Nicaragua
Two Models of Church: Chronology of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua
Envío team
August 84 - July 85. In envío #38 (August 1984), we presented an update of the important events involving the Catholic Church in Nicaragua. That review, entitled “Break off or Break Through,” reflected the uncertainty that prevailed in relations between the state and the Catholic hierarchy in that critical period. Due to factors we will cover in this article, that impasse was followed by dialogue and a temporary breakthrough. Today, the Church in Nicaragua can be characterized not so much by state-Church hierarchy confrontations as by the growing contrast between the two models of church operating in Nicaragua, each with its distinct theological messages, symbols, community work and ecclesiastical proposals. Never before has the contrast between these two models been as obvious as in the last two months, which saw the return of Miguel Obando y Bravo as the Cardinal of Peace and Father Miguel D’Escoto’s dramatic call to the faithful to join him in fasting and prayer as a new front in the struggle for peace.
The Sandinista delegation to the Vatican gives rise to a truceIn April 1984, the Nicaraguan bishops published a pastoral letter calling for reconciliation and proposing a dialogue with “those Nicaraguans who have taken up arms against the government.” The government issued a harsh pubic response to the proposal.
In July of that year, then-Archbishop Obando organized a demonstration to support Father Luis Amado Peña, who had been accused of counterrevolutionary activities. (In a hearing of the Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals, the Deputy Prosecutor of Managua accused Father Peña of conspiring to break the law and of having ties with the FDN. Although there was evidence against him, Father Peña was released uncharged after several hearings and returned to his parish.) The government responded by canceling the residency of ten foreign priests who were working in the Archdiocese of Managua. These events marked the most severe confrontation between the hierarchy and the state since the revolution, and threatened to bring about a complete break in relations.
During August, a series of confusing, unofficial reports concerning the future of priests holding government posts added to the tension. The drama began with a declaration by Father Fernando Cardenal. Speaking in Panama, he said he had accepted his new post as Minister of Education without formal opposition from the Holy See, the Bishops’ Conference of Nicaragua, or his religious superiors. The Vatican press office responded with a statement on August 10 calling Father Cardenal’s statement “surprising and almost unbelievable,” since the new Code of Canon Law, issued in 1983, prevents priests from holding any public office requiring the exercise of civil power. The declaration hinted at “painful consequences” for the Jesuit.
In an effort to ease the tense atmosphere, the Sandinista government offered to send a high-level delegation to the Vatican to express the government’s willingness to dialogue with the hierarchy and to discuss difficulties surrounding this dialogue.
Three government delegations to the Vatican had preceded this one. The first, in October 1980, discussed the deterioration in relations between the hierarchy and the government, and the second, in July 1981, the presence of priests in the Nicaraguan government. During the third, in April 1982, it became clear that meaningful dialogue between Nicaragua’s Bishops’ Conference and the government was impossible.
Two years and four months later, this fourth delegation was seeking ways to overcome the confrontations that characterize relations between the Sandinista government and some of the bishops. The Sandinista delegation was led by Rodrigo Reyes, Minister Secretary of the Governing Junta, and included Reynaldo Antonio Tefel, Minister of Social Welfare; Emilio Baltodano, Minister of Industry, and Leana Núñez of the FSLN Secretariat. Despite six days of intensive discussions, the negotiations failed to produce concrete results, and both sides declined to comment on the areas covered. A joint statement issued on December 12 simply said, “Then talks have offered both parties the opportunity to examine the different problems in an effort to find suitable criteria and procedures for defusing the tense situation.”
Although the Sandinista delegation’s visit produced no immediate solution, it did usher in a temporary reduction of tensions on both sides. On September 17, Pablo Schmitz, a US citizen of the Capuchin order, was consecrated as Auxiliary Bishop of Bluefields. The new bishop invited President Daniel Ortega and the government representatives of the region to the ceremony, and they did attend. A few days earlier, Pablo Vílchez had been consecrated Bishop of Jinotega, bringing the number of bishops in the Episcopal Conference to ten.
The elections: A pastoral letter that never cameFrom the start of the electoral process, many people wondered what the bishops’ official position would be. The more belligerent ecclesiastical sectors, represented by Monsignor Bismark Carballo, encouraged expectations by announcing that a pastoral letter would be published, although other bishops said that they were unaware that such a letter was being drafted.
With the opening of the actual campaign on August 1, speculations about the letter grew. Many expected it would reflect the skepticism that characterized the public pronouncements of Bishop Obando and Bishop Vega, who dismissed the elections “for lack of conditions.”
In an effort to prevent a letter that would disrupt the electoral process, pro-Sandinista media waged an effective campaign, encouraging progressive Christians to consider the kind of letter they would like to see. In the end, the letter—whether skeptical or hopeful—never came. The Bishops’ Conference has always displayed a certain lack of consensus when making public statements critical of the revolutionary process, but the gravity of the rupture of relations in April through September and the “truce” that followed seemed to have deepened the rift in the Bishops’ Conference with respect to the revolution, which led to the silence. The bishops as a group did not call for abstention, which would have been punishable by law, nor did they endorse any party. This silence had important implications, given the highly charged atmosphere of the pre-election period. Bishops Obando and Vega did make individual public statements, repeating the theme of “insufficient conditions.” Their position on the elections was very similar to that of the Coordinadora Democratica, which justified its abstention from the elections on the same grounds.
The lack of consensus about the elections was also demonstrated by the belligerent personal letter published by the President of the conference, Bishop Vega, on October 25, ten days before the elections. Although it was called “An Invitation to Christian Reflection,” his long letter was full of harsh criticism of the government. In keeping with his constant efforts to portray Nicaragua’s drama as an East-West struggle, Bishop Vega said in his letter:
“Vagueness and the imposition of silence have been the most specious and open tactic used to disguise what is really happening inside the country. But those of good faith inside Nicaragua and out already know enough to judge. We’re at the fatal crossroads: submission or death. At any cost and despite any holocaust of the people, regardless of the public declarations of ‘peace efforts’: all alternatives for a civic solution have been closed. All efforts are just that: ‘attempts,’ ‘acts of good will,’ ‘possible solutions.’ After five years of euphoric illusions, revolutionary myths and sorrowful detours, Nicaragua is a living lesson for the whole continent. It has once again been proven that ideological dogmatism and materialist schemes do not meet basic human needs. They are mechanism of domination, clans that ignore the fundamental rights of every person. They see human beings as nothing more than ‘instruments of labor’ and one more ‘soldier’ for their goal of world domination. Everyday the reality is more threatening, each day more oscillating: between ‘repressive violence’ and ‘vengeful violence.’”
Bishop Vega made similar comments in a press conference, though in softer language. The government did not react critically to his extreme statements. “The revolution has given a voice to the bishops too,” said Daniel Ortega in a public ceremony during the electoral campaign. The bishop’s words did not elicit much in the way of response, as would have been expected in other moments.
Bishop Vega’s statements to a visiting US delegation three days before the elections had much greater impact. A few days earlier there had been a contra attack on the San Gregorio cooperative in Nueva Segovia. Several children died in the mortar fire directed at the residents’ houses. This attack touched many foreigners already in Nicaragua to observe the elections and gave them a better understanding of the sort of terrorist tactics contras employ against civilian targets.
Max Azicri, a political science professor from the University of Pennsylvania, and two US citizens accompanying him met with Bishop Vega during this period, resulting in the following conversation:
- “What do you think of the US pressure on the Nicaraguan people?”
- “All imperialism is bad, economic imperialism through a reign of force, but also ideological imperialism.”
- “Would you send a message to the government in Washington [asking them] to halt this policy against Nicaragua?”
- “This should be something simultaneous. It has to be said to the Russians and the Cubans as well.”
- “But they haven’t killed seven thousand Nicaraguans. How can your compare the aid of Cuban doctors with the assassination of six children in Nueva Segovia?”
- “To kill the soul is worse than to bill the body says the Lord. And here we have an ideology that starts from the perspective that the other is my enemy, and therefore a bomb placed on the soul is worse…”
- “And for you this is worse than the assassination of children.”
- “The submission of people means the death of the soul.”
- “With all respect, Bishop Vega, I think that the six murdered children, were they alive, would not agree with you.”
The elections were held a few days after this contra attack. Seventy-five percent of the population voted and the FSLN received sixty-seven percent of the valid votes. The influence of the parish priests on the popular vote has yet to be studied, but given that the majority of them emphasized their doubts about the “conditions,” or at the very least expressed indifference, the results indicate that what some observers called a “lay vote” was not susceptible to ecclesiastical influence over political issues and civic decisions.
A new stageThe November 4 elections, which gave the FSLN internationally recognized legitimacy despite the Reagan administration’s efforts to discredit them, created the opening for a new stage in Church-government relations. In this stage dialogue was finally possible.
During November and early December, the stream of ambiguous reports on the fate of the priests in public office continued, with Fernando Cardenal particularly in the spotlight. On December 10 the General Curia of the Jesuit Order in Rome confirmed that Cardenal, who had been a Jesuit for 32 years, had been released from the order because he had remained in his political post, but he continued to be a priest.
In addition to several public statements made in Managua to clarify the situation, Father Cardenal presented a long letter headed, “A letter to my friend.” In the letter, which was widely circulated both in Nicaragua and internationally, the Minister of Education explained the reasons for his “conscientious objection” in not renouncing his post in the Sandinista government. He also made public the process of debate over the four priests in public office, concluding with this statement: “The one who clearly refused to grant an exception to the Nicaraguan priests so that they could continue working in the revolutionary government was Pope John Paul II. This statement hurts me, but as a Christian I cannot be silent.”
Father Cardenal’s words doubtlessly made an impact on some of the bishops, who subsequently came out against the war and in favor of improved relations within the church and between the hierarchy and the government. On December 13, the diocesan office of Estelí published a serious call for peace. It was the first time that the hierarchy had spoken so unequivocally about the war, the suffering and the death it has caused. In subsequent days, Bishop Pablo Schmitz (Auxiliary Bishop of Bluefields) and Bishop Carlos Santi (Bishop of Matagalpa) expressed the need for a dialogue between the Church and the government and acknowledged Father Fernando Cardenal’s human and Christian qualities. (There have been many statements by priests condemning US aggression since the war began. The most explicit and well known were made in July 1984, by Father Pedro Belzunegui during a mass offered at the burial of some youths who had died defending San Juan del Norte from an attack by ARDE. On this occasion, Father Belzunegui noted, “Christ said: Blessed are the poor, those who suffer and cry, but also cursed are those who make them suffer. Because of this, from this Church, we want to say: Forever cursed be the criminal CIA that clothes itself in the blood of our brothers and sisters.” Soon thereafter, Father Belzunegui was moved to Guatemala by his superiors. Bishop Vega, his bishop, called Belzunegui “a propagandist about things that are none of his business.”)
Added to this momentum from within the hierarchy, the International legitimacy of the newly-elected government led to the long awaited dialogue. On December 24, President-elect Daniel Ortega met for several hours with seven of the ten bishops and the Papal Nuncio, preceded by a one-hour meeting with Bishop Obando. In these conversations both sides detailed the most important conflicts that had accumulated over the years. At the end of the meeting, Ortega said the dialogue was “an effort on the part of the government and the Church for the good of the Nicaraguan people because we want peace.” At the Christmas Eve meeting the bishops and the government agreed to create a commission for future talks. Bishops Vega, Santi and Bosco Vivas (Auxiliary Bishop of Managua) were named as the hierarchy’s commission.
On January 8, after evaluating private talks held with the ecclesiastical authorities, the government officially announced its new cabinet. The list included three priests in their former positions: Father Fernando Cardenal, Minister of Education; Father Ernesto Cardenal, Minister of Culture; and Father Miguel D’Escoto, Minister of Foreign Relations. The next day, Bishop Vega confirmed the appointments, noting, however, that the government was not ignorant of church law and that this “places new obstacles that could disturb the flow of the dialogue and generate distrust before the common effort already underway.”
The truce remains intactOn January 10, 1985, Bishop Vega was the only other speaker at Daniel Ortega’s presidential inauguration. His attendance at the presidential inauguration was a sign that hierarchy-state relations had improved as a result of the truce, the elections and the beginning of talks. After reading an invocation, the bishop made an introduction in which he did not try to disguise the differences between the hierarchy and the government:
“A process of dialogue has been initiated with the President, who takes office today, and members of his government, which is giving rise to more adequate and realistic responses to the problems that urgently need to change in our country. The first reality is our well-known confrontations. We do not want to feign ignorance about them, nor do we want to aggrandize them. On the road to dialogue we want to say: No to war, no to violence, no to repression and overbearing absolutisms. But dialogue means that we all must become active, critical, dialectical and very involved to build on the real aspirations, needs and values of our people.”
Words such as these would have been unimaginable if Bishop Obando had been president of the Conference. The cordial exchange that took place between Bishop Vega and Cuban President Fidel Castro before the ceremony began was as significant as Vega’s presence at the inauguration. Castro invited the bishop to visit Cuba, and in a press conference on January 23, Vega referred enthusiastically to the possibility. “The basic thing,” he said, “is to take advantage of the Cuban experience in all its complexity, from the point of view of the Church, as well as of a leader with as much stature and experience as Comandante Fidel Castro.” (On January 31, La Prensa reported that Bishop Vega had thought better of his visit to Cuba, having been “warned by the bishops of the negative consequences of his trip.”)
On January 11, while inaugurating the “Victoria de Julio” sugar refinery built with Cuban assistance, Fidel Castro referred to his meeting with the bishop in an evident effort to improve relations:
“I saw my photograph in some of the papers today with Bishop Vega, President of the Bishops’ Conference. Yes, I have had the pleasure on several occasions of exchanging a few pleasant words on various subjects. He made quite a good impression on me. And his presence, the fact that he would speak at the ceremony with complete liberty, expressing his opinions, seems very positive to me…
“We are extraordinarily happy that relations between the Church and State in Nicaragua are getting better. No one can have any interest in promoting this conflict. I think everyone would stand to gain from this improvement in relations, and I always recall our experience in which adequate, absolutely respectful relations exist in this sphere between the state and our religious institutions.”
Bishop Vega’s participation in the presidential inauguration ceremony on January 10 marked the highpoint in the improvement of relations between the hierarchy and the government. Dialogue had staved off the threat of a breakdown in relations, at least temporarily, and even though it appeared that the Church hierarchy remained divided on this approach. (Once again in La Prensa, Bishop Vega referred to the pressures—ecclesiastical and otherwise—that were applied in an effort to prevent his attendance at the ceremony. “The interpretations that have been made regarding my presence [at the ceremony] have had repercussions for me. You should have heard the hostile telephone calls and telegrams I received the day before.”) This situation, however, did not progress as many hoped it would in the following months.
The priests in government: Final chapterAfter the crisis provoked by the case of Father Fernando Cardenal—separated from the Jesuit order, but not suspended from the priesthood—the cases of the other three priests serving in the Sandinista government remained unsettled.
During the month September, most of the international media and the Archdiocese of Managua maintained that the Sandinista delegation had gone to Rome to discuss the problem of the priests in government. By a common decision by the delegation and ecclesiastical authorities, this issue was never addressed in talks at the Vatican.
Another significant occurrence concerning the priest in government was a pronouncement by Monsignor Vega on January 9, in which he implied that the priests were an obstacle to Church-state dialogue. However, at a press conference on January 23, Monsignor Vega said categorically, “We have agreed that this point [the priests in office] will not be the subject of discussion or an obstacle to continuing [the dialogue]. This has been strictly adhered to in the various meetings between the hierarchy and the government since December 24,” which included meetings on January 3 and 14, February 12, March 4 and May 6.
There was every indication that the Holy See did every thing possible to resolve the problem of government priests on a global scale, imposing the same sanctions, the same “solution,” to the four Nicaraguans. This uniformity would have set a clearer example and consolidated the Vatican’s position in opposition to any exceptions for any priest. This uniformity was impossible to achieve, however. The diversity of the circumstances of the four Nicaraguan priests was the factor that prevented such uniformity and delayed the final decisions from the Vatican.
Each of the four priests had distinct ecclesiastical ties, and their superiors held different opinions. This created a variety of legal situations that prevented the Holy See from acting uniformly and at the same time obliged it to act directly, but within the limitations that each case imposed.
Father Fernando Cardenal: As a priest and a Jesuit, his immediate superior, in charge of any decision, is the Father General of the Jesuit Order. The Jesuit Order has had a special Vow of Obedience to the Pope ever since its founding in the 16th century.
Father Ernesto Cardenal: As a Diocesan priest, his immediate superior is a bishop. His direct superior, then, is Monsignor Pablo Vega, the Bishop of Juigalpa, since the Solentiname Islands, where Cardenal was a priest for many years, are in Vega’s diocese. His suspension as a priest should have been formalized through Monsignor Vega.
Father Miguel D’Escoto: As a Maryknoll priest, his immediate superior is the Father General of the Maryknolls and his suspension should be formalized through him. As a priest, he serves in the diocese of Estelí and the Bishop of Estelí, Monsignor Rubén López Ardón, has always given Father D’Escoto his complete support.
Father Edgard Parrales: As a Diocesan priest, he has as his direct superior the Bishop of Estelí, again, through whom his suspension should be formalized.
At the January 23 press conference, Bishop Vega also announced that the four priests would be receiving formal notice that they must either leave their political posts in 15 days or be suspended “a divinis.”
Father Parrales had called a press conference on January 21, in anticipation of this decision. There he announced that he had already decided to leave the priesthood as early as June of 1983. Father Parrales stressed that his decision at that time had been personal, and not due to blind adherence to ecclesiastical law or a belief that the priesthood and politics are incompatible. He had arrived at his decision, he said, after a “long period of internal crisis, reflection and consultation” which was the result of “an effort to analyze and define my Christian vocation.”
Father Parrales said he asked for Papal dispensation from the priesthood in October 1983, but had not received a response from the Vatican until May 1984, when he was informed that the legal ecclesiastical process of laicization was underway. The same month, however, the Vatican informed Father Parrales’ superior, the bishop of Estelí, that the laicization process had been suspended indefinitely, without offering any reasons. In light of the growing polemic over priests in government, Father Parrales decided to make public the details of his paradoxical case. On the one hand, the Vatican threatened to suspend him for violating canonical law by holding public office, while on the other, Pope John Paul II, in line with his hard stance against granting dispensation to priests who request it, refused to permit Parrales to leave the priesthood.
On January 27, Father D’Escoto announced he had received his ultimatum from the Vatican on the 23rd. The Foreign Minister was suspended “a divinis” in early February, although he was never formally notified. The ultimatum was not signed by Father D’Escoto’s direct superior, William Boteler, Superior General of Maryknoll, as it should have been. Instead, it came directly form Rome and was signed by Bishop Dermott Ryan, ProPrefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Evangelization of the Peoples, upon whom the Maryknolls, as missionaries, are dependent.
Father D’Escoto’s superiors in the Maryknoll order have publicly demonstrated their support for him as Nicaragua’s Foreign Minister on many occasions. The Maryknolls, most of them US citizens, have said that any Papal action against Father D’Escoto at this critical point must be interpreted as complicity with Reagan’s policy towards Nicaragua. Because of this support for Father D’Escoto within the order, the Vatican had to act directly, disregarding the Codex of Canon Law, which delegates authority, in cases such as these, to the priest’s bishop or religious superior.
On February 4, Father Ernesto Cardenal announced he too had received an ultimatum from the Vatican and had been suspended “a divinis.” He said he accepted his punishment, although he considered it an injustice, and added that, “If they take away my rights and privileges as a priest, I will voluntarily continue making the sacrifices and fulfilling the obligations of a priests, among them celibacy.” Again, the letter came directly from Rome, signed this time by Cardenal Silvio Oddi, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Clerics, rather than by Bishop Vega, Father Cardenal’s superior. The Vatican’s decision to act directly may have been motivated by a desire to emphasize the Pope’s personal dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan priests’ political roles or perhaps by a lack of consensus among the Nicaraguan bishops over the sanctions and a concern that the conflicts would interfere with the government-hierarchy talks. In any event, the significance of the high-level signatures on the letter cannot be overlooked.
On January 25, at the very moment he was being sanctioned by the Church, Father Ernesto Cardenal received the highest national honor: the August C. Sandino medal. At the ceremony, the Sandinista government recognized him as “having united his life as a poet and his life as a revolutionary, always from the perspective of a committed Christian, whose interests are the interest and longing of the poor and marginalized, which are in turn the interests of the Sandinista revolution.” Father Cardenal thanked the FSLN National Directorate with great emotion for “never reminding me of the vacillations, the prejudices, the political lapses I suffered… while they worked patiently to make me and others understand.” He concluded, “I know that God, who knows me well, forgives me and watches this act with bemusement.” The contrast between this act of national homage and the sanctions imposed by the Vatican best exemplify the conflict between the two models of Church in Nicaragua, over the definition of priests as servants of God and servants of the people.
The hierarchy and the dialogue for reconciliationThe truce between the hierarchy and the government did not last long. Beginning in March, the hierarchy once again took on the role of protagonist for the opposition, including the counterrevolutionaries, as it had done for the first time in 1984. The hierarchy has adopted a pastoral strategy directed at the youth, preaching opposition to Nicaragua’s mandatory military service. It is also reorganizing its priests in the countryside, demanding their strict obedience to the bishops and trying to set them against those priests who have historically cooperated with the Sandinistas in revolutionary tasks. The most obvious expressions of the hierarchy’s increasingly protagonistic role are its insistent demands for national dialogue and the recent activities of Obando, whose leadership was reaffirmed when he was made Cardinal.
On March 2, the counterrevolutionary leaders, with the exception of Brooklyn Rivera and Edén Pastora, sent a letter to the Sandinista government demanding a national dialogue to be called by the Church. The Church, the document said, should set the agenda for the talks and act as mediator between “the totalitarian tendency” (the FSLN) and the “democratic tendency, presently divided into armed organizations and civic organizations.” Arturo Cruz was to have hand-delivered the document to Bishop Vega on March 7. The Nicaraguan government, however, did not allow Cruz’s plane to land in Managua because he had publicly aligned himself with the armed rebellion when he visited a FDN camp in Honduras on February 20.
The Bishops’ Conference finally issued a statement in response to the contra’s request for mediation on March 22, expressing the bishops’ sorrow for “the pain and suffering of all Nicaraguans, without any distinction” and reiterating their desire to work towards peace in accordance with their “pastoral mission for reconciliation.” The bishops also referred to their April 1984 pastoral letter in which they first called for reconciliation with the contras, adding, “We are always willing to mediate in an internal dialogue as long as the following is clear: 1) We as a Church cannot impose a dialogue, 2) The dialogue must be accepted by both sides, 3) Our position must not be interpreted as a political position in favor of any party or ideology.”
The government responded with restraint, avoiding unnecessary polemics. The bishops, also in an effort to avoid confrontation, pursued the theme no further at the time. Significantly, the bishops’ statement coincided in content and timing with the position taken by the Reagan administration. On April 4, Holy Thursday, Reagan announced his “Peace Plan for Nicaragua,” in which he also adopted the contra’s proposal for dialogue mediated by the bishops.
Holy Week celebrations, transmitted nationwide on three radio stations, were full of allusions to the need for such a dialogue. Then-Bishop Obando and Andrea Lanza Cordero, Nicaragua’s Papal Nuncio, presided over evening Mass on Holy Thursday. In his homily, the Nuncio quoted from a December 2 message by the Pope on reconciliation through dialogue. “Everyone wants peace and everyone wants it in a sincere way,” Cordero said, adding that the Pope’s message “applied in a special way to Nicaragua’s situation.” He concluded that national dialogue was “a call from the Pope, which the Nicaraguan Church was also making” and, in reference to Reagan’s peace plan, said “no initiative in favor of peace should be discarded.” Pope John Paul II’s naming of Obando as Cardinal reinforced the Church’s position.
The Cardinalate of Monsignor ObandoIn the May, June and July issues of envío, we outlined the principal events and declarations involving Obando since he was named cardinal, evaluating his role during the recent military and political decline of the opposition and the increased aggression by the Reagan administration.
Since Obando returned from Rome as cardinal, there has not been another round of talks between the hierarchy and the government. At the end of the talks in May, June 17 was chosen as the date for the next meeting. It was canceled, however, at the insistence of the Bishop’s Conference, because Cardinal Obando was scheduled to arrive from Rome on June 14. Another date was not set.
The official government response to the naming of Obando as Cardinal has been very respectful. On April 24, the day of the appointment, President Ortega congratulated him in person, calling the appointment “an honor for all of Nicaragua.” Vice President Sergio Ramírez saw Obando off at the airport when he left for Rome, and the investiture on May 25 was broadcast in its entirety on Nicaraguan television. In Rome an official delegate of the Sandinista government proposed a meeting between the cardinal and President Ortega on the day of his return to Managua, which Obando rejected, but he did attend a reception for him on May 30, given by the Nicaraguan Embassy at the Vatican.
As euphoria increased among sectors of the Archdiocese aligned with the cardinal who were preparing for his return, the government urged prudence, insisting that the reception activities be strictly religious, free of political connotations or manipulation from the opposition. Given the history of confrontation between these sectors of the Church and the government, however, a depoliticized event was impossible. The counterrevolutionary radio station, “15 de Septiembre,” urged Nicaraguans to carry the white and yellow flag of the Church at the reception as a symbolic form of protest against the Sandinistas.
The government’s official statement concerning the Cardinalate was, once again, respectful and prudent, expressing a certain amount of national pride and joy at the ecclesiastical distinction of having a cardinal for the first time in Nicaragua’s history. Many pro-government sectors, including progressive Christians, interpreted the government’s position as weak, while sectors loyal to Obando interpreted it as a deceitful tactic. Carlos Nuñez, President of the National Assembly, was the only Sandinista leader to play down the Cardinalate, stating to foreign journalists that, “If we have a cardinal in Nicaragua today, it is because in Nicaragua we’ve had a revolution.”
On June 14, Monsignor Obando celebrated Mass in Miami for a gathering which included a number of notorious ex-Somocistas and counterrevolutionary leaders, including the FDN’s Adolfo Calero and ARDE’s Edén Pastora, who sat together behind the podium. When photos of the mass were published in Nicaragua, Nicaraguans were outraged and pro-government sectors lost whatever restraint they had maintained concerning the Cardinalate. Sandinista leaders themselves, however, made no critical or polemic statement in response to this open provocation, again avoiding unnecessary conflicts.
This continuous effort by the government to avoid public conflict with the hierarchy characterizes this stage of relations between the Church and the government. Although problems continue to exist, channels of communication are now open, which, although solving nothing, prevent misunderstandings or resentments from building up. A permanent obstacle to good relations between the hierarchy and the government, and many Catholic sectors as well, is the bishops’ notable public silence in response to contra atrocities and the economic sanctions imposed by the Reagan administration. The administration’s policy towards Nicaragua, characterized as “illegal and immoral” by US bishops, has never been condemned or even questioned by their Nicaraguan counterparts. On occasion, some bishops, especially Obando, have even justified it.
The fast of Father D’EscotoOn July 7, Nicaragua’s Foreign Minister, Father Miguel D’Escoto, began an indefinite period of fasting and prayer in the hope, he said, of sparking a world-wide evangelical uprising “for peace, in defense of life and against US-sponsored terrorism” against Nicaragua. Father D’Escoto was temporarily relieved of his duties as minister by President Ortega. D’Escoto said he had reached his decision after a long period of reflection and consultation with his religious superiors and peers.
The decision took Nicaragua and the international community, where Father D’Escoto is well respected, by surprise. Nicaraguans followed the fast closely, in the papers, on television or through their churches, where they were informed daily about the minister’s health, his reasons for the fast, and the growing worldwide support for his action. Recognizing the fast as a new, Christian tool in the struggle for peace, the Christian community in Nicaragua responded quickly. Individually or in groups, people from all over the country came to the church were Father D’Escoto was fasting. They visited with him, joined in morning prayer or afternoon Mass, and donated what they could to the church’s fund for war refugees. On any given day, there was an average of 25 people at the church fasting with Father D’Escoto. Christian base communities and local churches organized group fasting and prayer all over the country. This traditional Christian act by the Foreign Minister, linked as it was to the struggle against US aggression, commanded the respect and sympathy of a majority of Nicaraguans, regardless of their religious creed or political alignments.
Father D’Escoto ingested only water during the fast, as well as potassium and some vitamins to prevent an irreversible imbalance of body salts. After his initial press conference on July 7, Father D’Escoto had very little direct contact with journalists. Nonetheless, the national media, with the exception of La Prensa, broadly and respectfully reported on the evangelical uprising.
Among the statements Father D’Escoto made during his fast was a letter that President Ortega read to over half a million Nicaraguans on July 19, during the main event celebrating the sixth anniversary of the revolution. In it he wrote,
“After six years of efforts and advances we are united to proclaim that Nicaragua is free and will always struggle to keep the liberty we won on July 19, 1979. We give thanks to the God of life for having reached this day. We haven’t been bought out. I am witness to the fact that US imperialism has tried to tempt us into abandoning our revolutionary program and betraying our people. They have offered us security and money and these have failed. They do not understand that this revolution has a treasure: the compassionate love for the life of the poor and for national sovereignty. This treasure is the heart of our revolution and its heart has no price. The eyes of the world watch our small nation with great hopes. God has chosen to lift Nicaragua above the horizon of history and turn it into a light for the poor of the earth, an example which nations look towards in their struggle for dignity.”
On July 26, Father D’Escoto and the Christian communities throughout the country called for a national Day of Fasting. Thousands of Christians fasted and prayed together in their churches, homes and workplaces. Throughout Managua and other cities, posters on people’s doors read, “In this house we fast for peace, against terrorism.” Restaurants in many cities and towns closed early because of lack of business or in support of the fast. At midday Father D’Escoto sent a message over the airwaves to the Nicaraguan people:
“Today we go without food as a sign of the suffering imposed upon us by the demonic imperialism of the US, as a sign that we are ready to give up everything, even our life, in the defense of our country and for the future of our people. Today we fast as a sign that we are fighting so that tomorrow we will be able to live in peace and distribute the goods of the earth—education, health, bread and rejoicing—among everyone. Demonic imperialism only believes in weapons and dollars; it arrogantly proclaims itself lord of the earth and imposes itself by buying consciences and crushing the weak; this terrorist demon, like Goliath, believes itself invincible… Prayer and fasting are also needed now in the struggle to overcome, and we shall overcome. We must have faith, we shall overcome.”
Joining the many Nicaraguans who responded to Father D’Escoto’s fast are thousands of Christians from many countries around the world. In the first 25 days of Father D’Escoto’s fast, collective fasts were held in Mexico, Panama, France, England, Italy, West Germany and the US Christian leaders have also come to Nicaragua to fast and pray with Father D’Escoto. Among them are Paulos Mar Gregorios, Metropolitan of Delhi, India and one of the seven presidents of the World Council of Churches (who stated on his arrival, “the state-terrorism of the US is the same as what we knew before WWII and called nazism and fascism”); Bishop Dingman of Des Moines, Iowa; George Wald, Nobel Prize laureate in science; and Bishop Pedro Casaldáliga of Mato Grosso, Brazil. Bishop Casaldáliga’s arrival in Managua to join Father D’Escoto’s fast marked the first time he had left Brazil in 17 years, for fear that he would not be permitted to return. He said he felt impelled to come to Nicaragua to join in this struggle for peace.
In the first 15 days of the fast, Church authorities in Nicaragua were silent, although “Radio Católica” continually repeated the text of Isaiah on the kind of fast God prefers and a reading from Matthew in which Jesus criticizes the Pharisees for fasting hypocritically. La Prensa mocked the fast in its humor section, calling Father D’Escoto overweight and saying that traces of Russian caviar would be found in his blood if tests were taken. Then La Prensa began rumors that the fast was only an intermediate step to ease Father D’Escoto’s resignation as Foreign Minister. On July 23, it published a statement signed by the Bishops’ Conference denouncing the government’s unwillingness to dialogue with the hierarchy and the disrespect shown towards the bishops and the Pope in the media, which it said “could lead to aggressive actions.” The note also contained an ambiguous reference to the fast:
“Regarding supposed pastoral orientations given by individuals to Catholics, the bishops of Nicaragua reaffirm once again that only the legitimate authority of the Catholic Church can legislate for its faithful and no other authority or individual can assume the right to order or promote religious activities.”
This document, which reiterated the call for dialogue with the contras, was signed by Bosco Vivas, the Auxiliary Bishop for the Archdiocese of Managua. His sole signature on the statement is an indication that the initiative to delegitimize the fast comes mainly from the hierarchy in Managua and reflects the point of view of the Cardinal.
On August 6, as this issue was going to press, Father D’Escoto ended his fast at the request of his doctors. The evening mass, attended by the faithful, supporters of his political action and many government officials, was followed by a procession through the Monseñor Lezcano neighborhood in which the church is located. At that time, phase two of the “evangelical insurrection” was outlined. It involves a one-month continuation of popular religious mobilization within Nicaragua, led by the Christian communities, and culminates in an “International Week for Peace” from September 8-15, to be celebrated simultaneously in Nicaragua and in countries around the world.
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a monthly magazine of analysis on Central America