Hugo Chávez’s legacy of goals, accomplishments and challenges

The post-Chávez era has begun. Will there be political and economic instability? Will the Bolivarian Revolution continue forward with Nicolás Maduro at the helm? Is Chavism possible without Chávez? Will post-Chávez chavism survive a possible strengthening of the opposition? The challenges are enormous. Here are only some.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos

The most charismatic democratic political leader of recent decades has died. When this happens in a democracy the charisma creates a particularly moving political relationship between the rulers and the ruled, because along with democratic legitimacy there’s an identity of belonging and certain shared goals that go far beyond political representation. The working classes, used to being beaten by a distant and oppressive power fed by low-intensity democracies, experience moments when the distance between representatives and represented almost vanishes. Opponents talk a lot about populism and about authoritarianism, but rarely convince voters. And that’s because, in a democracy, charisma allows for levels of democratic civic education that are hard to achieve under other circumstances.

Charisma and democracy

The difficult chemistry between charisma and democracy deepens civic education, especially when it translates into measures for the social redistribution of wealth. The problem with charisma is that disappears with the leader. In order to continue without him, democracy must be reinforced with two components—institutional structure and grassroots participation—whose chemistry is equally difficult, especially in the immediately post-charismatic period. When they shout “We are all Chávez!” on the streets of Caracas, the people are lucidly aware that Chávez was just one man and that the Bolivarian Revolution will have internal and external enemies strong enough to question the intense democratic living experience they’ve had for 14 years.

Former President Lula of Brazil was also a charismatic leader. After him, President Dilma took advantage of the solid state institutional structure and democracy in Brazil but has had difficulties complementing them with grassroots participation. In Venezuela, the institutions are much less strong, while the drive for participation is much greater. This is the context in which we should analyze Chávez’ legacy and the challenges on the horizon.

Redistribution of wealth

Like all Latin American leaders, Chávez took advantage of the natural resources boom—especially oil—to implement an unprecedented socio-political program particularly in the areas of education, health, housing and infrastructure that has substantially improved the life of the vast majority of the population. Certain examples: free compulsory education; bringing literacy to more than 1.5 million people, which led UNESCO to declare Venezuela “an illiteracy-free territory”; reducing extreme poverty from 40% in 1996 to the current 7.3%, reducing infant mortality from 25 to 13 per 1,000 live births in the same period; soup kitchens for low-income sectors and increasing minimum wages to the highest level in the region, according to the International Labor Organization. Saudi Venezuela gave way to Bolivarian Venezuela.

Regional integration

Chávez was a tireless architect of the integration of the Latin American sub-continent. It wasn’t a petty calculation for survival and hegemony. Chávez believed as none other in Simón Bolívar’s idea of the Great Homeland. He viewed the substantial political differences between the various countries as discussions within one large family. When he had the chance, he tried to resume ties with the most reluctant and pro-US member of the family, Colombia. He tried to make exchanges between Latin American countries be much more than just trade exchanges; to be ruled by the logic of solidarity and economic and social complementarity and reciprocity, not by capitalist logic. His solidarity with Cuba is well known but he was equally decisive with Argentina during the 2001-2 sovereign debt crisis, and with small Caribbean countries.

He was an enthusiastic supporter of all kinds of regional integration that would help the continent stop being the United States’ backyard. He promoted ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), then ALBA-PTA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples’ Trade Agreement) as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) promoted by the US. He wanted to be a member of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and also gave impetus to other institutions for the integration of Latin America and Caribbean peoples such as the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

Anti-imperialism

In his government’s most decisive moments—including his survival of the attempted 2002 coup d’état—Chávez confronted the most aggressive US unilateralism, that of President George W. Bush, which reached its most destructive point with the invasion of Iraq.

Chávez was convinced that what occurred in the Middle East would one day happen in Latin America if it didn’t prepare for this eventuality. Hence his interest in regional integration. But he was also convinced that the only way to stop the United States was by promoting multilateralism, strengthening the remnants of the Cold War. That’s why he approached Russia, China and Iran. He knew that the US—with the support of the European Union—would continue the determination to “free” all countries that could challenge Israel or be a threat to its access to oil. Hence the “liberation” of Libya, followed by the threat of Syria and, in the near future, that of Iran. Hence also the “indifference” of the United States and the European Union to “freeing” the country ruled by the most reactionary dictatorship, Saudi Arabia.

Socialism of the 21st century

Chávez failed to build 21st-century socialism, which he called Bolivarian socialism. What would have been his socialist model, especially bearing in mind that he always showed what many considered an excessive reverence for the Cuban experience?

It comforts me to know that on various occasions Chávez referred approvingly to my definition of socialism: “Socialism is endless democracy.” True, they were discourses, and practice is surely more difficult and complex. He wanted Bolivarian socialism to be peaceful but armed, so that what happened to Salvador Allende wouldn’t recur. He halted the neoliberal project, ended IMF interference in Venezuela’s economy and nationalized companies, drawing the wrath of foreign investors who took vengeance with an impressive campaign demonizing him in both Europe—especially Spain—and the United States.

He dismantled existing capitalism but didn’t replace it. That’s why there are crises of supply and investment, inflation and growing dependence on oil revenues. He polarized the class struggle and warned the old and new capitalist classes, who for a long time almost had a monopoly on social communication and always kept control of financial capital. Polarization reached the streets and many thought it resulted in the large increase in crime. But, do they say the same thing about the increase in crime in São Paulo or Johannesburg?

The communal State

Chávez knew that the state machine built by the oligarchies that always ruled Venezuela would do everything to block the new revolutionary process that, unlike previous ones in other countries, was created and nourished with democracy. That’s why he sought to create parallel structures characterized by grassroots participation in governance.

First were the various missions of different sizes: an intense program of government policies in different sectors, each of them with a suggestive name—for example, Mission Barrio Adentro (Inside the Barrio) providing health services to the working classes—with grassroots participation and help from Cuba. Then came the institutionalization of grassroots power, territorial regulation in municipalities and states paralleling the existing one with the community as its basic cell, social ownership as its principle and the construction of socialism as its goal.

Unlike other Latin American experiences that sought to articulate representative democracy with participative democracy—as in the case of the participatory budget and the sectoral grassroots councils—the communal State assumes an adversarial relationship between the two forms of democracy, which is perhaps its great weakness.

The civilian-military union

The post-Chávez era starts now. Will there be political and economic instability? Will the Bolivarian revolution continue forward? Is chavism possible without Chávez? Will it survive a possible strengthening of the opposition? The challenges are enormous. Let’s look at some of them.

Chávez founded his power on two bases: the democratic adhesion of the working classes and the political union between civilian power and the armed forces. This union has always been problematic on the continent and when it existed it was almost always of a conservative and even dictatorial orientation. Chávez, himself a soldier, achieved a progressive union that gave the regime stability. To do so he had to give economic power to the military, which, in addition to being a potential source of corruption, could turn against the Bolivarian revolution tomorrow or, which is the same thing, subvert its transforming and democratic spirit.

Extractivism

The Bolivarian revolution deepened dependence on oil and on natural resources generally—a phenomenon far from being specific to Venezuela—and is occurring today in other countries ruled by governments we consider progressive: Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia.

Excessive dependence on resources is blocking diversification of the economy, destroying the environment and, above all, constantly assaulting the indigenous and peasant populations that live where the resources are found: polluting their waters, disrespecting their ancestral rights, evicting them from their lands and territories, murdering their community leaders and, violating international law, which obliges prior consultation with the populations.

They recently murdered Sabino Romero, a great indigenous leader from the Sierra de Perijá in Venezuela, who was at the forefront of a struggle I have been in solidarity with for many years. Do Chávez’ successors know how to face this problem?

The political regime

Even when it’s elected democratically, a political regime tailored to a charismatic leader tends to be problematic for the successors. In Venezuela’s case the challenges are enormous. On the one hand, the institutions are generally weak, and on the other is the creation of a parallel institutional structure, the communal State, dominated by the party Chávez created, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

If single-party vertigo is established, it will be the end of the Bolivarian revolution. The PSUV is an aggregate of various tendencies and coexistence among them has been difficult. Without Chávez’s unifying figure, ways need to be found to express internal diversity. Only an exercise of profound internal democracy will let the PSUV be one of the national expressions for democratic deepening that will block the assault of political forces interested in destroying, point by point, all that was won by the working classes in these years. If corruption isn’t controlled and if differences are repressed by statements that all are Chávez and each is more Chávez than the next, the way will be open for the revolution’s enemies.

One thing is certain: If Chávez’s example is to be followed then it’s crucial not to stifle criticism. The authoritarianism that has characterized large sectors of the Latin American Left has to be totally abandoned.

The challenge
and the legacy

The great challenge for the continent’s progressive forces is to distinguish between Chávez’ polemical, certainly controversial style and his government’s substantive political meaning, which is unequivocally in favor of the working classes and supportive of integration of the sub-continent. The conservative forces will do everything to confuse the two.

Chávez was instrumental in consolidating democracy in the social imagination. He consolidated it where it’s hardest to be betrayed, in the hearts of the working classes, and also where betrayal, if it happens, is most dangerous.

Can anyone imagine the working classes of many other countries of the world shedding bitter tears over the death of a democratic political leader like those with which Venezuelans flooded the world’s televisions? This is a precious legacy for both Venezuelans and Latin Americans. It would be a crime to waste it.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos is a professor of sociology at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra (Portugal).

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