Honduras
Undermining Opposition to Structural Adjustment
Envío team
Since the March 1990 issuance of Decree 18-90, comprising the neoliberal measures now a part of all Latin America's economic reality, Honduran President Leonardo Callejas has been promoting a severe structural adjustment program. The impact of a currency devaluation and price liberalization has been dramatic for the large mass of poor workers in the country's urban centers. At the same time, the elimination of subsidies for industry and the expectation of returning to a free trade system with the resurgence of Central America' common market have concerned the industrial sector—a protected child back when the state was promoting industrialization to substitute imports. The increase in interest rates and the inflationary and speculative increase in the cost of production inputs have also brought the crisis to the domestic agricultural sector, which produces for an internal market that is shrinking because of the severe contraction in wage-workers' buying power.
Given these effects in different sectors of the economy, opposition to the structural adjustment program has arisen from urban unions, peasant organizations, the Catholic Church, opposition political parties and even some sectors of private business. But the Honduran government has implemented an effective divide-and-conquer strategy against both the unions and peasant organizations and has simply ignored criticism from the other sectors.
Permanent propaganda To prop up his policies, President Callejas has spent a considerable amount of the Honduran peoples' money on a sustained propaganda campaign. Its principal spokesperson is the President himself—doubtless the most qualified defender of his political system and the measures it is promoting. The Honduran people have had to put up with radio and television appearances by him and various members of his Cabinet, unconvincingly defending the success of the economic measures and promising a future bonanza for the vast majority of the people—currently confronting their worst economic crisis in history. In his May 13 appearance, Callejas responded with habitual rhetoric to questions from citizens of different provinces; he promoted the illusion that Hondurans are living in the best of all possible worlds and that the country's immense problems are under control and on the way to being resolved.
Callejas has particularly advertised his Honduran Social Investment Fund (FHIS), founded during his administration to channel international donations into social and educational infrastructure. The President uses FHIS as well as the Program for Single Mothers mainly in order to proselytize. This latter program provides 20 lempiras ($3.64) a month to mothers for each child in first to third grade. Also as part of his campaign, Callejas has toured several regions of the country giving away sneakers to poor urban and rural school-age children. Tens of thousands of pairs of shoes have been distributed to poor children, many of whom had never previously worn shoes nor will again once the sneakers provided by this patronage campaign wear out, given their parents' growing poverty and the constant price increases for such goods.
The propaganda impact of these programs has been coldly calculated. It is hoped that by distributing gifts to low-income urban and rural sectors, they will be grateful to the party of their visible and immediate benefactor, even though he is robbing them of hope for a better future for themselves and their children.
Overwhelmed by the daily struggle for survival and the short-term vision that this engenders, the poor often do not perceive the two faces of current policy. In addition, these gambits are not new; they are part of the country's political culture. Honduran political parties have historically manipulated the poor to gain control of the state apparatus. What is new is the importance given to propagandizing the programs directed at the popular sectors to dilute the unprecedented social brutality of the economic measures.
The attack on urban unions The Latin American governments that have adopted monetarist neoliberalism see unions as an enemy that "distorts" the free play of market forces. Indeed, unions that defend the interests of one of the sectors most severely punished by neoliberal programs have naturally opposed the political regimes that promote such programs.
Callejas shares this view of unions that do not bow and scrape. One of his high-level officials took an extreme position along these lines by publicly proposing the introduction of an article prohibiting strikes into the Labor Code. This would obviously strip unions of one of their most important weapons against the neoliberal measures.
Divide and conquer Callejas has used all resources at his disposal to de-fang union opposition to the economic measures. To prevent the unions from uniting and thus multiplying their response potential, he won over the support of the General Workers' Confederation (CGT), which defines itself as Social-Christian but is considered pro-government. It earned this label during the early 1980s, when it allied with the Suazo Córdova government. Roberto Suazo Córdova was and is a member of the Liberal Party, traditional enemy of Callejas' National Party. The CGT received its legal status from Suazo Córdova, after having been denied it by previous governments that did not look positively on the confederation's combative spirit. For this favor, the CGT had to crawl under Suazo Córdova's protective wing.
Now from the National Party and Callejas, the CGT has obtained political recognition and government posts for its most important leaders. One is now a representative to the National Congress; another holds one of the country's three vice presidential titles; and yet another, a member of the "new guard," is vice minister of labor. Another top CGT leader was also raised to a high-level public administration post, but had to abandon it in order to take charge of the confederation—there were doubts about the government loyalty of some members of the executive committee that had remained in charge.
Consequently, in the past few years the CGT has systematically boycotted all efforts at union unity and joint mobilizations by the Unitary Federation of Honduran Workers (FUTH) and the Confederation of Honduran Workers (CTH). From the latter, Callejas was also able to draw into his ranks one of the most influential union leaders from the northern coast, currently a congressional representative. This has created serious tensions within the CTH; while it has always taken care not to identify itself with the party in government, its base, mostly from the northern coast, has maintained an attachment to the Liberal Party dating from the 1950s, when that party was the leader of reformism. Though the party forswore its reformist youth at the end of the 1970s, some old-time CTH leaders are still members.
The union groupings most affected by Callejas' policies are the CTH and FUTH, which have found certain common ground defending a social democratic position. The CTH was unable to protect the National Association of Honduran Public Employees (ANDEPH) from a government assault to "reorganize" the country's public administration by dismissing workers and filling the vacancies with Callejas faithfuls. ANDEPH reacted to this provocation by calling for a general strike, and its base responded accordingly. But the government organized a parallel board of directors that was swiftly registered legally, then alleged that ANDEPH had a leadership vacuum because the board elected by its members was not in the Ministry of Labor's official registry.
A similar tactic was used to divide the Honduran Federation of Peasant Women (FEHMUC). The parallel board claims to be the organization's legal representative, while its members continue to support the board they elected. The pro-government wing of FEHMUC remains affiliated with the CGT, of which it has been a member since its founding; the independent wing has not affiliated.
This strategy of creating parallel boards and giving them rapid legal recognition is one of the government maneuvers the popular organizations fear most. The government turns to this measure when it has to weaken a belligerent directorate or when an attempt to fill the directorate with devoted followers fails. Through ANDEPH, a dangerous fifth column has been introduced into the CTH, which fears that ANDEPH could spearhead a government strategy to get a supporter into the CTH general secretary's post during the elections scheduled for later this year. But this could only happen if another of CTH's federations were to accompany ANDEPH in this venture, which at this time does not appear likely.
The state sector FUTH, however, is the union grouping hardest hit by government policy. All of its unions in state institutions subject to privatization or conversion were wiped out. The first to be affected was the Graphic Industry Workers' Union of the state's typography house. The second was the Union of National Housing Industry Workers, eradicated by the conversion of the National Housing Industry into a new house-building entity called the Social Housing Fund (FOSOVI). The government, private sector and salaried workers will financially support FOSOVI.
FUTH could not mobilize the solidarity of its other members to oppose the destruction of these first two unions. It was, however, able to generate support to defend the Union of Beverage and Analogous Industry Workers (STIBYS) against the Honduran Beer Company, a subsidiary of the US multinational Castle and Cook.
STIBYS is one of FUTH's most powerful unions. The struggle began in May 1991 when STIBYS decided to join a 24-hour work stoppage called by FUTH in support of the Union of National Electric Energy Enterprise Workers (STENEE), whose long struggle is detailed below. Citing labor laws prohibiting solidarity strikes, beer industry managers fired 321 STIBYS workers, among them the entire union board. STIBYS responded by striking.
In support of the STIBYS workers, FUTH was able to mobilize the base of other member unions to protest in the streets of Honduras' major cities, since STIBYS has divisions in all of them. The strike lasted 17 days and ended when 64 national, divisional and local union leaders and delegates accepted a 6-day work suspension without pay in order to prevent the massive firing of their union base. By accepting this punishment, union leaders and activists sacrificed in order to prevent other workers with fewer resources from losing their wages. This raised the prestige of STIBYS' leaders in the eyes of its members, and a popular collection was taken up to support them.
The destruction of STENEE The biggest blow to FUTH was the destruction of STENEE, one of the country's most combative unions. In May 1991, STENEE called its members throughout the country to a general strike to protest the firing of several union members and plans to privatize the state electric energy company, ENEE, as well as to demand a reapportioning of the recent energy rate to reduce the abusive load on the poor. This rate hike and privatization of ENEE were conditions imposed by the World Bank so that ENEE could honor its foreign debt obligations. ENEE carries a burdensome debt originating from the construction of the enormous El Cajón hydroelectric complex, from which Honduras sells energy to neighboring countries. It is said that ENEE's debt represents approximately half of the country's entire foreign debt.
The strike lasted three weeks and received broad support from the other FUTH unions, which, like STIBYS, took to the streets and joined a 24-hour work stoppage. The strike ended with the signing of an agreement in which the government agreed to lower rates to low-income sectors and stop the privatization process.
But the enterprise did not fulfill the accords and continued to privatize some of its services. On November 6,1991, STENEE undertook a national work stoppage to protest this privatization. That day, the Tegucigalpa union held a street demonstration using the company's vehicles. The company board used this opportunity to request that the Labor Ministry declare the stoppage illegal and proceeded to rebuke union leaders and activists. The conflict intensified five days later, when unionists in the El Cajón complex stopped work to protest the presence of temporary workers contracted without union negotiation. The El Cajón installations were militarized, but the workers, briefly expelled from their posts, refused to return as long as the military was present.
The Labor Ministry ruled the stoppage illegal and authorized the employers to proceed legally against the union. Without a moment's hesitation, Mauro Membreño, president of the ENEE board of directors, and Federico Breve, ENEE's manager, both zealous enemies of the union movement, fired 127 of STENEE's best leaders and activists. STENEE responded by paralyzing the energy company's activities and asked for militant support from the other FUTH-affiliated unions. FUTH, in turn, called on its members to join a solidarity strike that would take place at the soonest opportune moment. It also solicited support from the CTH and CGT, which were also concerned about the situation. Given this response, the government named a high-level commission to negotiate a solution to the STENEE conflict with the leadership of the CTH, CGT and FUTH. These negotiations resulted in an agreement in December that FUTH refused to sign because STENEE rejected its terms.
The government, however, declared the negotiations over and handed the leadership of STENEE over to a parallel board being promoted by ENEE's own directors. As is now common, the labor ministry rapidly registered this new body. The parallel board negotiated the firing of some 500 ENEE workers—among them, the 127 STENEE leaders and activists—who appear to have received no severance benefits of any kind.
The destruction of STENEE has been very controversial. Gladys Lanza, the union's president, accused the union movement of having allowed it to happen, while the union organizations in question accuse her of having been arrogant and unrealistic in refusing to sign the agreement negotiated with the government. Lanza, however, had always made it clear that there are union principles, such as defense of union jurisdiction, that are not negotiable.
STENEE's destruction has brought to light the weakness of the Honduran union movement as well as the differences that exist among its leadership as to how the movement should be managed. But whatever differences separate union leaders, all agree that the destruction of STENEE was a painful defeat for the movement and one more victory for the government's anti-union policies. In STENEE's destruction, consumers have lost a valuable ally in the struggle against the utility company's neoliberal policies.
International Workers' DayIn Honduras, May 1 demonstrations have become true civic festivals. For a union member, May 1 is like September 15 for secondary school children—a religious commitment that one does not fail to attend. Many workers who attend May 1 marches, dressed in colorful commemorative clothing, do not participate in any other protest demonstration the rest of the year.
This year's International Workers' Day celebration served as additional evidence of the divisions in Honduras' union movement, notably weakened by the Callejas government's offensive. Like last year, the CGT marched alone. This year, the excuse was that various peasant organizations under its umbrella had been heavily criticized for supporting the government in the development and approval of the agricultural modernization law, described below. Last year, the reason was that the CGT did not agree with the frontal criticism of the government by the Platform of Struggle for the Democratization of Honduras, a coalition of union and peasant organizations, cooperatives, teachers and university professionals in which the CGT refuses to participate.
The CGT march in Tegucigalpa was lightly attended. Newspapers estimated that only about 5,000 demonstrators marched under its banner. On the public grandstand, located at the edge of one of Tegucigalpa's parks, the CGT found itself induced to criticize, a bit rhetorically, the government's economic policies.
The march mobilized under the FUTH and CTH banners was much more colorful and better attended, with some 20,000 marchers. In Tegucigalpa's central park, march leaders read an extensive document, also signed by the Platform of Struggle, criticizing the government.
Despite the reverses suffered last year and the differences that have historically divided FUTH, currently expressed in all their harshness, the federation remains active, seeking new bearings to increase its strength. In this vein, it was an important decision for FUTH and other popular organizations to form the United Confederation of Honduran Workers (CUTH). The Congress constituting CUTH took place May 14-17, and FUTH as well as five other teacher, peasant and progressive union organizations participated. It remains to be seen whether the government—which in a gala of political pluralism received in the presidential office several Hondurans involved in the armed struggle during the 1980s—will authorize CUTH's legal standing.
The peasant sector The impact of the structural adjustment set in motion by Decree 18-90 has also been felt in agriculture. The currency devaluation, the elimination of tax exemptions on imported agricultural inputs and the liberalization of—and resulting dramatic increase in—interest rates have all affected the agricultural sector, especially those who produce for the domestic market. Though prices for their products have also risen, producers argue that they have not done so to the same degree as input prices.
The structural adjustment is slowly but surely restructuring Honduran agriculture. Taking advantage of the devaluation and the readiness of some cooperative members in the agrarian reform sector to sell their land—some attracted by a short-term gain, others because they wanted their own private plot, and still others because they were indebted to the banks—transnational banana corporations bought up numerous agrarian reform cooperatives dedicated to banana production. Among these cooperatives was the "Isletas" Associative Peasant Enterprise, one of the symbols of the 1970 agrarian struggle. Others, located in the area of expansion of Standard Fruit Company's banana plantations, were also induced to sell by this powerful multinational company.
The government proclaimed the owners' right to sell these lands, which embody a tradition of struggle for national patrimony that represents an alternative to the powerful banana multinationals. The National Agrarian Institute (INA) also acquiesced to their sale.
Agricultural modernization law
The parameters for structural adjustment in agriculture have been set by the Law for the Modernization and Development of the Agricultural Sector, known as the agricultural modernization law, approved the night of March 5 and endorsed by Callejas on March 19. The nighttime approval of key laws has been one of the administration's strategies; decree 18-90 was also approved late into the night.
The most controversial articles of the law relate to the agrarian reform process. Critics point out that it is unconstitutional, because it modifies articles of the agrarian reform law that are part of the text of the country's Constitution. The agricultural modernization law allows the titling of up to 200 hectares of national and municipal lands to any occupant who has worked them for no less than three years. This impugns the spirit of the current agrarian reform law, which declares national and municipal lands the exclusive patrimony of the agrarian reform process. A regulation establishing that idle private lands cannot be expropriated until they have been fallow for at least 18 months conspires against the agrarian reform's land fund. Another regulation legalizing land rental, strictly prohibited by the agrarian reform law, does the same. Through these last two stipulations, the law's drafters protect the idle lands of the country's latifundistas.
To get a jump on critics who say that applying these regulations would reduce the agrarian reform land bank, the law creates another land bank—but parcels will only be available to those with money to buy them. Critics also reproach the law's legalization of latifundia and minifundia by allowing the titling of any agrarian property regardless of its size. In addition, they criticize the authorization of titles to each member of an agrarian reform enterprise and the power to sell them whenever they choose; this opens the door to individualism among the peasant groups of the reformed sector, which have made collective land exploitation a tenet due to its egalitarian connotations.
Finally, critics highlight this law's foreign inspiration. It is reported that the original text of the law came out of the offices of the Agency for International Development (AID), specifically from the pen of Dr. Roger Norton, a US agrarian expert well known among AID circles in Central America. For this reason, the law is also known as the "Norton law."
The first drafts of the law were received with open opposition by the organizations grouped in the Coordinating Council of Peasant Organizations of Honduras (COCOCH), which initiated its opposition by blocking highways and bridges and threatening to take over lands of important government members. COCOCH understood that it was unrealistic to demand repeal of the law and thus directed its efforts at eliminating the articles that affront the agrarian reform law.
To weaken this opposition, the government lured away two of COCOCH's largest member organizations through continuous and costly "concertación" meetings between state officials and peasant leaders. It decided to accept their demand that the right to buy agrarian reform lands be the sole heritage of other agrarian reform beneficiaries; this, however, is unlikely to be enforced since other articles of the law permit the sale of land to any bidder. The government also established rural credit chests whose managers should be agrarian reform beneficiaries and gave peasants from the reformed sector an annual fund of 2,000 lempiras for three years, as seed capital for their annual crops.
The loss of the two key organizations weakened COCOCH, but its other members continue to work in opposition to the law. The government, however, was able to profess to the public that the law had been "negotiated" and had the support of the country's main peasant organizations. At the same time, it unleashed a round of repression against the leaders and base of organizations opposing the law. Several peasant groups that had taken land were brutally evicted. One of the most important peasant leaders was assassinated—apparently by the state police force—while coordinating a peasant action in support of the STENEE struggle. Despite all of this, the law was approved. As a final deathblow to COCOCH, the government promoted the creation of the National Peasant Council (CNC) on April 22. CNC, it is said, is a parallel organization nursed with state funds.
To show that the law's passage and the creation of the CNC had not dissolved COCOCH or reduced it to inertia, groups of peasants undertook a synchronized national action on May 7 to occupy 40,000 acres of land throughout the country. At first, the INA board announced that it would take drastic measures to evict the occupants, but it later opened up to negotiation and promised to reassign the national, municipal and private properties subject to action. This conciliatory attitude, which indicates certain disagreement with the agricultural modernization law, cost the director and deputy director their jobs. The new INA director, who assumed his post on May 18, promised that he would evict the peasants, who have made public their willingness both to negotiate and to resist. It seems that occupying land to obtain a plot is a mechanism whose days are numbered.
The platform of struggle The coalition making up the Platform of Struggle for the Democratization of Honduras was founded in October 1989 in Tegucigalpa. Its name comes from the title of a document proposing reforms on which the signatory organizations agreed to focus as their primary goals. The initiative for this effort at unity arose from the union movement.
The Platform of Struggle was created to promote efforts opposing the neoliberal economic policies that its member organizations saw coming, and to develop an alternative economic, social and political project. It has not been very successful thus far.
Part of the Platform's weakness is its inability to win over the leaders of civic organizations in the principal cities' popular neighborhoods, where the great mass of urban workers lives. If it could do so, the Platform's following would increase considerably, as would the strength of its negotiating position.
But winning over these civic leaders is not easy, because they are also the targets of government patronage—they represent a potentially volatile population, punished by structural adjustment measures, as well as a sizable reservoir of voters. It is well known that heads and/or activists of the governing political party lead many civic organizations in the popular neighborhoods. Unable to break into this social base has meant that the Platform's urban potential rests with the unions. During its first two years of existence, the Platform of Struggle organized numerous demonstrations in Honduras' main cities to protest the structural adjustment program, but recently it has not done so.
Even the business sector complainsThe Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP) is the organization at the head of the Honduran business sector. It brings together, on a foundation of contradictory coexistence, exporters, bankers, industrialists, large and medium farmers and ranchers, and small, medium and large commercial importers. Hoping to make COHEP a solid base of support for the structural adjustment AID convinced its board of the theoretical benefits of the free market. The effort encountered little initial resistance, but AID's power of persuasion lies largely in the $1 million annually it has provided COHEP since 1987.
The decision of the COHEP directors, led by prosperous banker and builder Vicente Williams, to align behind the structural adjustment program generated serious conflicts within the organization. The National Association of Industrialists threatened to withdraw from COHEP given that Honduran industry has been seriously affected by the currency devaluations, the resulting contraction of demand and free market competition with other Central American countries. For its part, the National Association of Small and Medium Industry of Honduras, while not exactly lauding this alignment, did not threaten to withdraw, though it has plenty of reason to do so. It represents some 55,000 small and medium factories, one of the sectors most affected by adjustment policies: with the devaluation, these factories lost 82% of the purchasing power and 56% of their profits.
The new COHEP president, Juan Ferrera, who assumed this position in March, has called on the Honduran population to protest the economic adjustment measures. “Business and people should form one bloc,” he said, “to struggle and to raise our voice of protest in a respectful demand, so that foreign and national investment, which the country needs so badly, is not scared away." Ferrera has called for a review of the structural adjustment program because, as he put it, “I wouldn’t like people to have to die, as in Venezuela, for something we can discuss." He has also denounced government corruption, urging fellow businesspeople to do the same. One who did was Omar Cerna, the recently elected president of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce of Honduras.
Adolfo Facussé, who assumed the presidency of the National Association of Industrialists in April, says he agrees with certain aspects of the structural adjustment program, such as liberalization of the economy, privatization, reduction of the state apparatus and free trade, as long as the government reduces oil prices, electricity rates and high interest rates, and aids in industrial conversion so that Honduran industries can compete on an equal footing with other Central American countries. Facussé surely fears that, if his organization’s demands are not met, many Honduran industries will have gone bankrupt in a few years due to competition with traditionally much stronger Guatemalan and Salvadoran capital. The recent signing of free trade agreements with Guatemala and El Salvador has made the future of certain areas of national industry look very pessimistic.
Some national business sectors reproach the government for not sharing the sacrifices it is imposing on other social sectors. Some look unfavorably on the constant trips abroad by President Callejas and his cohorts. The popular sectors have also taken note of this and taunt him in demonstrations with the chant, "Callejas traveling and the people starving."
The Catholic Church and political partiesThe Catholic Church hierarchy has maintained a constantly critical stance against the economic adjustment, deploring its devastating social impact on the lowest-income sectors of the population and denouncing prevalent government corruption. The most critical Church posture is taken by Luis Santos, Bishop of Santa Rosa de Copán, who has repeatedly denounced the immorality of paying the country's foreign debt while subjecting the majority of the people to hunger and extreme poverty. Becoming somewhat desperate due to the lack of organized protests demonstrating the people's discontent with the current situation, Bishop Santos pronounced one of the phrases that has made him famous: "Let the people who don't protest be buried standing up." He was paraphrasing the popular expression, "Let him who dies by choice be buried standing up." The Church's appeals to soften the social effects of the adjustment program, however, have been unable to move the consciences of its sponsors and promoters.
The Liberal Party, in theory the governing party's primary opposition, has not dared to match the Church's constant public criticism as an institution. The main reason is that it does not have an alternative. Criticism of the economic program has come only from Liberal Party leaders speaking as individuals. Jaime Rosenthal, for example, has constantly criticized the program, both personally and through his newspaper Tiempo, as has Liberal leader Carlos Flores Facussé, owner of the daily La Tribuna.
The champion of government criticism from the Liberal Party, however, is former president José Azcona del Hoyo, who has also proven to be an open opponent of the privatization of public services. He has said, "The day services are privatized in Honduras, a poor man will never have electricity nor will a small village, because it's not profitable." Azcona believes that public services should be in state hands so as to subsidize the poor. During his administration, Azcona was a strong proponent of rural electrification.
The Party of Innovation and Unity and the Christian Democratic Party of Honduras, fraught by divisions and opportunism, have not been able to transform themselves into a viable opposition to government policies. Nor have the old and new political parties influenced by the organized Honduran Left been able to articulate a clear and convincing opposition to neoliberal policies: the Patriotic Renovation Party is currently struggling to be listed in the electoral register; and the Communist Party of Honduras is still trying to recover from an identity crisis suffered since the early 1980s.
The Current appraisal Those who oppose the structural adjustment have been unable to generate a broad and active movement capable of altering the course of neoliberal economic policy. Callejas, convinced that the "heroic" measures he has taken to clean up the Honduran economy are the most appropriate, has decided to systematically turn a deaf ear to the appeals of those who oppose them. "The government," emphasizes Callejas, "will continue with the adjustment and restructuring of the economy, because it is a successful program."
To maintain its established course, the government has employed numerous mechanisms for dividing, weakening, silencing and ignoring the demands of those who oppose its program, especially those belonging to organizations that have historically enjoyed a certain mobilization capacity and social legitimacy. So far, Callejas and his government team have managed to neutralize this opposition, trivializing those voices that foretell social decomposition.
It is true that the only sign of social decomposition so far is the escalating violence and crime that envelops the urban population in a dark cloud of insecurity and collective fear. The seemingly interminable flow of poor people emigrating from rural areas to urban centers continues to swell the ranks of urban poor. Yet the sight of the masses angrily protesting the measures that are making them poorer and demanding a new course is not to be found anywhere. So far, opposition to the structural adjustment is losing the contest.
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