Nicaragua
Green Light to Terrorism
Envío team
May was characterized by Nicaragua’s political-diplomatic successes following the announcement of the US trade embargo. International support, which came from both East and West in equal amounts, was combined with successes on the military front and in meeting the challenge of economic stabilization. As a result of these successes it was predictable that the Reagan administration would redouble its efforts to make the Sandinista government “say uncle.” New dangers were already on the horizon. The month of June was characterized by the materialization of these dangers.
“When we speak of the imminence of a direct invasion, this does not mean that we are picking a date and time, but rather that the conditions for aggression have become exaggerated and the danger is now greater.” These are the words of Sergio Ramírez, Vice President of Nicaragua, speaking in Colombia during his visit to the Contadora countries this month.
The conditions Vice President Ramírez speaks of are the fruit of US pressure and represent new threats to peace in Central America:
- The deterioration of relations between Nicaragua and Costa Rica as part of the Reagan administration’s diplomatic offensive, waged through its Central American allies;
- The green light given by Congress to the Reagan administration’s aggressive policy;
- Contadora’s crisis of weakness as the Reagan administration continues to effectively block this Latin American initiative.
Faced with this grave situation, aggravated even further by a tense international climate focused upon terrorism, Nicaragua continues to confront the war with both a military offensive and new peace efforts. Prominent among the latter is Foreign Minister Miguel D’Escoto’s fast, begun on July 7.
The deterioration in Costa Rica-Nicaraguan relationsThe counterrevolutionary forces have suffered several military defeats over the past few months, significantly decreasing contra military pressure on the Nicaraguan government. The Reagan administration, however, is making up for the decreased military pressure with greater international pressure, primarily through its Central American allies.
El Salvador’s President Napoleon Duarte has become increasingly belligerent towards the Nicaraguan government in recent months, repeatedly accusing it of giving support to the FDR-FMLN. Duarte is now refusing to dialogue with this armed revolutionary organization, hampering not only a negotiated solution to his country’s crisis, but also an overall solution to the region’s political problems.
In Honduras, the US maintains permanent pressure on Nicaragua through continual military maneuvers along the shared border. In the latest exercise, “Cabaña-85,” begun on June 7, troops are constructing a strategic highway in southern Honduras for future military needs.
It is with Costa Rica however, that relations are deteriorating most rapidly. If the Reagan administration’s role for Costa Rica in its Central American drama is for Costa Rica to break relations with Nicaragua, militarize its own system, replace Contadora with the OAS and provide a pretext for direct invasion, events this month moved a long way in that direction.
The case of Urbina Lara: A precedentThe deterioration of Costa Rican-Nicaraguan relations is a product not only of pressure from the Reagan administration’s Central American policy, but also of Costa Rica’s economic crisis and internal political tensions. These tensions have been accentuated by the pre-electoral campaign initiated in 1984. (Costa Rica is scheduled to hold presidential elections in February 1986).
Costa Rican culture has traditionally looked to the United States as its “model” and this perception has sharpened in the midst of the present crisis. During President Monge’s term in office, the political center has shifted to the right, with the mood of the country turning extremely conservative. In August 1984, Monge restructured the government in order to prevent a coup and stop further consolidation of power by the right. While he attained a fragile, temporary equilibrium, the changes were ultimately ineffective in preventing this. (See the October 1984 issue of envío.)
Costa Rica’s neutrality has always been a major issue of contention for the right and underlies the present internal political struggle. The Reagan administration is also pressuring the Costa Rican government to align itself more closely with the administration’s militaristic policy in Central America, especially where Nicaragua is concerned. The US objective is to eliminate Costa Rican neutrality or to redefine it in such a way that it would be nullified in practice. (One sign of the increasing pressure can be seen in the increased US aid to Costa Rica: military aid has risen from US$300,000 in 1981 to $10 million in 1985, and non-military aid from $178 million in 1984 to $220 million in 1985.)
The Urbina Lara incident is a telling example of the diverse ways in which this objective is being accomplished. At the end of December 1984, José Manuel Urbina Lara, a Nicaraguan youth avoiding military service, sought asylum in the Costa Rican Embassy in Managua. When the young man inexplicably left the Embassy on December 24, he was promptly arrested by the Sandinista police. This incident set off a crisis in Costa Rican-Nicaraguan relations that would continue for months.
The Costa Rican government responded to what it called this “grave” incident by reducing the number of personnel at its embassy in Managua and even suggesting it would break diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. It used the incident to justify abandoning Contadora, and declared it would seek OAS censure of Nicaragua. The incident was also used as an excuse to increase Costa Rican military personnel along the border with Nicaragua.
When the Nicaraguan government turned Urbina Lara over to the Costa Rican authorities, Costa Rica’s argument for abandoning Contadora and resorting to the OAS was considerably weakened. Costa Rica, however, refused to restore the original number of personnel at its Managua embassy.
Costa Rica’s mass media played a significant role in the deterioration of Costa Rican-Nicaragua relations during this period, as it has on other occasions. The most influential newspapers, radio and television stations in Costa Rica are owned by the ultra-conservative business sector, which has close ties to US interests in the country. Of all the Central American countries, it is Costa Rica’s media that has waged the most well-structured, pointedly anti-Sandinista campaign. Since 1979, Costa Rican media have exaggerated the significance of diplomatic and political disagreements between the two countries, and distorted Nicaragua’s political reality. This campaign accomplishes three objectives: it weakens Costa Rica’s position of neutrality (ratified in 1983), provides political space for the counterrevolution, and generates support for the creation of an army trained and advised by the US. A measure of its success is that the majority of the Costa Rican people “trust in” the US, “fear” Nicaragua, and consider it a “betrayal of the country” not to defend it from “Nicaraguan aggression”
The case of Las Crucitas: Reaching the critical pointOn May 26, the Sandinista Army began “Operation Sovereignty” with the goal of removing ARDE contra forces from Nicaraguan territory bordering Costa Rica. ARDE forces have been occupying this area for several months now. The successful operation culminated in the capture of “La Penca,” an ARDE base on the bank of the Río San Juan, which forms the border. The base, with its 800-meter landing strip, was used to receive supplies by air from Honduras and El Salvador. The construction of such a runway, capable of landing C-47 aircraft, requires heavy machinery and, given the impenetrable location of the base, could not have been built without the knowledge, participation, and complicity of the Costa Rican authorities.
The presence of ARDE forces on Nicaraguan and Costa Rican soil along the border is also inexplicable without such complicity. Since 1983, numerous ARDE bases set up by various armed factions have been established along the Costa Rican side of the border. The bases are located on various private farms belonging to exiled Nicaraguans, or to Costa Ricans who either cannot control contra presence on their vast properties or actively collaborate with them. The Nicaraguan government has repeatedly provided lists of contra bases to Contadora and to Costa Rica. These lists detail the bases’ location on Costa Rican soil and name Costa Rican officials who turn a blind eye to their existence, and the Monge government has failed to give any kind of adequate reply.
On May 31, during the Sandinista offensive, a group of Costa Rican civil guards were fired upon at Las Crucitas, on the Costa Rican side. Two Costa Rican civil guardsmen were killed and nine injured.
That night, while most Costa Ricans were in front their television sets watching a World Cup qualifying match between the US and Costa Rican soccer teams, the transmission was interrupted to announce that Sandinista troops had killed six civil guards. The following day, without having conducted a single investigation at the site of the incident, the media openly accused the Sandinista army of having invaded Costa Rican territory. The Monge government, claiming to have investigated the incident, confirmed the accusations.
The Nicaraguan government blamed the incident on an ARDE task force operating in the area, and led by “Tito” Chamorro. As proof, the Nicaraguan government released a tape of a revealing radio communication to Chamorro’s men, intercepted by the Sandinista Army.
Some of the civil guardsmen who survived the attack said they had not seen their attackers, but one announced on Radio Monumental that it could not have been ARDE forces because, “Well, they are good friends of ours.” All reports by the media and the government emphatically concluded that the Sandinista troops were responsible for the dead and wounded civil guards.
In the midst of these impassioned reports and testimonies, a public campaign began that was not only anti-Sandinista but anti-Nicaragua, bringing nationalistic sentiment to the fore. Businessmen, merchants and political groups from the right called for a five-minute national work stoppage to sing the National Anthem. They demanded that diplomatic relations with Nicaragua be broken.
The Nicaraguan Embassy in San José received numerous threatening phone calls and, on June 10, a group of Costa Ricans attacked the Embassy with rocks, destroying the doors and windows. They tore down the Nicaraguan flag and coat of arms and stomped on them. Although there is a police station not three blocks away, the Costa Rican police did not appear for an hour and a half. No arrests were made, and there are even photos of the attackers carrying a policeman on their shoulders. Evidence indicates that the Costa Ricans were members of the ultra-rightist group “Costa Rica Libre” and that members of ARDE assisted them in the attack. The anti-Nicaraguan sentiment in the country stayed at this fever pitch for several more days.
Costa Rica’s official response to the Las Crucitas incident was to further reduce the number of personnel at its embassy in Managua and to refuse to assign a new ambassador as scheduled. Once again, Costa Rica disregarded Contadora and went before the Permanent Council of the OAS, demanding that an investigative committee of the “highest authority” be formed immediately.
During this period so charged with nationalistic sentiment, the Costa Rican Minister of Public Safety, Benjamin Piza, announced that he had requested defensive weapons from the United States. The request, however, had been made even before the incident at Las Crucitas had occurred. Within days, Piza confirmed that the armaments had arrived: rifles, uniforms, M-50 and M-60 machine guns, recoil cannons, communications equipment, transport vehicles and other equipment.
At that point, information was divulged about a Costa Rican training camp 30 kilometers from the Nicaraguan border. The camp is located on the “El Murciélago” ranch, which belonged to Anastasio Somoza. There, 24 Green Berets are training 700 Costa Rican guards to use M-16s, mortars and anti-tank weapons. Four hundred of these guards make up a special counterinsurgency, rapid-deployment battalion. Others have been trained as subordinate instructors to the Green Berets. Twelve thousand more rural and civil guards will be trained there in the near future. It appears that “El Murciélago” will be converted into a US military base. The Regional Military Training Center (CREM), established by the US at Puerto Castillo, Honduras in June 1983, was closed this month. During the two years that the base was in operation, 11,573 soldiers received training at the CREM: 5,917 Hondurans, 5,611 Salvadorans, and 45 Costa Ricans. Since September 1984, Honduras has refused to allow Salvadorans—historical enemies—to be trained on its soil. When the closing of the CREM was revealed the Pentagon announced that each of the three countries will have its own military training center, and in Costa Rica, it is to be “El Murciélago.”
The OAS investigationThe OAS Permanent Council reviewed Costa Rica’s request for a commission the same day it was made. Monge’s government had already announced that it would seek “help from friendly countries” if the OAS refused to grant its request or if the OAS commission failed to rule in Costa Rica’s favor; the statement implicitly alluded to US military assistance.
“Today will be a dangerous day for peace in Central America,” commented Nicaragua’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Victor Hugo Tinoco, referring to the OAS council meeting in Washington. He voiced the apprehension of many Nicaraguan officials, who interpreted Costa Rica’s request as US manipulation towards its goal of replacing Contadora with the OAS. The Nicaraguan government protested publicly that Contadora not be “stripped of its function.” In Nicaragua’s view, jurisdiction in the case clearly belongs to that entity, which created the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican Mixed Commission in 1983 specifically to deal with bilateral conflicts.
The OAS reached a compromise solution by deciding to create a five-member commission made up of one representative from each of the four Contadora countries plus the OAS Secretary General, Joao Baena Suárez. Only the United States, Honduras and El Salvador argued against the idea at the Washington meeting, although they did not vote against it.
The Nicaraguan government said it was satisfied with the result, referring specifically to Contadora’s participation on the commission, but not with OAS involvement per se. From Nicaragua’s point of view, this first direct involvement of the OAS in a Central American conflict sets a dangerous precedent.
The solution adopted by the OAS commission was not ideal for Costa Rica either, since an OAS body would have been more sympathetic to its anti-Nicaragua position. By giving important support to Contadora, the decision ratified the validity and authority of its peace initiative, which among other things, represents an alternative that is more Latin American than the OAS itself.
The OAS commission arrived in Costa Rica on June 17 to hear its version and begin investigating what had happened. On the 18th, the commission went to the Costa Rican city of Liberia to hear Nicaragua’s version. With that, the commission began to compile its report.
On June 25, Nicaragua, which had reason to believe the US was placing undue pressure on the commission, requested that it also visit the captured base, La Penca, as well as the Costa Rican areas in which the ARDE and FDN contra forces operate, to get all of the relevant facts on which to base its decision. At the meeting in Liberia, Nicaraguan officials had presented the commission a detailed list of the location of the camps. The commission denied the request, saying it came too late and that the commission needed to deliver its report on the incident as soon as possible.
The first draft of the commission’s findings came out on June 28. The report concluded that the gunfire injuring and killing the civil guards had come from the Nicaraguan side of the river and not from within Costa Rica as the Monge government adamantly maintained. The report also said the commission could not accurately determine the identity of the attackers.
Nicaragua’s ambassador to the OAS, Edgard Parrales, said Mexico was the only member of the commission that remained impartial under pressure by the US to rule against Nicaragua. Throughout the incident, the Nicaraguan government maintained Sandinista troops had not crossed the border. From Nicaragua’s perspective, the ambivalent nature of the commission’s draft ruling must be analyzed in the same light as the issue of the composition of the commission itself. It is the “lesser of two evils.”
Nicaragua takes the initiative in creating a demilitarized zoneWhile Costa Rica was busily requesting an investigative commission at the OAS, Nicaragua took its own initiatives regarding the Las Crucitas incident. On June 6, the Nicaraguan government officially asked the French government to use its diplomatic powers to help create a demilitarized zone along the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border. The French Foreign Ministry immediately accepted the request, suggesting that talks between Nicaragua and Costa Rica be held in France, and accepting responsibility for organizing them. President Monge just as quickly rejected the possibility of French mediation, saying that only if Contadora and the OAS proved fruitless would he consider it. On June 13, the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry invited Contadora to send a delegation to visit the border zone, but a few days later the OAS-Contadora. Commission was formed.
A demilitarized zone had already been the subject of talks between the two countries last year, when Contadora’s Nicaraguan-Costa Rican Mixed Commission met in Paris twice to discuss the proposal. No agreement had been reached, with Costa Rica reportedly giving no concrete reasons for refusing to accept such a zone.
The creation of a demilitarized zone would mean the dismantling of contra camps, which are the source of continuous border conflicts. Skirmishes can be easily distorted, or even manufactured, as in the case of Las Crucitas, to provide a pretext for direct US intervention on behalf of Costa Rica. Monge’s persistent refusal to demilitarize the border assumes tactical support for the contras by at least some sectors of the government, as well as the government’s inability to resist US pressure. From Nicaragua’s perspective, a demilitarized zone is the key to preventing border conflicts and a test of the Monge government’s will for peace.
In a last attempt to persuade Monge, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega wrote to him directly on June 26. He urged Monge to reconsider a demilitarized zone in order to normalize traffic on the Río San Juan and agricultural activity in the area. Ortega further informed Monge that even if he did not consider the possibility viable, Nicaragua had already decided “to unilaterally establish a neutralized or demilitarized zone under international supervision, all along its border with Costa Rica.”
A unilateral initiative such as this has no precedent in the long history of conflicts between neighboring countries. President Monge belittled it unofficially by commenting that “Costa Rica demilitarized its territory in 1948 when it proscribed the army as an institution,” and that “Our territory is neutral in practice,” referring to the country’s tradition of neutrality. A week later, in response to a second letter from President Ortega urging a high-level meeting with the support of Contadora and France, Monge agreed to meet in Panama.
The diplomatic tensions that have accumulated around the border incident at Las Crucitas have brought Nicaragua and Costa Rica to a breakdown in communication unprecedented in recent years. Their present relation could be compared to the irreversible alienation that has existed between Nicaragua and Honduras for years. The situation may prove even worse since the level of disinformation about Nicaragua in Costa Rica is much greater than in Honduras and the recent deterioration of relations with Costa Rica has been much faster.
The Costa Rican government’s tolerance for the counterrevolutionaries operating on its soil and its reluctance to accept demilitarization of the border zone makes a solution very difficult. After more than two years of avoiding diplomatic “notes of protest” to Costa Rica, to avoid damaging already fragile relations, Nicaragua sent an energetic note on June 19, denouncing the release of ARDE leader Tito Chamorro, arrested only a few days earlier in connection with the deaths of the two Costa Rican civil guards. The note emphasized the fact that contra actions, in clear violation of Costa Rica’s neutrality, always go unpunished. This deterioration in relations could also be irreversible, if the basic conditions that have generated the conflict persist.
The capture of La Penca culminated the Sandinista offensive along the southern border. According to Sandinista army sources, 400 members of ARDE fled Nicaragua towards Costa Rica during the two weeks of the offensive. When it was over, another 500 ARDE troops were still active in Nicaraguan territory, in the Río San Juan and Nueva Guinea zones. The 400 who fled to Costa Rica have become active there. Sandinista soldiers guarding La Penca have been attacked frequently by indiscriminate cannon fire from the Costa Rican side of the river. These shellings are designed both to provoke the Sandinistas and to recover the base. As a result of these attacks—20 between June 20 and July 1—four Nicaraguan soldiers died and three were seriously wounded. The continuous attacks and the resulting deaths belie Costa Rica’s proclaimed neutrality.
The events of the past month in Costa Rica indicate that the geopolitical and economic pressures in a pre-election period have overwhelmed the equilibrium Monge sought with the self-imposed coup of 1984. The result has been the strengthening of right-wing forces seeking the militarization of their country and US intervention in Central America. Under these circumstances Costa Rica cannot be considered a neutral country. Its territory, like that of Honduras, is being occupied by the US military, put at the service of the Reagan administration’s plans for the region. The claim that the effort to militarize is justified by the “need to defend the sovereign homeland from the Sandinistas” does not negate the fact that Costa Rica’s neutrality has been itself neutralized, making the possibility of peace that much more unlikely.
For a direct intervention against Nicaragua, the Reagan administration needs a pretext. The deterioration of relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the end of Costa Rican neutrality and increasing militarization make this border area an ideal place to create a pretext. This is why Nicaragua’s struggle for peace now urgently moves to seek the demilitarization of the border and the permanent presence of international observers.
US Congress gives a green light to terrorismWithout abandoning pressure through its Central American allies, the OAS and even the Contadora countries themselves, the Reagan administration continues to rely heavily on military pressure from the counterrevolutionaries. According to Sandinista military sources, the contra forces are in a period of “strategic decline.” In order to reverse this trend the administration needs to revive political and military support for the contra. To achieve this, it first needed to legitimize the counterrevolutionaries as a goad to the Sandinistas and to win bipartisan support for them in Congress. One of the clearest indications of the gravity of the present situation for Nicaragua is the ease with which Reagan was able to garner this support.
Humanitarian aid to the terroristsSince April 23, when the House of Representatives voted against military aid to the contras, a bill on “humanitarian” aid for them has been pending in both houses.
On June 6 the Senate approved, by a vote of 55 to 42, $38 million of aid to be delivered to the contras over the next 18 months. This aid, although qualified as humanitarian, could include war-related logistical items such as radar and helicopters. The Senate also approved the CIA as administrator of this aid. Several amendments to the bill introduced by liberal Senators were defeated. One put forward by Senator Kennedy (D-MA) that would have prevented the President from introducing US troops into Nicaragua without congressional approval was defeated 64 to 31.
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who was attending a neighborhood ceremony with the Canadian Minister of External Cooperation when he heard about the vote, said “This is a vote for crime.” Similar aid bills were scheduled to appear before the House on July 12.
During the ensuing week, President Reagan actively campaigned to win support among Representatives for the humanitarian aid. He indicated that the real value of the aid was not the dollar amount or its qualification as military or humanitarian. “A House vote for humanitarian aid to the ‘freedom fighters’ will send a strong bipartisan message that we will not tolerate the evolution of Nicaragua into another Cuba, nor will we hide our heads in the sand while Nicaragua becomes a Soviet client state with installations constructed for use by the Soviet bloc.” Reagan added alarming accusations concerning the “Nicaraguan connection in the international network of terrorism” to his habitual accusations of religious repression and genocide of the Miskito Indians.
In order to persuade the Democrats who had rejected contra aid in April, Reagan sent a letter to Rep. Dave McCudy (D-OK), employing a moderate tone and falling back on an argument he had not used for some time: “My government,” he said in the letter, “is committed to political solutions, not military ones, in Central America. Our policy for Nicaragua is the same as the one for El Salvador and all of Central America: Support the democratic center against the extremes of both the right and the left, and secure democracy and a lasting peace through national dialogue and regional negotiations.” He concluded, “We do not seek the military overthrow of the Sandinista government.”
The House yielded before the public arguments and private pressures. On June 12, by a vote of 248 to 184, it approved $27 million for the contras until March 1986. The humanitarian aid was defined as such things as food, clothing and medicine, and it was stipulated that neither the CIA nor the State Department could administer the funds. It must be understood, however, that any such aid is logistical support for their military effort, since it frees funds for weaponry.
More significant than the approval of aid was the House’s vote against extending the Boland Amendment, which prohibits direct or indirect US participation in military or paramilitary actions designed to overthrow the Sandinista government. Although ever since its passage in 1983, Reagan has regularly found legal excuses to violate this amendment, it has been an important legal impediment to the escalation of US destabilization efforts. The Boland Amendment is still in effect until October 1.
The passage of contra aid in the House and its repudiation of the Boland Amendment seem to indicate a significant reduction in the number of congresspeople committed to a peaceful settlement in Nicaragua.
After several years of debate and disagreement, President Reagan finally received a bipartisan endorsement for his policy of aggression against Nicaragua. This aggression continues to include the by now well-documented terrorist activities of the counterrevolutionary forces. But the ramifications of congressional support go beyond policy towards Nicaragua. Those who voted for contra aid and against the Boland Amendment have given the green light to similar convert war strategies in other parts of the world. The vote legitimized a policy that has been internationally discredited in the World Court at The Hague. It was a vote that legitimizes terrorism.
In the United States, thousands who had signed the “pledge of resistance” held public demonstrations and occupied legislative offices to protest the congressional vote. More than 500 were arrested during non-violent protest in major US cities.
The Nicaraguan Foreign Minister declared, “Today is a sad day for the United States. What was debated was not only the future of Nicaragua, but the future of the United States as well. This is a blow to Contadora.”
On June 13 the FSLN National Directorate issued a declaration, calling the vote “unacceptable, illegal and immoral.” It concluded that, “The Reagan administration’s aggressive policy has imposed itself upon the voices in Congress that were raised in favor of prudence and reason.” As a result of the dangerous situation created by the bipartisan endorsement given to Reagan, the Nicaraguan government decided to “suspend the measures which it was applying unilaterally in the area of defense. This will allow Nicaraguans to seek all necessary material requirements and cooperation that our plans for national defense demand.”
This statement indicated an end to the moratorium on arms acquisition and other unilateral measures such as sending home some of the Cubans working in Nicaragua. The measures had been well advertised as initial steps to advance the Contadora process. At the same time, the government reaffirmed its support for Contadora and its readiness to sign the Peace Act of September 7, 1984 and to renew bilateral talks at Manzanillo.
On June 19 an urban commando from the Salvadoran guerrilla forces attacked a luxury restaurant in San Salvador, killing 13 people. The victims included four US Marines and two US businessmen. Outraged, President Reagan called for the punishment of those responsible, while the US media quoted an administration spokesperson as blaming none other than the Sandinistas. Rep. Michel (R-IL), who sponsored the humanitarian aid bill in the House, also declared that “Nicaragua pulled the trigger.”
In Nicaragua, the situation seemed so precarious that President Ortega issued an alert to the international community, which for more than a week had been following the fate of the 45 US citizens held hostage by Lebanese Shiites in Beirut. In this statement on June 20, the Nicaraguan government denied the accusations linking Nicaragua to the death of the Marines in El Salvador. It went on to point out that the tense international situation “closely resembled the events preceding the invasion of Grenada,” and warned that “The US government today is trying to repeat history.” The dramatic increase in international tensions has unquestionably brought the danger of a direct US intervention closer, but the political costs both internationally and in the US are still too high to favor such a move.
In the midst of counterrevolutionary euphoria following the congressional vote, and in the midst of a campaign against “Nicaraguan terrorism,” it was the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington that was subjected to a terrorist attack. An incendiary bomb thrown against the building sometime in the early morning of June 20 started a fire in the reception area that caused $50,000 in damages. The Nicaraguan government had already predicted eventual terrorist attacks against its embassies; now that anti-Nicaraguan propaganda has become more extreme in several countries, more attempts of this kind cannot be ruled out.
“Pretexts” for state terrorismThe green light given to Reagan’s aggressive policy shone even brighter as a result of congressional action taken on June 26. In an effort to fill the void left by the loss of the Boland Amendment, the House passed a revised version of the Foley Amendment. By a vote of 312 to 111 the House first approved a prohibition on the use of US troops in Nicaragua without congressional authorization. Later in the same session, by a vote of 375 to 45, they approved an amendment describing the exceptions that permit the President to launch an intervention or “surgical” air strike without a declaration of war or congressional authorization.
The President could take unilateral military action if any of the following conditions were “demonstrated”:
- That Nicaragua has received MiGs or comparable aircraft, or nuclear arms;
- That Nicaragua has attacked US citizens or US allies in Central America, or even that there exists the “clear and present danger” of such an attack;
- That Nicaragua has been involved in a terrorist act against the US or its allies or if it gives asylum to those who provoke such a terrorist attack;
- That it is necessary to protect the US Embassy in Managua.
Some defenders of this legislation allege that it is a wedge that will prevent a “capricious invasion” decreed by Reagan for mere “ideological reasons.” In the opinion of many liberal Representatives, on the other hand, the effort to restrain Reagan has actually increased his options for the use of force. Les AuCoin (D-OR) admitted that “It could be read as affirmative go signals for the administration,” while Ted Weiss (D-NY) called it “a dangerous blueprint for American involvement.” Weiss compared it with legislation that in 1965 opened the door for President Johnson to fabricate the Gulf of Tonkin incident as justification for increased US intervention in Vietnam. This interpretation was shared by Nicaraguans from diverse social and political backgrounds.
The real danger in this legislation is that some of the pretexts outlined in the measure are already “demonstrated,” to the satisfaction of the Reagan administration:
- In November 1984 the administration accused Nicaragua of having introduced MiG jets and, without providing further proof for this charge, created and maintained an artificial crisis for several days, during which US military intervention—then still illegal—was discussed.
- The administration has not ceased accusing Nicaragua of attacking its Central American neighbors, who are all US allies. As proof for these charges, the US presents falsified military news, declarations by Honduran, Salvadoran and Costa Rican officials who support US policy, and slanted impressions of public opinion. All of these are used to justify its military, economic and diplomatic pressures against the Sandinista government.
- Since 1981, the US government has accused Nicaragua of providing logistical support, in the form of arms and sanctuary, to the Salvadoran guerrillas, whom the administration qualifies as terrorists. It is precisely upon this accusation that the US has based its justification for funding the counterrevolution and militarizing Honduras. The Reagan administration has also accused Nicaragua of participating in an international network linking terrorism to drug trafficking, of maintaining close relations with countries and organizations considered by the US to be terrorists—the PLO, ETA, Lebanon, North Korea, Libya, Iran and Cuba—and of maintaining in its territory training camps and safe houses for these supposed international terrorists.
The congressional votes of June thus permit President Reagan to pursue his aggressive options against Nicaragua with very few constraints. He can apply pressure through the contras, who have already been legitimized as recipients of humanitarian aid. He can apply pressure through military strikes designed to cripple Nicaragua’s strategic infrastructure. He can resort to intervention. All of this has been foreseen and legalized by Congress.
At this point the fight against terrorism emerges as the ideological crux of the administration’s strategy, and is the key to analyzing the possible course of events in Nicaragua. According to the propaganda campaign waged for several years now by the Reagan administration, Nicaragua is a terrorist country (communist, subversive, totalitarian, extremist, and Marxist-Leninist are among the administration’s other adjectives for Nicaragua). These efforts to portray Nicaragua as a promoter of terrorism will be made easier by the international climate recently wracked by terrorist acts of diverse ideological motivation. Under the new legislation, any terrorist incident occurring anywhere on the globe could serve as a pretext for a retaliatory US strike against Nicaragua.
The FSLN never resorted to terrorist tactics in its national liberation struggle (violent methods that indiscriminately affect the lives of innocents, with the object of calling attention to a cause). But since 1981, the Sandinistas government and the Nicaraguan people have been victims of the terrorist activities of the counterrevolutionary groups financed by the US. The contras murder, rape and kidnap defenseless civilians and attack towns, transportation, hospitals, schools and other civilian targets in their war of intimidation. Nicaragua has been the victim of the state terrorism of the US government as well. Actions like the CIA mining of the ports in 1984 are integral to the Reagan administration’s strategy. Now, the most serious aggression of this policy of state terrorism, a direct invasion against Nicaragua, could be justified with the pretext that the Nicaraguan revolution is guilty of terrorism. This is an historical irony of grand proportions.
Contadora’s crisis of weaknessThe military pressure exerted on Nicaragua by the Reagan administration through the contras, now on the defensive, is taking a back seat to political pressure from the Contadora countries. The administration’s strategy concerning Contadora has been to effectively block it, until it finally falls apart or is converted into another instrument of political-diplomatic pressure against Nicaragua. The administration is also trying to replace Contadora with the OAS. While this has not been completely successful, the OAS has played an increasingly important role in the Central American conflict. The OAS compromise, including Contadora in the commission that investigated the Costa Rican border incident, did not strengthen Contadora, but it did avoid dealing it a death blow. The Contadora meeting in Panama on June 18 revealed both Contadora’s weakness and Nicaragua’s decision to keep it alive.
During the debate in April over the $14 million contra aid bill, Contadora, as a group, kept silent, just as it had done a year earlier regarding the mining of Nicaragua’s ports. Nicaragua felt that Contadora could not continue its discussions without including events such as these that are directed precisely against the group’s peace initiatives, and particularly not when these same events have been condemned internationally. The congressional vote in favor of humanitarian aid to the contras was the last straw for Nicaraguan diplomacy. At the June 18 meeting of Contadora, Nicaragua decided to point out what, in its opinion, was causing the group’s extreme weakness.
The scheduled agenda for June 18 included further discussion of aspects of regional security. In this area US pressure has resulted in a position presented by Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica, calling for Contadora to substantially modify certain aspects of the initial text of the September Peace Act (see envío, May 1985). These measures are prejudicial to Nicaragua and serve the interests of US policy in the region. By introducing them, Contadora is converting itself into an instrument of pressure to extract unilateral concessions from Nicaragua.
In the meeting Nicaragua asked that, in view of the dangerous developments in the regional situation, Contadora put aside its scheduled agenda and adopt a new one with new topics. Nicaragua also suggested that the goals and methods presently in effect be revised and redefined based on the reality of the present situation.
“It is not possible to elaborate abstract formulas for future understandings which may never take effect, ignoring all the new elements that have been accumulating. Contadora cannot continue turning its back on the reality of the war in Central America,” said Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco on his departure for Panama. After the meeting was suspended on June 19, Tinoco commented that “Contadora is now entering a new period.”
The position that Nicaragua took to Panama forced this new period. Nicaragua’s suggestions were not accepted by Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. This crisis motivated the Contadora representatives to meet separately. They concluded that the meeting be suspended, but not before reiterating their “firm decision” to continue the effort for peace.
The events that transpired in Panama have been followed by an extensive propaganda campaign on the part of the Reagan administration, in which the facts are presented as the “withdrawal of Nicaragua from the Contadora initiative” and the refusal of Nicaragua to reach a regional peace agreement, while the US exhorts Nicaragua to return to the negotiating table.
Nicaragua did not leave the negotiating table. Rather, faced with indications that this table was being replaced by the OAS or transformed into a source of pressure, it chose to adopt a firm position that will permit Contadora to continue playing a neutral role in the conflict.
As a complement to the decision taken at the Panama meeting, the Nicaraguan government decided to send Vice President Sergio Ramírez on a tour of the Contadora countries to explain Nicaragua’s position to the presidents and ministers of the four governments.
During the various stops along this trip, Ramírez publicly explained what Nicaragua is demanding of Contadora. He emphasized that these demands represent the interests not only of his own country, under attack by the US, but also of all of Latin America. In this way, Nicaragua hopes to make Contadora more credible and more effective, and to maintain the base of international support it has enjoyed thus far.
Nicaragua is asking Contadora to take a firm stance, as a group, to demand that the US call a halt to the military and economic aggression, and renew the talks at Manzanillo. Nicaragua is also asking Contadora to become actively involved in establishing a demilitarized zone along the Nicaraguan-Costa Rica border. Evaluating this phase, which in a sense ended with the meeting in Panama, Ramírez said, “The importance of Contadora should be measured by what it has avoided rather than what it has achieved.”
In Panama Ramírez announced that Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina might form “a block of South American countries” to support the Contadora group. For some time, the possibility that Contadora might increase the number of member countries has been a topic of speculation.
On July 1 Vice President Ramírez began a tour of Latin American countries that would include Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru and Ecuador in an effort to strengthen Latin American support for the Sandinista revolution and to solicit from these countries—all with new governments—the breath of fresh air that Contadora needs at this critical stage.
Another sign of Latin America support for Nicaragua appeared this month when the National Assembly was admitted as a full member to the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) on June 16 during a meeting in Brazil of Parlatino and the European Parliament. Cuba, Argentina and Uruguay were also admitted at this session, bringing the total number of parliaments represented to 19.
The recognition of the representative character of Nicaragua’s new legislative body is a Latin American recognition that Nicaragua’s November 1984 elections were legitimate. On June 10, returning from his trip to Austria, Holland, Belgium, Germany and Spain, Vice President Ramírez declared, “There is unanimous acceptance that the elections were the most valid Latin American elections of recent times.”
The stamp of approval for the Nicaraguan elections received from Latin America and Europe contradicts the Reagan administration’s efforts to delegitimize the Sandinista government, and further discredits the administration’s aggressive policy toward Nicaragua.
“The greatest concern that I encountered in Europe centered on the possibility of direct invasion,” Ramírez added. “We are sure that all the European ministers have made known to the US their disagreement with its policy towards Nicaragua, and that they have done so loudly and clearly.”
Another expression of concern and disagreement came out of the June 18 meeting of the Socialist International in Stockholm, Sweden. The 150 delegates of the European and Latin American parties accepted the FSLN’s request to send a commission to get a closer look at the regional conflict. “This was the most Latin American of the Socialist International’s meetings,” said Brazilian delegate Leonel Brizola. The possibility of a US invasion of Nicaragua was analyzed at the meeting as well. The common concern over the consequences of an invasion is unifying Latin America and the United States’ European allies. The growing preoccupation could give rise to a renewed initiative for Contadora’s peace effort.
Nicaragua’s red light to terrorismIn addition to bilateral initiatives, particularly toward Costa Rica, and multilateral ones, particularly those aimed at revitalizing Contadora, Nicaragua has continued countering the state terrorism of the US government by consolidating its defense structures and its survival economy.
On the battlefrontThe successful Sandinista offensive against counterrevolutionary forces in various regions of the country has continued. The customary bimonthly reports detailing combats and enemy casualties on a national level were not available from the Defense Ministry this month, but partial information that was released indicates the general course of military defense.
In the northern zone, the major Sandinista offensive begun in December 1984 continues to push thousands of counterrevolutionaries toward Honduras, inflicting high casualties on the contras in the ongoing fighting. It is estimated that by June some 4,000 counterrevolutionaries from three hard-hit FDN regional commandos had regrouped in their Honduran camps, and are now infiltrating back into Nicaragua. Their target appears to be the city of Jinotega.
There have been major battles in the mountainous areas surrounding the city. Interim official figures reported 56 dead among some 200 counterrevolutionary casualties in this region. This is apparently the big offensive announced by FDN leader Adolfo Calero in early June, which he said would coincide with the announcement of a definitive counterrevolutionary union. The announcement of this counterrevolutionary unification into what is called UNO (United Nicaraguan Opposition) came on June 13 in San Salvador, made by Arturo Cruz, Adolfo Calero for the FDN and Alfonso Robelo for ARDE. At the time of this writing, neither Brooklyn Rivera of MISURASATA nor Edén Pastora, who heads a faction of ARDE, had joined this “new” organization.
Meanwhile, in the central part of the country, the offensive launched against the Jorge Salazar Regional Commando is continuing. With 2,000-3,000 men, this is one of FDN’s most strategic commandos. According to unconfirmed reports, this group suffered at least 86 dead in June, and its fighters are dispersing both into the Chontales area and toward Honduras.
As noted above, “Operation Sovereignty,” against ARDE forces in the southern border zones, resulted in the occupation of various camps as well as the strategic base of operations, La Penca. At least 20 ARDE forces reportedly died in this Nicaraguan army offensive and another 41 in fighting in the Nueva Guinea area. Although final figures are not yet available, these initial reports total at least 203 contras killed in the month of June.
The war of the “freedom fighters” is still a terrorist war. During this month the counterrevolutionary task forces carried out three attacks against the new settlements in which hundreds of peasants, already displaced by the war, have been relocated.
One example of this terrorist action is the six-hour attack carried out on June 9 by 500 FDN contras against the partially constructed settlement of El Cedro in Jinotega, in which 61 families, with 200 children, are already living. Part of the new settlement was destroyed by heavy mortaring, including the chapel and grain warehouse. Twelve peasants died in the attack, among them two small children and one elderly person; eight others were wounded. Some of the twelve died while resisting with only their rifles, and others were simply assassinated by the counterrevolutionaries.
Contra terrorist acts such as these—on cooperatives, peasant communities and other civilian targets, as well as ambushes of civilian vehicles on the highways—are on the increase again, coinciding with the dispersion of their forces by the Sandinista offensive.
On July 5, the Atlantic Coast was shaken by an attack of some 100 contras against the “Bluefields Express,” the passenger boat that runs between Rama and the port city of Bluefields. The passengers were robbed of their belonging after being forced off the boat, and the crew and several militia members were kidnapped. Four other members of the militia burned to death when the boat was reportedly fired on with white phosphorous. The passengers were rescued from the bank of the river by the Coast Guard, which towed the burning boat back to Bluefields.
What is the general condition of the counterrevolutionary forces in mid-1985, the year in which the Nicaraguan army said it would give them a strategic blow?
According to Commander Hugo Torres, the army’s political director, the army has fulfilled two objectives, putting the counterrevolutionaries in what could be called a “strategic decline.” The first of these was to derail their strategic plans for these months, and the other was to decimate their combative capacity.
In a comprehensive evaluation, Nicaragua’s Defense Ministry outlined the contra plans that had been dismantled:
- January: the Plan “New Planting,” aimed at taking the important cities of Jinotega and Estelí (138 counterrevolutionaries dead);
- February: the ARDE plan for the central zone (54 dead);
- April: the plan to form two new regional commandos in the center and north of the country;
- May: the ARDE plan to take Bluefields (more than 24 dead) and the occupation of the principal camp of the Jorge Salazar Commando (50 dead);
- June: the already-mentioned “Operation Sovereignty” in the southern border.
The Defense Ministry calculated 1,500 counterrevolutionary casualties (including dead and wounded) in the first five months of 1985. It was careful to point out, however, that despite the strategic decline characterizing this period, the counterrevolutionaries still have enough men, arms and dollars to launch new and important offensives later in the year.
In addition to the war in battlefields throughout the country, Managua residents were tensed for the eventuality of intervention by the arrival, on June 24, of various armored vehicles, tanks and other defensive weapons to the streets of the capital. These were placed in strategic locations in this and other Pacific cities, where they remain to this date.
Seventy thousand residents of Managua further showed their readiness four days later by participation in “El Repliegue,” an all-night walk from Managua to Masaya. This trip—today festive, six years ago dramatic—is an annual reenactment of the tactical retreat of some 6,000 residents of Managua’s eastern barrios led by the FSLN during the last days of the final offensive against Somoza.
This year the 30-kilometer walk, headed by Nicaragua’s President, his cabinet, and members of the FSLN National Directorate, was joined by many more participants than in past years. The people of Managua saw this as an expression of their willingness to “resist, reject and defeat” US intervention, should it come.
The Atlantic Coast: Towards peace through autonomyDespite major difficulties, peace initiatives are advancing on the Coast, with the autonomy project as their driving force.
The banners that mobilize the various indigenous peoples on the Coast in favor of peace are the return to the Río Coco, the defense of the land and its resources, and the reunification of costeño families separated by the war. These proposals of the coastal population are being backed by the Nicaraguan government, not by the counterrevolutionaries. This important change allows greater hope for the future of the region.
The Sandinista forces have made military advances on the Coast and have also carried out peace talks with some field commanders of MISURA (the FDN-linked Miskito group headed by Steadman Fagoth). In addition, the government has been engaged in official talks with Brooklyn Rivera, who heads MISURASATA, since December 1984. These talks have been possible for various reasons:
- The space opened by the FSLN through the autonomy project is a self-critical space. The revolutionary government has been maturing in its sensitivity to ethnic problems and to what the democratic struggle on the Coast is, as a result of both the war in the region and six years of dealing with problems with which it had no previous experience.
- The ethnic consciousness of the coastal peoples and the demands arising from it find a channel for expression in the autonomy project that is lacking in the inflexible pronouncements of the counterrevolutionary organizations. This, together with the population’s real desire to put and end to a war that is losing its meaning, is exerting pressure on those who oppose a negotiated settlement.
- The decomposition of the armed Miskito groups in Honduras and Nicaragua themselves, as fighters tire of dragging out a war that has produced high human costs, is spurring some of their leaders to seek a peaceful way out, a way that can be appropriately expressed through the autonomy project.
All of these elements bring peace nearer.
The situation is new, and is already moving fast. As one member of the autonomy commission told envío, “Things have been changing so fast in the Coast during these last months that MISURA and MISURASATA people in the communities are no longer afraid, since they are not being seen as counterrevolutionaries. Instead, there is a new image of peoples who expresses their hopes through different tendencies—through MISURA, MISURASATA, MISATAN and the organizations of the Sumus and the Creoles. The indigenous peoples are now more revolutionary and clearer about what they want than the very leaders of the organizations that represent them.”
With this positive change as the backdrop, work continues to make autonomy for the Coast a law. On June 14, Comandante Tomás Borge, who now presides over the autonomy project, officially initiated a nationwide consultation, which will gather opinions and suggestions for the drafting of a statute that will be incorporated into Nicaragua’s new constitution. He announced that the goal is to have the statute ready by October 12—no longer to be called Día de la Raza in Nicaragua, but Día de la Autonomía. (According to data in the working document for the consultation, the six ethnic groupings on the Atlantic Coast include 80,000 Miskitos, 25,000 Creoles, 8,000 Sumus, 1,500 Black Caribs or Garifonas, 800 Ramas and 120,000 Mestizos.)
The return of communities resettled from the Río Coco in 1982 also got underway this month. Prior to that evacuation, forced by increased counterrevolutionary activity along the river bordering Honduras, there were some 50 communities, with approximately 25,000 people. It is expected that 43 communities (30 of them in Tasba Pri) will go back to the Río Coco over a period of months. The return is also open to those who fled to Honduras at the time of the evacuation, and it is hoped that many will return. Cost estimates for materials, housing and transport are very high, both to assure the successful return to the river and to reinstall the communities in their traditional surroundings.
On June 14, the same day as the start of the nationwide consultation on autonomy, MISURA kidnapped Regine Schmemann, a West German biologist working on a forestry project in northern Zelaya, and two Nicaraguan technicians who were with her. Among the demands of MISURA leaders in Honduras, where the three captives were taken on foot, was an exchange for several members of their organization. One of those was Miskito military chief Eduardo Panting, whom they claimed was being held by the Sandinista army.
In fact, as was later reveled, Eduardo Panting, or “Red Lion,” the most respected of MISURA’s military chiefs inside Nicaragua, was at that point freely engaged in peace talks with Sandinista military and security authorities. In mid-May Panting had decreed a cease-fire between his men and the Sandinistas, leading Steadman Fagoth, top MISURA leader in Honduras, to relieve him of his command.
On June 22, days before MISURA chiefs were to have met to evaluate the current peace process, Panting was killed in the Miskito community of Yulu, near Puerto Cabezas. He and his troops had been operating there since the cease-fire.
MISURA leaders who say they were with Panting at the time of his death claim that he was shot when his pistol accidentally fell from his holster. New information is leading Nicaraguan security forces to consider the possibility that Fagoth ordered Panting’s assassination. Whatever the case, there is no indication that he was killed by the Sandinistas, as Fagoth later declared.
Meanwhile, any interpretation of the news of a unification process between Brooklyn Rivera of MISURASATA and MISURA published in June must take into account that MISURA is badly divided, with one tendency seeking a negotiated solution, and the other, led by Fagoth, ever more separated from the real hopes of the indigenous peoples in his determination to continue the war.
In the desire to give a cultural, social and economic response as soon as possible to these hopes, President Ortega on June 24 inaugurated the work of the Expanded National Commission on Autonomy (the joining together of the national and two regional commissions into one) in a week-long conference. In his speech he alluded to the continuing effort of the US-financed war to “partition” the Coast and declare it a “liberated territory,” from which to then launch its invasion. Daniel Ortega said, “Reagan proposes to cut our rivers, our mountains, or heart, and our country, the better to exploit and dominate us. But now this will not be possible. Nicaragua is indivisible and will be indivisible forever.”
The economic camp: At peace with the banksThe first boats brimming with solidarity aid from eastern and Western Europe have begun to arrive at the Nicaraguan port of Corinto. The challenge of providing adequate storage for all these products and correctly administering and distributing them is sizable, and is already absorbing the efforts of various state agencies.
Since solidarity assistance is also coming in the form of various kinds of credits from very diverse countries, the Nicaraguan government has been urged to bring itself up to date by refinancing its external debt. By being in arrears it could lose many of these credits.
The Sandinista government inherited a foreign debt of $1.6 billion from Somoza, which it agreed to pay when it assumed power. The accumulated total now totals some $4.5 billion. Nicaragua renegotiated the interest on this debt in 1984, but could not make its payments, especially given the enormous losses caused by the war.
Nicaragua is currently some twelve months in arrears to the international private banking system. This month a Nicaraguan delegation traveled to New York to again renegotiate its $1.2 billion debt to these private banks. The group was led by Central Bank president Joaquín Cuadra.
The renegotiation terms agreed to at that meeting could not be more favorable to Nicaragua. In lieu of the $300 million that Nicaragua was supposed to have paid in interest, fines and fees, it only has to pay an immediate $9.2 million, with another $15.2 million spread over the next 12 months. Creditor banks from Europe, Canada, Japan and the United States—the latter making up the majority—showed themselves willing to understand the Nicaraguan position.
This accord will regularize Nicaragua’s relations with the private international banking system until June 1986. Later accords will also bring relations up to date between Nicaragua and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
Cuadra underscored the urgency of getting out of arrears and obtaining a negotiation that would guarantee the normal flow of the loans received from western countries after the announcement of the embargo. “The Sandinista government has been eminently pragmatic in constructing its international relations,” said Cuadra, who noted that to have refused to sign any kind of refinancing “would have been simply to open another front of war.”
The signing of these accords in the United States was a political victory for the Sandinista government. It is explained by the negotiating ability of the delegation, as well as by the contradictions that the Reagan policy toward Central America creates for some sectors of the ruling elite. It is well known that within US business circles there are two focal points of clear opposition to this policy.
Leaders of some transnational corporations, for example, suggest that the Central American crisis is beginning to affect all of Latin America and could end by destabilizing the whole continent, thus endangering the transnational investment process. They also believe that the increase of regional militarization is putting a break on Central America as a potential market for the transnationals.
The other opposition line comes from within the financial community. The regional crisis has a negative impact on banking interests by linking political issues with economic ones, particularly the explosive topic of the foreign debt.
The foreign debt is a priority political topic in Latin America today. The Nicaraguan government stresses a united position for the whole continent, towards achieving a broad moratorium and prioritizing payments to those banks willing to guarantee development credits.
From this perspective the political and economic achievement of Nicaragua, in its advantageous refinancing of the debt, can be better understood. The large US banks think much more pragmatically than the Reagan administration. They do not want to risk their arrangements in other third world countries, or lose their international credibility by hitting war-torn Nicaragua with the club of financial pressure when it is already weak. This contradiction obviously helps to maintain the fragile Nicaraguan economy while the war continues.
Cardinal of peaceOn June 14, Monsignor Miguel Obando y Bravo returned to Nicaragua after having been invested as cardinal by the Pope on May 25. For the previous several weeks the Managua Archdiocese had been actively engaging parishes and Catholic high schools to organize a major reception for the cardinal and assure massive attendance at the outdoor mass he would celebrate the following day. La Prensa provided a constant echo to all these preparations, announcing with great fanfare that 300,000 people were expected to attend the mass. It also spoke of the participation of Central and Latin American bishops. After six years of conflicts both within the Church and between the hierarchy and the state, in which the Archbishop of Managua has been a major protagonist on the ecclesiastical side, it was impossible to try to “depoliticize” these events. In Nicaragua the private media invited the Nicaraguan coordinating group of abstentionist political parties and from Honduras the counterrevolutionary radio station 15th of September made this call: “Catholics and Christians! This is a new opportunity to show that we are not defeated by the communist enemy!”
On the day before his return to Managua the Cardinal celebrated a mass in a Miami parish which was attended by some 5,000 people, the majority of them anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan exiles and anti-Castro Cubans. The cardinal’s reception committee was presided over by the ex-Somocista politician Cristobal Mendoza, and included twelve other Nicaraguans tied to counterrevolutionary organizations and the opposition in exile. Known counterrevolutionary leaders attended the mass, among them FDN leader Adolfo Calero and Edén Pastora, who reportedly sat side by side. President Reagan sent a message of welcome to Obando, calling his presence at this moment “a source of strength and pride, not only for the Hispanic population in southern Florida, but for all those who share the beliefs and traditions of your Church.” Francisco Urcuyo, who was president of Nicaragua for two days after Somoza fled on July 17, 1979, also attended the mass. Monsignor Obando, he declared, “carries an important weight to confront the apocryphal ‘Popular Church’ which serves the interests of tyranny in my country.” In his homily in Miami, he announced that he expected 150,000 people at his mass in Managua. The mass was transmitted directly to Nicaragua by a radio chain headed by Radio Católica. Two anti-Castro Cuban stations in Miami formed part of the chain, together with two others in Central America. Obando’s Miami mass was retransmitted the following day as he arrived in Managua, and was also picked up by Radio Impacto, the voice of the counterrevolution in Costa Rica.
In Managua, the obvious political character of the mass in Miami was publicly discussed amid growing expectations and tensions around the Cardinal’s reception. The government advised the auxiliary bishop, Monsignor Bosco Vega, that, given the potential security problems, it would only permit 100 people, to be designated by the Archdiocesan committee, inside the terminal area at the airport. The ecclesiastical authorities refused to accept the decision.
The cardinal arrived the next evening. From the early hours of the morning people began arriving at the airport to “take positions.” In the late afternoon hundreds of the faithful arrived wanting to enter, and a small, more violent group of them forced open the gates to the parking lot. Twelve of the unarmed police trying to contain the crowd were hurt, and two police jeeps were damaged together with other state and private cars. Some of the provocateurs were detained. It was for these detainees that the cardinal saw fit to offer special prayers during his mass the following day.
The trip from the airport to the cardinal’s residence was made in what La Prensa called the “Cardinalmobile,” an ordinary red truck. The 20-kilometer trip took seven hours while Cardinal Obando stood in the truck bed, flanked by controversial figures Father Amado Peña and Bismark Carballo, waving at an estimated 40,000 people who lived along the route. Motivations of people in the crowd ranged from religious respect for the figure of the cardinal, to simple curiosity, to open opposition to the government—expressed in a variety of insolent slogans. The reception for the cardinal was unquestionably a popular happening in the capitol, although it fell short of being the “historic, unexpected act that will remain forever engrained in the memory of Nicaraguans,” as the Radio Católica announcer kept repeating during the live coverage.
Organizers had even higher expectations for the outdoor mass on the 15th, but they were not fulfilled. The most optimistic estimate of attendance was 40,000 and the most conservative 20,000. La Prensa gave the best evidence that expectations had not been met when it referred only to “thousands of faithful.” More significant was the low level of participation of Central American bishops. Only four came, from Panama, Honduras and El Salvador, plus Gregorio Rosa Chávez, auxiliary bishop of San Salvador and secretary of the Central American Bishops’ Secretariat. No representative of the Latin American Bishops’ Conference (CELAM) came. Four of the ten Nicaraguan bishops were absent, and the Papal Nuncio was represented by the Chargé d’Affaires.
The event took place without incident. Monsignor Vega was more openly critical of the revolution than Monsignor Obando, whose homily was free of significant political content. The cardinal’s return to Nicaragua had neither the massive response nor the destabilizing impact expected by the ecclesiastical organizer or the opposition parties and armed counterrevolutionary groups. They see the cardinal as the only figure capable of bringing grassroots sectors that are not participating in the revolutionary process together with those that actively oppose it. He can do this principally through massive religious celebrations, the use of religious symbols coming from an alternative authority to that of the government, and messages that, in their political ambiguity, express the project of the opposition.
Visits that Monsignor Obando has made to various towns and cities on the outskirts of Managua confirm the hypothesis that he is willing to be the magnet that draws forces together “against communism.” But indications such as those this month show that this political-religious model may be wearing thin. The excessive exaltation of Monsignor Obando by ecclesiastical and political sectors creates discomfort among some traditionally religious people reluctant to mix religion and politics, as well as among believes who recognize what interests this model is serving. It also clashes with a society that has evolved a long way in these six years and responds to new historic and national symbols not found in the traditional and individualistic religiosity promoted by the cardinal.
Monsignor Obando’s peace message reiterated once again on his return is a call to “reconciliation among all Nicaraguans,” or, in other words of his, “a dialogue that takes into account those elements that have taken up arms.” In this proposal for the road to peace, the Cardinal coincides with the abstentionist opposition, the counterrevolution and the Reagan administration.
“Victorious Nicaragua won’t surrender, won’t sell out.” This is the motto of the Sandinista revolution’s sixth anniversary. Nicaragua’s recent victories and its proven determination not to sell out to US projects has brought serious threats and moments of danger to Nicaragua. One of the most worrisome developments is President Reagan’s efforts to lay “the foundations for a total war against terrorism,” and at the same time his singling out of Nicaragua as the “principal refuge of the world’s terrorist” and a member of a “confederation of terrorist states against which the United States must defend itself.”
Vice President Sergio Ramírez, in his urgent diplomatic trip to stop the state terrorism of the US, observed that the US “believes they are going to be able to come and stroll through Nicaragua, but they are committing a tragic error, because we aren’t going to run away. We will resist and Central America will go up in flames.” Nicaragua today is confident in this capacity to resist.
During his fast and meditation, begun as an inspirational outcry to God and the world, Nicaragua’s Foreign Minister Miguel D’Escoto said, “The force that is fomenting and defending a policy of terrorism in the world is accusing its victims of being the perpetrators. Such is this cynicism that it merits the most resounding cry of condemnation throughout the world.” Nicaragua also places its confidence today in the strength of that outcry, at the same time that it continues to confront the war and prepare its weapons to defend itself against the intervention.
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