly burning Miskitu. The State Department later had to admit the photos were of atrocities committed under the Somoza regime.
If the military threat were to greatly diminish and the situation on the Coast stabilize, it would be important for the government to consider some type of administrative autonomy in the area. Present news from Honduras and Washington indicates that the situation is more likely to worsen. Both Honduras and Washington have dismissed Nicaragua’s proposal for border control which would help Nicaragua’s problems on the Atlantic Coast as well as help to eliminate the supposed “arms flow” to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Certainly in the future, the idea of cultural pluralism within the framework of national unity will have to be developed, and a balance found between autonomy and integration. Some mechanism for orientation and cross-cultural education for those of the Pacific who go to work on the Atlantic is a necessary step in understanding. The means for a political outlet for the Miskitu will have to be found in the near future.
One of the tragedies of the whole situation is the separation of families, with some members here and some in Honduras. The Government is looking for a way in which these families can be reunited without facilitating the infiltration of counterrevolutionary elements. This will necessitate the cooperation of the Honduran government.
There is a great need for healing between church and government people. Since religion is such an important part of the lives of the Miskitu people, there is an urgent necessity for progressive church leaders to act as liaison between the people and the government and to help begin the healing process.
Amando López, rector of the Universidad Centroamericana in Managua commented after visiting the resettlement area: “Obviously we will have to put ourselves in the place of the Miskitu in order to understand the sorrow that he felt at having to leave the house in which he had lived; and having to leave his possession is also very painful. I believe that the challenge that the revolution faces and the duty that the revolution has is to offer opportunities so that this people not only recover what they left but also that they have better in time. That is the challenge and we must remain vigilant so that the hopes and promises are kept. One thing that they repeated to us various times is that the Miskitu cannot be duped; if one cannot do something, don’t make promises. Be ready to fufill the promises that have been made, because it would be fatal to lie to these people who have such a noble interior attitude and at the same time have accumulated sufferings.”
The government seems to be doing everything it can to fulfill the promises that it has made to the Miskitu. Progress will take much time and will require great patience and tremendous work by everyone concerned. It is crucial to the future of the revolutionary process to find the solutions.
|
a monthly magazine of analysis on Central America