Nicaragua
Striving for Peace and Curbing the War
Envío team
On January 10, before delegates from 69 countries of the world, Daniel Ortega was inaugurated President of the Republic of Nicaragua. On January 9, 96 representatives of 7 political parties held the first session of the National Constituent Assembly. With newly structured executive and legislative branches, the Nicaraguan government has begun its struggle for peace, the country’s major objective for 1985.
A few days after these events, Harry Shlaudeman, the US Special Envoy for Central America and the principal negotiator for his government in the Manzanillo talks, affirmed “I see no change in that country. Nicaragua remains a problem for Central America.”
During this month of important changes in Nicaragua, the new government has maintained previous means of working for peace while opening additional channels. In response the US administration has not relinquished its aggressive positions, preferring on the contrary to aggravate the conflict by withdrawing from practically all the avenues that could lead to a negotiated solution. Nicaragua’s President defined the attitude of the US leaders in the following manner: “They have not decided on a political solution, and they have not discarded the possibility of a military solution.”
“They have not decided on a political solution”Over the past month, the US government took several measures that moved it even further from a peaceful solution to its conflict with Nicaragua. On January 18, it announced that it was withdrawing from both the trial in the World Court and its bilateral conversations with Nicaragua in Manzanillo. Furthermore, in its attempt to continue blocking the Contadora negotiations, the Reagan administration seems to be applying special pressure at this time on the Costa Rican government so that it will take an active role in obstructing the negotiations, which have entered a crucial phase.
ManzanilloThe tenth Manzanillo meeting had been scheduled for the month of January. The Nicaraguan government has kept its mutual commitment with the US not to publicly divulge the contents of the talks. However, this silence has not prevented certain pessimism from showing through. Referring to the talks, Victor Hugo Tinoco, Nicaragua’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and representative in Manzanillo, made the following statement in Caracas on January 7: “We wish to believe that reasonable attitudes are going to prevail.”
The US administration has also remained silent. However, from time to time, and with intentions that appear to respond more to propagandistic motives that to reality, the US has manifested optimism. For example, in early January Harry Shlaudeman stated: “All signs are positive regarding the prevailing situation on the isthmus… We are confident that we will achieve good results in a short time.” Only a few days after this optimistic assertion, the US “indefinitely” suspended its participation in the talks, presenting two reasons: (1) the talks had made no substantial progress; and (2) their suspension would ease tensions between the two governments. Only days before the break in the talks, the Contadora group had publicly supported them as a means to reach bilateral solutions.
The HagueOn January 18, the US also declared that it was dropping out of the legal proceedings initiated by the World Court in April 1984 at the request of Nicaragua. At the time of the US withdrawal, both countries were in the stage of preparing documents to substantiate their positions. Nicaragua is scheduled to present its allegation on April 30, and the US would have until May 31 to reply with its defense. Although the US has abandoned the proceedings, the Court has decided to continue the trial as it was already programmed.
In a series of statements, the US government offered several reasons for its decision to withdraw from The Hague: (1) it was a “political decision” on the part of the US and not a case of ignoring international law; (2) the World Court was being “partial” and using Nicaragua’s suit for “political and propagandistic ends”; (3) the Court has given the impression that it “is determined to render a decision in favor of Nicaragua”; (4) although the US supposedly possesses proof that would enable it to refute Nicaragua’s accusations of aggression, this proof is of a “highly sensitive” nature and could therefore not be presented before a court in which 2 of the 16 judges are from Warsaw Pact countries.
ContadoraOn January 9, two years after the first Contadora meeting, the foreign ministers of the four mediating nations gathered in Panama to prepare the definitive version of the new Peace Treaty. Under US pressure, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica had proposed changes in the original September 7 Peace Treaty that Nicaragua had offered to sign. These proposed modifications, it would seem, are more “consistent with US interests.” Following two months of broad consultations, the changes have been incorporated into the September 7 document, and a new version of the treaty will be presented to the Central American foreign ministers at a meeting scheduled for February 14 and 15 in Panama.
The US strategy no longer appears to consist of simply pressuring its Central American allies—Guatemala has taken more independent stands on the Contadora issue—to modify the treaty; instead, Costa Rica has threatened not to attend the meeting itself. Presently, with serious internal problems in the Salvadoran government and military negotiations taking place between the US and Honduras, Costa Rica is in the best position to cooperate with the plans of the US administration.
An incident, certain details of which remain unclear, occurred at the Costa Rican embassy in Managua on December 24. José Manuel Urbina Lara, a Nicaraguan law student, had been given asylum at the embassy in August so that he could evade military service. (According to prevailing international agreements, this is not a justified motive for awarding asylum). On the night of the 24th, he left the grounds of the embassy accompanied by a woman and had an encounter with several Nicaraguan police officers, who finally arrested him. A Nicaraguan military court is presently trying him.
The Costa Rican government claims that Nicaragua violated the right to asylum, alleging that Urbina Lara was deceived into leaving the embassy premises so that the police could arrest him. Therefore, Costa Rica refuses to attend the Contadora meeting until the matter has been clarified and Urbina returns to his asylum. Costa Rican government officials have even stated that their country will completely withdraw from the peace negotiations.
Throughout the month of January, Costa Rica has presented this incident as a fundamental political problem. It attempted to take the issue before the OAS, but the Latin American members of this organization decided unanimously to refer the matter to Contadora. In the opinion of some Costa Rican politicians who had favored the OAS alternative, this was “the worst diplomatic defeat” in the history of the Central American nation. Contadora has begun its mediation between the two countries with caution and secrecy but, at present, has made no progress, although hopeful signs do exist.
It would seem that Costa Rica’s presentation of this small incident as a reason for not attending the Contadora meeting responds to the Reagan administration’s influence over the most pro-US sectors of the San José government. The Costa Rican ambassador to the OAS had to admit publicly that his country’s embassy in Nicaraguan had not been violated. Nevertheless, whatever the importance or insignificance of the incident itself, Costa Rica’s use of it is effectively blocking the current phase of the Contadora negotiations.
“They have not dismissed the possibility of a military solution”The counterrevolutionary war on Nicaragua has continued its course throughout the last month. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration is attempting to better its arguments for the late-February congressional debate over whether or not to continue providing the counterrevolutionaries with “covert” aid. Military maneuvers have also continued.
Between February 11 and May 3, the US and Honduras will carry out the most extensive military maneuvers ever jointly undertaken by these two countries. Over the years, these maneuvers have become increasingly numerous, expensive, and complicated.
The Big Pine III maneuvers will involve at least 4,500 US troops and 6,000 Honduran. The novelty of these latest military operations is that, in the phase to be carried out between February 11 and April 12, they will include M-60 and A-3 tanks, as well as M-13 armored vehicles, which will be used to simulate battle conditions only five kilometers from the border with Nicaragua, in the Honduran department of Choluteca. The maneuvers will also include the improvement of US-built airstrips and counterinsurgency training for the Honduran army.
The maneuvers are one of the primary sources of supplies for the counterrevolutionaries, and for the first time, they have been questioned for this very reason by two Democratic congressmen. They have described the maneuvers as a way of illegally supporting the contras and thereby violating the decision reached by Congress in the spring of 1984 to freeze all aid to these groups: “The maneuvers, worth millions of dollars, are a display of military power by the Reagan government, with the intentional by-product of secret aid to the contras.” US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger defined the utility of the maneuvers in the following manner: “Everything is designed to ensure that, if we go to war, we’ll be prepared.” Thus, in the eyes of the Reagan administration, the maneuvers are a form of preparation for an eventual invasion, as well as a channel to continue supplying the contras without having, as of yet, to obtain congressional approval.
The context of the maneuvers is important in analyzing the “new” position proclaimed by the Honduran government with respect to the counterrevolutionaries present on their territory. For several months, representatives of the Honduran and US governments have been holding talks in an effort to update their bilateral military agreements that date back to 1954. In January, they were involved in the third round of these conversations. The Honduran government, which is increasingly dependent on the US, is ambitiously attempting to obtain a mutual security pact like the one established between the US and South Korea.
Several events could lead one to imagining that Honduran policy toward Nicaragua has changed: (1) In January, the counterrevolutionary Misura leader, Steadman Fagoth, was arrested in Honduras and deported to Miami; (2) Honduran Foreign Minister Paz Barnica has declared that the contras will be “kicked out” of Honduras because of their interference in that country’s domestic politics; (3) The Honduran news media has launched angry accusations against the counterrevolutionaries for practicing terrorism against the Honduran civilian population. However, this shift in the behavior of the Honduran authorities reflects not so much a change in policy with respect to Nicaragua as a pressure tactic within the framework of the Honduran negotiations with the US
The very fact that these latest maneuvers are taking place indicates that Honduran Central American policy has not undergone significant changes. Nevertheless, following the departure of General Alvarez, who was obsessed with Nicaragua, some Honduran military leaders have at times seen the Salvadoran armed forces as more of a threat than those of Nicaragua. Moreover, it is important to remember that Nicaragua is the only Central American country that has accepted the basic points of the September 7 Contadora treaty: (1) total elimination of military maneuvers in the region; (2) complete suppression of foreign military bases in the area and the immediate departure from the area of all foreign military advisers.
The debate on aid to the “freedom fighters”The US withdrawal from Manzanillo and The Hague, as well as the anti-Nicaraguan rhetoric on the part of Reagan, Shultz, Weinberger, Motley, etc. throughout the last month, are closely related to the upcoming congressional debate on aid to the contras. In the first trimester of 1984, the US Congress, which had already granted contra aid totaling $73 million, cut all new assistance, retaining $14 million that, while already approved, had not yet been delivered to the counterrevolutionaries. The scandal surrounding the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors was influential in the congressional decision, and the scandal created a few months later by the appearance of the CIA manual added fuel to the fire. Any renewal of aid to the contras was to depend on the President’s providing reasonable proof that the aid was being used efficiently.
There are indications that nearly half members of the Senate, where the Republicans hold the majority of seats, are opposed to resuming aid to the contras because they consider it an unprofitable investment. In the House of Representatives, where the Democrats are in the majority, over half the Congress members appear to be opposed to renewing the aid, and some of them have voiced not only pragmatic but also ethical reasons for their disapproval.
Some Republicans believe that the aid should cease to be “covert” (via the CIA) and become “overt” (via the Defense Department). Others propose a search for new means to channel sufficient funds to the contras. David Durenberger, the president of the Senate Intelligence Committee, defended the need for overt and “legal” aid by arguing that providing aid “covertly contributes to an erosion of public confidence in the legitimacy of other CIA operations.” Therefore, the growing unpopularity of the aid to the contras could jeopardize the efficiency of the US global strategy for counterinsurgency against other Third World liberation movements. Certain opponents of legalized assistance to the contras contend that it would be practically equivalent to a declaration of war against a country with which the US maintains diplomatic relations.
On several occasions, including his February 6 State of the Union Address, President Reagan has justified aid to the counterrevolutionaries as a means of “self-defense.” Arturo Cruz, the would-be presidential candidate of the Democratic Coordinating Committee in Nicaragua’s November elections, clearly stated his position with respect to a possible suspension of the aid: It would be “a terrible political mistake” because “the aid is a bargaining chip, and, if you cash it in, you’re removing the possibility of obtaining a negotiated solution.” In late February, Weinberger declared that increased economic pressure should be added to the military aggression on Nicaragua. He suggested that the US reduce its trade with Nicaragua to a minimum or eliminate it “completely.” (Presently, 7.9% of Nicaragua’s exports are sold to the US, and 15.6% of its imports come from that country.)
With hostile rhetoric and a rejection of all the channels leading to a peaceful settlement of the Central American conflict (Manzanillo, The Hague, and Contadora), the Reagan administration is attempting to win a political battle with Congress. Part of its strategy seems to be the suppression of all alternatives to the counterrevolutionaries.
All forms of US pressure on Nicaragua (military, economic, diplomatic, etc.) can lead to direct military intervention, although, for the time being, the choice of that option appears less probable. All pressure on Nicaragua is intended to force its leaders to accept humiliating conditions that would compromise the revolution itself. This is the objective proposed by the Kissinger Commission and the one that Reagan reaffirmed in the first press conference of his second term.
“Nicaragua will defend its right to
normalize its relations with the United States”This was a central theme in Daniel Ortega’s inaugural address. In order to defend this right, Nicaragua’s diplomatic channels are presently endeavoring to strengthen the Contadora negotiations, resume the Manzanillo talks, and alert world opinion concerning the political significance of eventual congressional approval for renewed aid to the contras.
On January 10, the four Contadora foreign ministers were in Managua, where they met with government leaders to gain a better understanding of Nicaragua’s positions regarding the new content of the peace treaty. With the same purpose, the deputy foreign ministers of Panama and Mexico traveled to Managua on January 30. The Nicaraguan government has publicly assured that it is willing to sign the new treaty if it does not comprise “substantial” changes with regard to the previous text. (In October, the Contadora nations proposed a refinement of the treaty.)
The areas in which modifications have been suggested are: (1) security; (2) verification and control; and (3) the additional protocol document designed to accompany the treaty. The Contadora group has proposed several countries as members of the eventual Verification and Control Commission: Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, France, Spain, Brazil, and Argentina.
Fidel Castro’s presence in Nicaragua for Daniel Ortega’s inauguration was the occasion for an important display of concrete solidarity. Castro announced that Cuba was canceling Nicaragua’s $74 million debt for loans and material used in the construction of the Tipitapa-Malacatoya (Timal) sugar mill, which was baptized “Victory of July.” Castro’s visit was also an occasion for private and public diplomacy. In his speech at the celebration of the inauguration of the mill, President Castro expressed Cuba’s full support for the Contadora negotiations, emphasizing Mexico’s important role in them and the Latin American nature of the initiative.
In order to strengthen the Contadora effort, Nicaragua recently asked the Spanish government to help reactivate the negotiations. Both the Spanish and German governments seem to have improved their relations with Managua following the November 4 elections.
The Central American visit of West Germany’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Jürgen Mollemann, was important for Nicaragua. Upon returning to Germany, Mollemann stated that his country would strive, within the framework of the European Economic Community, to overcome any differences with respect to the Contadora negotiations. Mollemann also expressed his support for the Manzanillo talks. Several years ago, West Germany froze a $19 million loan with which Nicaragua was going to purchase capital goods. Mollemann’s visit may have initiated the thawing process, which several blocs in the German Parliament were already lobbying for.
At the present time, joint European pressure on the US would be a valuable complement to the Contadora endeavors, and Vice-President Sergio Ramírez’s visit to Europe fits into this context. He will place special emphasis on his talks with the leaders of Great Britain, the principal European ally of the US.
These are some of the means that Nicaragua is using to defend its right to normalize relations with the US. In summary, Nicaragua is trying to convince the US government that it is more rational and, in the long run, more efficient to engage in political negotiations, provided that they carried out on a basis of mutual respect and with acceptance of the fact that the Nicaraguan revolution is irreversible.
A new element was introduced this month on the path to find peace in Central America. In his New Year’s address to the diplomatic corps at the Vatican, Pope John Paul II, after mentioning the Vatican’s successful mediation in the conflict of the Beagle between Argentina and Chile, said further along in his speech:
“Without speaking of interference in the internal affairs of others, why couldn’t we make use of its [the Vatican’s] influence to address the current conflicts, to help to pave the way to dialogue, to search for negotiated solutions acceptable to all, except perhaps those blinded by an ideology or sustained in their plans by Machiavellian interests? [He later made reference to Lebanon, Afghanistan, Cambodia, the war between Iran and Iraq, and ‘several countries in Central America.’] If the Holy See is speaking in this manner even though his colleagues have not yet been affected, it is only because we cannot stand to see the ruin and massacre of innocent people who have already paid such a high cost for the absurdity of war.
“The Church is well aware that de-escalation is difficult, but we must have the courage to begin. In Central America, for example, we are willing to offer a place and a framework for the different parties to meet, listen to each other, and begin a sincere dialogue for peace.”
Official Nicaraguan reactions to this offer have been sparing. The most explicit comment on the subject was made in England by Sergio Ramírez, who said that the Pope could best mediate for peace in Central America by supporting the Contadora efforts. The Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Isidro Morales Paúl, pointed out that the Beagle conflict had been legal and political in nature, whereas the Central American conflict is socioeconomic and has been internationalized. Mollemann expressed the opinion that the Pope would not be the best mediator in the Central American conflict.
In an attempt to normalize its relations with the US and to consolidate the revolution peacefully, Nicaragua has constantly defended the Contadora initiative, its only proven alternative to regional war. Naturally, this alternative includes Manzanillo, which is complementary to Contadora. While the Contadora negotiations are aimed at reaching multilateral regional agreements, Nicaragua has never relinquished its efforts to attain bilateral solutions, especially with the United States.
The warDuring the last month, the Sandinista army launched several significant offensives in regions I (Estelí, Madriz, and Nueva Segovia) and VI (Matagalpa and Jinotega). These offensives, which commenced toward the end of December, employed a series of new tactics, including the use of helicopters, intended to counteract the contras’ guerrilla warfare. According to official reports, there are currently 1,500 counterrevolutionaries operating in Region I and 2500 in Regions VI.
The following results of these offensives, furnished by the Ministry of Defense, indicate the significant military advances made by the Sandinistas in flushing out the contras:
End of December-January 5: 138 contras killed
January 3-14: 29 battles, 372 contra casualties (298 killed)
January 15-31: 42 battles, 133 contra casualties (95 killed)
The third article of this issue of envío carries a detailed account of the ambushes and killings of civilians by the contra forces during this period. These atrocities are increasingly common, and the number of civilians murdered by the contras has been greater that the number of Nicaraguan soldiers killed in combat.
The military offensives have had an important impact on the economy, particularly with respect to the coffee-producing region of Matagalpa and Jinotega. The success in breaking up concentrations of counterrevolutionary troops in this region has allowed the coffee harvest to continue normally. At the end of January, it was estimated that half the country’s entire coffee crop had been harvested, with 1,000,000 quintals of the precious export commodity guaranteed. The challenge ahead is to increase that yield by 200,000 quintals. This month, the Ministry of Culture and part of the Ministry of Agriculture, along with other state institutions, temporarily closed down their operations in order to enable their employees to join in the harvest effort alongside the traditional workers and thousands of volunteer pickers: teachers, students, and foreigners.
In order to maintain the present level of military offensives, as well as those projected for the future, the Nicaraguan army is stepping up its recruitment procedures while strengthening the urban territorial militias. The major objective for 1985 is to deal the contras a serious blow. (This objective is more thoroughly described in the second article of this envío.)
The government has recently begun to implement a series of social and economic measures intended to deal with the economic crisis, which has been severely aggravated by several factors, the most harmful of which remains the war. The second article of this envío also presents an overview of these new measures, the details of which we shall report on in the coming months.
An important political initiative contributing to national peace efforts was the National Assembly’s January 22 passage of a new law granting amnesty to all members of the counterrevolutionary forces who agree to lay down their arms and involve themselves in productive activities in Nicaragua. This new law, which will remain in effect until July 19, 1985, stipulates that those contras presently in Honduras and Costa Rica may hand over their arms to the authorities of those countries or to the International Red Cross.
The essential difference between this new amnesty law and the one promulgated in December 1983 (and which remained in effect until November 1984) is the inclusion in the recent law of amnesty for all contra leaders and individuals responsible for orchestrating atrocities and destruction, for those who received money directly from the US, and for those who would have supported plans for direct US intervention in Nicaragua. The new law plainly states that all contras may return to normal life in Nicaragua if they lay down their arms.
This law demonstrates the new government’s desire for peace and is likely to contribute to achieving that peace. In addition, the law is designed to take advantage of demoralization among the contra forces resulting from their internecine divisions and the Sandinistas’ successful military offensives. (Recent attempts to unite the leadership of the counterrevolutionary factions have not prospered.)
National Assembly Debates, dialogue with the bishops,
and an autonomy plan for the Atlantic CoastWhile strengthening its military defense, the revolutionary government is engaged in an effort to strengthen political pluralism, national unity, and the channels for dialogue between social sectors within the country. Despite the November suspension sine die of the national dialogue, the new National Assembly has begun to operate and is expected to continue staging debates as lively and heated as those surrounding the passage of the Amnesty Law on January 22 and the new Wage Increase Law on February 5 and 6, both of which were introduced by the country’s President. The tone of the debates indicates that it will take some time before the new legislators—FSLN and opposition representatives alike—succeed in raising their debating techniques to a respectable level.
The government and the Catholic Church hierarchy have held three rounds of talks since their dialogue began on December 24. The easing of tensions became apparent when Bishop Vega, the President of the Bishops’ Conference, accepted the government’s invitation to participate in the presidential inauguration. In accordance with Nicaraguan parliamentary tradition, the Bishop delivered an invocation, preceded by an explanation of his participation in the inaugural ceremony. Though his words reflected the sharp differences persisting between the Church hierarchy and the new government, Bishop Vega’s presence at the ceremony indicated his recognition of the new government.
The debate surrounding the priests in government posts was rekindled this month with public statements by Father Edgard Parrales, who made know his desire to leave the priesthood, and with sanctions imposed by the Vatican on fathers Ernesto Cardenal and Miguel D’Escoto. Nevertheless, the dispute has not prevented the Church-state dialogue from continuing. During a press conference in Managua, in which Bishop Vega presented a document entitled “Opening the Opening, or What is the Irreversible?,” the prelate asserted that the issue of priests in government would be neither a point of discussion nor an obstacle to continuing the talks. Though the situation between the government and the hierarchy is rife with difficulties, including the conflicting positions within the hierarchy itself, the dialogue is something new and encouraging. Made possible, in part, by the new legitimacy earned by the FSLN through the November elections, the dialogue could become an important factor in the effort to build national unity and peace within the country.
Likewise, the dialogue between the government and Miskito leaders continued throughout the past month. Moreover, a series of consultations with various ethnic groups of the Caribbean Coast was carried out in order to determine the provisions for that region’s autonomy plan. The plan entails the establishment of two regional governments: one in the north and the other in the south-central area of Zelaya. For the most part, the northern government will be composed of Miskito leaders, while the south-central government will largely reflect the different ethnic groups in that area. These regional governments will be in charge of administering territorial rights, justice, law enforcement, bilingual education, and development projects—all of which will be granted preferential access to economic resources. Municipal and regional authorities will be elected by the regional population once voting districts are determined. The regional authorities will represent their regions before the national executive branch. All ethnic groups, independent of their population size, will be represented, with equal rights, in regional assemblies.
The talks between the Sandinista government and the Misurasata leader Brooklyn Rivera remain open, though bound in uncertainty. Rivera did not appear for the second round of talks, scheduled to be held on January 20 in Bogota before international observers. The main reason for his absence from the talks seems to be the infighting that Misurasata has experienced as a result of Rivera’s conversations with the Sandinistas. Other factors could be the strong pressure, including death threats, applied on Rivera by Steadman Fagoth’s Misura group (closely aligned with the FDN and CIA) and by various sectors within ARDE, some of which are members of Rivera’s own Misurasata group.
Misurasata’s internal problems emerged publicly this month when a triumvirate of Miskito leaders expelled Rivera from the organization, accusing him of “treason” because of his decision to negotiate with the Nicaraguan government. Joaquín Suazo, one of the three, appears to have formed a new organization.
In statements made to the press in Washington, Rivera remained very critical of the Nicaraguan government’s proposed autonomy plan for the Coast. Nevertheless, he expressed his firm opposition to both Fagoth’s group and to any granting of aid to the counterrevolutionary groups.
The autonomy plan is not a tactical measure on the government’s part. Rather, it is intended to respond to the historical demands of the coastal people, while contributing significantly to building peace throughout the Coast region. The project’s success will largely depend on the cooperation of as many Miskitos as possible, regardless of the differences that presently exist among them.
Harder years aheadIn the face of the Reagan administration’s hardened position toward Nicaragua, the latter has responded with a series of measures to try to make it more difficult for the US to avoid peaceful, diplomatic channels. Many smaller countries have begun a diplomatic offensive by demanding respect for international law and urging the parties in conflict to seek peaceful solutions to the Central American crisis. Nicaragua’s current international offensive centers on the importance of supporting the Contadora process while encouraging the continuation of the Manzanillo talks. Nicaragua is also seeking to involve as many US allies as possible in its search for peace.
Domestically, the Nicaraguan government is promoting dialogue with the Church hierarchy, the amnesty law, and the autonomy plan for the Caribbean Coast. The government’s principal goal throughout 1985 will be to deal the contras a hard blow and force them to retreat.
In defending its right to be a sovereign nation and in attempting to bring about greater equity within a wartime economy, Nicaragua continues its struggle to achieve peace through justice.
|
a monthly magazine of analysis on Central America