Nicaragua

The Views of René Núñez

Envío team

For years, Rene Núñez was considered the unofficial tenth member of the FSLN's nine-man National Directorate. Brother of Carlos Núñez, who died in October 1990, Rene worked closely with the country's religious community during the 1980s in his official capacity as the National Directorate's liaison to that sector. At the FSLN's July 1991 Congress, he, along with former Vice President Sergio Ramírez, was officially elected to the National Directorate of the FSLN. Last year, he was named to head the Movimiento Comunal, or community movement, active in many Nicaraguan cities and towns. envío spoke with him recently.
envío: How do you see the current situation in Nicaragua?
Núñez: What I'm going to give you is my assessment of the facts, not an official FSLN version. Naturally, my opinion is influenced by the FSLN's official opinions over a long period of time, but what I'm going to say is my own vision. Nicaragua is confronting today, as always, a consistent problem in that we—and all of Central America—continue to be of key geopolitical interest to the United States. In addition, in spite of the revolutionary triumph and almost eleven years of Sandinista government in Nicaragua, there are still politicians and organized political groups who believe that Nicaragua's internal affairs must be decided in Washington or, at the very least, receive the blessings of the United States. These two factors influence everything that happens in the country.
envío: What do you consider to be the country's greatest internal problem?
Núñez: The country's political situation is marked by a central struggle that has involved all the nation's different political forces. That struggle is over property. One of the revolution's legacies was an effective transformation of the structure of productive property in the country. A thoroughgoing agrarian reform took place, and though there were many problems and even abuses, it was a positive experience overall because it implemented a more equitable distribution of land, as well as the possibility of experiencing cooperative production and massive medium-size peasant production with bank financing—something not seen before in the country. Nevertheless, the problem of property, which should have been resolved by the revolutionary government, was not resolved and that is the principal problem currently. All the conflicts that have taken place since April across the country are linked to the problem of property. Personally, I feel that as long as this problem isn't resolved, there will be no security in the country, no stability, no possibility of economic reactivation. Nor will the possibility of a broadened armed conflict—as serious or worse than those of the past—disappear. For us, as Sandinistas, resolving the property problem means resolving the future. That's why we talk about the importance of the government being responsible and working with the sector that possesses the instruments of power; the popular forces, the ones who can give Nicaragua a future.
envío: What are the possible solutions to this problem?
Núñez: There are three proposals. The Sandinista one, which states that the property structure should be left as the Sandinista government left it, except in those cases in which abuses were committed in carrying out Laws 85-86-88. The rest is not to be touched. Coming from a totally opposed position is the extreme right, which demands the return of all properties to their former owners, to the situation existing before the triumph. A third proposal, put forth by the government, calls for a legal review of those cases not affected by Decrees 3 and 38, which are those pertaining to properties belonging to Somocistas. It's clear that the first two proposals are incompatible, but we can sit down to talk with the government and find many complementary aspects.
envío: How is privatization being approached?
Núñez: This is another element, privatization both of lands that were under control of the Sandinista government, as well as cooperative property. It's a proposal the government has put forth, and to which there is no alternative. After the electoral defeat, the FSLN declared, as a point of principle, that the Area of People's Property should not be privatized. That declaration was made as part of the first party assembly at El Crucero in June 1990. But subsequent events have shown that this position was not tenable. Despite the intensity of our struggle, and the strength of the organizations, privatization was moving forward. Given that, we decided to shift gears and unite under the banner that, if state property was to be privatized, an equitable part of those properties should remain in the hands of the workers who created nation's wealth. Out of that position came the proposal that 25% would stay with the workers, a proposal later converted into a banner for the workers and that is a real gain.
This was a political response, without carrying out economic studies. There's still no economic proposal around how to administer this workers' property, and this has brought consequences for the FSLN.
envío: What problems arose?
Núñez: Property in itself is a distorting factor; it has played that role inside the FSLN as a party and inside its organizations. Property has become a source of discord and has forced a process of redefinition, searching and identification. Because now we're talking about Sandinista haves and have-nots; about rich Sandinistas and poor Sandinistas; about Sandinistas who are bosses and others who are workers. It's true that there were always rich and poor, bosses and workers within Sandinismo, but not in such a broad and sweeping sense. Moreover, when there were Sandinista bosses, they were collaborators who were undergoing a positive evolution, looking to more justly share profits with the workers. During the Sandinista government, there were Sandinistas who gave land to the state so that it could be given to the people. It's not that way now. Now there are rich Sandinistas who want their property only for themselves, who have no sense of solidarity. Now we're talking about rich Sandinistas who are rich—rich, with different conceptions, in a different context and, of course, with different consequences. Thus the FSLN's organizational behavior is not the same as in the past; it's no longer one clenched fist, one united bloc. It's not yet atomized, but we're beginning to see a certain degree of incoherence in some aspects, because there's still no clear economic and political definition of this issue of property, either within the party or its organizations.
envío: What are the FSLN's concrete objectives?
Núñez: The first priority is to resolve the property issue which, for us, consists of the government respecting and legalizing all property that was handed over as part of the agrarian reform, as well as that which today is called the Area of Workers' Property. Another is making sure that, to some degree, the social gains made by the popular sectors during the Sandinista administration are respected. Not just those related to health or education, but also freedoms that were achieved and will only be maintained with a high level of organization and militancy on people's part. The third objective is to search for those forces sympathetic to Sandinismo who could transform themselves into an element that could change, if only to a degree, the government's neoliberal economic policies. It's clear that none of this will be achieved merely by sitting at a table and negotiating, but rather through organization and pressure.
envío: How is the use of pressure being discussed inside the FSLN?
Núñez: The country is in a post-war situation, very polarized, ready to explode at any minute with just one small spark. The reconciliation that has been talked of so much is very difficult to achieve. The government's economic policies add even more fuel to the fire. If we were to organize a union of the unemployed, it would be the largest organization in the entire country since right now there are more people in the country without work than those who have jobs. Nonetheless, in the FSLN we don't believe in armed struggle as a mechanism by which to resolve Nicaragua's problems today. We believe in the political road: dialogue, negotiation, forms of protest that are within the bounds of the country's Constitution.
envío: What political alternatives does Nicaragua have?
Núñez: The country's explosive situation must be taken into account when carrying out political actions of pressure or force, because we're not interested in seeing this government fall. It's not a political option for Nicaragua to change the current government; the question is rather to make it govern and function. Because the other alternative, taking advantage of popular discontent, the lack of resources, ongoing military activity, etc., would be to make the government fall. If that were to happen, all international support would be withdrawn and we would be in an even worse crisis. Because in the current international context, other countries would not support a government that's not freely elected. We think that the only viable path for Nicaragua is to make this government function, but with a different economic policy, one that shifts towards a real understanding of the problems of this country's popular sectors. That would not be an agreeable shift for the country to make, but with a popular organized force, which pressures around legitimate issues, significant gains could be scored. The truth is that the FSLN today is in a very difficult situation, and this is not going to change in the short term. It's been two years now and I don't see an end in sight.
envío: What relation does the FSLN maintain with the popular organizations historically linked to the party?
Núñez: The FSLN has as one of its prime objectives the search for stability, but this doesn't mean blocking popular initiatives. It means neither tying people's hands nor leaving them totally free. I think it means that people should organize to struggle, and that this struggle should have a direction. We think it shouldn't be a matter of imposing the party line, but that the party should give direction or leadership in the final analysis and that the leadership of the struggles should come from the organized sectors taking part in those struggles. Thus, we've recently observed a fairly high degree of autonomy in the popular organizations, particularly the unions, who have clashed with FSLN policies. Those clashes come about because their interests, as a sector, are in conflict with party policy. This is logical and valid as long as this autonomy is somewhat relative and maintains a certain association with a final political option.
envío: In these circumstances, what role is the FSLN playing with respect to the popular organizations?
Núñez: The FSLN's role is to maintain a political link with these organizations, but the organizations themselves must make their general and specific demands. The FSLN has more experience and more information, at the leadership level, than the organized sectors. For this reason, in many cases it's necessary to throw a little cold water in the face of protests that are unable to achieve their stated objectives but could cause serious difficulties. Sometimes Daniel Ortega will appear in Estelí or Ocotal, or bring together 300 revueltos in order to search with them for a consensus solution to a problem that's paralyzing the country.
envío: Is the FSLN coopting the demands of these organizations?
Núñez: Our position is not one of cooptation, but of mediation between the government and the demands made by the popular sectors. Objectively, the FSLN is a political force listened to by many different sectors. The government listens us to and our words also carry weight with the popular sectors. Our political function is fundamentally this: through popular organized pressure and with specific objectives, get the government to change its position regarding concrete problems.
envío: What is the FSLN aiming for with this mediation?
Núñez: The FSLN is trying to resolve specific small problems that, taken as a whole, then achieve larger objectives. During the last meeting of the Sandinista Assembly [March 1992], it was agreed to search for an accord with the government aimed at transforming its current economic policies somewhat so that those who have least won't be hit as hard. The aim is to make the government's push for economic stabilization less drastic, less rigid and with more potential to cushion the blow so that people suffer less. We're aware that an economic adjustment is necessary. In fact, we began one in 1988, but we did it, or wanted to do it, gradually. We weren't able to stabilize either the currency or the economy, though we did cut subsidies and lay off many state employees. In other words, we're not against the government's economic policy in principle, but we are against its concrete manifestations. In order for the country to produce more, economic adjustments are necessary, but they should be gradual. Obviously, from our current position, we don't have the possibility of promoting a different economic policy. It's the government that should be looking for solutions. But we are going to look for a solution that will benefit the popular sectors. We can exert pressure and work so that government policies shift in favor of the popular sectors.
envío: What would a possible accord with the government consist of?
Núñez: When we speak of seeking an accord with the government, it's precisely in this sense, making sure that it benefits the most disenfranchised sectors. What will the government ask in return? They'll surely ask for a total political truce from the FSLN and its organizations. In this sense, we have a disadvantage, which is that the government, despite seeing that the country has changed and that the FSLN has changed, still considers that anything any Sandinista does is on direct orders of the National Directorate. It's nearly certain that they'll ask for a treaty with the party, with the FNT, UNAG, the revueltos, with everybody. But we're not going to pay for stability in this country by tying everyone's hands. We think the best way of guaranteeing that the government does less damage to the people is by guaranteeing that the people stay organized to defend their rights.

envío: To what degree does the FSLN trust the government?
Núñez: The FSLN coincides with the government's discourse on a number of points and the government sometimes coincides with ours. Nevertheless, when it gets down to actual practice, things change. The government's actions do not correspond with their political discourse. We don't consider the government an ally. Naturally, we have a high degree of confidence, but force counts when it moves from negotiation to really guaranteeing the results of a given negotiation. And when we speak of force, we're referring to people, organized in their corresponding sectors and with their respective demands.

envío: What are the risks of negotiation?
Núñez: This feint and parry policy that the FSLN has been involved in has naturally had its political costs, in the sense that it has led to distinct currents of thought in which everyone looks to resolve their own problems for themselves as best they can. I would say that, in spite of everything, there aren't as yet any tendencies in the FSLN that are searching independently for an overall response, but there are some currents searching for concrete responses to concrete problems. This is why there have been so many groups of recontras, recompas and revueltos, each with its own chief. There's a certain trend towards atomization of the movement, and this creates difficulties during negotiations, making it necessary to speak with many different groups in order to arrive at an agreement. Atomization also creates the risk of the movement becoming anarchic and then there are consequences that work against the movement.
envío: What are the FSLN's perspectives for the near future?
Núñez: We would say that for the coming months, a year or maybe more, it will fall to the FSLN to make a big effort with the government, the organizations—which have very broad autonomy—and the political parties, so that every time that an advance is made, we can improve our position. We have to be very careful, but at the same time we must continue to be bold. It should be taken into account that the FSLN isn't just any political party. In any other country, a party that's in the government and then loses the elections just passes to the opposition—but it maintains its program, its banners and is recognized as a political party. That's not so in our case. We still don't have our existence as a political party guaranteed, because in the United States there are still those who would like to see us disappear, and the extreme Right in this country would also like to see that happen. Thus, at the same time that we're involved in all these other struggles, we must also win the battle for our own survival as a political party. We must demonstrate that the FSLN is not an easily liquidated political organization, and make our force felt in a reasonable manner within the democratic framework of coexistence in our country.
envío: How would you characterize the FSLN's forces at this moment?
Núñez: That's a very complex topic. I think that right now they're very strong. UNAG, ATC, CST and the FNT have many members and they've shown themselves capable of confronting both government and FSLN policies. Right now, they're strong, but looking to the future, problems could arise that need to be thoroughly examined and for which solutions must begin to be found. Contradictions are emerging within the working class, because there are workers who own a percentage of the enterprises where they work and other workers who don't. This is true within both the ATC and the CST, and with greater intensity in the ATC, because that's where the experience began. Although it will be similar with the CST, there will be less problems in the urban sector, because it's in such crisis that there's less to fight about. In terms of UNAG, there are also problems with the Peasant Coordinating Body, political problems that have to do with leadership in certain zones.
envío: And the question of the army and the police?
Núñez: The army and police also have problems. Their mission, for example that of the riot police, is not a unifying one, but rather creates internal divisions. We said in February and in April 1990 that we had an advantage in the change of government, because we had influence within the Sandinista army and the police force. Conceptually, it's a great advantage to have Sandinistas in these organizations, but given the country's concrete situation, it doesn't seem to be an advantage, because they are the instruments of public order that are responsible for enforcing, with force, the government's policies. To put it another way, Sandinistas are protesting but Sandinistas are also responsible for carrying out repression. In a given moment, there could be confrontations between Sandinistas, while the government sits back as conductor of the orchestra, as it were. You might remember that during the taking of Estelí in April, these confrontations provoked resignations of a number of police officers. These elements make for a very difficult situation and much care needs to be taken, because there are elements that could be easily exploited in the future.
envío: What concrete problems does Alfredo César pose?
Núñez: The problem with César, from my point of view, doesn't have much to do with political proposals or principles. The root problem is a personal decision. He wants to be the UNO presidential candidate in 1996 and is trying to clear the path of anything that could be an obstacle. It's in this context that you have to place his conflict with his brother-in-law, Antonio Lacayo. Lacayo represents a threat to César, who's not sympathetic to the possibility of the government and the FSLN arriving at some kind of accord; that goes against his personal and political interests. It should not be forgotten that César is the favorite of the ultra right in the US, who still think that Nicaraguan policies should be made in the USA.
envío: What responsibility does the FSLN have for César's current importance?
Núñez: We think we have a fairly high quota of responsibility, because it was thanks to FSLN votes that César was elected president of the National Assembly, though he was already known for his membership in the contra political directorate and his close links to the US Congress, which he maintains. Our responsibility, if it can be called that, consists of having given him this power, but we did so at a moment in which it seemed very viable for him to be president of the National Assembly: he was on good terms with President Chamorro and this option seemed better and more suitable than the other alternative. The decision was made in accord with the circumstances of the moment. Clearly, if the vote was held today, we wouldn't support César.
envío: What consequences have César's activities in the US had?
Núñez: He really did his work, because although one tells many lies and exaggerations, there are always recalcitrant sectors who pick up and run with any charge, however ludicrous. In this sense, he's doing very negative things and he could block advances toward a future understanding with the United States.
envío: How are relations with the United States and what is its attitude towards the different parties in Nicaragua?
Núñez: I couldn't really say anything about US policy towards the political parties in the country. They've been very careful and haven't really taken any one party's side, at least publicly. Initially they were flirting with Virgilio Godoy and the extremist position. More recently, they've been more prudent—they first observe a situation and then state their opinion. It's clear that they don't sympathize with the Sandinistas, although they're less hostile than before. You know about Comandante Henry Ruiz's trip to the United States, where he had positive meetings with several Congressional representatives and with Bernard Aronson. Recently, Aronson expressed interest, through Edmundo Jarquín, in knowing the Sandinista position on property. He also expressed the US interest in seeing this issue resolved as quickly as possible. Obviously, he didn't believe that the FSLN doesn't direct the revueltos, he considers us responsible for this problem. But he also indicated that the US government reserves no ill will towards the Sandinistas for ideological reason. The test is that they're maintaining good relations with M19 in Colombia and with the FMLN in El Salvador. The problems are of another order, but we don't know what it is.
envío: How does the international context influence what's happening in Nicaragua?
Núñez: We, the FSLN in Nicaragua, place ourselves as a progressive force, a left force. But the current international context demonstrates a clear turn toward the right in nearly all aspects. There's a real and concrete resurgence of the Right throughout the world, a Right that is moving forward with its policies and actions to block anything progressive. Rightwing elements have seized influence in the most recognized international organizations, including the United Nations Security Council and the UN itself. The UN was created to avoid wars and international conflicts, but in recent years it has actually fueled conflicts against Iraq and Libya—in other words, against governments that are not ultra-right and represent obstacles to the advance of the right wing.
envío: What influence does the fall of the socialist bloc represent in all this?
Núñez: The fall of the socialist community and other left efforts in other continents has had a strong influence on development, on hope. Unfortunately, with the fall of the eastern countries, it became clear that the organized Left throughout the world—the social or communist parties—were highly dependent on those countries and many began to change their thinking, their flags and their programs in accord with events in them. There are few parties with their own vision and their own independent political point of view.
envío: Given these international conditions, is there still a place for utopia? Is hope still possible?
Núñez: The FSLN considers itself part of the Left, the progressive forces of humanity, and the fall of Eastern Europe hasn't made us lose faith or hope in a popular project. A popular socialist project is still possible in our country. We believe in a socialist utopia and that it's possible to achieve it, that its fundamental essence is and was valid despite the failures of Eastern Europe. The failures were the application of theory in specific aspects, not of political conceptions. We think that the socialist political option is possible and we continue struggling for it now and in the future. In these moments there's an obvious difficulty, which is that there is still no clear economic proposal coming from the revolutionary Left, because the model that existed went under and in reality it doesn't seem to have been viable. The issue now is to seek out new options, research and reflect in order to find another economic model that will guarantee a socialist utopia. Utopia and hope are the FSLN's raison d'être. We haven't lost, nor will we ever lose, faith in a utopia.

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