The primary elections were just one more shortcut

The population spent all of 2012 amid violence, insecurity and the scandalous proselytizing of the three political parties that participated in the November 18 primary elections. We’re still in an economic quagmire, impunity still prevails and the shortcuts the political and business leadership have been scheming since the 2009 coup to avoid giving up privileges and advantages, don’t seem to be taking us anywhere worth going to.

Ismael Moreno, SJ

Since the June 28, 2009, coup d’état that violently wrenched President Manuel Zelaya Rosales from government, several paths have opened up to resolve the political crisis, but the political and entrepreneurial elites that dominate the State have bet again and again on quick fixes, short-term shortcuts that don’t endanger their interests and privileges. This year effectively closed with one of these shortcuts: the November 18 primary elections.

The first shortcut:
“Inflated” 2009 elections

Let’s go over the recent history leading up to the primaries. The first shortcut agreed by the political and business leadership was also electoral: the 2009 general elections were presented as the solution to the crisis deepened by the coup. The aim was to exclude the opposition from those elections, since at the time it was actively expressing itself in the organized Resistance that mobilized against the coup and was demanding a return to constitutional law.

The 2009 elections were held in “irregular conditions” and were supported by a media manipulation that tried to spruce up the negative profile of the de facto government by painting it “legitimate.” It simultaneously refused to recognize those who questioned the electoral process by painting them “unpatriotic.” The “irregular conditions” were the country’s militarization and intense repression of those who opposed the coup. Many people voted in those elections out of fear of reprisals, and where voters didn’t turn up ballots were filled out and duplicated. The parties themselves confessed that there had been prior agreements to make it look like a lot of people voted, far more than the actual number that went to the polls. With good reason grassroots inventive humor, which is one of the ways Hondurans endure humorless situations, dubbed Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa, the ruler who emerged from these elections, “inflated Pepe.”

The second shortcut:
Covenant of the elites

The next shortcut—the “covenant of the elites”—was ushered in by the new government of Pepe Lobo after he took office on January 27, 2010. Its aim was to regain the international community’s financial confidence enough to alleviate the economic crisis deepened during the seven months of the de facto government. To regain that trust the newly elected government tried to form a multi-party Cabinet of various interests, a “government of national unity and reconciliation,” which was opposed by the extremist sectors of the Liberal and National parties that had led or endorsed the coup.

Shortly thereafter, President Lobo made two decisions aimed at projecting a positive image to the governments of the United States and the European Union. He set up a “Secretariat for Justice and Human Rights” to counterbalance what had been done by the National Human Rights Commissioner, whose role in the coup earned it international disparagement. He also created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with highly credible national and international members. These two decisions sought to give consistency to the covenant of the elites, but they weren’t accepted by everyone, especially not by those unwilling to make any concessions that questioned “their” victory over the Zelayists and/or followers of 21st-century Socialism.

Despite the extremists’ influence, international pressure forced the covenant to open up by conditioned the return of
aid to concrete steps that would ensure respect for human rights and, above all, facilitate Zelaya’s return.

The third shortcut:
The Cartagena accords

The Lobo government’s expression of “opening up” was to agree to the negotiation that culminated in the return of Mel Zelaya, whose exile had become a thorn in their side. It all came about with the Cartagena Accords, another more elegant shortcut but a shortcut all the same, negotiated between the Lobo government and Zelaya, and intermediated by two Presidents who symbolize Latin America’s ideological polarization today: Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. The primary elections this past November 18 and the general ones to be held on the last Sunday in November next year grew out of those accords, signed on May 22, 2011. While they were the government’s most successful political act, they didn’t bring any solution to the crisis in a social contract based on minimum national consensus, if that was in fact their true intent.

The fourth shortcut:
The governance pact

The reality is that the Cartagena Accords ratified the covenant of the elites. With Zelaya’s return to the country, Honduras’ reintegration into the OAS and recognition of the Resistance as a belligerent political force with the right to participate in the electoral scenario, the “covenant of the elites” became the “governance pact.”

This pact established that elections would be the arena in which opposing sectors, including those on the left that agreed to participate in an electoral process driven by the powerful bipartisan machine, would sort out their conflicts.

The fifth shortcut:
The Truth Commission

Zelaya Rosales was still touring the country to regroup his forces around his electoral project when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its report on July 7, 2011. Without pulling any punches, the Commission described what happened on June 28, 2009, as a coup d’état and gave the government 80+plus recommendations to prevent something like this ever happening again in our country.

While President Lobo Sosa promised to comply with the recommendations, the report annoyed the extremist groups, apologists for the legal absurdity that was Roberto Micheletti’s de facto government, because they deny it was a coup and prefer to call it “constitutional succession.” The report also took the steam out of the left sectors of the Resistance, as they had predicted it would back the government’s game and legitimize the coup.

Nonetheless, the government’s subsequent disregard in practice of the report’s recommendations after the Truth Commission had borne the entire weight of the investigation during the seven months of the de facto government then recognized the new government as legitimate drew the Commission into a “governance pact.” That short-term understanding hammered out among the political elites opened the doors to this year’s primary elections. Instead of tackling the mechanisms that destroy social coexistence, it left those who nurture their capital and power in the underground corridors of crime, lawlessness and violence in even better conditions of impunity.

The sixth shortcut:
End runs around the CRSP

While the governance pact was following its course, Honduras became the country with the highest rate of violent deaths in the world relative to its population size: 86-90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Throughout 2012 the controversy over the progress and setbacks of the administrative process to purge the National Police via authorities and committees appointed by the executive branch rumbled on.

In May 2012 the Public Security Reform Commission (CRSP) was created to accompany the purging of what are called the operators of justice (police, prosecutors and judges). It consisted of three Honduran commissioners, one Chilean and one Canadian. According to confidential information the Canadian government conditioned its support to this issue on the Honduran government reducing the high profile civic fight against mining, because several Canadian mining companies have significant investments in Honduras.

After its first steps, the CRSP didn’t have the budget needed to carry out the mission entrusted to its five commissioners past the end of October. Although by the end of the year it had managed to introduce several proposals for purging and restructuring the public security institutionality, it has been an uphill, lukewarm and conciliatory process.

It has now hit the impenetrable wall of impunity. Only days after its creation the CRSP commissioners heard that the National Police director, at that time Commissioner Ricardo Ramírez del Cid, had been dismissed after having succeeded the also-dismissed Commissioner José Luis Muñoz Licona only seven months earlier. The controversial officer Juan Carlos Bonilla, alias “the Tiger,” was appointed to replace Ramírez del Cid.

According to sources linked to the CRSP, most changes in the police were made without the CRSP commissioners’ knowledge. Thus the main authority for purging the justice operators was ignored, even boycotted, not only by the Police officers and officials who felt threatened by the purge, but by the very people who promoted its creation.

Almost at the same time as appointing the CRSP in mid-2012, President Lobo Sosa created an intelligence organ attached to the Presidential Offices, commanded by retired military officer Julián Pacheco Tinoco, also without letting the CRSP Board of Commissioners know about this decision. Similarly the president of the National Congress headed up an initiative to create the Investigative Corps and Security Special Response Group (TIGERS), a specialized police and military elite team, without letting anyone know that the various power groups agreed on this plan. In none of these initiatives was the CRSP commissioners’ opinion taken into consideration.

One of the few CRSP decisions we know about was a proposal to suspend the Special Attorney for the Fight against Corruption, Henry Salgado, which the Attorney General completely opposed. Due to public pressure, Salgado was transferred to the Environmental Attorney’s Office. In late October and early November, the CRSP submitted proposals to ensure reviews of police, prosecutors and judges before they were appointed. It also submitted suggestions to restructure functions and positions in the police and other bodies that administer justice. Nevertheless, everything was already tainted by the failure of previous initiatives.

The agreement with Colombia

Ensuring safety and reducing public insecurity have been among the fundamental features of the Lobo Sosa administration, with a respectable number of decisions, investments and new entities set up inthe past three years. A systematization prepared by journalist Sandra Maribel Sánchez is the source for the following list.

A Cooperation Agreement was signed with the Colombian government during Alvaro Uribe’s presidency to undertake the fight against organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. It was one of the Lobo government’s first measures, taken in its first week. This agreement directly involves the Security Secretariat and Police. I recall a senior US State Department official saying to me when it was signed at the beginning of 2010 that the US government condemns the coup in Honduras, and to prevent it from happening again is committed to supporting the Honduran State by professionalizing and training the Army and Police, “as we have done in Colombia where they have achieved significant successes in the fight against drug trafficking and subversive groups.”

In search of security

There were other decisions as well, always seeking greater security. In November 2011 the Bureau of Police Career Research and Evaluation (DIECP) was created to help reduce abuse and criminal acts committed by the police, counteract impunity in the institution and restore citizens’ confidence in their authorities. The following month, the Special Law on Interception of Private Messages, popularly known as the “eavesdropping law,” was approved in a closed session. The Message Interception Unit was created for this.

And the list goes on. Also in December 2011, the National Council of Defense and Security, responsible for the communications and telephone wiretapping intelligence unit, and a supervisory office of national investigations were created, the latter with accompaniment and advice from the Colombian government. The National Office of Research and Defense, attached to the National Council of Defense and Security, was created as the President’s advisory branch on prevention and suppression of crime.

Yet there’s greater insecurity

In May 2012 the Special Law for Purging the Police Force was adopted for a six-month period, giving special powers to the security secretary and the director general of police to purge the institution at every level. This law was extended for a further six months as of November 24, 2012.

In October the National Council for Public Security was created to follow up on the crime situation, take action and propose preventive initiatives. In practice, it is a parallel body to the National Council on Internal Security (CONASIN), created by the Organic Police Law, most of whose members are also part of the new agency, with the exception of women’s groups
and human rights NGOs that have played a decisive role in investigating and denouncing violence against women and human rights violations by agents of the State, especially after the coup.

The legislative decree authorizing the military to carry out police functions was also issued and, as noted above, the National Congress introduced an initiative to create TIGERS, which does not enjoy consensus among those promoting the country’s security policy.

Also in these three years foreign forces have participated in armed actions on national territory: US troops and military advisers, DEA agents, Colombian paramilitary and advisers, and Israeli, Canadian, Spanish and Chilean advisers, among others. But despite this extensive list of decisions, actions and institutions to ensure “governance” with security, 2012 is coming to an end with even greater levels of insecurity and impunity.

The civic fight against impunity

On a track parallel to the “governance pact” and these measures, the civic struggle against impunity rolled on. It started almost by coincidence on October 22, 2011, after police officers murdered two young university students, one of them the son of the National Autonomous University rector. This was followed in December that same year by the still unpunished murder of politician Alfredo Landaverde, a former official in the fight against drug trafficking.

Throughout 2012 the disproportionate and unconstructive electoral primaries process competed with the civic fight against impunity, which was sparking desires for revenge among police officers and other staff members affected by the removals, dismissals and threats of investigation and prosecution. When viewed as a whole, the fight against impunity is the one that has made the least progress during the year, despite the efforts and some achievements. And what it did achieve hasn’t caused any loss of sleep by those shielded by the State as they commit crimes with impunity.

The seventh shortcut:
The primary elections

The primary elections of the traditional Liberal and National parties and former President Zelaya’s newly organized Freedom and Re-foundation (FREE) party took place on November 18. They grew out of the Cartagena Accords and governance pact, which accepted that the “Left” could take part in elections.

They ended a year stirred up by electoral propaganda and resulted in a new correlation of forces on the Honduran electoral map. For the past 20 years only five parties appeared on this map. This year the Supreme Electoral Tribunal registered four new parties: FREE, the Broad Electoral Political Front in Resistance (FAPER), the Patriotic Alliance Party (PAP) and the Anti-Corruption Party (PAC).

Despite these new options, the lively electoral activity was concentrated all year around the two traditional parties and FREE. The different currents of these three parties, which proposed and rejected candidates with effervescence and passion, tended to hide, ignore or relegate the violence, insecurity and economic and social instability that threatens Hondurans every day.

Plagued with irregularities

The primary elections were plagued with irregularities before, on and after voting day. The deliberate will of all three parties to manipulate the results at the polls, so clear in their various currents, albeit less obvious in the FREE, confirmed that both the electoral process and the parties themselves have become part of the cause of the deep national crisis and not of its solution.

Testimonies of voters and candidates of the three parties described serious irregularities in various localities, including polling stations in which candidates of different party factions contrived to fill in many of the unused ballots to beat their adversaries. There are testimonies of vote buying, especially in polling stations of Liberal and National Party factions and by the FREE’s June 28 faction, whose activists come from the ranks of the Liberal Party.

There were reports of National Party candidates who paid some $25 to get people to vote for them and of humble people who came to vote for FREE but got confused on seeing different parties’ tables with the same numbering and were led off by National or Liberal activists to their tables, where they signed the book of records. On realizing their mistake and wanting to rectify it, they found it impossible to do so.

The bitter lessons
left by the primaries

The insults, empty or superficial political campaigns, unrest, dirty tricks and acts of corruption seen on November 18, followed afterwards by accusations and senseless arrogance, confirmed for anyone who still doubted it that electoral processes as practiced in Honduras are a twisted caricature of democracy.

Among so many past and present flaws, these primary elections triggered important reasonable doubts about the general elections in November 2013. They make it clear that elections aren’t the way to a solution to our crises. On the contrary, they contribute to making them ever deeper.

The bitter lesson these primary elections leave us is the conviction that our political scene is the catalyst for the confrontations, polarizations and instabilities in which we live. At the same time, they once again confirm that today’s politicians are unwilling to recognize and learn from past mistakes, but rather want to continue laying traps upon traps to continue enjoying power, without bothering about whether what they are doing is legitimate or not.

The primary elections also confirmed that the “solutions” sought to the national crisis that opened with the 2009 coup have been nothing more than ill-fated shortcuts to avoid seeking genuine minimum national consensus. They were an attempt to cure a terminal illness with headache sedatives.

“Just a handful of communists”

The saying that a leopard doesn’t change its spots is true. The confrontations experienced during the primary elections campaign forecast even greater violence, uncertainties, instability and confrontation next year than we have lived through in the past three and a half years.

The main flag-waving for this dangerous political and ideological violence came from the head of the seven-month de facto government, Roberto Micheletti, when he expressed satisfaction with the primary results, which gave the Liberal and National parties more votes than those obtained by the FREE party. “These elections,” he taunted, “have made it clear that 120 years of political history cannot be hidden and that we political parties of democracy are the majority in Honduras while the communists are just a handful of people.”

Meanwhile, an economic crisis
with no foreseeable way out

We are ushering in 2013 with a whole series of accumulated conflicts that won’t be debated in the upcoming electoral scene.

The economic crisis doesn’t appear to have any positive outcome in the near future. For the second time running, the US government denied Honduras more Millennium Challenge Account resources given the Lobo government’s low level of compliance in its commitment to respect human rights and reduce public corruption. Nor has the government succeeded in negotiating a new agreement with the IMF, which means that other international financial institutions will be loathe to finance productive economic development projects that could help alleviate the national economy’s weaknesses.

The year began with an exchange rate of 18.89 lempiras to the dollar and is ending with a rate that exceeds 20 lempiras to the dollar. For the majority of the population this has meant an increase in the price of basic consumer goods, a steady loss
of purchasing power and the threat of losing job stability, all in a year in which unemployment has directly affected two million out of our nearly four million economically active population.

The year draws to an end with the National Congress threatening to extend the Law on Temporary Employment. This law’s critics identify it as unconstitutional and argue that it’s aimed at assuring cheap labor for businesses with no responsibility for social obligations and is a weapon to coerce permanent workers.

Despite such a critical situation, the economic and political sectors in power insist on searching for answers in formulas designed abroad. The controversial proposal by National Congress president and presidential hopeful John Orlando Hernández to speed up implementation of a “Model Cities” project adopted in January 2011, with the justification of creating jobs, was truncated in October by a ruling from the Supreme Court of Justice, which declared it unconstitutional following pressure and civic mobilization against it. Nonetheless, both Hernández and President Lobo reiterated their continued backing for it.

And a political crisis with
no foresseable way out

We are ushering 2013 in with all the accumulated conflicts, now even more acute. All these conflicts will pass through the sieve of political campaigns and each will be increased or decreased according to the calculations of each candidate and each party.

No conflict will be considered for the purpose of finding a solution, but rather only to discredit adversaries. The current government will have less power to make major decisions and will be limited to watching its own erosion and fragmentation, distributing the time and resources left to it between the general elections campaign and demands by the groups that wield real power inside and outside the institutional framework.

The election campaign’s ideological confrontation will be intense. An scenario saturated with empty propaganda and mutual accusations and disqualifications between the Right and the Left awaits us. The FREE Party will also surely attempt to revive its slogan of a new Constituent Assembly, without stopping to reflect on its contents.

Using false and non-consensual “political pacts,” the political and business classes have avoided seeking the paths in these years that might take us to the root of the conflicts that produce our crises of violence and public insecurity, the economic fragility of the majority and the concentration of wealth and resources of a minority. By evading any responsibility for getting to the bottom of the problems, the only thing that has been achieved is an increase in the number and size of the conflicts and a postponement of their solution until the next explosion.

More shortcuts next year?

The 2013 general elections will take place in a society that is more polarized than ever. The polarization that kept the country on tenterhooks by dividing us into extreme bands of “coup supporters” and “anti-coup supporters” will be revived with greater fury among those who will urge people to vote for keeping the power within the bipartite system and those who will urge people to vote for a government that will commit itself to convening a new Constituent Assembly.

Tensions between the two poles will define not only the content of the election campaign, but also the correlation of forces between sectors favoring the status quo and those advocating change. And what about the people themselves? Most of them hope for a political outcome that would help the country leave shortcuts behind and find the right way to help them along the road to a more dignified life.

Ismael Moreno, sj, is the envío correspondent in Honduras.

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