The 7-O results in Venezuela

Read with the outdated lens of the Cold War, the Venezuelan elections were a contest between US imperialism and the continental revolution in a country split in two by opposing political visions for the country and with no viable third option. Below some basic data and a few conclusions about the October 7 (“7-0”) election results.

Armando Chaguaceda

Fourteen years have passed since Hugo Chávez burst upon the presidential scene with his Project for a Bolivarian Revolution. Citizens weary of political corruption and the neoliberal policies’ exclusion of the poor built an electoral coalition that carried Lieutenant Colonel Chávez to a resounding victory over the other candidates. From that moment on the new government has confronted fierce resistance from the traditional parties along with an alliance between the mass media and urban middle and upper classes, which used destabilizing strategies in 2002 and 2003, including a failed coup against the government. The government managed to weather these events and even built ever higher levels of national and international legitimacy in successive elections between 2004 and 2006.

Since 2006: personalism
and political bureaucratization

To correct the deficits of the Fourth Republic (1830-1998), Chávez’s government expanded citizen participation and put the social agenda at the center of the debate. It used the oil income to increase social programs, generating more inclusive processes for the marginalized. These unquestionably positive elements coincided with a redefinition of the regulatory framework—a new Constitution and new laws passed—and with the reclaiming of the State’s role as an active agent in national life by outlining the central features of the project and identifying itself as Bolivarian.

Since 2006, however, the democratizing effect of Chávez’ government has become tinged with a more personalist style and with the bureaucratization of politics. A regime with an extremely strong presidency and one dominant political organization—the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)—has been consolidated and the mechanisms of participation, the Communal Councils, have been set up to operate as factors of control and political mobilization.

The rise of Hugo Chávez’s charismatic leadership was accompanied by the discretionary use of state resources, as well as by delimiting the other national powers (political parties, social organizations and movements, and the media). This was true both for those identified with the bourgeoisie and those of the grassroots forces and the autonomous Left.

With the spread of the idea of 21st-century socialism, a new Enabling Act was passed that gave the President the possibility of issuing decrees with the force of law. That, as well as the Constitutional Reform proposal and the creation of the PSUV party, has furthered the authoritarian and state-centered tendencies particularly visible in the nation’s public institutions, economic model and legal structure.

The concentration of power converging in the figure of President Chávez invokes a leader-masses relationship and confrontation with the enemy (i.e. the opposition) within a strategy that increasingly tends to ignore existing legislation, including the Constitution, and entails instrumentalizing the justice system, controlling and monitoring the mass media and serious backsliding in the respect for human rights. Even within the Bolivarian rank and file, the options for dissent and participation in building the process are restricted, with constant appeals to the Commander-President, a military lexicon such as battles, campaigns and missions, and the use of a “command and control” style in Chávez’s top-down political structure.

A country divided
with no third option

With such a background, Venezuela arrived at a very important moment in its current history with the October 7 elections, which quickly came to be known as 7-O. They took place in a country virtually split in two, where the opportunity for a third de-polarizing option that would combine the defense of rights and liberties with a sincere and substantive concern for social justice was blocked by both the conflictive environment and the institutional design around the Organizational Law of Electoral Processes.

Read through the lens of the Cold War, the elections reproduced the simplifications that strain balanced political analysis. Representatives of the Latin American Right and Left evaluated these elections as a fight between US imperialism and revolution on the Latin American continent.

Inside the country, the opposition stances ignored the causes that brought Chávez to the president, concentrating instead on the criminality, changes in property and threats to democracy under his mandate. Chávez’s followers, in contrast, emphasized inclusion of society’s poor sectors and the new political representation that gives them a voice.

Facing off against each other were a 14-year-old ruling party anchored in the charismatic leadership of Hugo Chávez and his social policies on the one hand and hand a pluralistic opposition gathered together in the Democratic Unity Working Group (MUD) on the other. The latter has slowly increased its number of votes (see the chart on the next page) by rejecting the discredited coup option and projecting the youthful figure of Henrique Capriles Radonski.

Both political blocs exhibited certain similarities in their organization and identity (parties with diffuse ideologies, charismatic leaders, use of rhetoric, programs and grassroots mobilizing styles). Where they differed was in Chávez’s constant appeal to polarization and Capriles’ rejection of polarization and call for reconciliation.

An exemplary day

If one had to summarize in three sentences the process experienced by Venezuelans in the past months and on 7-O itself—merely the closing event—they would be: an exemplary civic day, a technically trustworthy system and a process otherwise plagued by asymmetry and irregularities.

There was record voter turnout, with over 80% of the electorate motivated enough to stand in long lines at their polling places from the early hours. There was limited violence, with the Plan of the Republic and the military guaranteeing public safety, and campaign leaders providing observers for the majority of polling places and calling on their party members to act responsibly throughout the process.

Such a massive turnout in a country where voting isn’t obligatory, as well as the early announcement of the irreversible results and their acknowledgment by the main opposition candidate, prevented any potential violence or questioning of the process. As a whole, it was an exemplary day in which the winner was a Venezuela that, without ideological distinctions, accepted the idea of democratically resolving its political disputes.

The technological and logistical platform of the electoral system functioned at a good pace and almost without technical errors. Within three hours 90% of the results were known and everyone agreed to recognize both those results and the authority and work of the National Electoral Council (CNE). What still needs to be clarified is how it was possible for virtually the exact data on the main candidates’ total results to be leaked to the social networks minutes before the issuing of the first official bulletin.

It’s worth stressing aspects of the process that undoubtedly influenced the election results. First of all, the CNE was unable to regulate certain elements, such as the use by both candidates of national symbols and the profuse use of public funds by the government candidate. While the print media in general opposes the government, candidate Chávez had an overwhelming predominance on TV: on the obligatory presidential TV hookups, which the CNE declared itself incompetent to regulate, on public and private media spots and on “public service” spots on public TV of him, as President, explaining how to vote.

Campaign financing wasn’t transparent—as it doesn’t come from public funds assigned to the parties as a percentage of their past electoral results, as in Mexico—and the resources the government candidate spent were clearly exorbitant.

A technically reliable system

As for the electoral rolls, a fingerprint audit was done before the election and any duplication of voters was corrected, showing the election rolls’ consistency with the nation’s demographic evolution. The voting table officials were selected at random, notified by television, radio and internet and made known on the CNE web page. To guarantee a secret vote the machines that registered, counted and transmitted the ballot results were put through 16 audits and the electoral software was approved by specialists of the parties, guaranteeing that it could not be modified without the joint codes of all parties and the CNE.

The counting and totaling of votes went as technically planned, beginning with a fingerprint machine that identified each voter based on their ID card. Next voters chose and recorded their candidate preference, which the machine verified with a print-out receipt voucher that the voters then deposited in the ballot box.

After the closing of the polls, the machines printed copies of the ballot-count tally, including the total number of voters who cast ballots at each table. They were compared to the voting notebook, and copies were given to the witnesses or monitors. The presidents of its various tables then proceeded to sorting out which tallies would be submitted to “citizen verification” with a manual count of the receipt vouchers deposited in the ballot box, which was then checked against the machine tally. All of this was done in the presence of citizen and party witnesses.

Afterwards the duly registered machines sent their results to the two CNE centers set up for totaling that information, a process citizens can verify any time, as the results bulletin breaks the information down tally sheet by tally sheet and polling place by polling place. Thus the published data on the CNE web page allows for a triple check: the machine tally, the citizen verification tally and the findings of both relative to each table’s results published in the Electoral Gazette.

In all, several audits were done: of the electoral rolls and fingerprints, the ink, the totaling software, the machine software, the machine output, the voting notebooks and the means of transmission. According to the rules the process was technically irreproachable.

The debut of UNASUR

There was also foreign accompaniment and oversight on October 7. They were joined by more than 4,000 observers from six national NGOs and the party observers. There were witnesses at every stage of the electoral process (voting, tallying, citizen verification, the voter information station, municipal electoral boards and vote totaling rooms).

It was a baptism by fire for the 45 members of the new Electoral Accompaniment Mission of the United South American Nations (UNASUR), most of whom are officials of South American electoral organizations. It was the only international mission present this time, in the absence of the OAS, Carter Center and European Union.

Conscious of the importance of protecting trust in the electoral process in a polarized environment and of the mission’s own professionalism and impartiality given UNASUR’s identification with the regional Presidents, the team promoted the concept of accompaniment and asked the parties to promise to recognize the result issued by the CNE, a key requirement for neutralizing rumors and destabilizing strategies.

Some background
to Chávez’ victory

Some campaign elements have been learned that explain Chávez’s victory without challenging the results. According to citizen testimonies reported in the press, the government strategy, reportedly coordinated through organized groups and financed by the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, was to divide up its mass of voters in a planned fashion: a wave would enter the voting centers in the morning and a second wave would enter at a specific time in the afternoon, maintaining a flow of small waves in the midst of this. They also put up obstacles to voters in strong opposing areas, such as non-compulsory identity check points. There were also motorcades that made it difficult for voters to move about.

In the afternoon a massive SMS message was sent out giving the vote to Capriles to dissuade opposing voters who hadn’t yet voted from bothering to turn up. Thus at closing time (6 pm) the poorer neighborhoods were filling up with last-minute voters for Chávez while middle-class neighborhoods were celebrating Capriles’ victory.

A leaked military document showed coordination efforts by the National Bolivarian Guard (GNB), PSUV structures and the State with several social actors such as the Communal Councils, urban collectives and motorized groups to engage in surveillance activities and mobilizations that in the end benefited the government candidate. From public arenas in the capital city equipped with communication equipment and data bases on Chávez voters—coordinated private cars and public transportation went to the Caracas barrios to mobilize those who hadn’t voted and bring those housed outside the capital. PDVSA provided food for the Chávez bases and established mechanisms to take care of the children of those who were voting. From early morning it offered breakfast, medical attention and support for those with disabilities. This totally legitimate “induced” participation gave Chávez a decisive advantage.

These elements remind us that, like democracy itself, an election is an integral process whose phases and results go beyond the act of voting and on election day, and can provide decisive results.

What was at stake in Venezuela

These elections were extremely important for the region, especially the countries that are members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). But they were also very important nationally. They could be read as a plebiscite on the continuation of the Chávez regime and on a President who in 2019 will have accumulated 20 years of uninterrupted power. What was not at stake in Venezuela on October 7, as in other countries, was a rotation within the governing elite or any moderate change of direction in a political or economic project.

The main dilemma for each Venezuelan was whether or not to place confidence in a government that has demonstrated a sustained commitment to prioritize social justice at the same time that it threatens to modify the political field with its increasing authoritarian tendencies. The alternative was an opposition that, with inconsistencies and weaknesses, has objectively had to negotiate with the governing party and the rest of society to set a firmer foundation for the exercise of citizens’ rights, autonomy and political pluralism yet continues to bear the burden of its coup d’état past and its historical inattention to the demands and the material and symbolic realities of the poorest and most excluded in the country.

Is the Chávez political
camp willing to dialogue?

In a polarized society, with two major electoral blocs embodying opposing visions of politics and the country, recognition of the Constitution and the electoral processes as a source of legitimacy is a relevant element for building shared reference points capable of channeling a peaceful, democratic struggle. Thus it was healthy that, in their post-election speeches, both candidates recognized their opponent’s attitude and called on each other to work together for the Venezuelan people.

With that posture the opposition tested the sincerity of the winner’s willingness to dialogue, opening the door to working with the national government on urgent national topics such as lack of security, housing and unemployment. This option is unlikely given the government’s resistance to depolarize with the regional elections coming up in December, but it isn’t impossible given the magnitude of the problems and the need for all players to reach consensus on a solution.

Lessons for Chávez’s party

The governing party must moderate its discourse and stop identifying as “destabilizing agents of the empire” those who competed fair and square and who hold, within the framework of the rule of law, a different vision of the country. To avoid confusing winning with receiving a blank check, the government must attend to various matters such as change of leadership, respect for institutional strengthening, continued transparency in social policies and honoring the trust received from voters at the polls. The government must also tackle complex issues to combat the rising inflation plaguing the country and solve the lack of security (robberies, kidnappings, murders) that put Venezuela internationally on a very high risk level.

Analysts close to Chávez recognize an erosion of popular support for the governing party and a strengthening of opposition voters who identify the causes as a lack of internal democracy in the governing party, the absence of mechanisms for debate and democratic control and the promotion of an unconditional one-person leadership that protects mediocrity and careerists both in the party apparatus and in governance structures.

In a similar vein, Lula, Brazil’s former President and a close friend of Chávez, has recognized the desirability of political changes. In Lula’s own words in an interview with the Argentine daily newspaper La Nación: “For democracy the change of power is a triumph of humanity and thus should be maintained. I myself do not want a third term. Because if I had done that, I would have wanted a fourth term and then a fifth. Thus if I want that for me, I want it for everyone.... I believe that compañero Chávez has to start preparing his succession. The Constitution allows him to be a candidate for a fourth term, but when he loses, his adversaries can also run as often as they want and I don’t think that’s good.”

Lessons for the opposition

With the help of its most lucid analysts and leaders, the opposition ought to interpret Chávez’s victory not merely as the effect of his clientelist policies but also as an expression of the weight of the excruciating social debt and its solution, and as the symbolic representation of the poor and those of mixed race who have benefited from Chávez within the traditionally excluded population of Venezuela.

As Daniel Zovatto and Luis Vicente León, two recognized experts, have expressed, the heterogeneous MUD party has to maintain unity around Capriles’ leadership and the platform hammered out during the process, converting the post-defeat mourning into effective actions for the regional elections and beyond.

After learning the lesson about the political costs of ignoring institutionality as a way to consolidate its power in both 2002 and 2005, the opposition shouldn’t count exclusively on developing its political agenda from the arenas won within the legislative branch and the regional governments. Although it has continued to improve its election results, it must combine this with greater collective action: demonstrations, forums and political campaigns that are developed peacefully and in line with the current legislation. It must isolate the coup tendencies and broaden the social base of its vote.

The successful opposition to the 2007 proposals for Constitutional Reform and the new Universities Law in 2010 were largely due to a student-led movement joined by others who used the public space to raise society’s awareness of the risks these changes would tend to bring about in curtailing citizens’ rights and liberties.

The opposition will also have to convince its supporters that it has improved both its numbers and its presence in areas and population strata that Chávez’s party once dominated and that a migration stampede triggered by the defeat will only favor the ruling party.

The opposition responses to future scenarios will come not only from political scientists and jurists who have made an exhaustive analysis of the authoritarian capturing of the legal and institutional framework. They will also come from sociologists and demographers who will have to account for the support and growth of the opposing social forces, its mutations and the bridges extended to the grassroots sectors disenchanted with Chávez.

New electoral scenarios

The Bolivarian institutional design and the uncertainty around the state of Chávez’s health open up potential successive election scenarios. On December 16 there will be elections for regional governors; in April 2013 there will be new municipal elections and in 2015 legislative elections. In 2016 they could also convene a new recall referendum.

If Chávez were to be incapacitated in the exercise of his duties or to die within the first four years of his new term, the Vice President would temporarily take power but he would have to call a new election within 30 days. Only if Chávez had already completed his fourth year in power, would the Vice President complete the remaining two years. Those closest to Chávez will try to keep him in office for as long as possible in order to maintain cohesion within the government, prepare a transition for his leadership and avoid facing the opposition in new elections without the leader’s symbolic capital.

The recent governmental Cabinet appointments suggest revisions in the public agenda as shown by the substitution of Andres Izarra for journalist Ernesto Villegas as head of communications and the appointment—welcomed by both Havana and regional business circles—of Nicolas Maduro as Vice President in lieu of former military officer Diosdado Cabello or former student leader Elias Jaua.

All this indicates a possible reformulation of the Chávez party’s hegemony and alliances inside the country and out, opening up scenarios that will continue to be marked by complexity and tension between dialogue and confrontation.

Armando Chaguaceda is a historian and political scientist. This article was first published in Mexico and was edited by envío.

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