Was it genocide or wasn’t it?

The trial of Efraín Ríos Montt and his intelligence chief, accused of genocide and other exceptionally serious violations of the indigenous population’s rights between 1982 and 1983, including the murder of 1,771 Ixil Mayans, fueled a momentous debate in Guatemala: did the military operations of the Army in those years fall into the category of genocide or not? While Ríos Montt was convicted just as this issue went to press, this analysis serves as insight into what the court had to deliberate.

Ricardo Falla

Was genocide committed in Guatemala or not? There’s the possibility of an ideological trap in equating Guatemalan genocide with Nazi genocide and concluding that there was no genocide in Guatemala because it wasn’t the same as Nazi genocide. There was genocide in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda and other nations. While it had its own characteristics In each of those countries, all have been qualified as genocide.

Was there genocide in Guatemala? To answer this question, it’s very important to analyze how the United Nations defines genocide then look at what happened in Guatemala. That can lead us to a conclusion as to whether the definition is consistent with the facts of what happened in Guatemala.

The UN concept of genocide

Genocide is defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was adopted by the United Nations on December 9, 1948, and came into force on January 12, 1951. Guatemala signed that Convention on January 13, 1950, during the democratic government of Juan José Arévalo.

According to the Convention, genocide, whether committed in peacetime or during war, is a crime under international law. Article 2 says: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

a) Killing members of the group;
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group;
c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The acts and conditions

That article contains two sections: one lists the five acts and the other describes the conditions necessary for such acts to be considered genocide. If these conditions are not met, the acts can be committed without being genocide.

Two of the five acts described in the Convention clearly occurred in Guatemala: Killing members of the group and inflicting conditions of life on the group deliberately calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

In Guatemala, both—or more precisely a series of both—acts were linked together as two phases of the same process. First came the killings (the 1981 and 1982 massacres), then the attempt to control the scattered population through conditions of marginalized existence (from 1982 onwards, depending on the region). But both acts, even if they were not related to each other, would independently fit the definition, because the Convention stipulates that genocide means any of the five acts.

There are four conditions for these acts to be understood as genocide and they are what those cling to when arguing that there was no genocide in Guatemala. We must thus understand these conditions fully, trying to maintain calm objectivity.

Intent and scope

The first condition is intentionality: that any of these acts are committed with intent to destroy... This means they are not the spontaneous product of anger or revenge. Intentionality is revealed in their planning, either in written documents or by the victimizers’ expressions (words, gestures etc.) or through an analysis of the facts. For example, a succession of similar massacres indicates that they would not have happened like that had they not been planned.

The second condition is the scope of the destruction. The Convention says: to destroy, in whole or in part, a… group. According to this, there are two types of genocide. One that intends to destroy the group completely, such as the genocide intended to destroy all Jews, and one that intends to destroy it partially. If it is objected in the case of Guatemala that the Army did not intend to kill all indigenous people and hence did not commit the crime of genocide, that objection is a failure to understand that the genocide was of partial destruction.

Groups to be destroyed

The third condition refers to the nature of the group. But before looking at the different types of groups, it is necessary to bring into the argument, although the Convention does not say so explicitly, that all were unarmed civilians. The Convention defines genocide as a crime one step beyond the massacres of organized civilians.

Four categories define the target group of the destruction: nationality, ethnicity, race and religion, so to be categorized as genocide the group must belong to one of these categories, which are not mutually exclusive; several may co-exist at the same time. Other categories are not included in the definition, for example age, gender, political affiliation and others.

Nor does the Convention define the categories it does use: what is nationality, what is ethnic group, what is race, what
is religion? It leaves this open. The Commission for Historical Clarification (1999) considered that the K’iche’s, Ixils and others are ethnic groups of the indigenous population. Consistent with this reasoning, we can say that just as ethnic linguistic groups are subsumed in the indigenous ethnicity, so also can smaller ethnic groups be subsumed in the ethnicities of the linguistic groups and so on until you reach the ethnic micro-groups: the villages.

Here’s an example: Xek’echelaj (a village) of Santa Maria Chiquimula (a municipality) of the K’iche’s (an indigenous ethnicity). This is not only the result of an analytical process in the observer’s mind, but also corresponds to the existing social identities. Guatemala’s villages and municipalities aren’t only political and territorial units, but also groups with different ethnic identities. This is how a massacred village can correspond to a destroyed ethnic micro-group.

Considering a village as an ethnic group is not common in the language about genocide in Guatemala. On the other hand, irrespective of human rights considerations, one sees the Army’s political “success” in aiming at these ethnic micro-groups where vital clusters of the people are to be found. Which of the chiefs of staff designed this plan? They probably thought of it on seeing how the guerrillas, better acquainted with a people’s base, organized them upon entering into the heart of the village. To destroy these ethnic micro-groups was to destroy the center of their social power, formed by lineages and related families, with all this interweaving constituting the original nature of the ethnic group.

The reasons
behind the intention

The fourth condition refers to intentionality. To indicate this, the Convention uses “as such.” It says: With intent to destroy ... a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. For example, with intent to destroy a national group, as national, such as Jews as Jews, insofar as they are Jews, because they are Jews. With the intent to destroy an ethnic group, as ethnic. For example, indigenous people as indigenous people, because they are indigenous people. Or those of Nebaj, the Nebajians, because they are Nebajians...

This condition of the Convention denies that any political reason might constitute sufficient reason for the act of genocide. If the Army, for example, intends to destroy a group of indigenous people not because it is indigenous, but because it is politically an enemy group, then the act of destruction is not considered genocide. This is what the Convention says and many people debate the fairness of this definition. But we are trying to adhere to the Convention, not reform it, even though it should be reformed.

There are two extremely important things here for an analysis of the facts. The first is that, according to the Convention, it is possible to “partially” destroy a national, ethnic, racial and religious group “as such.” Just because the reason for the intention is “as such,” that doesn’t imply that the destruction has to be total. For example, a State can destroy some indigenous groups only, and do so because they are indigenous. Because it destroys them for being indigenous doesn’t mean that wherever it finds an indigenous person it will destroy them. Planning the deed depends on many other circumstances in addition to the reason behind the intention. This was how they could use indigenous soldiers to kill other indigenous people “as indigenous.” The training prepared them to kill their own people.

There were political
and racial reasons too

Another important point we should consider: the reasons behind the intention of human acts, including social and political acts, such as genocide, are neither unique nor exclusive. Whenever we do something, there are many mixed reasons behind the intention of our act. Because of this, there are mixed reasons behind the intention of destroying a group. A group can be destroyed insofar as it is Jewish, but also insofar as it represents opposition to a great plan for conquering Europe. In genocide it is usual to find various mixed reasons.

And here comes the most important point: political motivation doesn’t exclude racial or ethnic motivation; they can co-exist. For example, just because the Army destroys a group of indigenous people for being its political enemy because it’s supplying the guerrillas, that doesn’t exclude the fact that it also destroys it for being indigenous. One reason doesn’t exclude another. So the argument that there was no genocide in Guatemala because the Army committed massacres for political reasons isn’t tenable, because racial or ethnic reasons are revealed in these massacres in addition to the political reason. Signs of the existence of such racial or ethnic grounds do not necessarily have to be found in explicit written statements in documents in the style of Nazi genocide, which was supported by an entire publicly defended ideology.

The racial or ethnic grounds must be sought in the facts themselves: in the total destruction of villages; the killing of children; the statements of lieutenants who said “They must be destroyed, even the seeds”; in the cruelty of the sexual abuse, in the torture… What political justification could lead to such excesses? Through “the irrational excesses” of the acts of destruction can be read the hidden reasons of racist contempt and ethnic discrimination, still hidden now.

A reverse mirror image
of the guerrilla strategy

The genocide in Guatemala has historical antecedents. It’s good to recall events from the recent past to help us discern the present.

Let’s start with the triumph of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua on July 19, 1979. At that moment hope blossomed for revolutions throughout Central America. A wave of enthusiasm emanated out from Nicaragua. We used to sing: “If Nicaragua won, El Salvador will win and Guatemala will follow!” Like dominoes, the other dictatorships in the countries would fall one after another. The US understood it like this and occupied Honduras as a platform for supporting the contras fighting against the Sandinista government, and the government of El Salvador fighting against the FMLN.

In Guatemala, the Army and the private sector said NO to Communism, since this is how they perceived the wave of enthusiasm for what was happening in Nicaragua. It was a NO at any cost to “save western Christian civilization.” So the Army designed a dual strategy, which was a reverse mirror image of the revolutionary strategy: if the guerrillas intended to start taking power by moving from the periphery toward the center, the Army would follow the opposite path: it would start from the center and move toward the periphery.

This is how we understand the blows suffered by organizations in the city in 1980 and 1981, followed by the scorched-earth policy, that began in Chimaltenango and Chupol, to the south of the Quiché in November 1981 and little by little arrived at Guatemala’s border with Mexico in “black July” of 1982. It was a sweep operation: much as when a woman sweeps the trash out the door with the broom. Half this offensive was achieved with General Ríos Montt’s coup d’état on March 23, 1982. It didn’t change the strategy; it strengthened it.

Guns and beans

The Army’s twofold strategy considered that even if the guerrillas sought to involve the grassroots civilian population, to unleash an unstoppable people’s war, it would continue going the opposite way to separate the guerrillas from that base, combining two tactics: guns and beans. But first guns and then beans.

What did “guns” mean? It meant focusing destructive force on some communities believed to be supporting the guerrillas to eliminate them completely, not leaving a single person alive (total destruction of the group). It also meant eliminating some of the most prominent members of nearby communities who supported the guerrillas (partial destruction of the group) to separate the civilian population from the guerrillas through terror. Full and partial scope went hand-in-hand, because total destruction of the communities identified as red should radiate terror on the neighbors to break them so they could be controlled.

The population used to collaborate with the guerrillas by providing food, information and tasks. This was what the Army had to sever with this tactic. In this way “the water was taken from the fish,” as they used to say. But it wasn’t water; it was rivers of blood.

“Beans” meant concentrating the Army’s defensive force in certain communities considered loyal. And if the guerrillas had armed militias, the Army too would give civilians in these communities weapons and organize them in what were called Civil Defense Patrols (PACs). These patrols would be the backbone of a new map of communities called model villages, which were rewarded for their loyalty with food, resources and housing. “Beans” referred to these prizes. But it never became possible to loosen the Army’s control based on terror, so the “guns” element never disappeared.

In the first phase the only operation was based on “guns.” This was the phase of killing members of the group, in whole or in part. In the second phase, the operations consisted of “guns” combined with “beans” and corresponded to inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. These conditions were hunger, destruction of resources, burned homes, persecution and terror.

The gathering darkness of vultures

I recently published a book I called The Gathering Darkness of Vultures, in which I rescue the history of a massacre that took place on July 17, 1982, through the voices of survivors. This was not a singular act of genocide; it was part of an entire policy.

This massacre occurred in a village-farm of about 50 houses called San Francisco, located near the Mexican border in the municipality of Nentón, Huehuetenango. The population belonged to the Chuj linguistic group. The massacre took place after General Ríos Montt took power in the coup d’état. The scorched-earth strategy from the center to the periphery had begun under the previous government, that of General Lucas Garcia, although it had not been completed.

In June 1982, before continuing the massacre operations with new vigor, Ríos Montt decreed a month of amnesty. But before the month was up, the scorched-earth strategy was restarted in Huehuetenango, specifically in the municipality of Barillas. It was restarted with a series of partial massacres in operations in various villages, combined with the total massacre of the community of Puente Alto, on July 7 (353 victims). The Army left a trail of blood in its wake, as can be seen from the report of the Commission for Historical Clarification. They were connected acts: partial killings linked to a total massacre of the group.

A week later, on July 14, the Army entered San Mateo Ixtatán, a neighboring municipality, massacring everyone in the small village of Petanac (89 victims). Finally, it moved into the municipality of Nentón, neighbor to San Mateo, where it committed the main massacre, also total, of 376 victims in San Francisco. This entire campaign followed the tactic of “guns” to cause a wave of terror.

How was the massacre in San Francisco done? Some 400 soldiers surrounded the community in the early morning, with support from a helicopter that brought them supplies. The helicopter’s presence was a clear signal that they weren’t guerrilla fighters dressed as soldiers, as the Army sometimes said happened to divest itself of the responsibility.

“Destroy them, even the seeds”

The soldiers imprisoned the men in the auxiliary city hall and the women with their children in the church. The objective of separating them into two groups was to weaken first the women and children, so that later, through them, they could weaken the men.

The massacre began with the women. They killed them not in the church but in their homes, after raping them. Probably the Army also intended to get information from them. Then they killed the children, who had been left alone in the church, dragging them outside to kill them. Some were babies. They stuck a knife in them and took out their guts and because they screamed they dashed them against the rocks.

This is how they implemented the chiefs’ orders in Huehuetenango: “Destroy them, even the seeds.” Finally, they killed the men, cutting the throats of some with blunt machetes and shooting others. The massacre was total and cruel. They spared no one. That day they killed 376 people. We keep their names and surnames.

Halfway through the massacre the soldiers rested and ate a bull from the community. And at the end they had a party with a marimba, raping the young women who had been kept back, then killing them too. The siesta, the party and particularly the helicopter support are all signs of planning and intentionality. The massacre didn’t grow out of a spontaneous reaction; it was a plan brought ready-made and repeated in many other places.

After the massacre

There were several survivors. The most important were three men who escaped from where they were incarcerated. One, who was seen escaping, was chased, a sign that the Army planned to leave no one alive. The others were outside the village bringing firewood and stayed outside the fence the Army strung round the village, including the dispersed houses, or were further away. According to the Army’s intent, the entire population enclosed within that fence was to be exterminated. Total destruction.

News of this massacre spread like wildfire and some nine thousand people fled to seek refuge in camps in Mexico. The
first to flee were those of a neighboring community formed by people from San Francisco Yulaurel, who were warned by San Francisco’s survivors. But some nearby communities didn’t take refuge in Mexico and came under the control of the Army, which forced them through terror to organize in the PACs.

Afterwards, they would implement the combined guns and beans program. One “beans” component was to be rewarded with the land abandoned by the refugees. San Francisco’s land wasn’t part of that prize because it was a private estate, on which those slaughtered had been ranch hands. The second phase, of submitting the people to extreme conditions, wasn’t carried out in this border area because the population had either fled to Mexico or was quickly organized in the PACs.

The intention was to destroy them

In conclusion, the massacre of San Francisco showed:
* An intent to destroy. It wasn’t a spontaneous act; it was previously planned. Nor was it an isolated act; it was repeated in other places.
* An intent to totally destroy the group members: men, women, children, elders… leaving no survivors.
* The group was civilians.
* It was an ethnic micro-group with the identity of being from that village: Chuj speakers and indigenous.
* The reason for the intention (“insofar as”) was at least twofold: political (control of the population) and ethnic.
The presence of an ethnic and racial reason is revealed in the total destruction of the ethnic micro group; the expressions of that intentionality (“destroy them, even the seeds”); the cruelty and brutality of the act (disemboweling the children, killing the old by cutting their throats with a blunt machete, raping and torturing the women); and the combination of festivity and passion (an orgy upon ending the massacre). Orgy and cruelty are signs of an excess that cannot be explained only by political intent.

26 massacres 1981 - 1982

I made a chronological list of 25 massacres that took place between 1981 and 1982:
1. San Mateo Ixtatán, San Mateo Ixtatán, Huehuetenango (Chuj ethnicity, 55 victims, May 31, 1981).
2. Piche, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz (Achí ethnicity, 32 victims, January 2, 1982).
3. Chisis, Cotzal, Quiché (Ixil ethnicity, 132 victims, February 13, 1982).
4. Río Negro, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz (Achí ethnicity, 177 victims, March 13, 1982).
5. Los Encuentros, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz (Achí ethnicity, 94 victims, March 14, 1982).
6. cuarto Pueblo, Ixcán, Quiché (multilingual ethnic group, 350 victims, March 14, 1982).
7. San Antonio Sinaché, Zacualpa, Quiché (K’iche’ ethnicity, 199 victims in three massacres: March 16, May 18 and May 30, 1982).
8. Arriquín, Zacualpa, Quiché (K’iche’ ethnicity, 83 victims, March 19, 1982).
9. Estanzuela, Joyabaj, Quiché (K’iche’ ethnicity, 57 people, March 19, 1982).
10. Estrella, Chajul, Quiché (Ixil and Kanjobal ethnic groups, 96 victims, March 23, 1982).
11. Xalban, Ixcán, Quiché (multilingual ethnic group, 38 victims, April 1, 1982).
12. Chel, Chajul, Quiché (Ixil ethnicity, 90 victims, April 3, 1982).
13. Piedras Blancas, Ixcán, Quiché (Mam ethnicity, 55 victims, May 18, 1982).
14. Chacalté, Chajul, Quiché (Ixil ethnicity, 55 victims, June 12, 1982).
15. Puente Alto, Barillas, Huehuetenango (Kanjobal ethnicity, 353 victims, July 7, 1982).
16. Sebep, San Mateo Ixtatán, Huehuetenango (Chuj ethnicity, 60 victims, July 13, 1982).
17. Petenac, San Mateo Ixtatán, Huehuetenango (Chuj ethnicity, 86 victims, July 14, 1982).
18. San Francisco, Nentón, Huehuetenango (Chuj ethnicity, 376 victims, July 17, 1982).
19. Pklan de Sánchez, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz (Achí ethnicity, 268 victims, July 18, 1982).
20. Lancetillo, Uspantán, Quiché (K’iche’ ethnicity, 26 victims, September 11, 1982).
21. Agua Fría, Uspantán, Quiché (Achí and K’iche’ ethnic groups, 92 victims, September 14, 1982).
22. Rabinal, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz (Achí ethnicity, 205 victims, September 15, 1981).
23. Parraxtut, Sacapulas, Quiché (K’iche’ ethnicity, 27 victims, November 15, 1982).
24. Bacanal, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz (Achí ethnicity, 58 victims, December 4, 1982).
25. Dos Erres, La Libertad, Petén (mestizo, 190 victims, December 7, 1982).

All against
indigenous peoples

All these massacres except one, Dos Erres, were of Mayan language groups: Achíes K’iche’s, Ixils, Kekchis, Chujs, Kanjobals and multilingual. This tells us two things. One, according to the Commission for Historical Clarification, there was ethnic intentionality in the massacres of the groups, as shown by the proportion of indigenous victims (83%) and by the selection of the areas where the policy was applied. And two, while the case of the mestizos in Dos Erres was an exception , it fell within the same plan of genocide committed against the indigenous population groups.

In El Salvador, genocidal acts were committed against communities, such as in El Mozote, but they didn’t fall into the category of planned genocide of villages, as they didn’t belong to an ethnic group. The planned genocide that occurred in 1932 in El Salvador was different: it was directed against all “Indians” assimilated as Communists in which two reasons overlapped: do away with Communists and do away with Indians.

Some in the list above were total massacres: Cuarto Pueblo in Ixcán, La Estrella in Chajul, Piedras Blancas in Ixcán, Puente Alto in Barillas, Petanac in San Mateo Ixtatán and Plan de Sanchez in Rabinal. Others were partial: Pichec in Rabinal, Arriquín and San Antonio Sinaché in Zacualpa and Xalbal in Ixcán. We have no information on the others.

One of the massacres, Chacalté, was committed by the guerrillas or allied forces. All the rest were either by the Army or by civilian patrols or a combination of both.

In response to the Convention’s definition that slaughter may consist of the partial destruction of ethnic or racial groups and, at the same time can be a given ethnic or racial group as such, it can be concluded that Guatemala’s Army committed the crime of genocide by attempting to destroy the indigenous group partially, insofar as it was indigenous.

Given the terror of the operations, the indigenous population in many places interpreted the facts as though the intention was to completely destroy the Guatemalan indigenous population. This wasn’t possible for a society, represented by the Army, whose agricultural labor force is mostly indigenous. Nor was it possible for an Army whose soldiers, if not for the most part, were in large numbers also indigenous.

The perception of total destruction, though not correct, was why the indigenous population in many places left either the country or the indigenous regions, or disguised themselves on farms, and why the women abandoned their indigenous dress.

Racism in the Army

Those who argue that there was no genocide in Guatemala and ridicule those who claim there was, argue that it couldn’t have been genocide because the soldiers were also indigenous.

The intention to partially destroy the indigenous population “as such” is deduced from the racism inculcated in military training, as Manolo Vela showed in his 2010 thesis “Peletones de la Muerte” (Death Platoons), where he says things such as this: “The racism in the chiefs created this radical and necessary distinction among soldiers, indigenous youth and their victims, also indigenous: indigenous peoples, who had been tricked by the subversion, should die. The transformation in their way of perceiving reality with regard to racism condenses and is exposed in this paragraph by the soldier Martin Ramirez: ‘Oneself, being Indian, calls another Indian, Indian.’ This is part of the treatment that comes from the officers and links (ladinos), who make the great mass of troops (indigenous) function: ‘This is how one looks at it from the officers’ standpoint: that I am an Indian, that other one is an Indian, that Indian here, that Indian there; it becomes a common word, like a virus, it gets in and in and in.’ This is how Ramírez ends: ‘Even the worst Indian calls you an Indian. It’s a phrase that makes you laugh, because one says: Why is he calling me an Indian and when he’s more of an Indian than I am?’”

The disdain towards indigenous human beings is shown in the cruel actions and words of the troops in campaigns. Racism consists of despising a group as an inferior race, considering that it doesn’t have the same rights as other human beings, or even the right to life. The indigenous population was considered “expendable” to save the country from Communism. This attitude reveals the intention to destroy indigenous people “as such”: not only was it considered “lawful” to kill them for such a necessary cause, but it had to be done.

The prolonged second
stage of genocide

Let’s look at the second type of genocide, according to the Convention’s definition: Deliberately inflicting conditions of life on the group calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

This type corresponds to the second phase of Guatemala’s military strategy. Unlike the first phase, this took much longer and affected many population groups, causing enormous suffering. I myself lived through this phase in Ixcán’s Communities of Population in Resistance (CPR) after the 1982 massacres. I experienced it from 1983 to 1993, but the phase lasted longer: from mid-1982 until 1994, when the groups hidden in the mountain came down and the Army had to respect them.

This phase had its different waves and its critical moments. Compared to the CPR in the Ixil or Kekchí regions, the genocide was less intense for us. We were closer to the Mexican border so they couldn’t impose submission on us by causing the extreme survival conditions they were able to impose in regions that couldn’t get help from Mexico. Similarly, in other areas closer to Guatemala City, such as San Martin Jilotepeque, the population was subjected to these extreme conditions but only for a short time, because they were soon controlled by the Army.

After the large-scale massacres, the survivors had to choose one of three main options: escape to the mountains and hide there; go into exile if the border was near, as did the survivors of San Francisco and their neighbors; or migrate to the large towns and cities, including Guatemala City, camouflaging themselves among many people, most of them strangers.

First step: Prevent survival

The destruction phase was imposed on the group that went into the mountains. What did these population and territorial control operations consist of? How can they be understood as a crime of genocide?

Whenever there was a large-scale massacre or the Army passed through generating terror by killing some people,
a huge scattering of people, disorganized into small family groups, would go hide under trees far from their homes, or sometimes would seek ravines or caves.

In response, the Army patrols, sometimes combined with a PAC, would carry out a code of action adapted to the terrain, first trying to prevent the fleeing population from living in the mountains. For this, they would remove the conditions for survival: they burned down their houses and destroyed everything in them. including household goods and bedding; they destroyed their food, not only the stored corn cobs but also the standing corn out in the field, as well as stealing or killing their animals, from chickens to livestock; they burned or stole their clothes, so they would die of cold or couldn’t change if they got wet; they destroyed their working tools—hoes and machetes—and if they found a hunting rifle they would take it with them. It was an operation against the civilian population.

Second step: Pursue the fleeing

The second step was to track down the small clusters of people scattered over the mountains who had fled, terrified, because they saw the Army as a total, and incomprehensible, enemy. “The inhabitants of this region (Nebaj) are convinced that the Army is the assassin of the people,” Colonel Francisco Angel Castellanos informed the Chief of Staff in a letter dated July 22, 1982 (Operation Sofía).

In pursuing the people, the Army would shoot to kill those who were fleeing, above all if the guerrillas had ambushed them. Fleeing was seen as a sign of complicity with the guerrillas and people who didn’t flee because they couldn’t any longer, or because they surrendered, were captured alive. This was how control over the population was achieved.

In the reports of Operation Sofía in 1982, the enemy, i.e. the civilian population, was referred to as “eno.” They called the children “chocolates.” On page 316 of the Operation Sofía document, Majors José Esteban Arango Barrios and Otto Fernando Pérez Molina also appear as heads of the “Scotland III” patrol, made up of 32 specialized paratroopers. They reported “contact with the enemy” from Nebaj on August 15, 1982, resulting in 4 FIL [Local Irregular Forces] killed and 18 adults and 12 “chocolates” captured.

Third and fourth steps:
Re-educate, break resistance

The third step was to get the captured population down from the mountain and taken to a village for re-education, thus gaining control over the population. It also served to gain control over the territory, although at first it might be empty if a new community loyal to the Army was not already relocated there.

The fourth step was aimed at breaking the resistance of the groups that hadn’t surrendered, whether out of fear or conviction or both. To do so they would bomb them from war planes or blast them with machine guns from helicopters or drop leaflets containing harmless but insulting messages on the groups that stayed hidden.

“We were like animals in the forest”

These flyers are a revealing sample of the racist and genocidal intentions behind the Army campaigns. They included drawings of animals with tails and horns: “This is what we, the resisting population, were. They asked us to come out and give ourselves up to the Army. They tried to tell us that if we didn’t give ourselves up we were like forest animals and if we did give ourselves up we would become people. Therefore, as long as we didn’t give ourselves up we would be treated like animals, not just as guerrillas, and could be shot. We had no rights as human beings.”

All of this was deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. Many people died of starvation, malnutrition, despair and different diseases in these operations. Women would swell up and turn yellow and their breast milk for feeding their babies, some born on the mountain, would dry up. Countless people died in the months following the massacres.

In his book Nos salvó la sagrada selva (The sacred forest saved us), Alfonso Huet offers this statistic: of the 61 Kekchi communities of Alta Verapaz who took refuge in “the sacred mountain,” 574 people died from disease and 619 were killed.

We can conclude that...

These operations had the intention of planned destruction in many regions of the country, where they were practiced simultaneously or successively.

The intention was partial destruction, even though all members of the group—men, women and children—were subjected to
the same conditions.

The group was the sum total of indigenous groups speaking different languages and ethnic groups that were outside state control in the mountains.

The reason for the intention (“insofar as”) was at least twofold: political, to control the population outside state control and its territory, and racial/ethnic.

The racial/ethnic reason is revealed in the description of the group as forest animals, without the right to live unless it wouldt submit to the State (be tamed), but difficult to submit to the State, if not by force.

Yes, it was genocide

Guatemalan genocide had two intimately linked phases that corresponded to two types of the acts referred to in the definition of genocide in the 1948 United Nations Convention. It was undertaken in two different interconnected ways as two phases of the same process.

In summary, the first phase comprised the total massacre of indigenous villages, as such, and the partial massacre of indigenous people, as such, undertaken in tandem. The second phase, a result of the first, was deliberate subjugation of scattered indigenous groups to survival conditions (hunger, disease, cold, rain, etc.) that led to their partial destruction as indigenous groups.

Yes, without doubt, it was genocide: total genocide of indigenous villages and partial genocide of the Maya indigenous peoples, combining both types of acts.

Ricardo Falla, sj, is an anthropologist and author of several books on the armed conflict in Guatemala. This text from a 2012 lecture at the university center in west Quetzaltenango was published in the digital newspaper Plaza Pública in March 2013 and edited by envío for this issue.

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