Nicaragua
The FSLN-Government Balancing Act
Envío team
April, always one of Nicaragua's most sweltering months, had several unusual hot points this year. Just before Easter the health minister declared a national cholera alert. He feared that hundreds of vacationers might contract the inexorably spreading disease, given the appalling sanitary conditions at the beaches where so many head during Holy Week in search of some respite from the heat.
That was immediately followed by another national emergency when Cerro Negro, one of a chain of volcanoes near León, suddenly decided to spew out tons of ash and sand. Some 8,000 already impoverished peasants were forced to evacuate their tiny plots of land at the base of the volcano. While the mineral-rich volcanic refuse should improve the soil after a few years, it cancelled any possibility of cultivation in the meantime. In León itself, people abandoned plans to relax in the white sands of nearby Poneloya beach in order to contend with a few feet of black sand caving in their own roofs.
These two emergencies again showed the levels of governmental and social organization. By the end of the month cholera had yet to produce a single death among the 23 reported cases for the year (14 of them in April alone). The evacuation of volcano victims was orderly, and the provision of food and other requirements for the displaced was handled with relative efficiency.
It did not escape most political observers, however, that much of the effective administration of both emergencies was provided by Sandinista organizations in the first case and by Sandinista institutions in the second. The communal movement and popular health brigades pitched in during the anti-cholera campaign, and the army and police took on the main work of rescuing and relocating those affected by the volcanic eruption. The FSLN also interceded with both the government and the recompas to prevent the growing wave of public protests and takeovers of highways and small towns by recompas, recontras and revueltos from getting out of hand. Its main concerns were that there be no deaths and that the government fulfill its promises, particularly with respect to providing land and titles.
An unexpected green lightThe FSLN, which has been defending the current political order by insisting on dialogue, has become the government's main backer. While that has been going on long enough now that it no longer shocks anyone, many observers were caught by surprise when the Sandinista Assembly, in an extraordinary session at the end of March, gave the National Directorate its approval to negotiate specific and general accords with the government to foster national stability.
The government itself had already come to terms with the need to reach some form of institutional understanding with the FSLN, so it welcomed the Sandinista Assembly's seal of approval. The idea is apparently to create a mixed FSLN-government commission for this purpose, in which decisions will made by consensus. This commission, however, has yet to be formed.
On April 12, FSLN Secretary General Daniel Ortega announced in Matagalpa that his party is preparing modifications to the government's neoliberal policy, which the National Directorate hoped to unveil at the end of the month. He added that a group of Sandinista economists is also preparing a social and economic proposal that it will present to the government by the beginning of July at the latest.
Ortega promised that the proposal will be "a project of national scope about which all social and economic sectors of the nation will be consulted, whether Sandinistas or not." The immediate objective will only be to adjust the government's existing macroeconomic policies, since developing a full-fledged alternative would take more time than the affected population can be expected to tolerate.
Co-government or what? Some observers consider that the FSLN is acquiring veto power over economic policy by participating in governmental commissions. Ortega explained that these commissions will oversee compliance with the national accords that are expected to grow out of the proposal the FSLN will present following its consultations with the various social forces.
Ortega insisted that the FSLN does not have a policy of co-government, but rather one of support to help the country obtain international resources to shore up different social programs. He added, however, that for the commission mechanism to function, the FSLN must "put aside its party mentality." He said the party is not acting with "the narrow-minded goal of protecting its moral and political capital, but according to what must be done so that the country doesn't go under and the workers do not continue being affected."
Despite Ortega's denial, there is an unmistakable semblance to "co-government." "Why not be in government once and for all, with ministerial posts and everything?," challenged one reporter in a press conference. Ortega's responded that the institutional commissions seem the most viable and reasonable mechanisms right now. He did not reject the notion of co-government out of hand, but said that, under the current circumstances, neither the FSLN nor the government lean toward this form of understanding.
Who needs whom more? The other big surprise was that, after two days of debate with journalists present, the Sandinista Assembly as a whole, and not just the National Directorate, agreed to take the major step of "promoting dialogue between the government and all the country's forces, search for concrete national accords that can orient economic policy to the benefit of the popular sectors and contribute, together with them, to national stability." Some weeks earlier, the Chamorro administration also came out in favor of dialogue and "understandings"; as with the FSLN communiqué, it was implicitly understood that the dialogue would be bilateral and that any resulting accords would sidestep political forces opposing the government from the right. It is no secret that the political and human communication flow is already very fluid between Lacayo and the Sandinista leaders, and even more so with army chief Humberto Ortega. The idea is to create a mixed FSLN-government commission, in which decisions will be made by consensus.
The alacrity and apparent resolve with which both forces are moving toward an accord caught everyone off guard. The basic question observers are thus asking themselves is, which of these two forces has lost the most strength? Put another way, who needs whom more?
The Sandinista Assembly concluded that the government policy is condemning "major sectors of the population to intolerable levels of misery and suffering." Faced with this, it had to recognize the FSLN's own limitations as well as those of the government. Fighting with international lending agencies is not in the FSLN's current plans (nor was it while in government), but the country's situation does not permit it to sit idly by. In the worst-case scenario, the crumbling of the government—or Lacayo's resignation—could unleash a violent confrontation. The immediate danger is not the government's rightwing opposition—which has been weakened, although it still has some capacity to destabilize—but the social situation, which threatens to get out of control.
Based on information from around the country, one Sandinista leader said that there is no longer any doubt that Nicaragua faces an explosive situation that neither the FSLN nor the government can control without the other. This was what brought the National Directorate, together with the regional and union leaders in the Sandinista Assembly, to the unprecedented consensus that the FSLN should accept the administration's invitation to forge an accord between the country's two main forces.
The forgotten right The rightwing political parties in the electoral alliance that won at the polls two years ago have a reason for not abandoning the coalition name: the National Opposition Union (UNO). They grumble that the FSLN has never been the opposition, but has co-governed from the beginning—first through the Transition Protocol, later through the concertación agreements, and will do so now through the so-called National Accord.
Consequently, these parties threaten to do justice to the coalition's official name by becoming the "true opposition" to President Chamorro and what they call her "technocratic" Cabinet.
Wilfredo Navarro, current president of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), made the threat explicit: "After the betrayal of UNO's government program, UNO has to become a clear opposition, because it is not in government."
Technically, the President of the National Assembly and the UNO bench members are in government, as is Vice President Godoy, the PLI's former president and strongman. But they do not govern. The locus of power and decision-making is increasingly centered in the executive branch—more specifically, in Minister of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo, in whom President Chamorro has utter confidence. To a large degree, even this can be attributed to the FSLN, since the Constitution written during the Sandinista government gives the executive branch a lot of power.
Far-right UNO leaders don’t quibble with Lacayo's conclusion that the government must submit body and soul to Sandinismo or the country will slide into chaos. Where they differ is with his choice of alternatives. They prefer chaos, which at least leaves them some future options. As Vice President Godoy said recently in Miami, "Nobody is betting that the government of the Señora (Chamorro) will last out its term." He predicted that very soon businessmen "will have to contract bodyguards by the dozens to deal with the social chaos."
March in step or leave the ranksWhat UNO calls an "illegal and immoral marriage" between the FSLN and the Chamorro administration threw the right wing another unpleasant curve when Lacayo announced on April 1 that Minister of Government Carlos Hurtado had resigned "for health reasons." Hurtado immediately clarified to the press that his health was just fine, and that he had, in fact, been asked to resign.
The big error made by Hurtado—who a year ago followed Lacayo and General Humberto Ortega on the far right's hit list for forced resignations—was to take Secretary of State James Baker and the US Embassy too literally. They had let it be known that they wanted the police force—part of Hurtado's ministry—to be purged and reorganized to rid it of Sandinista influence. Supported by his foreign advisers, Hurtado prepared a plan to dismember the police and create new "independent" forces, including an elite unit for intelligence and the anti-drug fight.
Hurtado duly presented his plan to the State Department, but apparently without first getting Lacayo's approval, thus bringing his career as a Cabinet member to an abrupt and premature end. The issue for Lacayo is not one of outright opposition to the State Department. He just wants to reorganize the police force his own way and in his own time, keeping hold of the reins so he can maneuver between Sandinismo and Washington.
On April 9, during a "private" visit to the United States, President Chamorro followed her meeting with President George Bush with the announcement that she plans to restructure the police force over the next 12 months and that there will be new cuts in the military. Offering no details, she assured that the transformation of the police would be "total." Two weeks later, however, Lacayo told the FSLN newspaper Barricada that there are no current plans to cut military personnel further. "As long as there are officers who left and still haven't found a job," he said, "it would be illogical to discharge more people and increase the unemployment problem." While he admitted that the police must be continually professionalized and converted into a force with a national character, he responded to a question about US pressures by saying that "even if there are... this government doesn't function with pressures."
Lacayo is buying time and political space until the production turn-around contemplated by the neoliberal economic plan produces results. Because the government's future is riding on that turn-around, Lacayo is willing to buy time at top market prices. In addition to establishing a "de facto" consultation mechanism with the Sandinista leadership, he reportedly went so far as to declare in Washington, much to the dismay of those present, that President Chamorro's administration is "a continuation" of the Sandinista government.
In effect, Sandinista support permits the government the luxury of politically relegating the UNO parties, particularly in the National Assembly, and governing the country in a more coherent fashion—almost dictatorially, some would say. All this caused a former La Prensa columnist to sputter angrily in Miami that "Antonio Lacayo has gone outside of normal and civilized channels to defend his government thesis, and has fallen into the malignant audacity and contagious effrontery of the Sandinista commanders."
Confusion in FSLN ranksSome Sandinistas, in particular leftist intellectuals, have their doubts about the FSLN's radical change in attitude toward the government and the people. But the reality is that Sandinismo has no coherent alternative.
It may not even want to have one as long as it is unprepared to take over the political reins of the country. And the FSLN itself admits that it is not prepared to govern before working through the confusion provoked by the electoral loss itself, the corruption of many leaders and the enigma of continuing to constitute the country's most important political force. The struggle for power is not on the FSLN's agenda; on the contrary, both internal reasons and the international situation mean that it is a major relief that elections do not come again until 1996.
Nonetheless, the FSLN cannot overlook the fact that Sandinista influence and leadership is greater than that of the government in many areas of the country. This is due both to UNO's ineffectiveness and to the authority that a large part of the population grants the Sandinista popular organizations as a whole.
Many people take their anguish and grievances to the Sandinistas, not with any desire to bring down the government, but to get answers to problems of survival. They correctly surmise that Ortega has more influence with the government than many ministers or regional government authorities.
Said another way, strong pressures for some kind of "co-government" are coming not only from the FSLN's "center," but also from "below." Nonetheless, while not even the hardline union leaders represented in the Sandinista Assembly supported maintaining a posture of frontal opposition to the government, only six members voted in favor of continuing negotiations to the point of achieving formal co-government.
A voice for the popular sectorsThe arrangement is not one of classic upper-echelon agreements. On the contrary, the option of pure negotiations or strategic understandings with the government was rejected unless the government guarantees beforehand that it will modify the economic adjustment plan in favor of the poor majority.
And, in fact, the government has agreed to accept the recommendations of Sandinista economists aimed at cushioning the economic policy's effects. But there is a danger of falling into technocratic thinking; some Sandinistas are already defending as "inevitable" too many of the measures implemented by the government.
Daniel Ortega insists that the only road is to assure the country's stability, and that the decision to do so cannot be put off. But that does not mean postponing the popular struggle, which is recognized as just and a consequence of the aggravation of the economic crisis. What it means is that struggle must be carried out in an organized way, without leading "to chaos or anarchy."
Throughout the National Assembly debate, there was insistence that any understanding must include the popular social forces. "We cannot fall into the trap," said one leader, "of only benefiting a small clique, but must take the popular sectors into account."
Give neoliberalism a soulAll of this brings the FSLN's dilemma back into the spotlight: to what point should an anti-people neoliberal economic plan be permitted to succeed? And can an economic policy that is not only anti-people but also anti-democratic be reformed without ceasing to be neoliberal?
These are not easy times for those who are either weak of heart or dogmatic in their theories. Theory is not always the best guide for action, particularly not in these new times, when many old theories have been found wanting and new ones are being tested in the crucible of action. Furthermore, as Trotsky sagely noted, it is always easier to predict major historical movements than daily events and situations.
Looked at from the outside, it seems impossible that a revolutionary social force politically committed to the popular sector of society and organized as a party could enter into institutional agreements to share political responsibilities with a neoliberal government committed to capital and big business. But despite the theoretical incompatibility of the two projects, and the implicit risks for both the government and the FSLN of a political strategy that conceals both projects, the waters seem to be parting to make way for what some hopefully refer to as "revolutionary neoliberalism."
The Sandinista Assembly finally agreed to "put some soul" in the government's economic plan. Lacayo, on learning the results of the Sandinista deliberation, reiterated his willingness to come to "thoroughgoing" accords with the FSLN to get out of the crisis, saying that the administration had also been seeking this "understanding" for some time. The government proposed to offer the FSLN what it never wanted to offer the UNO legislative bench: the possibility of modifying the economic plan. But, as could be expected, there is a hitch. "We will incorporate [the Sandinista reform proposals] into the plan and go forward with them," he said, as long as the international lending agencies "look with favor" on them.
A soul for the lending agencies? In the Sandinista Assembly debate, no one denied the need to reach an understanding with the multilateral lending agencies. But what kind of understanding? It is quite clear that the government is not about to confront the lending agencies headquartered in Washington with the same firmness it applies to striking workers. Will a national accord "put some soul" into these banking institutions?
The FSLN is trying to get the government to be firmer with the agencies and more flexible with popular demands. It also insists that the resources pledged by the international community not be reduced to mere account juggling to make debt payments, then later come hat in hand to both the banks and the population seeking some unprecedented arrangement within a neoliberal framework just to achieve stability and cushion the suffering.
Momentary stability is not the only thing at stake. The next generation is as well. But there are winners and losers in any stabilization scheme. And under the rules of neoliberal stability, the left and the popular sectors are driven to accept their institutionalized subordination, independent of the political stripe of the government in "power." This is the danger in any political strategy that aims on the one hand to oppose the adjustment policy and on the other to support the government politically through negotiations and accords.
Political stability between parties, in this context, cannot assure social stability; it is more likely to lead to a divorce between social struggles and party ones. Furthermore, a democratization of the economy, the essence of any revolutionary proposal, becomes incompatible with the rules of the neoliberal game. Independent of what is agreed to legally with respect to property, economic groups tied to banking and commerce are in fact being reconstituted, and the government's leaning toward them is clear. They are the economic subjects of the neoliberal scheme, and, as far as they are concerned, there are just too many poor Nicaraguan workers and peasants. These "excess" poor go from being exploited by the social and economic programs to being excluded from them.
The problem the neoliberals then have to face is that these workers and peasants then go from exclusion to protest. It is from this phenomenon that it can be deduced that all neoliberal stability necessarily carries with it greater recourse to police force.
An identity problemThe FSLN is moving toward a new strategic definition, but it cannot be automatically assumed that what the FSLN has just agreed to can be embraced by all the unions or social movements, particularly not those that respond to the dynamic of their own base. What is being sought, however, is not so much a contradiction as it is a complementarity of forces.
As a party, the FSLN has committed itself to negotiating with the government to reach new accord levels, but it will not put a freeze on popular struggle to do so. Popular mobilization is the demonstrated way to neutralize the government's tactic of snuffing out brushfires where it can to further capitalist stability, and only coming to the FSLN when the flames threaten to leap its firewall.
But leaving aside "party mentality," as Ortega suggested, carries with it certain risks—not the least of which is potential loss of identity. But Sandinista leaders perhaps calculate that the risk of not assuming a new mind set and party strategy of a more national scope is even greater.
The next obvious question, then, is, which of the two forces will emerge hegemonic? The limited maneuvering room offered by the international lending agencies unquestionably favors the government's neoliberal project. But the level of resistance to the implementation of its measures—both organized and unorganized resistance, both civic and illegal—leaves the government with little space of its own.
An impossible dream? The development of a genuine alternative to the neoliberal model is still necessary, but is increasingly being seen as a long-term project. But the clock is ticking for the popular political forces. Their immediate need is to wring every concession possible from the government to assure their very survival. Whether the political parties like it or not, this means confrontation as well as negotiation, or even a combination of the two. In this context, negotiation is a form of resistance.
The neoliberal project has been unable to advance to the same degree as in Costa Rica or Honduras largely because of the levels of popular mobilization. These organizations may not have a coherent long-term strategy, but they refuse to tolerate hunger or to let the project imposed by the North advance unscathed. Society's drastic impoverishment in the past two years has led the FSLN to give more priority to defining concrete changes in government policy than to working through an alternative social and economic policy.
With one foot in popular civil society and the other in the government camp, Sandinismo finds itself at a crossroads with no clear alternative direction in mind. In the best scenario, it might be able to hang on to the space it now has, which, in these moments, is equivalent to what, in others, going forward would be. This consideration was surely in the minds of most Sandinista Assembly members when they decided to let the FSLN make its formal request for membership in the Socialist International. It meant that neither national accords nor international ones caused the same visceral and ideological reaction that they did a few months ago when some insisted that such accords would inevitably mean losing the FSLN's historic identity. Sandinismo has again shown its ability to reach some level of cohesion based on the requirements of the moment and a discussion of essentials.
Politicians, intellectuals and analysts continue to place faith in political reconciliation, although it is difficult to see how this could come about between the FSLN and National Assembly president Alfredo César. But, at the same time, they cannot remain insensitive to the specter of hunger, a serious reality.
Despite the misery or, rather, because of it, a new kind of reconciliation is taking place at the base level. It is a reconciliation of those who are desperate and ever less influenced by or incorporated into the political parties and unions or other social organizations. They demand the right to survival, to live with less hunger and misery. They have no interest in bringing down the government; they just want a profound reorientation of national policies.
They are in no condition to grit their teeth and wait another couple of years for the economy to recover, much less four more years for somebody to start spouting new campaign promises. They quickly lose patience with calls by the government and FSLN to sit down and negotiate. It is not because they oppose dialogue, but because political space is limited by the government's failure to comply and by its obsession with guaranteeing an economic "take-off" which will never reach this 86% of the rural population and 55% of the urban one that cannot even satisfy its minimum needs.
The popular sectors have their own positions, and the support that they may be willing to give to the political accords will depend on whether they can be convinced that these accords will translate into better lives now and new hope for their children.
Because of them, the union leaders warn that "the mobilization of the workers will not end with a simple accord, but with the satisfaction of their demands." Sandinista Worker Federation leader Damaso Vargas feels that "an accord between the FSLN and the government will not calm down the union struggle, because the workers defend other interests."
In the end, neither the FSLN nor the government have the capacity to comply with everything they have proposed. Its limits were tested toward the end of April, when the strongest wave of local conflicts to date swept over different parts of the country. At the barricades outside of Estelí, Boaco and Masaya, among other places, recompas and recontras were joined by cooperative members, the landless and the unemployed. They all had access to weapons and, with some minimal level of coordination, managed to block highways and take various towns for days.
Same struggle, same demandsThere was nothing new among their demands. They want jobs or land, titles and credit to produce—in other words, a genuine alternative to starvation. But what had the demonstrators in a particular fury this time is that the government had already agreed—obviously lightly—to provide all this and had done little or nothing to fulfill its promises. "One gets the impression," opined Barricada, "and it is a perception shared by more people all the time, that the government agrees to satisfy demands that it cannot fulfill; or rather that it lacks the executive mechanisms to make its political will felt."
Once again, Daniel Ortega and the local FSLN structures called on the demonstrators to cool out tempers that had flared with the government's failure to comply with its own promises. A new round of negotiations came out of this new crisis, but if what is agreed to this time is not fulfilled, the next wave of protest, when it hits, will undoubtedly be much more serious. Furthermore, those affected will be far less inclined to return to the negotiating table or to trust the government's word yet again.
One way or another, the FSLN's own word is now on the line too. For the "revueltos" and all the peasants without land or deeds, the FSLN is the last card they hold to force the government to listen to them. The government is fully aware of this and is probably exploiting it since the FSLN is backing the revueltos' demands on the one hand and joining the government in disapproving of the revueltos' methods on the other. This dynamic cannot be maintained indefinitely, particularly since no one can guarantee that the spontaneous explosions will not generate violence as happened in Estelí, when a demonstrator was killed in a skirmish with the police.
Yet another FSLN crossroadThe FSLN is also criticizing the government's increasing tendency to turn to the army and police, which translates into confrontations between people who came from the same revolutionary roots. This brings the FSLN to a crossroads in which it sees its political capital pledged both to the revueltos' demands and to the government's insistence that they act within the law. "Co-government" and the barely emerging national accord are already being put to the test by a population that is not particularly interested in the colors of political flags, but feels burdened with needs and is demonstrating the survival of a revolution much bigger than the party that led it.
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