Both Sides Up the Ante

Envío team

In the most recent US government statements concerning Nicaragua one can discern a shift in the “image war,” and a speeding up of the contra war. The intensification of the effort to wear down the Sandinista revolution was also apparent on other levels, especially in the anti-Nicaraguan rhetoric of the Costa Rican government. In this context, Cardinal Obando’s repeated call to “dialogue” reinforces the religious-ideological fusion with which the Catholic Church has approached this issue since April 1984. The acceleration of the counterrevolutionary strategy is a response to the Nicaraguan government’s strategy, which includes the military offensive in effect for several months, the Atlantic Coast Autonomy Project, and the institutionalization of change through the drafting of the constitution.

The Reagan administration tries hard
to improve contra image

The campaign against Nicaragua launched by the US just two months ago, in which Nicaragua was accused of terrorism, seems to have run out of steam. The administration’s exaggerated accusations and threats of reprisal did not find the echo in the international community that would have made the campaign a success. Such hysterical posturing about terrorism was also beginning to boomerang against the government that directed the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors and published the CIA manual. President Reagan’s bout with cancer gave rise to speculations about what the remainder of his term will be like, and may have contributed to the abandonment of this perilous detour in favor of dedicating his energies to seeing through his much discussed tax reform program.

Ever since Congress approved US$27 million in “humanitarian aid” for the counterrevolutionaries, the Reagan administration has been trying to up the figure, justifying the contras’ activities. Having put aside its attempts to portray the Sandinistas as “miserable criminals” and “terrorists,” the administration is again putting all its efforts towards cleaning up the image of the FDN, the contra group receiving the most aid from the US The following developments are part of the shift in the “image war” in recent weeks:

- The FDN created a Human Rights Commission and drafted a code of conduct for its members, initiatives that received the blessing of the State Department and are intended to neutralize the international publicity resulting from the numerous atrocities committed by the contra against the civilian population;

- FDN leaders announced that they are creating a Red Cross in Nicaraguan territory (in the war zone of Jinotega, which the FDN claims as “controlled territory”) for the exchange of prisoners and other activities. All this is intended to give the impression that the contras are humanizing the war.

- The contras’ renewed attempts to present themselves as united with civilian leaders of the recently created Nicaraguan Opposition Union (UNO)—the triumvirate Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, and Adolfo Calero—are taking center stage. In the south, the Southern Opposition Block (BOS) was formed to unite ARDE and other smaller groups. BOS also has presented civilian leaders—Alfredo César and Alvaro Jérez from Movimiento Rescate (Rescue Movement)—who made political-diplomatic proposals to the Contadora countries before the Cartagena meeting.

- Brooklyn Rivera of Misurasata is taking advantage of the displacement of Steadman Fagoth from the leadership of MISURA by the organization’s own Council of Elders to unite the two groups under his leadership. This new moderation is expected to be ratified in an assembly of ASLA (Miskitos for Unity), a new alliance of the two groups created in Miami in June with the support of sectors of the US Moravian Church.

In this new phase of the “image war,” the “freedom fighters” will be increasingly presented in the US as the “democratic resistance,” while the Nicaraguan government will be attacked as a flagrant violator of human rights.

On August 16 Reagan finally signed the order for the $27 million in “humanitarian aid.” This sum was part of a comprehensive 1986 foreign aid package totaling $24.5 billion and including military aid for the armed groups in Angola, Cambodia, and Afghanistan.

Fifteen days later Reagan created the Office of Nicaraguan Humanitarian Aid as an arm of the State Department to administer and distribute the official aid, while the private channels for contra aid were publicized more and more openly. These developments are part of an effort to lift some of the responsibility off the CIA and to reinforce the public image that the contras are self sufficient and are neither weak nor poverty stricken.

After Reagan signed the foreign aid bill, a series of recommendations by the Heritage Foundation were made public, in which the influential “new Right” think tank proposed the following:

- The President should make clear to his government his desire to support “democratic forces” trying to combat “communist aggression” by overthrowing communist regimes;

- The President should break diplomatic relations with communist regimes, such as Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Mozambique;

- The President should recognize non-communist opposition forces as soon as they occupy a piece of territory and form an alternative government.

The accelerated campaign now underway to clean up the contras’ image seems destined to legitimize the group that will make up this sought-after “alternative government.”

On the military front the contras have continued their strategy of seeking significant victories at any price, although the attacks have not been as spectacular as those in July, especially in La Trinidad. The contras’ strategy is designed to improve their image within Nicaragua as a serious threat and, even if it requires suicide tactics, to win a “piece of territory.” Their recent activity in some areas indicates not only a headlong quality but also an inability to adapt to new measures taken by the government. The government has recently made palpable improvements in the food supply for peasant farmers and is exempting certain rural areas from the draft while the contras continue to recruit in the same areas. The senseless character of some recent contra activity supports the theory suggested to IHCA by a parish priest from Nicaragua’s central region: “The strategy is not being made by those who are in Nicaragua, but by the strategists who direct them from Washington. If the orders were coming from the local contra leaders, they would be different.”

The government accelerates its military offensive

This intensification of the US/contra efforts comes as a response to the Sandinista military offensive, designed to deal the contras a “strategic defeat” in 1985. Confrontations continued on all fronts of the war this month. Partial reports from the Sandinista Army (EPS) report 516 contras killed between August 5 and September 5, an average of 17 per day.

Some of these battles are part of the breakup of “Plan Roundup ’85,” which the FDN launched in June with the goal of liberating important territory. According to Comandante Luis Carrión, in charge of Regions I and VI where “Plan Roundup ’85” was focused, 90% of the FDN troops in Nicaragua and Honduras were activated to guarantee the success of the operation. After suffering several defeats, a large part of the contra force has returned to Honduras and many of the current battles are talking place between the EPS and groups of 60 to 80 contras who are crossing the border to resupply the remnants of the retreating force.

The support provided by the combat helicopters of the Sandinista Air Force has become a decisive factor in the defeat of counterrevolutionary attacks. Beyond the military performance of the helicopters, there is the psychological effect they have on peasant farmers who have joined the counterrevolution believing in its military superiority. The formidable helicopters, visible in combat, are more effective in making farmers decide to turn in their weapons under the amnesty decree than are the artillery, far away and invisible. The helicopters have been important in the breakup of “Plan Roundup,” and were decisive in turning back an offensive of 1,000 to 1,200 contras who were trying to reach Sébaco and attack a strategic agroindustrial project located there. One hundred contras were killed in this failed attempt.

In the south the EPS has already achieved the goals of “Operation Sovereignty” begun in June. All the bases that ARDE had along the Nicaraguan side of the Río San Juan have been cleared out, thus cutting the supply routes by land and water to contra troops near Nueva Guinea and Bluefields.

On August 2, after taking the ARDE base at Sarapiquí—the most important base after La Penca—officers of the EPS and of the Costa Rican Civil Guard held meetings in which the Costa Ricans promised to try to prevent the contras, dispersed along the border, from firing at Sandinista positions and expressed interest in a joint patrol. This month “Operation Sovereignty” continued to dislodge ARDE members remaining in Nicaraguan territory along the 26 kilometers of border between El Delta and the mouth of the Río San Juan. Having successfully pushed back the bulk of ARDE’s forces, the Defense Ministry estimates that there are less than 100 men still operating on Nicaraguan soil. Taking advantage of this setback, FDN troops are being relocated from Honduras to Costa Rica in order to consolidate the counterrevolutionary activity around the group favored by the Reagan administration. Historically, ARDE has been a trouble spot for Washington and the administration intends to permanently replace ARDE on the southern front with FDN.

In order to strengthen this offensive, the Nicaraguan armed forces made a new call to youth registered for the draft to receive their pre-selection medical checkups. This is the fifth round of recruitment since the law making mandatory military service legal was passed in 1983. These new recruits will reinforce the soldiers in the Irregular Fighting Forces (BLI), which are the spearhead of the offensive.

This increase in the military ranks of the EPS, coupled with the increase in contra desertions and the defeat of the FDN’s last offensive, have left the Sandinista leaders optimistic about the course of the war. “We are seeing an upset in the balance of forces,” commented Comandante Luis Carrión. “The counterrevolutionaries are in strategic decline,” added Comandante Hugo Torres, political head of the Nicaraguan army; “they are trying desperately not to die as a political and military option.” On September 2, the sixth anniversary of the armed Forces, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega made reference to the recent Congressional aid, “The doctor came late; the contras find themselves in a state from which they cannot recover.”

With four new voices, Contadora steps up its peace initiatives

On August 24 and 25, at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, the four foreign ministers from Contadora met for the first time with their four colleagues from Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Uruguay representing the recently formed support group. The results of this first meeting showed that these four countries will boost the efforts of Contadora considerably, accelerating the movement towards peace. The statement issued by the eight foreign ministers put forth a strong Latin American position in the face of US hegemony in the region. It is exactly such a position which first gave birth to Contadora.

In Central America today, fundamental questions are being debated which will affect the region’s democratic, free and independent development. If a peaceful and negotiated solution is not found, this conflict will affect the political and social stability of all of Latin America.

Because of this, the foreign ministers emphasize that it is not a matter of finding transitory solutions or of letting nonessential pretexts draw attention away from the crucial problems of the Central American crisis. It is a matter of finding meaningful and permanent solutions to the region’s central conflicts.

They also insist that peace efforts and activities should be carried out with a vision toward the future and in accordance with the goals of solidarity, independence and justice, which have always been the aspirations of the Latin American peoples. In the search for these solutions, time is a fundamental factor.

The document also detailed specific tasks assigned to the “Lima Group.” The four ministers will act as diplomatic intermediaries between the Central American governments, the governments of countries with ties to the region and the governments of countries committed to the search for peace in the region. They will also serve as intermediaries between the Central American governments and international organizations such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Most importantly, the Lima Group will be in charge of promoting the speedy conclusion and signing of the September 1984 Contadora treaty. There was also some discussion about making the Lima Group the mechanism for the verification of the treaty.

At the Cartagena meeting the eight ministers agreed on the urgent need to implement the measures outlined at the last Contadora meeting in July. These measures called for the reopening of bilateral talks between the US and Nicaragua and the initiation of talks between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Such talks are essential for creating an atmosphere in which the Contadora treaty can be signed and its peace initiatives carried out.

The eight ministers also agreed on the need to stop the present use of force to resolve the Central American conflict, since it is rooted in the economic inequality and unjust social structures that have historically characterized the region. They stressed the need to simultaneously move forward with peace negotiations and programs for reactivating and reforming the Central American economy.

The pro-Latin American position taken by this new coalition, in favor of combating problems at their roots, has not pleased the US. For one thing, eight countries are harder to pressure than four. For another, the Reagan administration is determined to limit discussion within Contadora to technical and legal aspects surrounding the September 1984 treaty proposal, rather than deal with concrete problems. In this way the administration can gain more and more concessions from Nicaragua without having to give away anything. But the political influence of huge countries like Argentina and Brazil suggests that they will be creative participants in Contadora. Peru and Uruguay, for their part, also seem determined to make their voices heard. Already the Lima Group has changed the dynamic within Contadora, jolting it out of the passive posture it had begun to take.

On September 3, the foreign ministers from Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica met in San Jose, Costa Rica. These meetings have come to be a matter of course anytime a step forward is taken in a Contadora meeting that questions their anti-Nicaraguan stance. The three ministers petitioned Contadora to urge the Nicaraguan government to hold a national dialogue (a euphemism for dialogue with the contras) and to accept the formation of a commission to evaluate and control Nicaragua’s level of armaments. Some observers classified the petition as an ultimatum to Contadora. Guatemala participated as an observer, sending only its deputy minister to the meeting. The role this country will play in the unfolding Central American drama remains to be seen. Presently, Guatemala faces demands for elections, a serious economic crisis and a resurgence of popular demonstrations against the regime. These circumstances are sure to limit the role it can play. To date, Guatemala has remained neutral, refusing to align itself with El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica against Nicaragua. The Reagan administration, however, may take advantage of Guatemala’s present economic crisis to force such an alignment, further complicating the Central American peace process.

Contadora called for a meeting of the Central American foreign ministers in Panama of September 11-13 to analyze the most recent events in the region. Foreign Minister Father Miguel D’Escoto will attend the meeting for Nicaragua. This will be Father D’Escoto’s first official activity as Foreign Minister since he ended his 30-day fast for peace on August 6.

At the end of September, the UN General Assembly, celebrating the 40th anniversary of its founding, will discuss the Central American crisis. The Lima Group will add four new voices advocating the Latin American alternative represented by Contadora.

Costa Rica loses credibility

For the US, Costa Rica still represents the best vehicle for applying military and political pressure on Nicaragua. For this reason, Nicaragua continues to insist on the creation of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two countries. With almost all of ARDE’s troops out of Nicaraguan territory, the timing is ideal for the creation of such a zone. This month, Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco described in detail the Nicaraguan proposal concerning this issue.

According to Tinoco, the DMZ would consist of a strip of land, 350 kilometers long and between 3 to 6 kilometers wide, on either side of the shared border. Within this strip there would be no military presence allowed except for an international peace keeping force. This peace keeping force would patrol, observe and guard the border zone according to orientations from Contadora. Costa Rica and Nicaragua would agree upon the powers that would be granted this peace keeping force. UN specialists in this area would decide on the number of members on the force. Tinoco estimated that “several thousand” would be necessary. The project would be financed through international organizations, which could include the UN. The length of their stay, the means they would use, etc. would be subject to study and negotiation by a specially created commission. Both countries would gain by the proposal according to Tinoco, particularly when one considers Costa Rica’s inordinate fear of Nicaragua’s “military expansion.”

Costa Rica’s President Luis Monge has flatly refused to consider the proposal, just as his government did not accept bilateral talks in Panama, called for in August by Contadora. Furthermore, Costa Rica refuses to permit a border inspection, and has made bilateral relations even more tense by stalling the process of accreditation for the new Nicaraguan ambassador—Claudia Chamorro, daughter of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro—and refusing to permit entrance to the traditional “torch of liberty” that passes through the capitals of Central America each year marking the September 15 celebrations of independence from Spain. The government of Costa Rica has justified these actions, which are threatening its international image as a neutral country, with the complaint that Nicaragua has not accepted responsibility for the incident that occurred on the Río San Juan on May 31, resulting in the death of two civil guards. Both Contadora and the OAS have examined this incident and agreed that the shots that killed the two Costa Ricans came from the Nicaraguan side of the river, and that it was impossible to determine who fired the shots. This decision failed to satisfy Costa Rica.

Another incident this month revealed the contradiction that the contras’ presence presents for Costa Rica. A group of US citizens traveling along the Río San Juan on a mission of peace were kidnapped and held for 29 hours. The group, made up of Catholics, Protestants and Jews, belonged to the pacifist organization “Witness for Peace,” whose members have maintained a permanent presence in Nicaragua’s war zones since 1983. Inspired by Father D’Escoto’s recent call for concrete actions in favor of peace, these US citizens—accompanied by several international journalists—decided to travel on the river August 5 and 6, stopping in several places to sing and pray for peace and to commemorate those who have died in the fighting so far. Witness for Peace’s Managua coordinator traveled to Costa Rica a few days before the trip began in order to inform the Minister of Security of their plan and to publish an announcement in Costa Rica’s press detailing the objectives and the itinerary of the mission. In response, Edén Pastora announced publicly in San Jose that his troops would open fire on any traffic on the river, labeling the Witness for Peace members as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.”

On August 7, after a day and a night on the river, the boat was stopped and the group taken into Costa Rican territory by armed men who identified themselves as ARDE members under orders of “the Old Man” (Pastora). In Washington on ARDE spokesperson confirmed that the group had been kidnapped by his organization. The event generated immediate publicity in the States and US diplomats in Managua and San Jose went into action straight away to try to influence attitudes about the case.

The Nicaraguan government let the Reagan administration know that it would hold the US responsible if anything happened to the North Americans. The event even brought about a very rare personal telephone communication between Daniel Ortega and Monge.

Amidst a sea of contradictory official and unofficial US statements, the victim were released, after having been told at the last minute that their captors were not after all members of ARDE but belonged to an “independent group of Nicaraguan anti-communists.” This sudden switch was viewed by many as a rather clumsy “damage control” effort by the State Department, which was clearly unhappy about the scene Pastora created.

This did not end the matter. On August 13 in San Jose, ARDE member Noel Boniche, identified by the hostages as the leader of the operation, held a press conference justifying the kidnapping. Nicaragua has repeatedly requested the extradition of Boniche on charges of smuggling, robbery and extortion.

This event, which received major press coverage in the US, and others which affect Costa Ricans daily, are creating serious concern in some sectors of Costa Rican society. These people are beginning to be alarmed about a situation that could quickly get out of hand if Costa Rica does not stop the counterrevolutionary activity along its border area and get out from under US pressure. Mayors in border zones, for example, are organizing and have begun to write open letters about the situation. This growing national embarrassment led four former Costa Rican presidents (José Figueres, Daniel Oduber, Joaquín Trejos and Rodrigo Carazo) to sign a document “for dialogue and peace” in which they propose an “inter-American dialogue to resolve the problem with our Nicaraguan neighbors.”

In another expression of this new effort to undercut the extreme right-wing position toward Nicaragua, José Figueres set out on a symbolic peace mission with 21 Costa Rican deputies, union members, religious figures and journalist. The delegation planned to travel by boat from Costa Rican territory along the San Juan River to San Carlos, Nicaragua, where they would meet a Nicaraguan delegation led by Father Ernesto Cardenal. The Costa Rican border authorities permitted only six of these 21 people to make the trip, however. When Figueres arrived in San Carlos he said worriedly, “For a long time now there has been no objectivity in the Costa Rican media.”

Concern about the hardening Costa Rican position also moved General Noriega, chief of the Panamanian National Guard, to make a new gesture of mediation this month. On August 7, the day of the Witness for Peace kidnapping, Noriega was in Costa Rica. In a conversation with Monge he said that “dialogue is the best weapon” and referred to the “political and emotional” pressures to which the Costa Rican president is being subjected.

Noriega was in Nicaragua a week later expressing concern about the possibility of a generalized conflict in Central America which could affect Panama as well. “No one will win that war,” he said, “All will lose.” President Ortega reiterated to Noriega that Nicaragua was ready “at any time” to dialogue with Costa Rica in Panama, as Contadora had recommended. From Nicaragua, Noriega met with Honduran General Walter López in the Tegucigalpa airport.

General Noriega’s mediation reinforces Contadora, the role of Panama in Contadora and the position of the Panamanian National Guard within Panama’s political crisis. Noriega is taking up the old goal of General Torrijos to make Panama a regional mediator—a position that in a certain sense is a precursor of Contadora. Given the weakness of Panamanian President Ardito Barletta, the role of the National Guard has been strengthened internally and is now being felt internationally as well. This gives Panama more leverage to negotiate its position on the regional crisis with the US, taking into account that in a Central American conflict, the canal, as a strategic area for the US military effort, would be affected to the detriment of Panamanian interests. The 1977 treaty which stipulates the return of the Canal to Panama in 1999 could conceivably be invalidated for reasons of US “national security.”

Noriega’s mediation efforts could ease the tensions, but the pressures on Monge seem to be mounting rapidly. Monge’s criticism of Contadora on August 27, upon hearing the results of the meeting of “The Eight” in Cartagena, seems to reflect this pressure. “It is an international embarrassment,” said Monge, “a worldwide embarrassment, that the Contadora Group and the OAS do not want to recognize Nicaragua’s aggressive and vulgarly deceptive attitude toward Costa Rica… Contadora is not behind Costa Rica, but it is behind Nicaragua when it announces that it is the victim of US aggression.”

No other leader in Central America or elsewhere has voiced such a negative judgment of the work of Contadora. Monge’s inopportune remarks surprised the Contadora foreign ministers, who said they “respected” them, but also chose to reply. Consalvi, of Venezuela, referred to the “absolutely even-handed way” in which Contadora acted, without “discriminations of any kind.” Abadía, of Panama, stated that if Contadora had ever protected or attacked any country as Monge claimed, “We would not have been able to gain the respect and the endorsement we have in the world.”

The Costa Rican government’s recent rejection of dialogue with Nicaragua, even to the point of insulting Contadora, is seriously damaging the international credibility of a country that has always had a solid image of neutrality, restraint and diplomatic capacity in Latin America and the rest of the world. Such belligerent rhetoric and permissiveness toward the counterrevolution is evidence of Costa Rica’s capacity to wear down Contadora, but the price of this depreciation is very high. By engaging in nothing but anti-Nicaraguan rhetoric, neither responding to Contadora’s public request to dialogue nor offering an alternative solution, Costa Rica is losing the “war of images,” thus weakening its prestige in Latin America.

Nicaragua ups the ante to consolidate the revolution

Nicaragua’s strategy is to speed up the arrival of peace. On the military front the offensive is intensifying. On the diplomatic front Contadora is gearing up its initiatives. On the domestic front, too, other initiatives are being accelerated to consolidate the revolutionary project and thus help win the war and bring about peace.

Moving toward political and party coherence

Within the mandate given to the FSLN in last year’s elections, the Sandinista Assembly—the highest consultative organ of the party, composed of 105 members—announced a series of changes in the party structure this month. All of the changes are geared toward reinforcing the executive capacity of the state, the FSLN National Directorate and the President. To use the words in the final document from the Assembly’s meeting, the measures are designed to overcome the “segmentation and feudalism” that have occurred in some areas when, for example, the state, the FSLN, the Army and the Agrarian Reform Minister end up implementing different, sometimes contradictory, lines and at different paces.

In this effort to “strengthen the political unity of the FSLN and its coherence in action,” FSLN Regional Coordinators were named or reconfirmed for each region of the country. These coordinators will also serve as delegates of the President’s Office in their regions.

Since January there have been a series of gradual changes at the ministerial, party and diplomatic levels. The changes of names and duties do not reflect a desire to “institutionalize” one political model, but rather the urgent need for coherent centralization so as to unify lines of action, interpretation and implementation in defense of the revolution. Daniel Ortega stressed this issue of coherence when he took office as President of the Republic in January. It has also been reiterated frequently by other FSLN leaders as an indispensable element in the effort to defeat the counterrevolutionary project in the shortest time possible.

The most obvious sign of this tendency is the unification of government and party leadership in one person, Daniel Ortega. These changes and those that will no doubt continue are part of the search for better coordination between the various agencies of local and national government, as well as for greater unity in state administration and in the party, a task barely begun by the FSLN.

The goal of seeking greater coherence is also touching the popular organizations but according to a different logic that is appropriately theirs. This month the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS), the nationwide organization with the largest and most heterogeneous membership, began a profound process of revision, after seven years of very uneven development.

Among the conclusions of the evaluation emerged a clearly defined new line of action which will mark a major shift in the style of the CDS. The committees will be structured as “basic units” of participatory democracy, with a communal rather than party-oriented character. This assertion of their proper nature will permit them to respond creatively at the grassroots level to the specific needs and problems of each community, instead of carrying out “an unending flow of tasks” that come from above and are not adapted to the characteristics of each neighborhood.

In the evaluation, emphasis was made not only on redefining the organization and its tasks, but also on the kind of leadership the new CDS will need. Rather than those selected at first for their political reliability, the new leaders will have to be people who have natural authority in their communities, based on work in already existing community organizations such as parent-teacher organizations, the Christian community, Alcoholics Anonymous, etc., and who therefore understand community needs.

The change is extremely important. It is a move toward consolidating grassroots democracy, one of the fundamental principles of the revolution, and it will undoubtedly prepare the ground for the municipal elections scheduled for after the drafting of the Constitution. For some leaders of the revolution, this shift in the CDS is the urban equivalent of the change in agrarian policy taking place in the countryside, discussed in another article of this issue of envío.

The autonomy process on the Atlantic Coast

The process of autonomy on the Atlantic Coast, with the profound changes that it implies, is moving forward. Additionally, for the last two months there has been no war on the coast, with the exception of a few isolated skirmishes. Most of the members of both Misura and Misurasata, the two armed indigenous groups operating in the region, move freely in the Miskito communities and are participating in the autonomy process without any clashes with the Sandinista army.

Initiated last December, the autonomy process moved slowly while talks were underway between the government and Misurasata. But when Misurasata leader Brooklyn Rivera broke off negotiations at the end of May and it became apparent that he had decided not to join the process, there was no further reason to hold back.

Once the government demonstrated to the coastal peoples that it was prepared to recognize their historic aspiration, the process also began to show its potential to serve as a tool to neutralize the counterrevolutionary leaders abroad, and to clearly distinguish them from the indigenous leaders who are genuinely struggling for their peoples’ rights. Since that time, events on the Coast have begun to move very fast. Each week new elements arise—positive ones on balance—that should be included in any detailed analysis of the situation.

Training workshops, begun in the first days of August, have by now prepared more than 600 people from southern Zelaya to carry out house-to-house consultations in every community to gather viewpoints for the final statute on autonomy. In northern Zelaya, the population has organized into regional and ethnic-based commissions to discuss the issue among themselves and to prepare their own training workshops.

To guide this massive popular consultation, some 80 representatives of the Regional Autonomy Commissions met with the National Commission in late June to draft a document on “principles and policies” of autonomy. At that time the Regional Commissions, composed of natural leaders from the Coast—teachers, lawyers, pastors and representatives from all the ethnic communities—merged with the National Commission. It is this single commission that will analyze the results of the consultation and write the final statute for inclusion in the new Constitution.

Parallel with this process is the return of Miskito families from Tasba Pri to their original communities along the Río Coco. President Ortega announced at the end of May, on the basis of unpublicized accords reached by government representatives with local Misura commanders, that the return could be safely permitted. Despite enormous shortages of transport, medicines, food and protection against the mosquitoes that have multiplied mercilessly, some 4,000 have now made the trip north with their chickens, pigs and tin roofing to begin rebuilding their communities. The return to the river, more desired by the Miskitos than autonomy itself, is being made without the accompaniment of the Sandinista army—a real expression of the peace that has been achieved so far on the Coast.

This month Misura’s Council of Elders gave orders for the capture of Steadman Fagoth, leader of this groups since his flight to Honduras to ally with the contras there in mid-1981. The Council, said to be the organization’s highest authority, accused Fagoth of having kidnapped some of its members between August 8 and 12, with the goal of carrying out a coup. This event puts in bold relief the important role Brooklyn Rivera could play at this stage, in which divisions in both Misura and Misurasata, between those seeking a settlement and those who want to continue fighting, have become acute.

Rivera, well advised, moving astutely and employing an appropriately “indigenist” rhetoric, has gained a high profile among international Indian and indigenous rights groups. They see in him a sort of “David” challenging the “Goliath” of the Nicaraguan state, and therefore support and promote his leadership. But this image of a just leader is currently slipping among the Miskitos of the Coast who, anxious for peace, satisfied by the return to the Coco and the process of autonomy, find that they are not represented in the ideas Rivera is putting forth in international forums. By his attitude he is demonstrating his increasing lack of understanding of the current reality on the Coast.

There is already evidence that the acceleration of the autonomy process has at least temporarily upset US destabilizing plans for the Coast. It can be assumed that Reagan administration strategists will not abandon their efforts, but will find a new way to move, all beneath the cover of the Indian cause.

The constitutional process progresses

The first task for the National Assembly after the elections was to draft the Constitution of the Republic, one of the most important steps in the formalization of the revolution. On May 21, the Special Constitutional Commission was formed, its 22 members drawn from the seven political parties that participated in the elections and hold seats in the Assembly.

On August 6 the Sub-Commission for the National Consultation—one of three that make up the Commission—called on all the political parties, both those that participated in the elections and those that did not, and on all the unions and other organizations in the country to express their opinion concerning the content of the future Constitution. On August 19 the first stage of this consultation began with presentations by the Conservative and Socialist parties. A second stage, scheduled for early 1986, will consist of open town hall forums held throughout the country to clarify the general public’s views on the content of the Constitution.

Throughout the month of August—until September 5, when the FSLN presented its position—the seven political parties that ran in the elections attended the consultations. At one point it seemed that the Liberal party (PLI) would abstain, repeating its dramatic withdrawal from the elections, but this was not the case.

The three parties of the Coordinadora, which were given the right to present their point of view along with other unions, guilds, and social and religious organizations, have all said that they will abstain from the consultation, for the same reasons they offered for their abstention from last fall’s elections: insincerity on the part of the FSLN and inadequate conditions. The Social Christian Party (PSC), the largest and most active member of the Coordinadora, made its position clear in an announcement. Mauricio Díaz, leader of the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC), said in the Assembly: “Our old friends from the party are going to convert an error (abstention from the elections) into a political aberration (abstention from the national consultation).”

The parties’ presentations—serious, responsible and consistent—indicated how they have been using the political space they won in the elections. So far, the constitutional process has fostered a flexible and respectful relationship between the FSLN and the rest of the parties.

Before beginning the consultation, the Special Constitutional Commission—with only the Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP-ML) abstaining—discussed and approved a first draft or proposal, in which the eight fundamental principles to appear in the Constitution were laid down. The document reads:

1) Democracy: Understood as the combination of the concepts of liberty and equality, such as Sandino dreamed of: “effective democracy and social justice.” In other words, the construction of a society with the real participation of the people, where people have effective rights to elect and be elected, to free speech, to organize and demonstrate, to a respectable home, education, health care and employment, in short, to live in dignity.

The goal is a democracy where all the political, economic and social sectors of the country may participate toward concrete goals and objectives. In such a democracy, the country’s economy should be organized so as to protect the nation from undernourishment and war, to make possible the happiness of the people, and eradicate misery, hunger, malnutrition and unemployment.

2) Political Pluralism: The existence and participation of all political organizations without ideological restrictions, with the exception of those seeking a return to Somocismo or a similar system.

3) Mixed Economy: An economic model where three types of property exist: state, cooperative and private, and where all three are put to use for the public good, without preventing the enjoyment of reasonable profits.

4) Non-alignment: As a principle that guarantees independence from hegemonic power centers; the active, peaceful coexistence of all states, aligning us with the struggle against imperialism, apartheid and racism; expressing our opposition to the existence of military blocks and alliances and the urgent necessity to restructure international relations based on justice and establish a new international economic order.

5) Anti-imperialism: Our basis in the struggle for independence and sovereignty; for this reason we reaffirm our right to self-determination and reject unjust commercial exchange relations that work to the detriment of the developing countries, the use of the Latin American countries as geopolitical reserves, and intervention whether military, political, or economic against the legitimate sovereign rights of peoples.

6) Latin America: Revive the ideal of Bolívar and Sandino to forge the unity of the Latin American countries, to strengthen and enrich our peoples.

7) Non-intervention: Adopt the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

8) National Defense: Expressed in the participation of the population in the defense of the nation and the struggle to maintain peace, the indispensable basis for the country’s social and economic development.

In their presentations, the seven political parties elaborated on these eight principles. The MAP-ML stood out in its rejection of the concepts of non-alignment, political pluralism, and a mixed economy.

While the Constitution was being discussed in an atmosphere of political pluralism, the Coordinadora parties along with US officials continue to emphasize the need for a different dialogue: one that includes the counterrevolution and has on its agenda, among other things, new elections. On August 13, La Prensa published a letter from Violeta Barrios Chamorro, widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, which she had sent to the General Secretary of the OAS. The letter complained of the FSLN’s “flagrant betrayal” of the principles of the anti-Somoza struggle and asked the OAS to demand that Nicaragua live up to “what it promised then.” It went on to say that “the first step towards confronting this critical situation would be to call for a National Dialogue to lay the groundwork for an effective reconciliation.” It closed with these words: “I leave it in your hands to implement my petition, because it would be fatal to stand aside with arms crossed and do nothing effective; then somebody will fill this vacuum and there will be nothing left to demand.” Daniel Ortega commented that she must not have known what she was signing.

Cardinal Obando continues to be the most active promoter of the aforementioned national dialogue. The cardinal has continued his frequent pastoral visits to cities and towns, especially in his Archdiocese, prioritizing the towns on the Masaya and Carazo plateau (see “The Nicaraguan Peasantry,” in this issue). In his visits—or “arrivals,” as they are called in that area—the cardinal insists on the need for a dialogue for “national reconciliation.” Although this message has obvious political implications, the cardinal does not take it beyond the moral or ethical realm. Because of this, a great many of the faithful who eagerly attend his services, following a tradition of respect for ecclesiastical authority, do not view his references to “dialogue” as a political position, nor do they draw from them any clear conclusions for the political arena. Despite these limitations in what the cardinal says and how it is heard, he and his closest collaborators in the Archdiocese increased their efforts to make the hierarchy into the champion of national dialogue.

On September 5, when Daniel Ortega presented the FSLN’s position on the Constitution, he also offered an analysis of the situation. In describing the US plan to destroy the revolution he said: “The US plan includes the use of political groups, the press, the hierarchy of the Church and the private sector as internal forces complementing the military aggression. These groups have the mission of opening the internal political front. The US plan ignores all possibility of dialogue with Nicaragua or mediation by Contadora. The US plan intends to promote dialogue with the counterrevolution in order to advance in what would be a debilitating maneuver, which would be added to their purpose of destroying the Nicaraguan revolution.”

The explicit inclusion of the hierarchy in the US strategy and the characterization of the national dialogues as a “debilitating maneuver” are significant elements in the government’s present analysis. On the same day La Prensa printed the following headline: “Cardinal Obando insists: The Key to Peace is National Dialogue.” For the first time, Obando responded rapidly and directly to the government’s position:

Faced with the FSLN’s reasons for refusing to talk with the counterrevolutionaries, including those repeated yesterday by Commandante Daniel Ortega, the cardinal said, “I think that when dialogue is discarded in moments as difficult and delicate as these, the doors to violence are opened, and violence engenders hate, destruction, and death.”

There is every indication that the cardinal, with the approval of the Vatican, will continue to emphasize this issue.

Throughout the month another bishop, Father Pedro Casaldáliga, conducted a tour of the country visiting Christian communities and pastoral workers, especially in the war zone. None of the bishops in the dioceses Casaldáliga visited—he did not go the Atlantic Coast—agreed to receive him, and some pressured their priests to refuse to see him as well. Casaldáliga spoke of Nicaragua’s position in the ecclesiastical struggle, of the need for determination and confidence in confronting the privations of war, and of keeping the happiness of future generations in mind.

This month, in addition to the war, Nicaraguans had to confront other serious problems. A summer of sporadic rains produced a serious drought, which caused dramatic losses in the year’s first harvest of basic grains, affecting the food supply and livelihood of some 10,000 peasants families. The Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform described the drought as “a disaster,” and calculated the losses at 400 million córdobas. Corn was the most seriously affected staple with losses calculated at 45% of the crop; the bean harvest will be down by 88%, sorghum by 30% and millet by 21%. The cotton, sugar and rice crops were also affected, but to a lesser extent.

The other serious obstacle facing Nicaragua is the dengue epidemic. This tropical disease transmitted by mosquitoes has already affected 500,000 of Managua’s 900,000 inhabitants, and could possibly develop into an epidemic of another potentially fatal variety, hemorrhagic dengue. The government has invested valuable human and financial resources in an effort to eradicate the disease. Twenty thousand volunteers organized by the Ministry of Health spent two weekends this month eliminating garbage receptacles and other sources of stagnant water, and visiting, one by one, houses, workplaces and markets all over Managua applying a water treatment that eliminates the mosquito larvae.

Nicaragua’s case before The Hague

On September 10 in The Hague, the most important and definitive phase of Nicaragua’s case against the US in the International Court of Justice begins. Nicaragua has charged the US with funding and directing a war that violates international law. The judgment of the Court must be delivered within 60 days after the close of the hearings in September, although it is possible that the US will try to modify the length of this period so that the sentence will not coincide with the UN’s 40th anniversary celebration or with the meeting scheduled for November in Luxembourg between the European Economic Community and the Contadora countries.

On April 9, 1984, after the CIA-directed mining of its ports, Nicaragua presented its demands to the Court. Three days before, knowing that this demand was going to be submitted, US Secretary of State George Shultz declared that the US was unilaterally suspending its recognition of the World Court’s jurisdiction over the conflicts in Central America for a period of two years. On May 10, 1984, the Court issued some provisional measures which called on the US to immediately stop the mining, indicating that Nicaragua’s political independence should be respected and that it should not be subjected to “military and paramilitary actions that are prohibited by the principles of international law.” The first of these measures was approved unanimously, including the vote of the US judge at the Court. This judge, however, voted against the second measure. Beginning in May, 1984, the US began to allege that the Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter, and that Nicaragua’s case was inadmissible. On November 26, in an historic decision, the Court decided that it was competent to hear the matter, and recognized the admissibility of Nicaragua’s case. In a surprising and unprecedented reaction, the US withdrew from the debates being held in the Court, alleging that “the Court is determined to rule in favor of Nicaragua in this case” and that its evidence justifying the military pressure against Nicaragua came from “highly sensitive intelligence sources” that could not be revealed in the presence of some of the judges at the Court, since they were Soviets.

Nicaragua is sending four witnesses for the prosecution to The Hague, including two Nicaraguans and two US citizens: Comandante Luis Carrión, who will describe the characteristics of the war imposed upon Nicaragua; Finance Minister William Hüpper, who will demonstrate the economic costs of the aggression; David McMichael, a former CIA official in El Salvador (1981-1983), who will analyze the proof used by the US to justify the war related to Nicaraguan military support for the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador; and Michael Glenon, a law professor and former counselor to the Senate’s Foreign Relations Commission, who will document the acts by the contras against the civilian population. Nicaragua will request full indemnity for the material costs of the aggression. Daniel Ortega announced on August 20 the creation a Claims Commission, presided over by the Minister of Justice, with which any citizen affected by the aggression can file a claim.

Referring to the indemnity and the Claims Commission, President Ortega said, “We have faith in the North American people, in their values, and in their principles. And, therefore if this administration does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court and refuses to indemnify us, another administration will come along that will recognize international law and the judgment of the Court, and will indemnify the Nicaraguan people. The Claims Commission is not founded in false expectations, but in this confidence in the people of the United States.”

In its thirty-ninth year, the International Court of Justice is confronted with a case that will capture international attention. When the US government, which has brought cases before the Court several times in the past, announced last January that it was withdrawing from the discussion, it was assumed that it would not recognize the Court’s ruling. Despite this, the proceedings of the Court have not been interrupted and it is likely that the ruling will be in Nicaragua’s favor. If so, the ramifications, not only for public opinion but for institutions such as Congress, Contadora and others, will be significant.

The proceedings at The Hague Court will make it clear that the Nicaraguan conflict is not a domestic civil war as the Reagan administration along with the Nicaraguan Church hierarchy and some opposition leaders portray it. The case will highlight the international dimensions of the conflict, which is the fruit of US interventionist policy. Perhaps the international opprobrium that will result from the publicizing of its culpability will induce the US to begin to seek a means of peaceful coexistence with Nicaragua.

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