A New Government: Programs and Self-Critical Evaluation

Envío team

“This is a different kind of power. It’s new, original, and revolutionary, and it has no ties with the past. This power is sovereign. With all of us as its representatives, the people will have full and absolute freedom to decide the course of this revolution and to choose the political model best suited to its interests, hopes, and aspirations.”
—Carlos Núñez, President of the Constituent National Assembly, January 9, 1985

“Today, on January 10, 1985, we are called upon to assume the Presidency of the Republic of Nicaragua. I say ‘we’ because the President is the people who, by voting for the candidate of the Sandinista Front, were voting for their own interests. I accept this office as the partner and President of all Nicaraguans. My criteria for working with my fellow citizens will not be tinted by politics but rather by patriotism…”
—Daniel Ortega, President of Nicaragua, January 10, 1985

A new beginning

Nicaragua’s new government took office on January 9 and 10. In the recent National Assembly of Labor Unions, the workers addressed their resolutions to “the new administration.” In a press conference, the president of the Bishops’ Conference referred to the talks between the Church and “the new government.” Reluctant to trust any form of state authority and less than enthusiastic about the revolutionary state, peasant farmers from remote mountainous areas in Matagalpa have voiced their expectations regarding “the new government.” On our way home from the presidential inauguration ceremony, we heard more of the same, but in a more lyric version: “I’ll be able to tell my grandchildren about this…seeing Daniel Ortega with his presidential sash. There was Nicaragua being reborn.”

Leading the new government is Daniel Ortega, the former Coordinator of the National Reconstruction Government Junta. The Vice President, Sergio Ramírez, was also a member of the junta. The same party remains in power, the FSLN, and it is continuing to implement the same program of national liberation.

However, the FSLN’s November election victory has provided it with renewed legitimacy. To the legitimacy derived from having led its people to victory through the insurrection the FSLN has added a gust of reinforced credibility, the result of its decision to hold elections after five years of revolution and in the midst of war and shortages. This makes for a new beginning.

Positive and negative prior conditions

Prior conditions are both positive and negative. The positive factors were probably influential in the FSLN’s election victory.

In summary, these factors could be enumerated as follows: dignified nationalism in the face of the Reagan administration’s imposing arrogance; able diplomacy and a constant willingness to negotiate, the fruit of which were several important successes in international affairs; direct and continual contact between government leaders and the people, and the government’s responsiveness to the people’s demands; respectful firmness and a low degree of coercion on the part of the police; enormous progress in health and education; truthfulness in informing the population of national problems and the mistakes committed by the government; basic honesty on the part of government leaders; increasing participation by workers in the construction of their own independent organizations; increasing participation for all Nicaraguans in daily decision making; 3.4 million acres of land turned over to peasant farmers through the agrarian reform (in the form of family property or, more frequently, in the form of cooperatives); state loans for private agricultural production and exportation; subsidies for more than 200 private schools, most of which are religious, and for a Christian-inspired university; respect for the religion of the majority of Nicaraguans (Roman Catholicism) and for other minority faiths; the presence in Nicaragua of international solidarity, aid projects, and advisory services, with no strings attached.

Another factor conditioning the new government is its high degree of revolutionary activism. Although this element is positive in itself, it may be difficult to keep up the pace in the next few years. In the last five years, the Nicaraguan government has had to face numerous and impressive challenges: redistributing the country’s educational and cultural wealth; constructing a new state; diversifying foreign trade; redistributing land; investing ambitiously in long-range infrastructure and agroindustrial projects; subsidizing the cost of basic consumer products; defending the country against aggression; promoting new values, such as collective sacrifice and generosity; organizing the elections; and, recently, implementing a broad consultation process in preparation for the autonomy of the Caribbean Coast region.

The new government has also been conditioned by its own errors, limitations, and naivetes, which it has not attempted to hide. For example, a few days before the presidential inauguration, Sergio Ramírez spoke of the mammoth state apparatus:

“We created an apparatus that was too large for the country’s needs… Perhaps we were preparing for a more ambitious project of social and economic transformation, without foreseeing that the war was going to prevent us from reaching a significant level of development in the short run. The government we set up wasn’t designed to endure a war or face a blockade…”

The Vice-President-elect also admitted that it was a mistake to have lifted the state of national emergency only a few months after the 1979 victory. The decision to do so was based on the calm prevailing in Managua but did not reflect the very different situation in other parts of Nicaragua.

Rafael Córdova Rivas, the other member of the Government Junta, remained self-critical on January 9, the very day of the inauguration of the National Assembly. He commented on the lack of cohesion among the different ministerial organizations and low levels of performance on the job.

“There are a series of ministries here that are like little republics… They have their own television systems, their office of external relations, their fleet of vehicles, even planes and boats. That’s one of the faults… We’re lacking a work-incentive policy. Performance is very low not only in the central government but also in its outside branches, in factories and agriculture…”

In addition, there are large problems that the government has not yet begun to resolve. 45% of Managua’s population is self-employed in the “informal” business sector, which constitutes an endless chain of intermediaries and speculators who sometimes make huge profits at people’s expense. Some industrial workers and peasant farmers have left their regular jobs and joined the chain, in which they can obtain an income equal to or greater than their earnings for harder work.

The new government is also conditioned by initial mistakes that have developed into conflicts. For example, Córdoba Rivas pointed out the problems with the Catholic hierarchy and the “rude treatment” used “from the very beginning, especially with Bishop Obando.” Córdoba Rivas stressed the government’s lack of initiative to familiarize the Church hierarchy with the new brand of leaders who were to exercise a new kind of power and who were not particularly inclined to “diplomacy.” A similar problem evolved as a result of the strong and frequent statements with which the revolutionary leaders at first attacked the United States.

A particularly serious conditioning factor is Nicaragua’s historical contradiction between rural and urban areas. In 1980, 53.8% of the country’s population was living in urban centers; this percentage is the highest in Central America.

Over a long period of guerrilla fighting in the mountains, the FSLN achieved strong support in isolated regions from certain sectors of the peasantry, which represented 32% if the population. Then, the long liberation war came to a head in only one and a half years of urban insurrections. Following the 1979 triumph, although some rural areas have been a symbol of revolutionary spirit (Jalapa, for example), the cities became the major base of support for the revolutionary process.

In the new Nicaragua, the urban areas, with a certain air of progress, and the countryside, labeled as backward, have often been in conflict. The urban sector’s demand for consumer goods has monopolized the small amount of foreign exchange provided by Nicaragua’s exports. This situation is delaying any improvement in rural infrastructures or incentives for the production of basic foodstuffs. As a result, food self-sufficiency still remains a distant goal for Nicaragua.

Looking beyond slogans, goals, and already-accomplished realities, it appears clear that what is actually at stake in the conflict between rural and urban Nicaragua is the peasant-worker alliance itself. In other words, at stake is the egalitarian content that any successful revolution in Latin America must stress as one of its priorities.

Finally, the new government is conditioned by the powerfully negative factor of the US-backed war on Nicaragua. This war represents a barrier for the country’s development, the aspirations of its people, and the revolution’s principles in favor of greater justice. The war has forced the government to allot 25% of the country’s budget directly to defense spending. This figure rises to 40% if one considers military expenses related to industry, transportation, construction, the institutionalization of obligatory military service, etc.

The war gives former Somocistas a chance to take their vengeance. It also channels toward violence the discontent and confusion of certain isolated peasant sectors and of ethnic communities that had always been separated from the rest of the country geographically, economically, and culturally. Due to the fact that much of the military activity takes place in regions intensely devoted to coffee growing (for exportation) and the production of basic foodstuffs, there has been an exacerbation of the problems preventing the establishment of complementary ties between the countryside and the cities. However, the war has caused a large proportion of the urban population, above all in Managua, to develop a spirit of sacrifice. The challenge of facing the grievous costs of the war has thereby contributed to national unity. In a reciprocal manner, the heroism and daily endurance of the peasant farmers who defend cooperatives as well as state and private farms prove that Nicaragua’s peasantry is composed of much more than an insurmountable conservatism and accentuate the challenge to accelerate the revolutionary process in the countryside.

These are the positive and negative elements that condition the performance of the new government. It is difficult to say which tendency will tip the balance.

The legacy of US domination and the burden of US aggression

From mid-December until mid-January, several members of the FSLN’s National Directorate made comments that indicate the fundamental concerns of the new government. In self-critical evaluations and the presentation of general plans for 1985, Nicaragua’s revolutionary leaders expressed a need for new orientations and a revised order of priorities.

The FSLN is not planning to change its original program, but it has clearly insisted on the limitations facing the government in its attempts to carry out that program. As was the case during the election campaign, the government has made very few promises to satisfy working-class aspirations on a short-term basis. Instead, it has stated its convictions that most Nicaraguans are capable of understanding the government’s limitations and are willing to pay the cost of austerity and loss of human life in order to consolidate the revolutionary process.

Carlos Núñez, the newly elected President of the National Assembly, expressed this conviction in his January 9 speech:

“We have not attempted to conceal the acute suffering of the working class, nor the limitations and shortages keeping us from satisfying requests from the countryside, nor the obstacles preventing us from resolving the misery that Nicaragua inherited from the days of domination and exploitation, nor the aberrations in our economy, the need to strengthen our national defense system, or the mistakes that have been made. We have offered a wartime economy that will enable us to survive as a sovereign nation, devoting our scarce resources to the productive sectors and war fronts. We have called for sacrifice, combativeness, dignity, honor, and hope for the future. Our people have responded to that call.”

In its propaganda the Reagan administration continually refers to the Nicaraguan elections as a “sham,” repeating that Nicaragua’s government really has only “more of the same” to offer. In reality, the new government is requesting more of the same: more sacrifice and efforts aimed at ensuring a better future and a dignified nation based on the needs and productive endeavors of the working class and not on the consumer desires of an elite.

There are two basic recurring interpretations of Nicaragua’s revolutionary process. The US government sees it from the perspective of its own confrontation with the USSR, thereby attributing excessive importance to the opposition between capitalism and socialist tendencies in Nicaragua. Nicaragua regards its process in the context of US neocolonial domination, which lasted for more than a century in this country. Therefore, Nicaraguans tend to stress the opposition between national liberation and imperialist domination. In his inaugural address, President Daniel Ortega again referred to this historical domination:

“Those who govern the United States have continued to send nightmares to Nicaragua. In over a century of domination, they failed to promote democracy in Nicaragua. Instead, their neocolonialist policy left us with more than 100,000 victims.”

On December 20, Pablo Schmitz, the US missionary who, with ten years of experience in Nicaragua, was recently appointed Auxiliary Bishop of the Caribbean Coast, made the following comment with respect to this persistent US policy:

“I hope that the Church here in Nicaragua will be able to take a position in which, on one hand, it will not lose its credibility and, on the other, it will help to avoid a massacre between the two forces that are fighting: imperialism and the people.”

The new government’s first evaluation necessarily refers to the US and the military situation. This is not the result of an attempt to “export” the revolution or of a militaristic approach, but rather a consequence of the war that the US administration has been imposing on Nicaragua for four years. In his inaugural address, President Ortega furnished the following facts:

“The United States government has provided more than $100 million in funding for the counterrevolutionaries, who have victimized 8,000 people, killing 2767. Included in those killed are 132 children under 12 years old, 705 peasant farmers, 48 women, and 153 technicians and professionals. Money belonging to the US people has been invested in causing material damages amounting to more than $1 billion. The counterrevolutionaries have destroyed workplaces, schools, health centers, bridges, fishing boats, fuel tanks, machinery, and construction equipment.”

In his year-end speech, the President realistically forecast that “In 1985, military aggression will remain the principal influence on life in this country.”

On December 26, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega presented an analysis of the war situation, describing the different stages in which the contras’ activity has evolved: surprise attacks by small groups that immediately fled back across the Honduran border to their camps; the penetration of isolated task forces; the development of regional commands supplied by night-flying aircraft and equipped with sophisticated communications equipment that enabled the FDN troops in the north of the country to use dispersion-concentration tactics and to improve their capability of remaining inside Nicaragua.

The two fundamental counterrevolutionary strategies have always failed: the “liberation” of a chunk of Nicaraguan territory with the capture of some major city, as well as the unification of the FDN in the north with ARDE in the south. The latter failure is due not only to ideological differences between the two groups but also to the significant defeats that Edén Pastora’s forces have suffered at the hands of the Sandinista army. His troops have been continuously routed ever since they “captured” San Juan del Norte, an unserviceable port that has been abandoned for 20 years. According to the Defense Minister, the only thing that the armed forces have not succeeded in doing to the counterrevolutionaries is completely driving them out of Nicaragua.

The tactics of terrorism—murder, torture, rape, kidnapping, etc.—were practically the only ones that the counterrevolutionaries were capable of using until 1983, when they began to engage in “armed propaganda” such as that described in the CIA manual. The objective of this new tactic is to persuade and recruit peasant farmers. Together with their increased capacity for dispersion and concentration, the contras’ armed propaganda has enabled them to operate at the present time as guerrilla contingents. Of course, they are supported by an endless and free supply of provisions, which make them a kind of “luxury-class guerrillas.” To a large degree, their fighting morale and the coherence of their tactics depend on the continuity of these supplies. In desperation, the contras have recently resorted to more frequent terrorist tactics as a result of the heavy blows that the Sandinista armed forces have dealt them.

Defense Minister Ortega emphasized that counterrevolutionary efforts, especially in the last months of 1984, were aimed at obstructing the coffee harvest in the north of the country. In order to attain their objective, the contras dramatically intensified their attacks on private plantations and volunteer pickers. The contras intend not only to dry up the country’s most important source of foreign exchange but also to block the flow of goods and services to the northern rural population. If they were to achieve this latter objective and provoke considerable discontent in the area, they might help to convince the US Congress that a “civil war” is taking place in Nicaragua and that aid to one of the two “factions” would be viable.

However, US propaganda can sell the “Nicaraguan danger” scare more easily than it can the “civil war” argument. This scare provides a pretext for the military maneuvers in Honduras, the primary source of the contras’ logistic and military supplies. With a “MiG crisis,” the US government can go much further than with the image of civil war in Nicaragua.

Peace: The main objective for 1985

On January 9, at the opening session of the National Assembly, Carlos Núñez spoke of the July 1979 victory: “We imagined that we had won peace, but war returned—covert, escalated, cynical, aggressive, shameless, a war of oppressors.” On January 10, the new President proclaimed: “Our principal struggle will be for peace.”

In order to carry out this struggle, the Defense Minister announced that the Sandinista armed forces would be stepping up their military offensive at the beginning of 1985. He also announced that this would imply a “mass mobilization,” in other words an expanded and improved military service, more activity in the rear-guard, civil-defense, and surveillance structures, as well as priority care for war victims.

The President ratified this defense program in his December 31 and January 10 speeches. He gave his word that “Nicaragua will never be an aggressor,” rejecting propaganda to the effect that his government was seeking to develop a nationalist policy of expansionism in order to counteract domestic discontent and a supposed lack of democracy. Furthermore, he reiterated Nicaragua’s willingness to sign the Contadora Treaty of September 7, 1984.

While criticizing US violations of international law with regard to Nicaragua, President Ortega declared that “Nicaragua is not an enemy of the United States, and we defend our right to normalize our relations with that nation.” He insisted on the fact that Nicaragua had done nothing more than respect the channels established by international law when it presented its charges against the US to the World Court in The Hague. He clearly supported the Manzanillo talks, calling them “an excellent opportunity to prepare the foundation for negotiations.” Finally, he announced an amnesty for all counterrevolutionaries who agreed to lay down their arms, including contra leaders, who had been excluded from the December 1983 amnesty decree.

In May 1981, former Undersecretary of State for Latin America Thomas Enders first proposed the US government’s humiliating conditions for an improvement in his country’s relations with Nicaragua. Since then, the Reagan administration has been totally intransigent in all its conversations with Nicaragua. However, the Nicaraguan government has taken a series of measures designed to facilitate peace talks: supporting the Contadora negotiations; refraining from reprisals on contra camps in Honduras and Costa Rica; providing a continually broader amnesty plan; following up on pre-election agreements with the opposition political parties; continuing to promote the Manzanillo talks; refraining from purchasing airplanes that could cut off the contras’ supply lines; creating commissions charged with resolving border incidents with Honduras or Costa Rica; etc.

Actually, the Reagan administration is not willing to accept what President Ortega described as the major objective of Sandino’s struggle: “the sovereignty and self-determination of Nicaragua, the recuperation of our natural resources for the people.” Killings and the destruction of the Nicaraguan economy are not a priority for the majority of the US Congress, either. Despite US rhetoric regarding peace and justice, the only values that seem to count are the United States’ “vital interests.”

It is significant that Time magazine refers to the film Red Dawn as “an allegory designed subtly to reverse the moral onus of the Vietnam War.” In order to resist a supposed invasion of Cubans and Nicaraguans, young Americans take to the Colorado hills to form a guerrilla band. “The Americans become the Viet Cong, the little guys, the underdogs fighting for their own land. The Soviets become the oppressive great power (the Americans in Vietnam), the occupiers with superior forces and sinister helicopter gunships. Thus the guilt belongs with the Soviets, and an odd kind of subliminal absolution descends upon the American viewing audience.”

Economic assessment: The causes of the crisis

The new government’s economic evaluation is very sober. It points primarily to the enormous allowances for defense spending and the repercussions of the war on the economy. In addition, Nicaragua’s economy must face the effects of the persistent international economic crisis.

President Ortega also referred to “the costs of transition from the Somoza economy to a new revolutionary economy.” More than anything else, it has been a question of paying the costs of education, health care, social security, and subsidies to hold down the prices of basic products. Another important item in the costs list is long-term investment projects: geothermal plants, the deep-water port, vegetable production and canning, African palms, the agroindustrial sugar complex, etc. Finally, the cost of agricultural imports is considerable in this country, where food production was not a priority until 1979 and the exportation of agricultural products was not complemented with the development of agroindustry.

Nevertheless, Nicaragua’s economy has grown. In 1980, 1981, and 1983, Nicaragua was one of the few countries in Latin America to experience high growth rates. The crisis in Nicaragua is more of a financial nature. Part of the reason for this crisis is the sometimes anarchic surge toward major changes, accompanied by the need to divert a large proportion of the country’s resources to the defense effort.

For several years, Nicaragua has earned approximately $400 million annually for its exports, while spending about $1 billion for long-term investments, defense, the expansion of social and cultural services, and inputs imported for productive purposes. The enormous gap created over these years cannot continue to widen indefinitely. In addition, Nicaragua has a high fiscal deficit caused by an inadequate tax system and uncontrolled inflation, the latter resulting, in turn, from scarcities, speculation, and the overly generous program of subsidies on basic consumer products. This deficit has been further aggravated by a low level of performance in the productive sector, many of whose members have been lured into informal commerce, where speculation contributes to higher incomes.

The revolutionary government has committed itself to a fairer distribution of social wealth and the creation of a solid foundation for future development. This is one of the two fundamental factors responsible for the present economic crisis, the other, of course, being the US-backed aggression. Moreover, the government has attempted to carry out important changes while tempering their effects on certain sectors of the population. This attempt both to rely on and to benefit everyone has been the cornerstone for forging national unity in the face of pressure from the US

1985: An economy dominated by austerity

Judging from the words of Daniel Ortega, 1985 will be a much more difficult year than any of the previous ones. In certain ways, the US administration has succeeded in provoking a contradiction between the objective of social justice and the need for national defense.

The priorities announced in the 1985 budget are: “defense, health, and subsidies and social assistance for the direct victims of the war.” Missing from these priorities are education, subsidies for production cost, and long-term investments, all of which were preeminent in every prior budget since 1979. This reordering of priorities will probably entail serious cutbacks throughout this year in the areas mentioned above.

The President also announced important complements to these overall budget plans. There will be salary readjustments for workers producing material and cultural goods, as well as for those supplying essential services. This measure is designed to offer some compensation for the inevitable price increases that will result from programmed subsidy cuts. The government is freezing the expansion of urban social services in order to channel more resources to rural areas. Furthermore, it will continue to promote the agrarian reform, while providing efficient producers with greater incentives, such as higher prices and bonuses.

There are plans to reduce labor market competition between the informal-commerce sector and the productive industrial and agricultural sector. One step in this direction has been the creation of a “tax on presumed income,” which establishes means of estimating the income of those who, in the past, easily concealed the major portion of their earnings or simply filed no income tax returns. This new tax will affect, among others, members of the liberal professions; hotel, bar, and restaurant employees; small-scale import merchants; owners of small businesses; and those who rent houses to diplomats. Earnings in these sectors have been surprisingly high, contributing to inflation and speculation.

Obviously, further progress in the agrarian reform will continue to remove labor power from the area of agricultural exportation, which requires large numbers of farm workers. However, it is hoped that an increase in rural salaries, the tax on presumed income, and the increase in the cost of certain basic products will help to eliminate some of the informal sector’s appeal. Other new taxes—on capital gains, the constitution and dissolution of companies, increase in their capital, etc.—as well as the reordering of already existing taxes on consumer items, may considerably reduce the fiscal deficit.

“Each and every Nicaraguan,” said President Ortega, “must be conscious of the critical situation that we are going through. If we long for peace, we all must fight to attain it.” The most dangerous period for any revolution begins when different sectors of the population have to support in unequal proportions the burdens of establishing greater justice.

The unproductive Nicaraguan oligarchy (large and, many cases, absentee landowners) was affected by the agrarian reform. The productive bourgeoisie has lost its dominant power. One of the reasons why industrial and agricultural workers have achieved greater power and security, with access to basic goods, is that they have increased their levels of organization and bettered their understanding of the economy. However, they have worked for years without significant raises in wages and, in some cases, even with reductions. They are the ones on whose shoulders the country’s productive efforts rest. Many peasant farmers, though not all of them, have benefited from the agrarian reform, but the state has not yet made a sufficient endeavor to supply them with the goods that could contribute to a major improvement in their living standards. Moreover, the war has affected the civilian peasant population more directly than any other sector of the country, and the militia self-defense units organized by the rural co-ops play a key role in the overall defense of the revolution. Young people in the cities have done voluntary work in the fields of education, health, and agriculture, and they have made great sacrifices with their participation in the military service. Many teachers and state employees have taken part, on a rotating basis, in voluntary coffee and cotton picking. Their salaries remained low until 1984, when teachers and health workers received 100% increases. This year, the vast sector of small businesspeople and street vendors, as well as middle-class professionals, will have to pay a larger part of the bill.

The rationale behind the new government’s economic program, as President Ortega summarized it on January 10, is aimed at “protecting the real salaries of productive and disciplined workers; providing incentives for producers; channeling goods and services to workers in the productive sector; and fighting speculation.” One of the objectives included in the program is to dignify work and life in rural areas to “prevent the further aggravation” of the crisis. This implies an attempt to reduce the imbalance caused by the overpopulation of Managua and its metropolitan area (31.6% of the country’s population), where supplies are concentrated and channeled back at high costs to the different regions, continually inflating the unproductive sector of the economy. Deep in the mountains of Matagalpa, the president of a co-op, an older man who had known Carlos Fonseca, made the following comment on January 1: “We know that we can’t recover all the land that’s been taken away from us since colonial times, but maybe the agrarian reform will be able to expand a little bit more. Then, if peace is achieved, we’ll be capable of producing better.”

Both the financial readjustments and the need to curtail migration to the cities represent challenges that are bristling with difficulties. Nevertheless, if Nicaragua does not confront these problems immediately, it will be impossible to reinforce the present wartime economy and ensure long-range development.

Political assessment:
The danger of paternalism

Henry Ruiz offered this political assessment on December 26: “In all honesty, we humbly and publicly recognize that the administration and exercise of power has not been the Sandinistas’ best performed task.”

This self-critical evaluation expressed by the former Minister of Planning was recently echoed by President Daniel Ortega when he referred to the inconsistent use of power in economic programs and the promotion of public participation. He criticized the lack of efficiency with respect to production and administrative procedures, while pointing out the sacrifices endured by the population. This critical evaluation was, of course, based on an analysis of the revolution’s achievements and the “irreparable wounds” caused by the aggression, as well as on the fact that the Nicaraguan people had reaffirmed their support for the revolution through the November elections, demonstrating the growth and consolidation of the national identity that had led them into the insurrection.

The President was pointing out that the greatest shortcoming in the exercise of power by the state, grassroots organizations, and the FSLN leadership has been an imbalance between a high level of political identification and a low level of economic and administrative coordination. Although vast sectors of the government ministries, political leadership, organized workers, and youth have been capable of outstanding work with regard to both production and defense, they have been bogged down in the process of trying to make decisions intended to set the economy on course toward structural transformation.

A new government program, a restructured Cabinet
and greater political participation

President Ortega has stressed the need of the government, the FSLN, and the grassroots organizations to exercise power through more coherent policies. The leadership in these positions of power cannot formulate clear policies unless it listens to the people and clearly explains its own decisions. The President admitted that there has not been enough consultation with the people before decisions are made, nor adequate explanation of those decisions. There have often been apparent discrepancies between the actions taken and the explanations given. President Ortega emphasized that, if these shortcomings are not remedied, “we run the risk of being demagogic and paternalistic.” The exercise of power must therefore be communicated coherently “by political leaders to the grass roots to bridge the gap between brilliant theories and practical action.”

The government has begun to implement this new program with the restructuring of the Cabinet. A new development is the creation of the Ministry of the Presidency, presided over by René Núñez, the Secretary of the FSLN’s National Directorate. This attempt to unite the party’s secretariat with the government Cabinet—seven of the nine members of the National Directorate are currently serving in government posts (the Presidency of the executive branch, five government ministries, and the Presidency of the National Assembly)—indicates the FSLN’s will to make full use of its electoral victory in forming the new government. “In this way,” affirmed President Ortega in his January 8 speech, “the FSLN is defining its policy lines.”

At the same time, the Ministry of Planning has been replaced by a Department of Planning and Budget, the Executive Secretary of which will belong to a Planning Council to be presided over by the President. In an attempt to formulate more coherent economic policies around the needs of production, the other members of the Planning Council will include the Vice President (responsible for the coordination of projects relating to the country’s infrastructure), the new Minister of Foreign Trade and Cooperation, the Minister of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform (in charge of coordinating the production of basic consumer goods and supplies), the Minister of Industry (in charge of fish and mineral production), and the Central Bank President (responsible for coordinating the work of all the ministers representing the central government in each region). Another indication of the effort to more effectively structure the broad state apparatus is the merging of the Institute of Natural Resources under the Ministry of Agriculture and of the Institute of Statistics and Census under the Department of Planning.

Moreover, the decision ratified by the National Assembly to hold municipal elections and to draw up a new Constitution for the country, together with President Ortega’s willingness to fulfil the agreements made during the political parties’ summit in October, reaffirm the desire for political pluralism, participatory democracy, and national unity. The opposition parties in the National Assembly, which compose more than one third of the legislature, will play an important role in defining the framework of the Constitution. The broad composition of the FSLN’s representation in the Assembly—many of its representatives are not party members—will also contribute to the complexity of the debate.

The new dynamism demonstrated by the major labor unions—the Association of Rural Workers (ATC) and the Sandinista Workers’ Confederation (CST)—along with their increased membership, have led to lively debates with government and FSLN leaders, indicating a growing degree of maturity in participatory democracy. There is no doubt that the workers’ demands for salary readjustments, the strengthening of commissaries at their factories and work centers, and their concern for both the difficult life of the peasantry and the problems related with speculation and low production rates will contribute to the implementation of a more realistic economic policy.

The new government program, intended to provide the basis for a more coherent policy in the use of power, is moved by the desire for peace. The national slogan for 1985—“For peace, everyone against the aggression!”—implies the need to combine all efforts in order to overcome the two great obstacles facing Nicaragua: the war and economic strangulation. The latter is both the object and a product of the aggression, but it is also the result of inconsistency and inefficiency in domestic administration, the organization of production, distribution, foreign trade policies, and consumer patterns. The new government is attempting to resolve the country’s administrative and economic problems through a renewed effort to improve defense and diplomacy, by providing better attention to the needs of the peasantry and the country’s ethnic groups, and through international support.

Cultural assessment: The heroism of daily survival

In offering a cultural evaluation of the revolution, President Ortega referred to the “vices we have inherited from our past, which, rather than disappearing, have tended to multiply.” Excessive bureaucracy, he explained, promotes the belief in a hierarchy of power and multiplies meetings, rules, and procedures, which drain human resources. This vice encourages inefficiency and privileges, stifles creativity, and promotes vanity in those holding rank over others. The President also referred to the tendency among the urban sectors to take life easily, attributing this to a lack of discipline, daily work, and austerity, as well as disregard for public well-being, all of which could degenerate into irresponsible collective selfishness.

President Ortega insisted that the interest of the overall country should guide the spirit of national unity and prevail over political interests. He urged the people to pursue the goals of popular democracy, national dignity, political pluralism, respect for human rights and ethnic groups, and religious freedom, but above all, to commit themselves to building peace and working productively.

From the final phase of the insurrection until today, Nicaraguans have lived between the extremes of heroism and the daily struggle for survival. The daily challenge lying ahead is to keep the country armed for defense, prevent the constant loss of human lives, and overcome the economic strains imposed on the country by the war and the effects of social and economic transformation. Even without the pressure of the aggression and economic “punishment,” structural changes would take time to materialize and would inevitably encounter resistance. However, at least these changes would have the chance to develop at a constant pace, while providing essential education and preparation in the process.

Victor Tirado, one of the nine members of the FSLN’s National Directorate and the person in charge of promoting popular and organized participation in the affairs of the country, spoke to an organization of professionals on December 16 about this cultural aspect of the revolution: “The originality of this revolution lies in the fact that the Christian movement united with the Sandinista Front against the dictatorship in order to forge a new society.”

This unique combination implies an historic cultural change. The conflicts that have arisen between sectors of the Church hierarchy and Christian lay movements supportive of the FSLN demonstrate the challenge that such an important change presents. More than a political and military victory, the defeat of Somocismo in Nicaragua meant the downfall of powerful symbols and the creation of new cultural values. However, this does not mean that the new values that emerged from Somoza’s defeat are not affected by the old value system.

The revolutionary program needs to explore better channels through which to explain the complex truths proclaimed in the FSLN’s slogans. The government lacks a policy whereby it is required to offer regular explanations to the people of the measures taken. The Sandinistas would never have succeeded in taking power without their persistent contact with the people. Likewise, the furtherance of their goals is dependent on the same contact.

Nicaraguans bear the historical traces of cultural values from past regimes and systems of domination: colonialism, feudalism, and dependent capitalism. These values have created attitudes of quick profit making and a dependency on imported goods, high technology, and bureaucracy. The peasantry never relied on the state under any of the past systems. Only by promoting responsible grassroots organization and participation, while establishing adequate government services, can the present revolutionary process overcome Nicaragua’s cultural heritage. The recently elected Assembly representatives will have the task of putting the unique concepts of this revolution into law as they write new constitution.

Victor Tirado pointed out that “this underdeveloped, agriculturally based country cannot implement a plan for socialism while war is being waged against us; we must first ensure economic survival before thinking of development.” These words reveal the realism with which the new government is having to readjust the revolution to the limitations of poverty. These limitations are apparent in the lack of trained leadership, technicians, and administrators.

The election campaign demonstrated the Nicaraguan people’s ability to determine their collective future in the midst of a war, severe economic scarcities, and intense political debate. The greatest challenge for the immediate future is to end the war. There will be no economic future if the motivation to work is broken and people are unable to enjoy peace. The austere conditions and the need for defense can be overcome only if there is a coherent policy with respect to the use of power and broader participation in the decision making process. A policy of truth must be accompanied by one to put that truth into practice. In addressing the workers in his ministry, a Cabinet minister recently affirmed: “The double standard of morality must no longer continue: the morality of self-sacrifice as demonstrated daily in the country’s war zones compared with the irresponsibility and inefficiency apparent in Managua.” Nicaragua can neither achieve peace nor survive the austere economic conditions—much less count on active public participation—with such a double standard.

If Nicaragua can effectively bridge the gap between these two sets of morality and between theories and practice, it will be in a much better position to limit the success of the counterrevolutionary war.

Print text

Send text