Nicaragua
Peasant and Worker Struggles at a Crossroads: 1. Omens of a Rural Blow-Up
Envío team
For the umpteenth time in the past two years, the country's stability and the government's capacity to exercise control over society without using repression is up for grabs. On previous occasions, the closure or privatization of urban factories and massive layoffs in the government bureaucracy turned the footlights on the desperate responses of the urban workers movement. While tensions were inexorably building in the countryside, actions there were dispersed, less visible and usually billed as outbreaks of vengeance between Sandinistas and former contras. This time the countryside is center stage in the drama. It has been shaken in recent months by a series of major protests fostered by government measures that do little to help small and medium farmers, much less landless peasants.
Two years have passed since Nicaragua's armed conflict came to an end, yet thousands of demobilized peasant combatants from the Nicaraguan Resistance, the Sandinista Popular Army and Ministry of Interior still find themselves empty-handed each time a new planting cycle comes around. The anguish generated by their economic plight is aggravated by the government's systematic non-compliance with its agreements to provide them land and credit.
The rural crisis has prompted varied responses, given the interests at stake for different groups. The model for most small and medium producers in the Nicaraguan Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG), who have land but no access to credit, has been to use all legal mechanisms necessary to find a peaceful solution. They have faith in the government's good will. Those without land or a job have nothing more to lose, including the faith they once had in the government's word. Their model was to rearm to call attention to their needs. Some have laid down their weapons yet again after signing new accords with the government, but it has still failed to fulfill its side of the agreements in most cases.
Recent events leave many questions still unanswered: What possibilities exist for a real solution to the rural problem? What is the most appropriate method of struggle right now? Is the peasant struggle being worn down by the government's refusal to solve the crisis? Are these genuinely autonomous movements? Have the ideological differences among the peasantry really been overcome? What is the main factor around which the alliance among the different groups revolves? At the end of this crisis, will a new peasant sector have been consolidated that is neither UNAG nor the Farmworkers Association (ATC)?
Who's allowed under the neoliberal tent? The neoliberal's economic tent was made small, and leaves many exposed to the elements. Who could it cover? Reality is answering the question. Reactivating UNAG's small and medium producers does not appear among the government's priorities, but they have enough resources of their own at least to survive, thanks largely to UNAG's support from abroad over the years. Those with nothing are of interest to no one.
What the peasant sectors, be they UNAG or not, are demanding would seem to be in the government's reach, were it not taking such intransigent neoliberal positions. What does each sector want?
UNAG: Property is power During the Sandinista administration, UNAG was seen as a faithful follower of FSLN party directives, a linkage that annoyed a sizable peasant sector. With the FSLN's defeat in the 1990 elections, UNAG began to rapidly depoliticize its actions. In the words of leaders and base members alike, it situated itself more on an economic-organizational plane than on a political or party one. Abandoning its confrontational and ideologized attitudes in favor of a more pragmatic, businesslike one has given it a foot in the neoliberal door.
UNAG has not reneged on its revolutionary origins; in fact, one leader went so far as to say that "we are the builders of the revolution in this new stage." UNAG sees the current challenge as finding a place for itself in a world largely governed by market rules. It is thus stressing its role as an authentic producers association in order to gain credibility among landed peasants, particularly those linked to the former contra movement called the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN). For UNAG's leaders, the moment has come to engage the organization fully in the entrepreneurial battle with whatever alliances are necessary. As an organization defending producers, this is the only thing that counts.
UNAG's motto in its relations with the government seems to be that dialogue produces better understanding than confrontation. In UNAG's recent congress, UNAG president Daniel Núñez insisted that an alliance between small and medium producers and the government is possible right now, but that it presupposes open and continual dialogue. That, in turn, presupposes a good mediating structure with solid links to grassroots farmers to coordinate and firm up their demands.
With this line, UNAG is very successfully presenting itself as the most viable alternative for small farmers trying to get back into productive activity in the midst of enormous difficulties. Given its new image of defending stability for the peasant economic model, UNAG's membership has mushroomed among those who once questioned its ideological tendency and doubted its business acumen. And what is the peasants' economic model? Sell to whomever you want at the price you choose, and store for later when the market is unfavorable.
UNAG's growth and consolidation has led it to define itself as the nation's main productive force. In the UNAG congress, Daniel Núñez called on the government to recognize the small and medium farmers as genuine allies for economic recovery. He warned of the serious consequences of an economic policy that leads not to an equitable distribution of resources but to a concentration of national wealth in the hands of big producers. The success of the government's economic plan, he confidently asserted, must be based on recognizing a quota of power for the UNAG sector.
UNAG recognizes that the government lacks the available resources to fully resolve the crisis. It is thus willing to accommodate itself to the little there is and fight for the little the government is willing to share with it. For the rest, it is turning to international financing agencies, which, for their part, appear pleased with UNAG's new entrepreneurial thrust.
UNAG is not only aiming for more recognition and power from the government. It also wants to sink its roots more deeply in the countryside. The National Campesino Coordinating Body (CNC) grew out of ongoing dialogue between UNAG peasant producers and demobilized combatants from the RN and army who already have some sort of rural property. The CNC does not aim at confronting the government, but at unifying the peasantry around common economic interests having nothing to do with their political-ideological preferences. Top leaders of UNAG and the ex-RN are seldom heard debating political issues in the CNC; they are all business.
NATURE OF THE MAJOR NEW ARMED ALLIANCES”
The Revueltos. A strategic alliance of recompas and recontras, with a significant capacity to mobilize forces using military structures (creation of a high command, delimited operating zones, etc). The object proverty experienced by both groups has overcome the political-ideological differences that divided their respective members only divided their respective members only a few months ago. This alliance seems most consolidated and coherent in the northern border regions that encompass Matagalpa, Jinotega, Estelí, Madriz and the Sevovias.
The Rejuntos. A tactical alliance, in which resentments and distinct ideologies still prevail with some intensity, preventing greater integration. The rejuntos acted together to occupy towns in Region V, in the center of the country, and to close the high way to Rama. Their coordination methods are less formal, since the occupied towns are not claimed by the group as a whole, but by the faction with the greatest backing in each area. Neither the commanders nor the troops are mixed; each group maintains its identity as recontra or recompa. The term with which they have been populary dubbed is an indication that rural Nicaraguans have not lost their sense of humor, despite their economic desperation. It is both a play on all the other “re” groups that have emerged, and a recognition of their real distinction from the revueltos, as exemplified in a traditional Nicaraguan saying, “juntos pero no revueltos”—together but no mixed.
Peasant Alliance. This grouping is presenting itself as an organization that has overcome political-ideological barriers to find its identity as a class. It seems to be an unarmed tendency whose objective is to negotiate directly with the government rather than exercise military pressure, although it has engaged in highway takeovers. It is trying to become an alternative force that pulls together landless peasants and those without access to credits.
Popular Armed Front (FAP). The FAP has membership characteristics similar to the Peasant Alliance, but has an armed aspect. As with the recompas in Chinandega and Rivas, it has occupied various large private farms in Matagalpa, paralyzing production. It has only targeted farms unaffected by the government’s economic measures.
The CNC shares UNAG's view on what methods should be used. Luis Fley (former contra commander "Johnson") of the CNC says: "We should not engage in actions that endanger the other peasants or the people in general. Our objective is to pressure the government, but in order to get results. We want the government to listen to us, and to that end we'll try to use influential people both inside the government and from the opposition."
UNAG is asking for its quota of participation in economic administration because it represents significant economic resources. UNAG director and Sandinista National Assembly representative Juan Ramón Aragón put it this way: "For us, democratizing the country assumes a democratization of the economy. This means access to the sources of the country's wealth. As producers, it is our business to be present in the three stages of economic life: extraction or production, agro-industrialization and marketing, which is when one has access to the real price of the products in the marketplace. Only in this situation can we defend ourselves against the onslaught of the big producers."
These demands seem incompatible with the neoliberal scheme, but UNAG also has others that are not, at least in principle. They are simply measures of justice. A legally recognized land title is required to apply for bank credit as well to be eligible for any debt restructuring. Some UNAG leaders consider that the government per se is not the obstacle to credit since the conditions for getting it are clearly laid out. The problem, they believe, is that the Sandinista agrarian reform titles had a little flaw: they were made out to the cooperatives as a legal entity, but not to their individual members. In the many cases where the members are now working the old cooperative land as individuals, the lack of a deed makes them ineligible for credit.
UNAG maintains that land and property titles should be provided to the greatest possible number of peasants, who, if they were not already, would soon become small producers and, by making use of UNAG's structures, raise their living standard.
UNAG also now recognizes that loans must be repaid, that they are not a gift. Gone are the days of Sandinista paternalism, when debts were repeatedly pardoned even though production ground to a halt. UNAG's new policy is that credits should only go to those able to repay them, but it insists that the government treat its members as the businesspeople that they are, with the same advantages offered to the country's large entrepreneurs. The government gives financing to many who once had good harvests and big earnings, but now send the money out of the country and do not reinvest it. UNAG and the CNC are demanding credit for peasants who invest in their property, not those who decapitalize it. They want the government to understand that small and medium farmers are the force that can truly help raise production levels.
The landless: Weapons are power In these two years, thousands of demobilized combatants from both sides of the 1980's armed conflict have found no productive alternative. With no home, job or land, or with a plot that is not legalized and therefore is ineligible for credit, they have taken up actions dubbed "violent," paralyzing productive and commercial activity in a number of zones. To refer to the recontras, recompas, rejuntos or revueltos is to speak of peasants with little or nothing except a military mentality built on 10 years of armed conflict. The system has offered them no other recourse than to pressure the government for their very survival.
The recontra movement arose in mid-1991 for two reasons: fear of reprisals from Sandinistas in rural districts and government noncompliance with the peace accords signed in 1990. At the outset, recontra groups attacked agrarian reform cooperatives and killed a number of Sandinistas. In response, the recompas emerged a few months later as a self-defense movement. By late 1991, military confrontation was firmly back on the rural agenda, though skirmishes were scattered and small at first.
This mutual rearmament provoked serious tensions when the government sent the army after them. "Indomable," the most renowned recontra chief, took an intransigent military stance against the government until the beginning of this year, when he accepted a sizable amount of money from the government to demobilize, disarm and go into exile in the United States.
By that time, the government had turned to a new disarmament tactic. It offered to buy the recontras' weapons (spending a total of $8 million by February of this year, according to official figures). In separate agreements with each armed group, it also agreed yet again to provide land and credit. The growing stack of new accords created obvious expectations among those who believed in them enough to turn in their weapons, but as the new planting season approached with no sign of government action, the countryside became a powder keg. The ATC puts the rural jobless figure at 100,000 and many peasant families barely scrape together one meal a day of a tortilla with salt.
The government's foot-dragging led to the formation of new armed groups, sometimes including disillusioned members of other groups that had already signed an accord. In a number of cases recompa and recontra groups have joined together in what are known as revuelto or rejunto units. Self-defense has been replaced by defense of their common agrarian demands. With this new identity, weapons are not the dominant element, although they still have a role. As recompa leaders explain, they are not armed to overthrow the government, but to get its attention.
Buying their weapons cannot solve the agrarian problem; it goes much deeper and requires a far more serious response. This is the only explanation for the joint actions of recompas and recontras, unimaginable only a few months ago. The coming together of these strange political-ideological bedfellows grew out of sheer survival needs. The first seeds of mutual confidence were sown when the different rearmed groups on each side signed accords with the government and turned in their weapons. The maximum expression so far of that new mutual confidence is the revuelto group that peacefully occupied Ocotal for eight days with incredible unity and coordination in the planning and execution.
All these recent takeovers of towns and highways require winning the support of the affected population. As evidenced by the magnitude of their actions, they seem to have accomplished this to a greater or lesser degree depending on the region. Whole northern and central sections of the country have been paralyzed for days at a time.
Their methods involve two different moments: the first is the use of pressure to take over towns, occupy state institutions and close stretches of main highways. This can involve groups with only rifles as in the north and central regions, or heavily armed contingents as in Chinandega, in the country's northwest corner.
The second moment entails conversations with the government while still occupying the target areas. On more than one occasion, the government has sent in troops to evict the occupiers while talking to the group chiefs; all this has done is increase distrust. The rearmed groups say they would not be using such methods if the government's attitude were different.
These groups have added no new demands in recent months; in their peaceful land or highway occupations they just repeatedly stress that the government must fulfill the ones to which it already agreed. This rock-steadiness has captured a good amount of support among the rural population. In some cases, it has even led landless peasants and unemployed farmworkers who remained neutral during the war to join this new movement. Over the past few months, at least 15 different groups have requested negotiations with the government.
Given the diversity of groups, their specific requests vary regarding amount of land or number of houses, but the fundamental petition is the same in all cases: access to the basic means of subsistence. Some groups have also added strictly local or regional demands that some military chief or government official be removed, for example. Still others claim their constitutional rights such as access to free health and education services.
For people whose very survival is on the line, these are not preposterous demands, though some call into question the model that has been promoted up to now. Many, however, do not even do that; they only want to participate in the model. In any case, none of their claims seem aimed at undermining the government's stability. On the contrary, it is the government that seems quite ready to undermine social stability.
If these dispossessed people have had one thing, it has been patience. Armed struggle was not their first alternative; the government has simply left them no other. Their negotiations first with local authorities and later with the central government have been fruitless. Up to now the government's only concrete response has been to give some land to a group of revueltos in the north of the country. Word has it that a more comprehensive answer will be given in September quite likely too late for the second round of grain planting.
Is what they are asking really so impossible to provide? The government is not unable to satisfy the demands of this movement; it has just been unwilling to do so. Meanwhile, the crisis is not being defused. The occupations have ceased, but for how long? The government is not throwing up even a temporary lean-to for the poorest peasants, much less making room for them under its tent.
If this movement's objective has never been to destabilize the government, much less has it been to clash with the army, although it has made clear that it will defend itself if attacked. Nonetheless, the army has been ordered in recent weeks to deploy special troops, in combination with the National Police, to disarm these groups and throw them off the occupied farms. The launching of this armed repression is a signal not of the government's strength but of its weakness.
The government has to sit up and take notice of such a solid peasant bloc. And, in fact, it does not appear to underestimate the movement's military capacity to put real heat on. It hardly could when it sees former contra commanders Bigote de Oro, Cinco Pinos and Dimas lined up in the same trench with former Sandinista Army officers, all of them peasants.
No harvest yet, but the soil's richer What have these two groupings reaped with their new methods? What indications are there of answers to the questions outlined at the beginning of this article? Whatever merit one gives to each method of struggle, their range demonstrates the complexity of Nicaraguan society today and the readjustments the varying forces are making in response to the neoliberal model. Despite their radical differences, they share some important common elements.
Both UNAG and the armed groups have demonstrated their autonomy from existing party and military structures. UNAG states that its only link to the FSLN is at the level of Sandinista producers who are also members of the union, but that they do not act on party orientations within UNAG. This autonomy is not new, but, within UNAG, it has not been easy to reach understanding and consensus. UNAG is going after different productive sectors and an alliance with ideological groups distinct from those that have characterized the organization. The organization's own unity can only be achieved if it is autonomous.
The diversity of groups and alliance schemes indicate that the mobilization of these forces does not respond to any national structure. There are structural demands (land, titles, credits, etc.) and specific local ones (removal of a certain official, withdrawal of riot troops, etc.). Their mobilization capacity is real, for one equally real and fundamental reason: the sheer survival of many families is at stake.
Peasant identity is being rediscovered and given new value with the addition of an ingredient inherited from the revolution: organizational capacity. To bear fruit, the struggle cannot allow itself to be divided and isolated.
The events of the first half of 1992 can thus claim to have brought some benefit to the popular sectors and to have sounded a clear signal of alarm to the government. Stability, however, will remain beyond reach as long as the demands of these different groups are not satisfactorily met. Failure to resolve the problem will not weaken these agrarian movements. On the contrary, they can be expected to grow as more dispossessed peasants join their struggle day by day.
The greatest problem for stability is that the spontaneity and autonomy enjoyed by the armed groups means that no one appears capable of stopping a massive rural explosion. The struggle could become uncontrollable, as much for the government and UNO parties with influence in the rural areas as for the FSLN, UNAG and the CNC.
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
KEY DEMANDS AND ACTIONS OF EACH RURAL GROUPUNAG:
Demands:
* Stability, legal security and bank credits to producers.
* Provision of land to landless peasants.
* Legal property titles to traditional peasants and demobilized contra
and army combatants.
* Restructuring of old outstanding credits.
* Sustained peasant literacy classes.
* Recognition of peasantry as the country's fundamental force.
Actions:
* Direct talks with government by UNAG leadership to explain producers' problems and get a response.
* Consultation with base about its actions.
* Requests for aid from international agencies to dealt
UNAG's membership.
NATIONAL COMMISSION OF SUPPORT OF THE DEMOBILIZED:
Demands:
* Legalization of 148 properties.
Actions:
* Closing of highway leading to the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN).
* Explanation to population of protest motive.
* Paralysis of transport in whole zone.
PEASANT ALLIANCE:
Demands:
* Restructuring of peasant debts to 3 years interest free.
* Medical attention and free medicines.
* Review of production costs and price of basic products.
* Health center improvement in specific towns.
* Suspension of student fees.
* Reopening of Yalí professionalization center for empirical teachers.
* Light, water and sewage system for "Santiago Meza" demobilized housing project.
* Immediate purchase of 147 farms taken over by revueltos.
Actions:
* Temporary occupation of Yalí and San Rafael del
* Direct negotiation with government.
POPULAR ARMED FRONT (FAP):
Demands:
* Access to land
Actions:
* Occupation of farms belonging to ATC, army and some large and medium producers.
* Efforts to bring together peasants independent of their political-military past.
YATAMA - RAAN:
Demands:
* Funds for Special Disarmament Brigades.
* Material support for small-scale fishing.
* Resources for economic reactivation of region.
* Jobs in National Police.
* Removal of autonomous government's Regional Coordinator.
* Fulfillment of March 26 signed accords by May at latest (including veiled threat).
Actions:
* Occupation of Waspán; attack on police station there.
* Occupation of autonomous and central government installations in Puerto Cabezas.
RECOMPAS:
Demands:
a. Chinandega - Somotillo
*Urgent attention to over 30,000 starving and jobless peasants.
* Freedom for 25 peasants detained on orders of a large local farmer.
b. Leon (Rigoberto López Pérez Western Front)
* Provision of some 7,000 acres of land at regional level.
* Construction of 1,800 houses.
c. Rivas
* Removal of Ministry of Government delegate and departmental
attorney general.
d. Region V (Iván Montenegro Central Front)
* Compliance with laws 85-86 (recognizing urban properties provided during Sandinista government)
* Deeding of rented tract housing to long-term occupants.
* Creation of agrarian commission
* Removal of Agrarian Reform delegate in Boaco.
* Medical attention to movement members, mothers of heroes and martyrs and war disabled of army, Ministry of Interior and RN.
* Provision of medicines to hospitals and urban and rural health centers, and free dispensation.
* Physical security and safe mobility of rearmed group chiefs.
* Pensions for Organization of Disabled Revolutionaries (ORD)
Actions:
a. Chinandega - Somotillo
* Massive support to poor peasants in zone.
* Closing of highway at border with Guasaule.
* Armed presence to exercise greater pressure.
* Occupation of big private holdings without halting production.
* Military ring around city.
b. Rivas
* Taking of state institutions.
* Threat to occupy private farms.
* Occupation of Radio Rumbos.
* Threat to close San Juan del Sur port and highway at border with Costa Rica.
c. Region V
* Takeover of Camoapa.
* Coordinated action with recontras in rejunto closing of Rama highway.
REVUELTOS:
Demands:
a. Jinotega
* Titling of 5,000 acres in first phase.
* Construction of 800 houses
* Provision of 500 lots.
* Purchase of 17,000 acres of land in La Zompopera.
b. Ocotal
* 20,000 acres for 2,000 demobilized in Region I.
* Construction of 780 houses.
* Maintenance of public education and health.
c. Estelí
* Purchase of 3,400 acres of land for 700 revueltos.
* Provision of 750 lots.
* Construction of 2,400 houses.
* Stop National Police riot squad actions against population in Regions I and VI.
Actions:
* Temporary takeover of Jinotega, Ocotal, Estelí, Sébaco, Palacagüina, Somoto, Totogalpa, Condega, Pantasma, Wiwilí, Quilalí, Cuá, Bocay, Zompopera.
* Closing of Panamerican Highway, obstructing traffic to and from
Honduras.
* Raising of barricades and presence of strongly armed force to repel
police and army actions in Estelí.
* Paralysis of economic activity in the zone.
* Occupation of state institutions (bank, Telcor, Ministry of Education, etc.)
* Explanation of motive of actions to the population to win its support.
* Negotiations with central government while still holding positions
pending level of government compliance.
NORA ASTORGA NORTHERN FRONT:
Demands:
* Installation of and financial support for micro businesses.
* Reactivation of production.
* $3,000 for Ocotal's maternity center.
* Revision of bank loans for housing.
* Increase pensions for retires, war disabled, mothers of heroes and martyrs, etc. by 100%.
* 20 sewing machines to start a collective
* 165 lots and construction materials.
* Reintegration into Sandinista Popular Army of founding officers.
* Ratification of food provision law.
* Change rape from a private to a public crime.
Actions:
* Participation in peaceful takeover of Ocotal.
* Occupation of state institutions.
* Coordinated actions with groups inside city.
REJUNTOS (REGION V):
Demands:
* Access to scholarships.
* Discharge specific Ministry of Government officer in Camoapa.
* Free medical attention.
* Physical security.
* Severance pay to former municipal workers.
* Free deeding for cooperatives of Camoapa, San Lorenzo, Cuapa and Boaco.
* Jobs in National Police.
Actions:
* Closing of highway to Rama
* Unarmed takeover of Juigalpa, Lóvago, La Batea, Presillas, La Esperanza, La Gateada and Ciudad Rama (productive activity not paralyzed and police and Red Cross vehicles permitted to circulate).
|
a monthly magazine of analysis on Central America