Nicaragua

Peasant and Worker Struggles at a Crossroads: 2. Talking with a <i>Recompa</i>

Envío team

Leonel Martínez (nom de guerre "William") shares the typical timidity and simplicity of Nicaragua's peasants. These qualities, combined with his young age, hide the firmness forged by William's long military experience. At age 14, he was a founding member of the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS). As the war dragged on, he fought in the Irregular Warfare Battalions and other combat units. Today William heads the high command of Matagalpa's "recompas"—the movement of rearmed grassroots Sandinistas.
In recent months, recompas and rearmed former contras throughout the countryside have been carrying out joint actions, putting aside the differences that led them to try to kill each other for nearly 10 years. This surprising rural alliance—known as "revueltos"—could cement itself over time into a genuine popular movement that all political forces in the country will have to take into account.
William was interviewed by envío at a difficult moment for the revueltos. Acting on government instructions, the Minister of Defense had ordered an army offensive to prevent further takeovers of large farms and stretches of major highways by the revueltos. The wave of important occupations that began with the 10-day occupation of Ocotal earlier this year and peaked last month with similar activities in numerous areas of the country were carried off without a shot being fired. They forced the government to sign new accords in exchange for the re-disarming of the new armed groups. The big challenge the revueltos now face is to survive the military assault without falling into armed confrontations or losing control of their initiative to force the government not just to sign, but to comply. In this interview, William takes us through the steps since 1990 and gives us a glimpse of the different routes the armed groups' future could take.
envío: How did you view the return of the contras, especially peasant contras, to the country after the elections? What kind of relation did you establish with them?
William: We saw the demobilization of the counterrevolutionary force as a positive step, because it ended the war, which had prevented the development of the Sandinista government's project. Shooting at them wasn't solving anything; a way out of the country's situation had to be found.
During the war the only conversations I had with contra chiefs was when my unit head talked to them. After the electoral defeat, I didn't hang out with any of their higher-ups; I only talked with peasants who were returning to their zones, about what the war had been like and all that. The relationship really began later, when we formed our new armed movement and invited them to join us.
envío: How did Sandinistas, particularly former army officers, react to the recontras' first uprisings? How did your movement emerge and how did you present yourselves? What zone did you operate in?
William: Our movement rearmed in reaction to the armed uprising of the contras, who started calling themselves "recontras." They were endangering the country's shaky stability, and particularly threatening Sandinista cadres. A good number of Sandinista cooperative members were killed in those months, so we decided to protect ourselves and our people. In La Dalia, the recontras started jeopardizing our people's security. Our movement emerged in May 1991, when armed groups organized in the Waslala zone. Our first name was the Armed Revolutionary Movement, but we were popularly known as "Danto '91."
That was how we introduced ourselves to people who were having problems, like the cooperatives that had been given lands by the revolution. The movement was well organized, with a high command, and began carrying out some actions. Later we called ourselves the Movement of Armed National Self-Defense.
My group got started in Wiwilí, after some former military comrades were killed. Then it extended out to Matagalpa, Estelí, Region V and the rest of the country. In fact, people in León who felt insecure due to some government leaders' positions had to come here to organize. We had many people from around La Paz Centro, Managua and even Masaya.
envío: As Sandinistas reacting to a specific historical situation, how did you structure your organization, and what kind of arms did you have?
William: We started out with a military structure that followed off our previously acquired discipline. It was almost the same as what we'd been used to in the army, with cohesion at the command level. The majority of former officers like myself, who were from the countryside and had been left high and dry, began to organize because we had no security. We armed ourselves with everything we'd held on to, and with weapons caches left behind by the former resistance. As for uniforms, we all had two or three, and even some people who'd been in combat units or were discharged draftees let us have theirs.
envío: Although self-defense was the main motivation for the recompa movement, did the situation of the peasants in the region also have some influence?
William: Sure. The country's economic situation led some unemployed people to join us, including some who'd never had anything to do with the revolution. The movement was made up not only of military guys, but also of civilians who'd run out of alternatives. There are no jobs in the towns, and it's even worse in the countryside. They had to join us.
envío: How many men are under your command? Are they all armed? Do they all participate in combat?
William: I have 1,455 men under my command and we're all armed. That doesn't mean we all go out together; each group covers its sector: Río Blanco, Mulukukú, Bocay, etc. We've had a lot of clashes—a few with a contra chief in the Río Blanco zone who was going around bothering people, and several with recalcitrant contra chiefs in La Dalia.
envío: Which government ministers did you have your first contacts with, how did you lay out the search for a solution and what did they promise you?
William: We had a lot of contacts with Minister of Government Carlos Hurtado and his vice minister, Leonel Rodríguez. The first point we insisted on was total disarmament of the contras, after which we would hand over our weapons. Since the majority of the people accompanying us were unemployed peasants, we also negotiated the provision of housing, urban lots and farmland so people could work. At a minimum, we talked about decent housing for combatants who'd been evicted from their cooperatives and for peasants who had nowhere to go. But more important was land to work. If you give a house to a man who has nothing to eat, he'll sell it. We told the government that with 25 acres of land a man won't be unemployed anymore, because he knows how to work it. For us to abandon our activities, the government has to begin complying with this bottom-line issue: land to work and somewhere to live.
envío: How important do you think the movement is, and what are your current objectives?
William: The majority of combatants in the counterrevolutionary war are represented in this movement, which also organized compañeros from army combat units. Peasants who have nothing are represented as well. We have a social base because conflicts among the peasantry have only been minimal. At this point, we recompas and the recontras are united, and coordinate our actions, even though each group has its own structure. When a property is occupied, it's done half and half.
I see a future for the movement, because up to now we've fulfilled all the goals we set for ourselves, doing what we had to do as best we could for the country. We figured that the best thing was to stop shooting it out between peasants, and look for a solution for the country as a whole. We decided to create one single movement of compas and contras, so the government would have to sit down and talk with us seriously.
The government is the party mainly responsible for fulfilling the accords. If we saw it taking steps, making advances, why would we go on taking farms or highways? But the government isn't complying with even a fraction of the accords. We've had more than 200 meetings with them and haven't gotten even an inch of land. We want the government to comply totally.
They've been maneuvering so much that even though they put 20 coordinators in the accord verification offices, none of them has done a thing. Now they put [Ministry of Government spokesperson] Frank César in there. The answer isn't to keep putting some new person in every little while, it's to deal with the accords, fulfill them, so we can put this situation behind us. The money's there to buy these properties, what's missing is the government's willingness to do so.
envío: When this union between the recompas and recontras began, how did you come to trust each other? What kind of relation do you have now?
William: For both sides, it began when we demobilized. The relation that has been created has reached the extreme of a solid friendship with some recontra commanders—Dimas, Bigote, Johny, Cinco Pinos. With these people who were our enemies for so long, we now work together, move together, in fact are together.
Given that we're in the process of creating a peasant organization, we decided among us that all properties provided by the government would be divided evenly between us. If a property is big enough for 80 men, then it's 40 recontras and 40 recompas. Same thing with the housing projects. We also help each other at a personal level. If one guy has 20 pesos and the other's broke, then give him 10! At a national level, the two movements have some 26,000 men; ours has something over 15,000. But not all of us are benefited by the accords. In Region VI there are 1,800 and in Estelí 1,500. We have our own lines, we're a new organization but, to repeat, we're now united.
envío: How do you explain the fact that you, as ex-army officers who had or have a revolutionary ideology, and the recontras, who were instruments of imperialism, with different ideologies, are acting together and have the same objectives?
William: We came to the conclusion that the only way to make the government comply was to create a peasant alliance, not just a coordinating body. This alliance includes recompas and recontras, all those who were combatants on both sides, and all peasants who side with us; in short, all those who were left with no future, without any job alternative. Each of us still has his own ideology, but our strength is in our unity; we have to support each other. We decided to join hands to contribute to pacifying the country. Here it's the armed movement that has to create stability, as a show of good will. This peasant alliance at some point will have to create a strong and solid organizational structure with its own base, independent of our different ideologies. We're a new organization that the government will have a lot of trouble destroying.
envío: How do you analyze the government's rural policy? In other words, neoliberal policy is presented as the only possible alternative—what impact is its implementation having on the peasantry?
William: We don't think the government's policy in the countryside is appropriate, because it's hit the peasantry hardest. They no longer have any right to credit to work their land. And given the resulting hunger and unemployment, the people have decided to join our movement. Peasants need some money to work their land, but now credit is only available to people who already have money, for the capitalists. The peasantry is really resentful, so if the government genuinely wants peace it has to change its policy. When the peasants can't get what they need, when they see that the government is holding back, shoving them off to the side, they're bound to decide to organize and fight the government.
envío: Considering the unemployment problem and the wave of violence across the country, do you think the government's noncompliance with the accords it signed with you and other sectors is contributing to the growth of this peasant alliance?
William: If the government hasn't complied with us, it's doing even less with other movements. Its noncompliance with the various organizations is getting serious. In our case, the movement is tending to grow. If the government doesn't change this pretty quickly and all these peasant and other organizations lose control of their base, I believe it'll be difficult to stop a popular uprising. Not even the army will be able to stop it, because the army's a minority, no matter how many weapons it has at hand. We wouldn't even be able to control our own forces if it reaches that point. We tell them what the government tells us in the talks, but a time will come when the people will make their own decisions and we'll have to side with them. The government just doesn't seem to want to comply. We're not the ones responsible for the fact that our men and the recontras have dug up their weapons and gone back into the mountains, or that the movement is growing. But if the government complies, man, everybody will go back to work.
envío: What's your relation with the FSLN?
William: Some of us are party members, but this movement doesn't have anything to do with the FSLN. We make our own decisions, follow our own lines, and have to fulfill our own objectives. There's no reason whatever to have any contact with the FSLN as a movement. As individuals, as party members, of course, there's contact, but we don't get into issues about the movement. To carry out actions like some of the recent ones, we don't have any prior consultations with the FSLN. We make our own decisions as we go. Admittedly, they've stopped us at certain moments, like in Estelí. That time Comandante Daniel [Ortega] came to tell us that it couldn't go on like that, that another solution had to be found. But in the end, that depends on the position we decide to take. We're the ones who say what we'll do, because as a movement, we have our own objectives and lines.
envío: How would you characterize the current role of the FSLN leaders? Do you think they're acting appropriately as an opposition force, or that they're in a co-government?
William: I think that what the FSLN has been doing, through its leaders, is good, because it's contributing to peace. As the biggest party in the country, the FSLN has to contribute to finding solutions. The problem is that accords get signed, lip service is given to concertation, but in reality, nothing's achieved. It's good that the FSLN comes to agreements, but it should demand their fulfillment. The point isn't to sit down together and sign accords if nothing concrete happens afterwards.
envío: What relation do you have with the Campesino Coordinating Body that UNAG organized?
William: We haven't had any contact or relationship with other groups, including the Coordinating Body, because we don't share their politics or methods.
envío: What's the main point of being an armed group: to carry out military actions, demonstrate that you'll defend yourselves if attacked, or is it only a form of pressuring the government?
William: At first we hauled out the iron because we didn't see any other alternative with this government. We had certain conflicts with army commanders who thought they could influence us only because we'd been officers. We came close to confrontation due to the pressure they were putting on us to dismantle the groups. Man, if they'd attacked us, we were going to fight back, but the idea wasn't to fight with the army. Once when I was in a truck they followed me, but we preferred to run rather than clash with the army. The government's pushing us into it, but all we want is to sit down with the government and hammer out a real and reasonable solution. Right now our armed people are occupying 20 properties. We can't just go there and tell them to get off. If the government wants to stop these takeovers right now, all it has to do is comply with the accords it signed.
envío: Ramiro Gurdián, president of [the big business umbrella association] COSEP, recently accused General Humberto Ortega of being the head of two armies, the formal one and the recompas. How do you respond to that?
William: First of all, we don't owe any obedience to the army's lines. Maybe they're confused, and think that because we were in the army we're still part of it. We're retired officers with our own organization. We have nothing to do with the army's command structure now, nothing at all. I consider what Gurdián said to be an offense, because he doesn't know what he's talking about; he knows nothing about the situation out here. We have our own structure, our own organization, and no other entity gives us orders.
envío: How do you see the army's current position of taking forceful actions against you?
William: The government is pressuring the army commanders to take action against the people. There have been cases in Region VI where the army came in just like Somoza's National Guard used to do. This may not be their idea, but if they don't follow orders, they lose their jobs. This government pressure contributes nothing to solving the problem. The way to stabilize the country is to comply with the accords.
envío: What has this order to the army to use force done for your relations with the government and what can we expect in the near future?
William: We're meeting with Cardinal Obando y Bravo's commission and with CIAV [the Organization of American States' International Commission for Support and Verification], both of which are supposed to verify compliance with any accords that are signed. We want them to call a meeting to review compliance with the ones we've signed with the government. We're very concerned about the repression; we have compañeros who've been detained and brutally beaten. The use of force is no solution right now. If we, by signing accords and turning in our weapons, are contributing to peace and genuine reconciliation in the country, then our rights as a disarmed movement must be respected. We have to have some guarantees; they can't just come and evict us from different places with more repressive methods than the Guard.
Now they're calling us criminals because we're protesting the government's non-compliance. The government's idea is to make a big public deal of signing accords with us, then quietly fail to comply, so it can then turn the population against us. We're urgently looking for a solution, because people are arming again, and we don't want an armed uprising of all our people. Three hundred peasants with our movement just armed in El Tuma, another column did the same in Estelí, and everybody in Pantasma is armed. If they continue using force, I don't know where they'll jail all 22,000 members of the two movements. If this goes on, the government could soon find itself with some 6-7,000 armed men, which could endanger the very stability we're trying to contribute to with our demobilization.

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