Guatemala
A New Kind of Development—Or a New Face on the Old?
Envío team
With the international United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) just around the bend, it seems appropriate to take a close look at the kind of development currently being promoted for the countries of the South by the United States and the multilateral lending agencies. Today the words "environment," "sustainability" and especially "sustainable development" have become part of the vocabulary of even the most conservative institutions. (One very influential association attending UNCED, for example, is the Business Council for Sustainable Development, an association of multinational corporations headed up by petrochemical companies.) But is what these groups promote truly a new kind of development, or just the same old kind couched in a more modern and acceptable vocabulary?
The implementation of sustainable development strategies is vital to the future of both North and South—for their economies, natural resources and peoples. But little has been done to alter the unsustainable and inequitable models of the past; and, in fact, current policies actually foster their continuation.
One such policy, championed by the US government and multilateral banks, is the diversification of agricultural exports. This strategy, especially encouraged in Central America, promotes new kinds of crops—primarily fruits and vegetables—known as "nontraditionals," as distinguished from coffee, cotton, sugar and other traditional exports.
No one can deny the need to diversify exports in nations that depend so heavily on increasingly unprofitable traditional crops whose international market prices only continue to fall. But it is important to examine the environmental, social and economic results of nontraditional export promotion. Guatemalan researchers are doing just that. And their studies have shown that this diversification strategy, instead of offering farmers a solution to their historic poverty, has had a myriad of detrimental effects on the population and environment.
Why has this policy failed to offer an effective alternative in Guatemala? The answer lies, in part, in the historical context of ecological destruction and glaring social and economic inequalities that have shaped that country's development—none of which have been addressed by this "new" development scheme. Guatemala suffers from all the major environmental problems facing Central America and most other developing nations—deforestation, soil degradation, watershed deterioration, pesticide abuse, the contamination of water supplies, the disappearance of wildlife and massive migration to urban areas (see box). It also epitomizes the region's paramount social problem—highly concentrated wealth and political power, in shocking contrast to the extreme poverty of the majority.
Land: The key to life... or povertyDevelopment in Guatemala has always been focused outward, on developing the export economy, with little attention to the domestic market. Guatemala's political leaders have rarely given attention to local development, domestic food production or even the expansion of social services.
In addition, development has long been characterized by highly unequal access to land, technology and capital. From the colonial period until 1944, the indigenous population was subjugated as cheap, forced laborers at the service of local and foreign interests who exploited the land and natural resources. Though forced labor was outlawed under the democratically elected Arévalo government in 1944, the precarious condition of the indigenous peoples has continued to date. Income, for example, continues to concentrate increasingly in the hands of a few: the poorest 10% of the population received only 2.4% of national income in 1981, falling to 0.5% in 1989, while the share for the wealthiest 10% rose from 41% to 44% in the same period.
Guatemala's most important natural resource is land, and control over that land is its greatest source of conflict and poverty. About half of the economically active population is dedicated to agricultural production, which represents 26% of the Gross Domestic Product and 67% of exports. The economic importance of agriculture becomes even greater when one recognizes that a high proportion of the country's economic and service infrastructure exists fundamentally to meet that sector's needs.
The National Institute of Statistics (INDE) estimated in 1989 that 30% of the rural population is landless, while another 50% has plots too small on which to survive. Guatemala has the most skewed land distribution in all of Latin America. The Gini coefficient, which quantifies the degree of equality or inequality in land tenure, ranging from zero in a situation of perfect equality to one for maximum inequality, was 0.85 in 1979, up from 0.82 in 1964.
Less than 3% of the population owns 67% of all agricultural lands, while at the other extreme, 54% of Guatemalan farmers, owning tiny plots of less than 1.4 hectares, cultivate 4% of the land. From 1964 to 1979, with a growing population and nowhere else to go, the average size of these farmers' plots dropped from 1.0 to 0.7 hectares.
Farms this small are obviously too tiny to support a family. In order to survive, then, farmers must complement their income through other activities. Historically, many have migrated to the coast at harvest time to work on large cotton, coffee and sugar plantations. But the economic crisis, particularly in cotton, has reduced the demand for migrant laborers; some of this slack has been taken up by the intensive labor required for the production of nontraditional exports. Nontraditional crops, however, are not in themselves a solution to Guatemala's development problems.
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVERSE BUT DIMINISHINGGuatemala’s cultural diversity, with at least 21 different Mayan indigenousgroups, is paralleled only by its ecological diversity, and, hand in hand, two have been exploited and degraded over the years.
Because of its location on the isthmus joining the northern and southern hemispheres, where species from both come together, Guatemala has some of the richest ecosystems in the world. Its landscape, ranging from sea level to mountains towering over 4,000 meters, endows it with an immense variety of tropical and subtropical climates and soils. It is the most biologically diverse country in Central America, with almost 1,500 varieties of mammals, reptiles, birds, amphibians and fresh-water fish, including at least 45 species of invertebrates found only in Guatemala.
Guatemala’s forests are also some of the most biologically diverse in the world. The coniferous forests of Sierra de las Minas, for example, are considered to be the world’s most important source of tropical pine diversity. The Petén region boasts Central America’s second largest expanse of broad-leaved forest. Even modern food crops like corn exist in some 130 different varieties, preserved and cultivated over the years by the Mayan Indians.
But this wealth of diversity is diminishing. Due to the unrestricted exploitation of resources, some researches report that Guatemala is losing between 1,000 and 1,600 square kilometers of coniferous forests and rainforest annually. An estimated 65% of its original forests have already been destroyed, most in the last 30 years. It was during this period that the country’s principal export development took place, when thousands of hectares of virgin forests were cleared to make way for the massive expansion of agricultural exports.
The US government, together with private and multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank, promoted and bankrolled the expansion of cotton, sugar cane, coffee and beef. Between 1954 and 1980, lands devoted to cotton production increased 2,140% and to sugar 406%; coffee, the primary export crop since the late 1800s, expanded another 56%. Beef production also joined the export boom, with a 2,125% increase in grazing land by 1978.
UNICEF reports that forests covered 67% of the national territory in 1959 and only 39% by 1986; this means 41% of the nation’s forests were lost in this 27-year period. If deforestation continues at its current rate, the country’s forests will disappear altogether in less than 40 years.
After this massive export expansion, which had virtually ended by the early 1980s, one of many culprits in this forest destruction was the government’s scorched-earth counterinsurgency policy in the early 1980s, as well as the aerial spraying of herbicides and defoliants to control the cultivation of marijuana and opium. But more important today are unrestricted logging; expanding oil exploration and export agriculture; the need for firewood—the primary source of cooking fuel for 80% of the population—and the need for land. UNICEF reports that these last two account for more than 80% of forest area currently destroyed annually. In their acute poverty, a result of the highly skewed structured of Guatemalan society, indigenous peasants are forced to slash and burn new, unproductive lands to eke out their living, or to farm on steep, erosive hillsides; for this, they are often the ones blamed for environmental degradation—instead of those who impose this structural poverty.
Deforestation is destroying not only trees of high commercial and genetic value, but also the wealth of habitats for Guatemala’s rich wildlife. At least 133 species are considered threatened or endangered, including howler and spider monkeys, puma, ocelot, jaguar, tapir, two species of crocodiles and, symbolically, even Guatemala’s national bird, the quetzal. In addition to the disappearance of their habitats, these rare and irreplaceable animals are also threatened by the illegal and lucrative export of endangered species abroad.
Deforestation has also led to massive erosion. In some areas where less than 2 tons/hectare/year is an acceptable erosion rate, soils with vegetation cover are being swept away at the annual rate of 30 tons/hectare, and barren soils at an astonishing 1,400 tons/hectare. Erosion causes both a drop in soil fertility, which affects productivity, and the sedimentation of river beds, which in turn causes extensive flooding.
The country’s fishing industry is threatened by the destruction of coastal mangroves, where 90% of commercial marine species spend part of their life cycle. Since 1985, and estimated 40% of the mangroves have disappeared, primarily due to the demand for firewood. In addition, the tons of soil swept into the sea by tropical rains carry poisonous agrochemical residues, also damaging coastal ecosystems.
It was the expansion of cotton, as well as other crops like coffee, sugar, tobacco, bananas and cardamom, that brought Guatemala the intense and indiscriminate use of agrochemicals. As pests build up resistance to these products, producers are caught in the incessant “pesticide treadmill.” In addition, agrochemicals decrease soil fertility and, therefore, productivity, thus driving up the use of chemical fertilizers. Between 1955 and 1985, the average number of pesticide applications per cotton season rose from 5 to 36.
The magnitude of adverse health effects is largely immeasurable as these poisonous chemicals filter into water and food supplies.
In the 1970s, Guatemala had the distinction of having some of the highest DDT levels in the world. DDT in the milk of dairy cattle measured 189 times the acceptable limit set by the World Health Organization. DDT levels in mothers’ mil, at 224 times that limit, were reported to be the highest in the world.
Guatemala has an apparently large water supply, with 2,500 square kilometers of its national territory in lakes and rivers. But deforestation and erosion have caused what used to be year-round water supplies to dry up in some areas during the dry season. Numerous lagoons have disappeared entirely, and other waterways are seriously contaminated by the inappropriate disposal of human, solid and toxicindusstrial wastes. These wastes, like pesticides, have not only affected water supplies but have also entered the food chain through agricultural products, beef, milk and seafood.
Nontraditionals: Jackpot for a fewResearch in Guatemala shows that the introduction of non-traditional export crops is effecting numerous structural changes in the peasant economy on a national level, as well as in peasant communities and families.
* The production of nontraditionals has dramatically increased pesticide use, resulting in additional pest problems, greater health risks and increased environmental degradation.
* While nontraditionals create more jobs because they are highly labor intensive, many farmers simply work far more hours and employ their wives and children.
* Those who have been financially successful with nontraditional products are those already privileged in some way—through resources or connections—while the results for those with the fewest resources have been devastating.
* The quick and high financial return that some have been able to cash in on, at the expense of the majority, has increased social differentiation, tearing away at the remaining fabric of community solidarity within both indigenous and ladino communities.
* The high risk factor in nontraditional crops has increased rural instability in general and has specifically heightened the risk of losing one's home or land, especially for poor farmers.
* Even the most basic decisions over what, when and for whom to produce are being transferred from the small farmers themselves into the hands of large, dominant and arbitrary export companies, which have woven a tight web of dependence through their credit and marketing policies.
One poor farmer summarized many people's experience with nontraditionals as follows: "We're working more hours and producing more and better, yet we're still eating less and less all the time."
Nontraditionals come to GuatemalaThe term "nontraditional export" technically refers to any crops that do not fall into Central America's short list of traditional agricultural exports—coffee, sugar, cotton, bananas and beef—though in some areas of Guatemala vegetables and fruits have been produced for decades. For the purposes of this publication, we will use the term nontraditional to refer specifically to those crops that were introduced beginning in the 1970s as part of a concerted international effort at export diversification. Areas that have produced vegetables for a much longer period, however, also serve as an important reference, especially with respect to environmental and health risks.
As with past export promotion, the US government—primarily through the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Agency for International Development—as well as the multilateral banks are stimulating the cultivation and export of nontraditional crops throughout the region through credit, tax and other economic incentives. Export diversification has led to the cultivation of snow peas, melons, broccoli and dozens of varieties of other vegetables, fruits, cut flowers and root crops.
In the Guatemalan highlands known as the Altiplano, the first large export company, ALCOSA (Alimentos Congelados), built its packaging plants after the 1976 earthquake. ALCOSA started promoting nontraditional crops in Patzún in 1977. The company recruited farmers by offering seeds and all other necessary inputs to peasants who were generally unable to get credit from other entities; ALCOSA also guaranteed that it would purchase their harvests. This arrangement obviously appealed to small farmers, who were increasingly drawn in when they saw the first successful harvests.
Few reliable statistics are available on nontraditional production, but according to a November 1990 Bank of Guatemala report, 3,090 hectares were in nontraditional fruit and vegetable production (plus another 118 hectares in cut flowers) in 1979 in Guatemala's central Altiplano, which includes the departments of Guatemala, Sacatepequez and Chimaltenango. The primary crops produced then were potatoes, green beans, carrots, cauliflower and cabbage, which made up 80% of the area in nontraditional production. At the same time, corn, wheat or bean production occupied 72,807 hectares in this region, meaning that nontraditionals were only being produced on 4% of the total area cultivated.
The Bank reports that a decade later 5,608 hectares were being dedicated to fruit and vegetable production in that part of the Altiplano. Nontraditionals thus represented 6.6% of the total area cultivated, of which 75% was broccoli and snow peas.
More and more peasants have turned to nontraditional production in the past three to five years because of the devastating effects of economic stabilization and adjustment policies on basic grains production. Unlike peasants who began producing vegetables and fruits 10 or more years ago, farmers today feel that they have little choice. "They make the decision to produce nontraditionals," comments one researcher, "in the same way that they would decide to chance illegally immigrating to the United States."
The main culprits in the basic grains crisis are government policies that have driven down the domestic sales price of wheat and corn—in particular, the importation of wheat through the US "food aid" program, Public Law 480 (PL480). The Guatemalan government began importing wheat through PL480 in 1983; imports steadily increased to three million quintals in 1986, dropping slightly from 1987 to 1989 and hitting three million again last year. The country's industrial mills obviously prefer to purchase this higher-quality, lower-priced imported wheat than that produced domestically. National wheat production thus dropped from an average of one million quintals (1 quintal = 100 pounds) in the 1986-89 period to 500,000 in 1990-91, and a predicted 330,000 for the 1991-92 cycle. The number of producers dropped from 60,000 in 1989 to 23,000 currently.
Corn prices have also dropped relative to increasing production costs as well as in absolute terms. The real sale price of corn has dropped 3.3% per year since 1980, partly because imports increased six times between 1980 and 1990, undercutting local production. INDECA, the Guatemalan institute that regulates grains prices, is also playing less and less of a role. The World Bank's plan for regulating basic grains prices in Central America is to set a range, based on average international prices, within which domestic prices should be controlled by a public or private regulatory agency. Given the weight of US grains exports on the world market and the fact that they are heavily subsidized, these international prices are an unjust standard, but Guatemala does not even follow World Bank policy. INDECA, which bought and sold a significant portion of the grains produced up until 1986, drastically cut its purchases in 1987 (corn purchases, for example, dropped from 1 million to 58,000 quintals) and, as a result of heavy budget cuts, has gradually lost its regulatory capacity altogether.
Together, these policies are driving basic grains producers bankrupt and carrying the country further and further from food security toward dependence on basic food imports. Given this crisis in basic grains production, nontraditional crops appear to be an attractive—if not the only—alternative. Farmers are drawn in by the possibility of harvesting as many as three times a year and receiving large cash payments, and witness the apparent success of some farmers around them. They see that a few people are doing quite well.
Nontraditional case studiesThe Guatemalan researchers chose four zones in which to conduct case studies of the effects of nontraditional export production. The first three, all of which are indigenous communities, are located in different climatic regions of the mountainous Altiplano. The fourth, Usumutlán, a ladino community, is located in the dry eastern region of Guatemala. In order to guarantee that their findings are representative, the researchers also conducted regional surveys and selected numerous sites as "control zones."
* In Patzún, nontraditionals were introduced in 1977 and have expanded over the past decade. The primary crops produced are snow peas and broccoli.
* In El Novillero, local farmers began nontraditional production in 1988 with two successful years, then went deeply into debt and abandoned nontraditionals altogether when a broccoli harvest was rejected in its entirety.
* In Almolonga, farmers have produced vegetables—potatoes, onions, cabbage, and so on—for export within Central America for over 70 years.
* In Usumutlán, ladino farmers used an extensive irrigation system to produce a fairly successful melon crop in 1990, but their 1991 crop was rejected and left them in debt. One large private producer has since taken over the vast majority of melon production in that area.
These villages are all characterized by a majority of farmers who either own or rent minifundios. Minifundios are defined as land plots too small to support a family; their size varies depending on soil and climatic conditions. The Altiplano itself is made up mainly of landholdings of less than 0.7 hectares each, as the Bank of Guatemala's own statistics exemplify: the 3,090 hectares in fruit and vegetable production in 1979 encompassed 6,633 different farms, each thus averaging half a hectare. Research indicates that virtually no peasants with such small landholdings will benefit from nontraditional production, nor will the landless.
Poor farmers cannot survive off farming alone. Most supplement their income by working as itinerant merchants or seasonal migrant laborers selling traditional handicrafts, clothing or other goods and services, or with the aid of family members that have migrated either to Guatemala's cities or the United States. (Relatives in the United States send an estimated $1 million per day to Guatemalan families.)
Nontraditionals appear to be an alternative to these composite solutions. But most farmers who try their hand at nontraditional crops will not risk everything: they also continue to produce basic grains, especially corn and beans, in order to guarantee their family's subsistence for at least part of the year.
New exports, new risks for the producerStudies of nontraditionals in Central America as a whole show that large producers—often tied to US fruit companies—generally grow fruits and flowers, which require much higher capital investments, while small farmers are more able to participate in the production of tubers, vegetables and some ornamental plants. A 1989 study of broccoli production showed that 63.2% was produced on farms smaller than 7 hectares, 16.6% on agricultural cooperatives, 16.8% on farms larger than 7 hectares, and 3.3% on land owned by the export company.
Nontraditional crop production requires large outlays of capital, primarily due to the need for costly, imported agrochemicals. Over a 15-year period, traditional corn production requires a $175 investment and traditional coffee, $1,500, while melons require $56,735. Averaged out over a variety of crops, nontraditionals demand 4.4 times greater investment. Because very few small farmers are eligible for bank credit (the National Development Bank, BANDESA, only funds 3%), they must turn either to usury credit, at a minimum 10% monthly interest, or to the export companies. These export companies, generally subsidiaries of transnationals such as United Brands, Del Monte and Standard Fruit Company, manage product marketing and determine prices, payment conditions and criteria related to product "quality."
A small farmer generally has two choices: to sell to the export company, which pays in two weeks' to two months' time, or to sell to "coyotes" or intermediaries, who offer a lower price but pay in full on purchase. The advantages of selling to the export company are that they pay higher prices and sometimes offer credit and technical assistance. The export companies do not all have the same criteria, though they are very similar. Some, for example, require farmers to organize in groups, where the company can then take advantage of economies of scale and thus use fewer employees and technical assistants to attend to producers. Others prefer to attend to individual farmers, where they have greater control over the final product.
The black box: Export company maneuversThe export companies are all-powerful under the current scheme, and epitomize the problem of profoundly skewed control of resources in Guatemala. They are like a "black box" into which farmers feed their produce, but which grant no control, input or recourse. Though the companies generally sign nationally recognized legal contracts with producers, peasants have never been able to use their rights as guaranteed by those contracts, while the exporters act arbitrarily at will. Even holding such contracts, the majority of producers suffered losses during the past two years due to maneuvers by the export company. The export companies determine how much credit they will grant and at what rate, often prohibit farmers from seeking technical assistance or credit from other entities, encourage them to apply massive quantities of agrochemicals, analyze the product's quality and set the purchasing price. The entire risk is assumed by the producer; none by the exporter.
The researchers have documented glaring injustices with respect to credit and prices by the export companies. In one case, small producers from Sololá purchased broccoli seeds on credit from the export company, which did not stipulate the price or interest rate. When this cost was later discounted from their harvest, the farmers discovered they had been charged double the local market price, that is, 100% interest over the three-month production cycle. But producers said they had no choice: the company would not otherwise have purchased their products.
In 1990-91, credit repaid in cash was often charged at 21% interest for the three-month harvest period (equivalent to an annual rate of 84%), while the private bank annual interest rate for credit—unavailable to peasant farmers—was 27% annually.
In another case, the researchers compared the price paid to melon producers with the official international market price during that same period. While some variation due to quality or transportation costs would be expected, they found that the price paid to producers differed excessively: 50% were paid between 3.25 and 15.00 quetzals per crate; 42.3%, between 18.00 and 25.00; and 7.7% between 40.00 and 45.00. Almost 55% of melon producers harvest in December; at that time the market rate for a crate of melons averaged 73.00 quetzals. This means that those who received the lowest price (over 15%) were paid less than 5% of the average market rate. Often, the justification for lowering the price is the product's quality, which, of course, is also determined by the purchasing company, and often for questionable motives.
Researchers found that in 1990, at a time when the government was implementing currency devaluations, the export companies set the quetzal purchase price for melons before the harvest, thus discounting future devaluations in relation to the dollar. But they charged for inputs acquired before and during planting at a price adjusted for devaluation and inflation after the harvest. In other words, producers had to pay for their inputs at the new, higher dollar value but were paid for their melons at its lower, pre-devaluation value, despite the fact that the export company turned around and sold them at the higher rate.
One export company not only refused to pay farmers after rejecting their produce but also tried to charge them for its own losses. Melon producers in Usumutlán found themselves in such a situation with what they thought was an "alternative" export company. After a bad experience with Chiquita Corporation in the mid-1980s, Usumutlán's farmers were hesitant to return to producing nontraditional crops, but were convinced to try again by an AID-funded company called Alpine, which promised to help them organize and offered greater local control over marketing. The first harvest successful but generated some debts because Alpine could not sell all of the melons. In 1991, the second year, the company claimed that it could not sell a single crate, leaving the farmers thousands of dollars in debt. If that were not enough, Alpine also said it would charge the producers for the loss of prestige it suffered due to the presence of parasites in the melons.
"Quality" control and agrochemicalsQuality, as defined by the export companies, refers not to nutritional value but to cosmetic appearance. Hence the "need" for massive doses of agrochemicals. A contract with the export company ALCOSA for brussels sprouts sets the cultivation dates and includes stipulations on diameter, color and maturity; it sets "quality" standards stating that the delivery will be rejected if more than 2% have aphids; if there are more than 4 worms per sample of 200; if there are blemishes caused by worms on more than 5%; if there is insect damage on more than 5%; if there is fungus damage on more than 10%; if the delivery is at all damp; or if any hair is found in the sample.
The contract states that ALCOSA will provide technical assistance but that the producer must sell all his or her produce to ALCOSA and agree to use only chemical products it authorizes (which, coincidentally, it also imports and sells). If other agrochemicals are found in laboratory analyses, the product will be rejected without pay. Perhaps under other circumstances one could surmise that the agrochemicals stipulated by the company are actually safer to use or less likely to cause a product to be rejected by US importers. The ALCOSA contract leaves little room for such optimism. It states that, "ALCOSA assumes no obligation for the eventual damage caused by the use of any chemical on the contracted brussels sprouts plantation, either to people or to the product itself."
Another company operating in Chimaltenango demands even greater obligations by the producer: if a farmer uses an unauthorized product and the shipment is, for this reason, rejected, the producer is responsible and will not only not be paid for the product but must also "cancel the total value of the delivery at that day's market rate."
The export company generally takes in the produce then reports back several days later whether or not it has been accepted. The producer, who usually does not have easy access to transportation, often has less than 24 hours in which to recover a rejected delivery, which would make it possible to try to sell it somewhere else. During broccoli harvest season, one can see mountains of rejected broccoli rotting along the roadways.
When farmers have complained about treatment by the export companies, they find themselves faced with a virtual monopoly that simply responds by threatening to move operations to another area of the country. An attempt in Patzún at organizing farmers to refuse to sell to the exporters failed due to economic differences among the producers themselves; the poorest farmers were unable to hold out because they were too dependent on the sale income to remain in limbo, with no other financial support. The few existing cooperative export companies formed by small farmers, like La Flor Patzunera in Patzún, appear to have become carbon copies of the transnational exporters; non-member farmers complain that they are treated no better and that payment is even slower in coming, and offer evidence that coop directors are taking a hefty cut off the top.
So who's getting rich? If nontraditional exports bring in high returns, it is clear that the majority is going to the export companies themselves. They are the ones that benefit from the government's tax exemptions and other incentives for the promotion of nontraditional exports. The other high rollers are market intermediaries and speculators who purchase crops in cash and re-sell them to the export companies. One indigenous man from Patzún started by buying and selling nontraditionals from local farmers; with his profits he started lending credit; now people claim he is rapidly becoming a large landowner as he acquires both lands and homes from those who could not repay their debts.
Others who have come out ahead are often those who serve as "group leaders" or contact people between a group of farmers and the export enterprise. But it is unclear whether they are somehow directly rewarded by the export company, if they receive—overtly or covertly—an extra cut, or if these leaders simply tend to be farmers who have more resources and stability anyway, which allow for greater success with nontraditionals.
Other farmers—generally those with greater resources—are at least breaking even, or have been until recently. Those who are most successful tend to be close to all-weather access roads, are in areas with good climatic conditions, own a larger-than-average plot of land, are tied to nongovernmental organizations or to political power and/or have other sources of income that increase their overall stability. They are likely, for example, to have an extended family network and receive remittances from family members living abroad. These farmers generally have enough resources to pay others to help them during peak work periods, instead of using exclusively family labor. They are also generally those who started producing nontraditionals early on and invested their profits in improving their living standard or buying more land.
In some cases, large farmers with more resources have edged small producers out of the competition. This is particularly true with melon production, which has already been experimented with on large plantations (which, however, eventually destroyed melon production in Mexico due to an upsurge of uncontrollable pests after years of extensive agrochemical use). In Usumutlán, for example, one large farmer not only continued producing melons after the small farmers' disaster, but has also expanded into the space they left behind, virtually taking over the area's melon production. Some think that small farmers are simply the guinea pigs for large producers, and that once several years of "experimentation" have passed, latifundistas—large plantation owners—will displace small producers in those crops that pose the least financial risk.
Two new phenomena have been observed in recent years: the first is that the basic grains crisis has driven even poorer farmers into nontraditionals, who often soon find then themselves deep in debt; the second is that income is dropping even for what were "successful" farmers.
Peasants in El Novillero heard about the success with nontraditionals in neighboring Chimaltenango and, made desperate by the economic crisis, decided to try their hand at broccoli. Their first two harvests, in 1989 and 1990, were fairly successful. But when they took their 1991 broccoli harvest to the export company, it was rejected in its entirety, on the claim that the quality was unacceptable. It is unclear if this was the real reason: there was a flood of broccoli on the market at that moment, and many suspect that the company simply did not need it.
But the export companies do not have to provide explanations. El Novillero's farmers are now thousands of dollars in debt, and they have all returned to basic grains production, migratory labor, selling traditional woven or embroidered garments and other survival strategies.
A group of poor peasants in Patzún rented land under a three-year contract. Since they did not have much money for agrochemicals, they applied them too little, too late and too sporadically—pests had already gotten into the broccoli. The entire harvest was rejected. They were left with a debt for their land rent, which they finally paid off by working for the owner, as well as with unpayable debts to two export companies totaling 25,000 quetzals (US$5,000).
Those who had success in the past have also run into new difficulties: the price of inputs is rising while the security of selling one's crop is dropping; drought and an invasion of a new pest called plutela devastated many farmers' harvests in Patzún last year; farmers say melon production peaks in five years, while broccoli and snow peas start out with good yields then begin to fall; the export companies do not offer the same "breaks" as when they began recruiting producers. Competition has risen as more and more farmers turn to producing nontraditionals; there is nothing to stop the exporters from becoming increasingly arbitrary.
This phenomenon is even more of a problem internationally. Small markets make prices highly vulnerable to relatively small changes in supply and demand. The entire international market for nontraditional products totals some $1 billion annually, compared to an $8.4 billion world market for coffee alone; yet 33 countries are already producing nontraditional exports, and competition is only bound to increase. Nontraditionals generally aim to reach the US market during the winter, when the same US-produced crops are in short supply there, or, for example, when Mexican broccoli or Taiwanese snow pea suppliers are unable to ship to the US. These "windows of opportunity" are very narrow and closely watched by all interested parties; thus they are always changing.
Environment and healthMany aspects of environmental destruction in Guatemala have not been caused by the production of nontraditional exports (see box). But neither do nontraditionals offer a real, long-term development alternative that would relegate to history the population's survival strategies that put fierce pressure on natural resources. In addition, some elements of current nontraditional production do make some environment and health problems more acute.
The short growing season required for vegetables makes it possible to cultivate up to three crops per year. In Patzún, corn takes nine months just to produce one crop, and those plots rest for the other three. Giving the earth time to rest between crops was once a concept integral to the beliefs of indigenous peoples there. This contrasts, however, with the production of nontraditionals; farmers generally produce three harvests a year—two of broccoli and one of snow peas. The soil remains idle for only a short period, if at all. If such intensive land use were combined with the traditional practice of integrating manure or other natural fertilizers into the soil, it would not be as devastating; but Patzún's farmers have little to no access to manure, and few incorporate even the stalks from the previous harvest into the soil, let alone more nutritive organic matter.
In addition, while nontraditional exports are seen as crop "diversification," a plantation of snow peas is far less biologically diverse than a traditional milpa, or corn plantation. A traditional Guatemalan milpa contains over 20 additional plant varieties, generally including numerous medicinal herbs, squash, beans, chilies and coffee, as well as trees for shade and firewood. Nontraditional crops actually decrease biodiversity on agricultural lands.
But the greatest environmental and health risk, made critical by the growth of nontraditional production, is the exponential increase in agrochemical use. One study in Chimaltenango showed that farmers use 600% more pesticides on broccoli and almost 700% more on snow peas than they use on com. Historically, experience with using vast quantities of agrochemicals on other products, such as cotton, has demonstrated their long-term effects on the environment and agriculture, not to mention the health of the population.
The growth and territorial concentration of nontraditionals favor the development of pests and imply increasing use of pesticides, breaking the ecological balance and launching producers onto a "pesticide treadmill." As pests develop resistance, farmers apply more and more chemicals with greater frequency in order to try to get the same yields and cosmetic results. Farmers in Patzún say they have increased pesticide applications from one per month to three per week, and where they once used a capful of poison, they now use a cup.
There is little awareness about the dangers of agrochemicals among farmers. One carried his backpack spray pump to the potable water tank in Almolonga to clean it. Another plugged a leaky sprayer with his bare hand while talking to another peasant. The owner of a small store in Patzún had stored his backpack sprayer on the floor beside vegetables for sale and in easy reach of his small children.
Farmers in Almolonga have produced vegetables for export to the Central American market for many decades. The soil, in spite of over 25 years of intensive agrochemical use, is still extremely fertile due to the extensive and consistent use of organic matter to renourish it between crops. Yet, awareness about agrochemicals is almost nonexistent. Empty containers of highly toxic liquid or powdered chemicals, replete with red warning labels, are strewn throughout the area, into the extensive irrigation canals and the pathways between fields where children play. The leaves of the plants are white with pesticide dust. Produce is washed in a stream passing through the area where people walk barefoot and splash water on their faces, and where domesticated animals drink. It is very likely that farmers living downstream use that same spring for drinking water. There appears to have been a recent upsurge in birth defects in Almolonga.
Some argue that the export companies' control and the US market's stricter pesticide standards actually serve to rein in the overuse of pesticides such as is seen in Almolonga. But while Almolonga may represent an extreme, there is no question that extravagant agrochemical use in Patzún is precisely the result of export company recommendations, technical assistance and cosmetic standards. These companies are far more concerned with the product's appearance than with pesticide residues, as demonstrated by the ALCOSA contract cited above. Less than 1% of this produce is actually tested upon importation to the United States. Even so, what reaches US consumers is far less toxic, due to the chemical breakdown process, than what Guatemalan farmers are exposed to during production; organophosphates like methyl parathion, long banned in the United States, are used regularly.
In one survey of 50 melon producers in Zacapa and 50 broccoli producers in Sololá, over 70% had had health problems or become ill from the use of agrochemicals since they had begun producing nontraditionals, 37% to the point of vomiting. Nearly 39% admit to using no protection whatsoever in applying them, though the percentage is probably actually much higher. After application, fewer than 65% bathe, and nearly 19% do not even wash their hands. Once farmers have finished with their spray pumps, 39% wash them in their home, 22% in the river and only some 32% away from the drinking water supply. Finally, a third said they had seen animals die from contamination caused by agrochemicals.
The social effects of nontraditionalsThe social effects of these new crops are very complex and are altering family and community relations. Researchers have only begun to uncover some of these changes; far more in-depth research must be done to make a thorough analysis possible. Some preliminary observations follow.
National and international promoters of nontraditionals often point to increased employment opportunities as one important benefit of such crops. In comparison to basic grains, nontraditionals require an estimated five to eight times as much labor to cultivate the same area. But what the majority of poor farmers have done, in practice, is work longer hours and involve more family members—particularly women and children.
Women are working outside the home, in many cases for the first time—some in the fields with their families, while others have taken jobs in the export packaging plants. For these women, traditional weaving and embroidery—skills learned by virtually all indigenous girls, who often make their family's clothing and/or sell to others who do not—have become secondary. What impacts—both positive and negative—is this having on family relations? Are women increasingly turning away from these traditional arts?
Researchers have noted that peasants speak differently about their lives and goals, especially with respect to their community. Whereas there used to be community vision and cohesion—especially in indigenous villages—individual survival appears to have won peoples' attention. This, as well as increasing social differentiation, which is engendering new conflicts within these rural communities, could make the future development of a broad peasant organization more difficult. This may, in fact, be one of the goals of those who promote nontraditional exports.
With the production of nontraditionals, peasants have lost the little stability they had. Because of the role of the export companies, even fundamental decisions that any farmer would normally make about what and when to produce, or for whom, have been taken out of peasants' hands. Perishable vegetables and fruits leave them little to no flexibility in marketing; corn, beans and wheat, on the other hand, can be stored, for example, until prices rise. And when a broccoli crop is rejected, the farmer is left with nothing but debts; at least when corn or beans cannot be sold, they can be eaten. Nontraditionals have thus also increased the possibility of losing the most precious resource a peasant has: land.
A new kind of developmentResearch projects such as that described above are vital for understanding the impact of global policies at the local level and for aiding in the search for alternatives built from the bottom up. Fundamentally, each country's path toward development should be defined in a negotiated, participatory effort that includes all of those it affects—in other words, its own citizens. Local initiatives should feed into national ones, national into regional, and so on.
Because of the high cost of agrochemicals, many Guatemalan farmers have begun, on their own, to experiment with organic alternatives. In Patzún alone, some 50 different farmers have started innovating with traditional recipes. One indigenous farmer began investigating alternatives after hearing about a broccoli shipment that was rejected for pesticide residues. "They send us their chemicals, we buy them and use them, then they reject our products. Something's wrong here," he said, explaining his motivation. After several months of experimentation, he has patented four different organic products: fertilizer, insecticide, fungicide and adherent. He claims excellent results with both broccoli and snow pea production.
The Cakchiquel Coordinator for Integral Development (COCADI) promotes the recovery of traditional farming systems and community self-reliance, focusing on soil quality through organic farming and general care of the local environment. Numerous other groups and individuals are working on similar projects—composting, green manures and natural pesticides, herbicides and fungicides for organic farming; still others are promoting and experimenting with herbal medicines.
Some rural communities are organizing to seek common solutions for survival. For example, people from all over the country—internally displaced ladino and indigenous people without land—came together in the community of Sumután. Diverse but united by need, they met for a period of two years in order to stay organized; over time they built up a fund with which to purchase farmland. And they are now struggling to survive on that land together; each farmer produces individually, but their harvests are sold as one, and the benefits are distributed equitably.
A new peasant organization has recently formed, which represents, so far, some 2,000 small and medium agricultural producers from the Altiplano. Their goal is to find collective solutions to their most critical production and marketing problems, including the need for land. Poor ladino and indigenous farmers are working together; some indigenous groups, for example, are reviving Mayan organic agricultural techniques and sharing this traditional expertise with both ladino and other indigenous farmers. This peasant association, which does not yet even have a name, may offer important alternatives for other small farmers in the future.
Such local initiatives—which lay the foundations for defining a model of sustainable development for Guatemala—must be encouraged to develop and connect with national and global initiatives. Lack of freedom to organize impedes the development of peasant organizations, as well as of society in general. The government has the responsibility to open political space to allow for their development.
In addition, if basic grains producers are ruined by structural adjustment policies, groups like COCADI, who are returning to their technical and organizational roots, will not survive. They must also be given the economic space in which to develop their techniques, and not simply be forced to adopt technology sent down by the North. The government should actively promote and support local initiatives to recover and expand the use of environmentally sound traditional production technology. Among other things, it should maintain protective tariffs for national industry and food production. These same measures exist in the United States and thus result in unfair competition, such as in the case of Guatemala's wheat producers.
The government, as well as development agencies, should also provide credit to small producers, and, ideally, seek mechanisms through which to finance peasant organizations that manage their own credit funds. At the same time, INDECA, the state grains purchasing agency, which regulates prices, should have its budget restored and even increased so it can play an effective role.
Guatemalan peasants, however, face an even greater obstacle: many do not even own land, and those who do, more often than not, have plots too small on which to survive. In order to lay a real foundation for equitable and sustainable development in Guatemala, the government should implement an agrarian reform program that provides land parcels at least large enough to feed a family to landless peasants and minifundistas. The state should also provide credit and training to beneficiaries and conduct the land reform program with their participation.
In addition to redistributing this key resource, the government should also regulate the country's environment and natural resources in order to guarantee their equitable and sustainable use over the long term.
All of these policies—from increased credit to the promotion of traditional technology and resource distribution and regulation—imply an important role for the state. But such active and extensive government participation is in direct contradiction with the current structural adjustment policies that the US government and multilateral lending agencies are promoting throughout Latin America.
Nontraditional export production promotes islands of growth in a sea of poverty. It is the tip of the iceberg of policies that simply restructure the same old development model for Central America, perhaps under conditions a little less drastic for a peasant minority. Fundamentally, this concept of development does not address structural problems of poverty, resource access or democratic participation; it thus continues to prevent Latin America's peasantry from earning a secure and dignified livelihood, and impedes development from being sustainable for the future.
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a monthly magazine of analysis on Central America