Reflections on the “citizen’s revolution”

Ecuador is in an historic stage that needs to be seen as part of the Latin American Left’s new revival process. Rafael Correa’s government has made an abrupt change in Ecuadoran political and economic life. After six years in office, his recent reelection with 57% of the votes permits us to talk about a new political identity: Correism. What can be said about Correa’s project?

Ivette Sosa y Armando Chaguaceda

On February 17, 2013, Rafael Correa was ratified as head of the Ecuadoran government for the third term, this time by an overwhelming majority. Accumulating more votes than all other candidates combined, Correa also obtained majority control in parliament for his Alianza PAIS (which stands for Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance). That is allowing him to push forward his agenda of political-institutional changes aimed at overcoming what he calls “the long dark neoliberal night” Ecuador has been going through since the 1980s. Neoliberalism led to growing deinstitutionalization expressed in cuts in both social spending and public works, the collapse of state services, widespread administrative corruption, governmental inefficiency and a severe crisis of governance, especially in the executive branch.

Since his political rise in the middle of the last decade, Correa has been bringing together grassroots demands, proclaimed in demonstrations. He has echoed the need to overcome the crisis of representation eroding the political system, the widespread repudiation of politics resulting from the conduct of leaders and parties and the strategically important political struggle being waged in the legislative arena, muddying the rules of the political game. Correa proposed “great changes” in that context.

Another economic model

Long-standing political uncertainty and instability in Ecuador led to the search for strong, anti-establishment leadership, i.e. someone outside the political system. Electoral support for the traditional parties competing in the 2006 elections had been declining and the Rafael Correa/Lenín Moreno ticket, which headed the PAIS Alliance proposal, had significant grassroots support in the second round against the candidacy of Álvaro Noboa, a Guayaquil businessman and politician.

On taking over the presidency, Correa opened the way to a constitutional process that included a referendum to reject or convene a Constituent Assembly and its members, the drafting of a new Constitution (also then subject to a referendum) and the election of grassroots representatives into office. So began the road to the officially named Citizens’ Revolution.

The new government soon abandoned the hackneyed economic model in place since the 1980s: it advocated economic nationalism, revitalizing government participation, especially in the oil sector where it divested private companies and accumulated up to 80% of the natural gas wealth. Foreign trade relations were subjected to changes in line with national labor liability, and to diversification, uprooting dependence on the United States and opening up to Latin American countries, Europe, the Middle East and China. Breaking with external constraints—especially those of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—has led to a reduction and more effective management of the foreign debt.

Labor and social policies also changed. Labor outsourcing and underemployment were eliminated; workers’ wages and protection improved, reinforced by rights subsequently established in the 2008 Constitution. Informal workers were prioritized, integrating them into credit programs and services; and both social security and social spending were strengthened. Income tax policies helped redistribute wealth.

Organizational control and management methods were introduced to combat the professional incompetence and widespread corruption of public servants. Bureaucracy was rejuvenated, optimizing the training of technocrats in management positions. The principle of gender equality was supported in public office and the government deployed an extensive credit and benefits program for public investments as a way to redistribute wealth. Infrastructure works and social spending for education and health multiplied while what is called the “human development bonus” given to the poorest reached 1.9 million people out of a total population of 15 million. All this has notably increased the citizenry’s living standards and quality of life.

Recognized social achievements

In the field of education and training of human capital, the government implemented a university reform that visibly improved the quality of higher education, requiring better standards by commercialized private universities, and supporting research, development and technology as well as scholarship programs for study abroad. The excellent internationally recognized experiences achieved through governmental care programs for people with disabilities are shared with countries from the region with advice by Ecuador.

These economic and social results achieved during Correa’s six years in government have been recognized by international organizations, particularly the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. The country’s growth has put it in third place in the region and even reversed the migration trend. Domestic opposition has positively acknowledged the infrastructure and social spending programs, although it considers them populist and unsustainable and warns of dangers to private enterprise, the free market and investment diversification.

Some analysts believe that the success of Correa’s government is largely due to the economic boom that has accompanied its mandate. They have noted that the absence of deep structural changes could bring a halt to this comfortable period, which would affect the redistribution of wealth and the increased social welfare already achieved.

The government’s new role

The government’s new role during Correa’s administration can’t be condensed to a mere “regaining” of an old role. It has to be understood as a transformation that has helped the majorities of grassroots and middle classes and their corresponding neophyte political leaderships displace the interests of the hegemonic social classes and political groups in favor of their own.

Some—the opposition, essentially—summarize these changes as increased hyper-presidentialist autocratic government, populism and patronage, expressed by the re-concentration of power in the executive branch. From this viewpoint the Ecuadoran government’s patronage, i.e. the giving out of the “development bonus,” has been viewed as a reflection of the government’s patronage politics. Other observers—from various leftist perspectives—see the transformations in the class structure as establishing the dominance of “state capitalism” and the emergence of a “post-neoliberal” model that has put the finishing touches on the traditional parties’ crisis of representation. Political scientist Simón Pachano, however, describes the ongoing process in Ecuador as an “uncertain transition” as it hasn’t generated either the institutional conditions or the incentives for players to function in the new conditions, thus ensuring institutional continuity.

Political transformation

This new historical cycle in Ecuador owes its origins to the weakness of the party system, the political instability in the country, the split in the opposition and its inability to rearticulate the population’s interests. The long period of erosion in Ecuador’s political system destroyed the main forms of political representation and left clear institutional lacunas in the political process. This led to widespread distrust in politics.

The government of the “Citizens’ Revolution” has been notably plebiscitary compared to previous administrations which, far from giving it the insulting character often attributed to this feature, has meant the search for legitimate bases to implement the transformations since 2007. A glance at the general elections shows not only increased support for the government-sponsored process but also the consolidation of the Correa-led alliance in the Assembly, with the legislative benefits this represents for the project.

In the April 2009 general elections, the ruling party had won 43.6% of the total number of Assembly seats. This didn’t eliminate the obstacles to adopting “essential” laws to advance the Citizens’ Revolution; nor did the structure of the Assembly at that time favor the formation of stable coalitions based on programmatic agreements. Although PAIS Alliance was consolidated as a hegemonic party, various groups that initially joined it split away.

In contrast, PAIS Alliance won more than 93 seats in the first round of this year’s elections, somewhat more than the two-thirds needed to pass legal initiatives in the collegiate body. The opposition was left with meager results: Creating Opportunities 12, Social Christian Party 7, Democratic Popular Movement and Pachakutik 6 each, Patriotic Society Party 6, representatives of Ecuadorans abroad 6 and Advance 4.

In the term ahead, this prominence of the ruling party will accelerate the adoption of pending legislation (the communication law, the Penal Code, amendments to the social security and land redistribution laws) and the production of new legislation. Decreased co-legislation and internal debate, however, could weaken the legislature and the “revolutionary” process itself while alliances among other parties make hay and the executive overseeing and controlling function intensifies.

On the other hand, although the elections have managed to bring stability to the presidency, deficiencies persist in the institutional design that perpetuate the irregular political situation: shortcomings in producing laws to complement the Constitution, scant accountability and political constraints, absence of facilities for the proper processing of conflicts and the fact that a number of officials are still being provisionally appointed to important government areas. All this shows the relative instability of the government-sponsored political process.

The most questionable aspect

Despite the Correa administration’s widespread legitimacy, one of its most questionable aspects has been the National Assembly reform, especially regarding the judicial function. Although the 2008 Constitution established mechanisms for its implementation, the issue addressing the administrative and organizational functions of the judiciary was not included until 2010, and then through a referendum. Although this reform was needed in order to support the new model of government, the fact that it was initiated by Gustavo Jalk, President Correa’s former personal secretary, cast doubts on the neutrality of the process that went beyond the legitimation achieved through the referendum. This reform has reduced the Assembly’s powers to control and oversee the executive branch, transferring them in part to the Council for Citizens’ Participation and Social Control, and the truncated appointment of authorities to institutions of control and to the judiciary itself has continued.

The Left in opposition

The image of the Ecuadoran regime has also been affected by splits in the political sectors that initially supported it. Indigenous movements, trade union and peasant groups, middle sectors and intellectuals from the national Left withdrew their support for the government following the Constituent Assembly, establishing themselves as opposition movements: Rupture group 25, Popular Democratic Movement (MPD) and the Confederations of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE).

A very significant factor in the breakdown of social mobilizations during the cycle of political instability prior to Correa was the abrupt change citizens saw in the political “project” of the government and President once in power. Given that, the leftwing proposals for the refounding, redistribution and citizen culture of that that time were incorporated into the PAIS Alliance programmatic platform, which led to Correa winning the 2006 elections.

Once in office, however, Correa gave occasional preference to the Catholic Church’s Social Doctrine. His government’s programmatic amalgam also extended to adopting the Development Plan prepared by the National Secretariat for Planning and Development. That platform was also later amended by the Plan for Living Good, following the Constituent Assembly.

Differences with
Venezuela and Bolivia

Although the different PAIS Alliance platforms coincide in substantial aspects—anti-imperialism, nationalism, redistribution of wealth and a living wage for workers—the ongoing moving of political projects and personalizing of proposals has divested the Left of its own project and fragmented it. The Left’s withdrawal of support for Correa has gone hand in glove with the transformations in the legislative body, increasingly limiting participation to ratifying government decisions and socializing government policies, not to deliberating and seeking consensus. It’s enlightening when political analysts such as Pablo Stefanoni recognize a reduced propensity in the Ecuadoran government to promote local and national participatory policies in both its genuinely innovative plan and its potential use of participation as a motivating factor, such as happened with its Bolivian and Venezuelan allies.

The fragmentation of the Ecuadoran Left is complemented by the associated decomposition and segmentation of the opposition, which hasn’t achieved consensus and unity like its Venezuelan counterpart—almost emptying the political arena of autonomous social and belligerent movements of the kind that manage to tweak Evo Morales’ agenda in Bolivia. Much of this disintegration and partitioning of the civil political agenda finds its trigger and counterpart in the strength and dominance of Correa’s leadership in defining the political agenda. It plays with the advantage found in the positive effect of a well managed economy and public policy, which contrasts with the variable results we see in Caracas and La Paz in those same areas.

At war with the media

The way the Ecuadoran government deals with the private mass media has been challenged as undemocratic. Both Correa’s confrontational language and the lawsuits to which various national newspapers, TV channels and local radio stations opposed to the government have been subjected have exacerbated an image of political polarization that doesn’t correspond with the electoral results achieved in the 2013 elections. Unquestionably the economic power of the business groups that own these private media reached political and ideological levels that replaced the parties. However, the pressures to which they have been subjected not only violate the freedom of corporate exercise, but also—and this is perhaps more serious—reduce the possibilities of autonomous information and expression to the government, recurring to old patterns of politically controlling the press present in earlier Latin American authoritarian governments and in today’s Cuban model for subordinating the press. And it advances a communication hegemony similar to those we see in several of the Bolivian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) countries.

The private media’s notoriously anti-governmental alignment and its connection with a political business class that once hegemonized the country’s destiny isn’t reason enough to break with and undermine citizens’ freedoms and rights. The exclusion and derision to which the opposition is subjected in the government’s political discourse limits the options for a national dialogue, something potentially damaging to the consolidation of the government-sponsored process.

Certain simplistic questioning of the emergence of a government media system—such as the newspapers El Telégrafo and El Ciudadano, the news agency Andes, public radio and TV—to disseminate official government information shows the biased interests of one sector of the opposition. Strengthening public media, practicing freedom of speech and abandoning the taunting between the two groups would be much healthier for the freedom of speech needed in the government’s democratic conduct.

Media law

The journalistic ethic to which the government referred in its proposed media law—contained in the 2008 Constitution—should clarify that it’s fighting the corruption of any opinion, news item or information that limits the development of democracy in the country and is not solely directed against a private media “coup.”

The most crucial question in the media law proposed by Correa’s government is the definition of “journalistic ethics.” Needed constriction of the delimitation of ethics in communications could leave abundant gaps for administrative arbitrariness and/or even condition media production to the “higher interests” of the revolutionary process. That is something that seems to hark back to Fidel Castro’s “Words to intellectuals,” which perpetuated in Cuba the post-1961 adage: “Everything within the Revolution, nothing against the Revolution.”

The indigenous factor

Another criticism of Correa’s government has been the blocking of dialogue and negotiations with social and indigenous movements. It was initially thought that Correa’s taking up of the grassroots’ organization’s proposals in general and those of CONAIE in particular ensured the alliance between the candidate-government and indigenous peoples. Different situations, however, have moved indigenous support to the outright opposition, despite the public identification by the government and the President with indigenous peoples’ cultural symbols and values.

Correa gives prominence to and revitalizes pre-Columbian culture by speaking Quichua in his Saturday speeches, using allegorically embroidered indigenous shirts and appointing indigenous people to ministerial positions, which contrasts starkly with previous Presidents’ disregard and contempt. But the Pachakutik-CONAIE and PAIS Alliance competition for indigenous voters and the government’s cooptation of leaders of indigenous organizations and local leaders has weakened relations between the two.

Moreover, promoting other indigenous and peasant organizations to the Assembly—such as the National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organizations (Fenocin) and the Ecuadoran Federation of Evangelical Indigenous (Feine)—split the unity of indigenous representation in the legislature. Political projects and wide-ranging impact measures implemented by the ruling party in indigenous populations have placed Pachakutik-CONAIE in a secondary level of influence.

Rejecting mining

The trigger for mutual contempt was President Correa’s position on indigenous rejection of mining extraction, which he considers indispensable to acquiring resources. From that point on, Pachakutik has continued supporting progressive proposals and opposing the Right but it no longer gives the government its votes in advance, and in recent times has been notably closer to MDP in opposition.

The most recent example of the estrangement between indigenous organizations and the government was the “Multinational Resistance March: For water, life and the dignity of peoples,” convened by CONAIE in March of last year. That Amazonian uprising occurred after the executive branch insisted on intensifying extractive mining in the country despite the population’s opposition. The march demonstrated both the detachment of these sectors from national politics and society’s polarization.

The march, which was not exclusively indigenous, demonstrated the government’s inability to facilitate dialogue with the CONAIE leaders and the need to review political relations between them, especially considering that Correa’s government initially received indigenous support and that he has acted in favor of indigenous peoples during these six years. The march was also used by the opposition and certain leaders with their own agendas who took advantage of it to magnify the political disagreement in the media.

It’s undeniable that Correa’s government has accessed greater social spaces by inserting indigenous people and their goals into the political arena. Nonetheless, the strained relations between the two reveal the dispute over demands for recognition of difference and an increase in equality. Although there are numerous programmatic parallels between indigenous organizations and the current government, different concepts concerning the ways to implement them increase barriers in building agreements and alliances to the point of political adversity. The absence of a defined indigenous agenda in the government’s platform removes the possibility of conciliation and an end to the conflict and exacerbates political polarization. Recognition of Ecuador’s multicultural character remains in the Constitution’s literary rhetoric, removed from reality.

Ecuador is a major player

The historic period Ecuador has been going through since 2007 is part of an unprecedented reformation period for the Latin American Left. The building of the Citizens’ Revolution in the framework of representative democracy coincides at this juncture, politically backed by the governments of what is called 21st-century socialism. The Correa government has signified an abrupt change in national political and economic life and has also set a new course in international relations. The struggle waged against the hegemony of the big businesses that hoarded Ecuador’s political and social sphere has also been accompanied by the strategy of international independence in the search for economic and political sovereignty.

Ecuador has been financially, economically and politically oriented towards Latin American unity with international projection as an undisputed major player with political leadership. It has joined Latin American and Caribbean supranational organizations such as the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Union of South American Nations (Unasur), Andean Community of Nations, ALBA, Pacific Alliance, Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA). Regional integration is based on a shared identity with the member countries of these organizations regarding historical periods, economic and social conditions and struggles for national and regional economic and political independence.

When Hugo Chávez became ill, President Correa began speaking of the need to strengthen integration from doctrinal and programmatic bases, beyond any particular leadership, as a key factor in perpetuating, consolidating and developing Latin American unity. Ecuador has benefited from solidarity programs established in multilateral agreements among the nations forming Latin American unity and at the same time has shared certain advances achieved during the Citizens’ Revolution, especially care programs for the disabled.

“Socialism for Living Good”

The success of Rafael Correa and the Citizens’ Revolution’s in the February 2013 elections involves political, economic and social challenges for the country and for Latin America. The PAIS Alliance is committed to deepening the “change” and consolidating the “revolutionary” project through the “Socialism for Living Good” proposals.

The aspects covered by this platform are social inclusion and equity, education, health, security, “decent” housing and environment, culture, leisure time, social communication, science, technology and ancestral knowledge as sources of national welfare and unity, as well as amendments to the constitutional model regarding rights and social justice, decentralized government, inter-culturality and pluri-nationality.

Correism has emerged

Correa’s overwhelming reelection victory doesn’t show a political erosion of his leadership after six years in office, but rather the generation of a new political identity: Correism. Although this concept has managed to shift Ecuador’s political and economic praxis and redefine the political discourse, it faces the enormous challenge of democratic consolidation with a hegemonic party and strong leadership.

It’s time to ask pertinent questions about the future of this political identity: Are Correism and the Citizens’ Revolution the same thing? Does radicalization necessarily have to imply constitutional amendments in order to perpetuate the leadership in power? Does granting legitimacy to the masses permit the removal of freedoms?

Although some experts would take these answers for granted, it would be healthy for democracy—formally accompanying the “revolutionary” process—to move away from the authoritarian positions so evident in Latin America. Problems arising from political successions of authoritarian powers throw democratic processes overboard and repeat dictatorial stages that move away from the positive edges of the inevitable globalization we’re currently experiencing.

Although some of President Correa’s supporters point out that he’s a team player, there’s no doubt that his strength and charisma have been the main driving force for the Citizens’ Revolution. The generation of political cadres within a framework of representative democracy is essential to give continuity to the process. While the changes make the enactment of legislation urgent, the radicalization being advocated clashes with the silencing of social, trade union and peasant organizations that have played a key role during these six years and during Ecuador’s democratic history. Ignoring the importance of solidifying autonomy and freedoms concomitant with civic exercise undermines the democratic nature of the regime and ends on the road to authoritarianism.

Tasks for the new term

Even if it benefits the implementation of government-designed policies, the concentration of powers with the current correlation of forces in the National Assembly and the absence of adequate arenas for dialogue and consensus building pose a serious threat to national cohesion and feed political polarization as well as breaking up the needed debate among Ecuadoran society’s ideological and political diversities.

Correa’s new term of office should aim to regenerate political alliances with sectors that have withdrawn their support, with special emphasis on coming to agreement with indigenous leaders and organizations. Although Correa has correctly pointed out that the nation’s economic growth has occurred without depending on international organizations like the IMF or colonialist and interventionist countries, diversification of the productive matrix—extracting and exporting raw materials—must be amended and, above all, priority given to the formation of an alternative national business class to that of the oligarchy. The treatment of the press and the opposition should change, not in favor of the government of the day but rather in favor of representative democracy which it has claimed to support since 1979.

Democratization and authoritarianism

The Citizens’ Revolution is a noteworthy as well as a rugged road. The differentiation process with previous national projects and current leftist international platforms also implies considering that political identity and identification involve recognizing unity before discrepancy. Calling a political regime democratic implies respecting the fundamental attributes of democracy, respecting the agreement to institutionalize the democratic game and seek the autonomous perfection of politics itself without distorting the historical progress of the democratizing processes.

The ongoing process in Ecuador mixes attributes that reinforce citizenship—by means of social inclusion and promoting development and, to a lesser extent, democratic innovation—with centralist and authoritarian traits that threaten democratic consolidation. It’s a battlefield where, despite the growing political clout of Rafael Correa and the PAIS Alliance, the outcome is not a foregone conclusion.

Ivette Sosa is a jurist and political scientist on the Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences (FLACSO), which has its headquarters in Ecuador. Armando Chaguaceda is a political scientist and historian with the Veracruz University/Latin American Council for Social Sciences (CLACSO).

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